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Abstract 
	
	
The	 following	 thesis	 examines	 the	 role	 that	 Oxfam	 played	 in	 Kenyan	 development	
between	1963	and	2002.	Academic	studies	of	NGOs	and	their	place	in	the	development	
apparatus	have,	of	course,	been	numerous	and	prominent,	but	to	date	they	have	often	
lacked	 the	 historicism	 and	 empiricism	 necessary	 to	 fully	 articulate	 the	 variegated	
functions	 that	NGOs	perform	 in	 the	 ‘global	 south’.	 For	 this	 reason,	 the	 following	 thesis	
concentrates	 on	 documenting	 the	 shifting	 mechanisms,	 dynamics	 and	 discourses	 of	
Oxfam’s	 work	 in	 Kenya.	 In	 its	 first	 case	 study	 chapter,	 the	 thesis	 argues	 that	 Oxfam	
offered	 its	 support	 to	 the	 Kenyan	 state	 apparatus	 and	 its	 seemingly	 exclusivist	
development	ideology	in	the	1960s,	but	that	such	support	was	predicated	on	the	Kenyan	
government	 behaving	 in	 a	 way	 that	 would	 reduce	 exploitation	 and	 promote	 equality.	
Thus,	when	 such	 an	 approach	was	 seen	 to	 be	 ineffective,	 Oxfam	 disengaged	 from	 the	
Kenyan	state.	In	its	second	case	study	chapter,	the	thesis	shows	how	Oxfam,	emboldened	
by	a	shift	in	ideology	towards	‘conscientisation’,	sought	instead	to	empower	Kenya’s	most	
marginalised	 citizens.	 However,	 Oxfam’s	 commitment	 to	 ‘conscientisation’	 was	
challenged	 in	 the	1980s	both	by	 the	hostility	of	 the	Moi	 regime	 to	 ‘foreign’	 ideologies,	
and	 by	 the	 terrible	 drought	 and	 starvation	 unfolding	 in	 the	 north	 of	 the	 country.	 The	
chapter	 sheds	 light	 on	 Oxfam’s	 response,	 which	 was	 to	 use	 an	 outwardly	 technical	
approach	to	development	to	allow	for	‘transformation	by	stealth’.	
	 The	 third	 case	 study	 chapter	 focuses	 on	 the	 1990s,	 by	 which	 time	 Oxfam	 had	
come	to	fear	that	older	political	logics	would	not	disappear	just	because	the	authoritarian	
Moi	 regime	was	 challenged	 from	 below.	 Accordingly,	 its	 staff	 felt	 that	momentum	 for	
change	 needed	 to	 be	 maintained	 at	 the	 highest	 levels	 of	 government.	 Yet	 as	 Oxfam	
sought	 to	 re-engage	 with	 the	 state,	 Moi	 was	 attempting	 to	 informalise	 Kenya’s	
institutions,	 and	 thus	 Oxfam	 projects	 and	 personnel	 were	 drawn	 into	 the	 political	
machinations	 of	 the	Moi	 regime.	 The	 thesis	 concludes	 that	 historicised	 in	 such	 a	way,	
development	 interventions	 take	 on	 a	 much	 messier	 appearance	 than	 overarching	
theories	of	development	suppose.	As	such,	the	thesis	forms	part	of	a	wider	endeavour	to	
test	 the	 predominant	 theories	 of	 social	 science	 as	 regards	 NGOs	 and	 development	
empirically	and,	above	all,	historically.	
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Introduction 
	
THE	ORCHESTRA	ON	THE	TITANIC,	OR	PART	FOGHORN,	PART	LIFE-RAFT?	
	
	
	
	
	
	
We	seem	to	have	been	case	in	the	role	of	the	orchestra	on	the	Titanic	–	nice	but	ineffective,	
whereas	we	see	ourselves	as	part	foghorn,	part	life-raft!	
Brendan	Gormley,	Africa	Desk	(North),	in	a	submission	to	the	Africa	Committee	from	Brazzaville,	Congo,	
in	September	1986.	
	
	
Throughout	the	middle	months	of	1986,	members	of	Oxfam’s	Africa	Committee	debated	
the	 past,	 present	 and	 future	 of	 the	 organisation	 in	 Africa,	 the	 continent	 that	 brought	
Oxfam	 to	 the	 attention	 of	 the	 world	 more	 than	 20	 years	 previously.1	The	 Committee	
reflected	on	decades	of	near	unrivalled	success	 in	 fundraising	and	small-scale	relief	and	
development	efforts,	but	also	spoke	of	the	failure	of	development	in	Africa,	a	continent	
where	the	poorest	were	worse	off	than	a	decade,	and	even	two	decades,	earlier.	Implicit	
in	much	of	 the	discussion	was	a	haunting	 suspicion	 that	all	 the	 time,	effort	and	money	
invested	in	Africa	by	Oxfam	and	others	had	failed	to	ensure	lasting	 improvement	 in	any	
sense	 of	 the	word	 for	more	 than	 a	 small	 number	 of	 people.	 For	 some,	 rather	 like	 the	
orchestra	 on	 the	 Titanic	 –	 which	 played	 on	 stoically	 as	 the	 ship	 sank	 –	 Oxfam	 in	 its	
contemporary	form	was	doing	little	more	than	generating	soothing	background	noise	for	
its	 Western	 supporters	 as	 Africa	 hurtled	 into	 its	 own	 iceberg	 of	 debt,	 structural	
adjustment	and	political,	economic	and	social	crises.2	How	Oxfam	should	conceive	of	 its	
past	 and	 future	 divided	 the	 Committee:	 on	 one	 side	were	 individuals	 such	 as	 Brendan	
Gormley	 –	 soon	 to	 be	 Oxfam’s	 Africa	 Director	 –	 who	 lauded	 the	 fact	 that	 Oxfam	 had	
played,	and	would	continue	to	play,	at	best	a	modest	role	in	African	development.	On	the	
other	were	those	who	concurred	with	Jeremy	Swift,	an	expert	on	pastoralists	(who	were	
often	Africa’s	most	marginalised	citizens);	together,	they	lamented	Oxfam’s	modesty	and	
near-sightedness,	 which,	 they	 argued,	 guaranteed	 that	 even	 successful	 projects	 would	
																																																						
1	Oxfam	was	an	abbreviation	of	the	organisation’s	original	name:	the	Oxford	Committee	for	Famine	Relief,	
under	which	it	operated	until	1965.	For	ease	of	reading	the	name	Oxfam	is	used	throughout	the	thesis	to	
denote	the	organisation	regardless	of	the	date	under	consideration.	
2	‘Oxfam	in	Africa’,	Brendan	Gormley’s	submission	to	the	Africa	Committee	[hereafter	AfCom],	September	
1986,	for	discussion	at	22	October	meeting.	Oxfam	Archive,	Oxford	[hereafter	OxA],	MS.	Oxfam	PRG/1/3/13	
Folder	1:	October	1986.	See	chapter	three	for	a	full	discussion	of	this	debate.	
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make	barely	a	dent	in	the	crisis	enveloping	the	continent.	Influenced	by	the	organisation’s	
foray	 into	 operational	 restocking	 projects	 in	Northern	 Kenya	 in	 1984-85,3	Swift	 and	 his	
allies	on	the	Committee	argued	that	Oxfam	needed	to	scale	up	–	in	a	period	of	significant	
growth	 in	 donations	 –	 to	 a	 size	 where	 the	 organisation	 might	 challenge	 African	
governments,	 the	 World	 Bank	 and	 other	 development	 institutions	 to	 ensure	 that	 the	
interests	 of	 Oxfam’s	 constituents	 –	 the	 poorest	 and	 least	 powerful	 –	 were	 no	 longer	
ignored.4	
The	‘Oxfam	in	Africa’	debate	is	covered	in	greater	detail	in	chapter	three;	but	it	is	
chosen	as	a	starting	point	here	because	it	 illustrates	two	important	details	that	must	be	
considered	 when	 writing	 about	 a	 non-governmental	 organisation	 (NGO)	 like	 Oxfam.	
Firstly,	 the	 debate	 shows	 how	 judgement	 on	 the	 success	 or	 failure	 of	 development	 is	
almost	always	subjective.	Of	course,	there	are	certain	targets	that	NGO	projects	hope	to	
meet:	the	number	of	goats	distributed,	the	number	of	wells	dug	or	the	number	of	women	
attending	committee	meetings,	for	example.	Nonetheless,	 judging	whether	any	of	these	
interventions	 actually	 constitutes	 development	 (as	 opposed	 to	 palliative	 relief	 work,	
environmental	 destruction	 or	 simple	 tokenism)	 is	 entirely	 subjective.	 Conceptions	 of	
development	 vary	 enormously,	 both	 within	 and	 between	 development	 institutions	 (as	
shown	by	the	‘Oxfam	in	Africa’	debate)	and	their	host	nations:	for	Kenya,	in	particular,	as	
chapter	 one	 shows,	 development	 was	 a	 politically	 charged	 and	 contested	 concept	
amongst	the	nationalist	elite.	Other	obstacles	to	any	judgement	include	the	lack	of	data	
available	 for	 assessment.	 Before	 the	 1990s	 most	 NGOs,	 including	 Oxfam	 (though	 to	 a	
lesser	 extent	 than	 others),	were	 better	 at	 financial	 accounting	 than	 producing	 project-
based	 information.5	Moreover,	 even	 project-based	 reports	 tended	 to	 veer	 towards	 the	
descriptive,	 focusing	 on	 the	 inputs	 provided	 (medicines,	 goats,	 boreholes)	 and	 outputs	
achieved	 (disease	 reduction,	 milk	 production,	 stock	 numbers)	 for	 each	 project.	 Often,	
such	reports	concentrated	only	on	the	short-term,	meaning	that	the	longer-term	impact	
of	NGO	work	on	the	lives	of	people	from	the	village,	town,	region	or	country	(regardless	
of	 any	 judgement	 on	 whether	 it	 was	 ‘developmental’	 or	 not)	 is	 nearly	 impossible	 to	
																																																						
3	Operational	projects	are	those	funded,	staffed	and	directed	by	Oxfam,	in	contrast	to	the	normal	mode	of	
operations	for	the	organisation	at	the	time,	which	was	to	fund	projects	devised	and	managed	by	local	
groups	or	governments.	
4	‘Oxfam	in	Africa’,	Brendan	Gormley’s	submission	to	AfCom,	September	1986,	for	discussion	at	22	October	
meeting.	OxA,	MS.	Oxfam	PRG/1/3/13	Folder	1:	October	1986;	‘Oxfam’s	Future	Work	in	Africa’,	Jeremy	
Swift’s	submission	to	AfCom,	discussed	23	April	1986.	OxA,	MS.	Oxfam	PRG/1/3/12	Folder	1:	January	1986	–	
April	1986.	
5	R.	Riddell,	Does	Foreign	Aid	Really	Work?	(Oxford,	Oxford	University	Press,	2007),	pp.	265-266.	
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evaluate.6	Most	NGOs	have,	in	fact,	failed	to	maintain	an	adequate	memory	of	their	own	
past	 activities,	 with	much	 knowledge	 of	 previous	 development	 efforts	 destroyed	 in	 an	
effort	 to	 make	 space	 for	 an	 ever	 increasing	 volume	 of	 files	 or	 lying	 withered	 and	
disorganised	 in	 unsuitable	 facilities,	 including	 the	 sheds	 and	 garages	 of	 expatriate	 staff	
guesthouses.	 As	 Jennings	 has	written,	 NGOs	 ‘are	 by	 their	 very	 nature	 forward	 looking’	
since	 they	 attempt	 to	 shape	 the	 future;	 however,	 this	 can	 come	 at	 the	 cost	 of	
understanding	 their	 own	 past. 7 	(Ian	 Smillie	 has	 argued	 that	 there	 are	 other,	 more	
powerful,	 reasons	 for	 NGOs	 to	 forget	 the	 lessons	 of	 their	 past,	 including	 the	 constant	
battle	for	donations	and	public	funding,	which	means	that	published	histories	of	project	
work	can	tend	to	be	biased	towards	showing	success.8)	A	related	difficulty	is	the	need	to	
disentangle	an	NGO’s	impact	from	the	myriad	other	factors	(including	the	work	of	other	
NGOs)	affecting	the	development	of	an	area.	Even	if	a	particular	 intervention,	such	as	a	
borehole,	 is	 considered	 ‘developmental’	 and	 is	 successfully	 installed,	 and	 even	 if	 the	
number	of	people	congregating	at	famine	camps	decreased	around	the	same	time	as	the	
borehole	was	dug,	it	is	difficult	to	assert	with	confidence	that	the	borehole	caused	or	was	
even	 the	 most	 significant	 cause	 of	 a	 drop	 in	 numbers	 at	 the	 famine	 camp.9	Hence,	
accurately	evaluating	an	NGO’s	contribution	to	even	local	level	development,	particularly	
in	the	long-term,	is	fraught	with	difficulty	and	is	not	a	task	this	thesis	prioritises.	
Instead,	the	thesis	examines	the	role	that	Oxfam	played	in	Kenyan	development.	
As	discussed	in	greater	detail	in	the	following	section,	although	academic	studies	of	NGOs	
and	 their	 place	 in	 the	development	 apparatus	 have	been	numerous	 and	prominent,	 to	
date	they	have	often	 lacked	the	historicism	and	empiricism	necessary	 to	 fully	articulate	
the	 variegated	 functions	 that	 NGOs	 perform	 in	 the	 ‘global	 south’.	 Instead,	 they	 have	
either	focused	on	providing	a	descriptive	overview	of	NGO	numbers,	NGO	types	and	NGO	
financial	 contributions,10	or	 they	 have	 approached	 the	 work	 of	 NGOs	 in	 an	 ideological	
																																																						
6	Riddell,	Does	Foreign	Aid	Really	Work?,	p.	271.	
7	M.	Jennings,	‘Surrogates	of	the	State:	Oxfam	and	Development	in	Tanzania,	1961-79’,	Ph.D.	thesis,	SOAS,	
1998,	p.	29.	
8	I.	Smillie,	The	Alms	Bazaar:	Altruism	under	Fire	–	Non-Profit	Organizations	and	International	Development	
(London,	Intermediate	Technology	Publications,	1995),	pp.	158-159;	Riddell,	Does	Foreign	Aid	Really	Work?,	
p.	267.	See	‘Oxfam	Annual	Report	&	Accounts,	2013/14’,	
http://www.oxfam.org.uk/~/media/Files/OGB/What%20we%20do/About%20us/Plans%20reports%20and%
20policies/6182_Oxfam_ARA_web_final.ashx	[accessed	5	March	2015].	
9	When	organisations	move	onto	terrain	with	less	observable	outputs,	such	as	‘empowerment’	or	capacity	
building	of	local	organisations	and	institutions,	the	difficulty	increases	since	the	markers	of	success	are	less	
than	clear.	Riddell,	Does	Foreign	Aid	Really	Work?,	p.	266.	
10	See	for	instance	J.	Semboja	and	O.	Therkildsen,	Service	Provision	under	Stress:	The	State,	NGOs	&	People's	
Organizations	in	Kenya,	Tanzania	&	Uganda	(London,	J.	Currey,	1995).	This	edited	collection	is	one	of	the	
better	discussions	of	NGO	work	in	East	Africa,	but	even	so	talks	about	NGOs	in	a	general	sense.	
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fashion,	 arguing	 from	 pre-formed	 judgements	 and	 theories	 that	 development	
interventions	 are,	 for	 instance,	 an	 extension	 of	 Western	 and	 US	 (neo-)	 imperialism	 in	
which	NGOs	are	complicit.11	Unfortunately,	 such	studies	do	not	always	 interrogate	how	
institutions	like	NGOs	actually	operate;	more	often	than	not,	NGOs	are	treated	in	generic	
terms,	 and	 their	 varied	 ideologies,	 organisational	 forms	 and	 relations	 to	 state	
mechanisms	remain	underexplored.12	Such	an	approach	is	particularly	problematic	since	
even	 individual	 NGOs	 cannot	 be	 considered	 as	monolithic	 or	 static:	 for	 instance,	 there	
was	–	and	is	–	no	such	thing	as	a	single	‘Oxfam’,	except	in	an	institutional	sense.13	Tony	
Vaux,	a	member	of	the	organisation	for	more	than	28	years,	describes	the	1980s	as	an	era	
when	‘Oxfam	was	scarcely	an	entity	at	all	but	a	group	of	free-moving	individuals’	working	
in	a	variety	of	contexts	across	the	world.14	The	‘Oxfam	in	Africa’	debate	opens	a	window	
onto	 this	 ‘age	 of	 the	 individual’,	 documenting	 one	 stage	 in	 the	 incessant	 tug-of-war	
between	different	 interpretations	 of	Oxfam’s	mandate	held	 by	 a	 number	of	 prominent	
staff,	whose	own	interests	were	shaped	by	their	previous	experience	‘on	the	ground’	 in	
Kenya	and	elsewhere.15	Michael	Jennings	has	asserted	more	recently	that	the	earlier	one	
goes	back	 into	Oxfam	history	 the	more	accurate	Vaux’s	 assessment	 is:	 before	 ‘Oxfam’s	
direction	 had	 solidified	 into	 bureaucratic	mechanisms’,	 he	 suggests,	 ‘the	 Field	 Director	
and	 the	 periphery	 were	 able	 to	 shape	 Oxfam	 policy’	 both	 in	 Oxford	 and	 at	 the	 local	
level.16	The	 role	 that	Oxfam	 fulfilled	 in	Kenya	 cannot,	 therefore,	be	predicted	based	on	
our	(limited)	knowledge	of	NGO	work	in	other	spatial	and	temporal	contexts;	nor	can	it	be	
predicted	based	on	Hegelian,	Weberian	or	other	social	science	theories	that	oversimplify	
																																																						
11	A.	Escobar,	Encountering	Development:	The	Making	and	Unmaking	of	the	Third	World	(Princeton,	
Princeton	University	Press	1994);	F.	Manji	and	C.	O’Coill,	‘The	Missionary	Position:	NGOs	and	Development	
in	Africa’,	International	Affairs,	Vol.	78,	No.	3	(2002),	pp.	567-583.	
12	Even	when	monographs	engage	at	a	deeper	level	with	NGO	activities,	their	authors’	ideological	
proclivities	often	shine	through:	thus	Mahmood	Mamdani’s	work	on	Darfur	alleges	that	the	Save	Darfur	
lobby	in	the	US	masked	a	big	power	agenda	to	recolonise	Africa,	and	was	an	extension	of	the	Bush-era	‘war	
on	terror’.	Scarred	by	the	Iraq	war	and	fixated	on	US	imperial	designs,	Mamdani	reads	far	more	into	Save	
Darfur’s	actions	than	is	justified	by	the	evidence,	and	overestimates	their	lobbying	power.	M.	Mamdani,	
Saviours	and	Survivors:	Dafur,	Politics	and	the	War	on	Terror	(Three	Rivers	Press,	2010).	See	also	F.	Cooper	
and	R.	M.	Packard	(eds.),	International	Development	and	the	Social	Sciences:	Essays	on	the	History	and	
Politics	of	Knowledge	(University	of	California	Press,	1997),	p.	29.	
13	Of	course,	in	a	literal	sense,	there	are	other	Oxfams	established	in	other	Western	nations	(Canada,	the	US	
and	Belgium	for	instance),	but	the	thesis	focuses	on	Oxfam	GB	and	its	non-homogeneity.	
14	Africa,	where	the	Field	Director	system	took	shape	(see	chapter	one),	absorbed	around	50	per	cent	of	
Oxfam’s	overseas	aid	at	this	time.	But	the	organisation’s	interest	in	India	–	where	Oxfam	made	its	first	
effort	to	respond	to	a	natural	disaster	in	a	‘developing	country’	–	and	Central	and	Southern	America	was	
expanding:	each	received	around	one	fifth	of	Oxfam	aid	from	the	mid-1970s.	T.	Vaux,	The	Selfish	Altruist:	
Relief	Work	in	Famine	and	War	(London,	Earthscan	Publications,	2001),	p.	68;	M.	Black,	A	Cause	for	Our	
Times:	Oxfam:	The	First	50	Years	(Oxfam,	Oxford	University	Press,	1992),	p.	184.	
15	The	outcome	of	this	debate	is	discussed	in	chapter	three.	
16	M.	Jennings,	‘“Almost	an	Oxfam	in	Itself”:	Oxfam,	Ujamaa	and	Development	in	Tanzania’,	African	Affairs,	
Vol.	101	(2002),	p.	517.	
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the	 role	of	 civil	 society	 and	 the	place	of	NGOs	 in	 the	 ‘development	 apparatus’.	 As	one	
former	 Oxfam	 staff	 member	 recalled,	 Oxfam	 has	 always	 been	 a	 vastly	 different	
organisation	depending	on	where	and	when	one	looks	at	 it:	thus	in	Central	Africa	 it	has	
been	known	as	 ‘plombiers	sans	frontieres’	 for	 its	water	and	sanitation	work	over	recent	
years,	while	in	Arusha	and	Dar	es	Salaam	it	was	at	the	same	time	mobilising	radical	youth	
to	 protest	 government	 policies. 17 	Accordingly,	 even	 attempts	 to	 write	 institutional	
histories	of	particular	NGOs	such	as	Oxfam	(though	informative)	are	restricted	because	of	
their	need	to	adopt	a	rather	broad-brush	approach,	an	approach	which	lacks	(for	want	of	
space)	enough	engagement	with	each	NGO’s	work	in	specific	contexts	and	the	influence	
of	such	work	on	the	organisation	itself.18		
Though	the	somewhat	enigmatic	nature	of	NGOs	may	seem	to	question	the	very	
utility	 of	 the	 following	 study,	 in	 fact	 it	 only	 makes	 it	 more	 incumbent	 on	 researchers	
interested	in	the	history	of	development	to	look	more	closely	at	particular	NGOs	and	their	
role	in	different	contexts.	Narrowness	as	regards	location	and/or	time-period	should	not,	
therefore,	be	mistaken	for	methodological	error;	on	the	contrary,	a	generalising	or	broad-
brush	 approach	 to	 the	 study	 of	 NGOs	 is	 truly	 problematic	 because	 it	 comes	 at	 the	
expense	 of	 a	 nuanced	 understanding	 of	 NGOs	 in	 all	 their	 specificity	 and	 violates	 the	
historicism	necessary	to	gain	a	proper	understanding	of	the	development	apparatus	in	its	
full	complexity.	The	way	forward	 is	best	 illustrated	by	the	dynamic	perspective	adopted	
by	Christy	Cannon	Lorgen,	who	has	published	work	on	Oxfam’s	health	work	 in	Malawi,	
Uganda	and	Zambia.	Lorgen	suggests	that	NGOs	such	as	Oxfam	formulate	policy	and	take	
action	based	on	the	unique	interaction	of	‘pragmatism’	and	‘values’	in	particular	locations	
and	 time	 periods. 19 	‘Pragmatism’,	 in	 this	 sense,	 includes	 the	 survival	 needs	 of	 the	
organisation,	its	financial	situation	and	its	rapport	with	the	host	government.	‘Values’,	on	
the	other	hand,	includes	the	organisation’s	mandate,	its	approach	to	development	and	its	
perception	of	its	role	in	the	host	country.	
																																																						
17	Interview	with	author	no.	XVII,	23	October	2014.	
18	For	Oxfam,	Maggie	Black’s	A	Cause	for	Our	Times:	Oxfam:	The	First	50	Years	and	Ben	Whitaker’s	A	Bridge	
of	People:	A	Personal	View	of	Oxfam’s	First	Forty	Years	serve	this	purpose,	documenting	in	a	general	and	
wide-ranging	sense	the	history	of	the	organisation	from	its	inception	in	1942.	Black,	A	Cause	for	Our	Times;	
B.	Whitaker,	A	Bridge	of	People:	A	Personal	View	of	Oxfam's	First	Forty	Years	(London,	Heinemann,	1983).	
Examples	of	histories	of	NGOs	other	than	Oxfam	include	D.	Mickelwait,	C.	Sweet	and	E.	Morss,	New	
Directions	in	Development:	A	Study	of	U.S.	AID	(Boulder,	Colo.,	Westview	Press,	1979);	S.	Ross,	The	World	
Food	Programme	in	Global	Politics	(Boulder,	Colo.,	Lynne	Rienner,	2011);	D.	Shaw,	The	World’s	Largest	
Humanitarian	Agency:	The	Transformation	of	the	UN	World	Food	Programme	and	of	Food	Aid	(New	York,	
Palgrave	Macmillan,	2011);	L.	Mahood,	‘Feminists,	Politics	and	Children’s	Charity:	The	Formation	of	Save	
the	Children	Fund’,	The	Journal	of	the	Institute	of	Volunteering	Research,	Vol.	5,	No.	1	(2002),	pp.	71-88.	
19	C.	C.	Lorgen,	‘Dancing	with	the	State:	The	Role	of	NGOs	in	Health	Care	and	Health	Policy’,	Journal	of	
International	Development,	Vol.	10	(1998),	pp.	323-339.	
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Such	 a	 dynamic	 perspective	 acknowledges	 that	 NGO	 interventions	 are	 the	
outcome	of	an	unpredictable	and	unique	 interaction	between	organisational	 ideals	and	
the	 realities	 of	 working	 ‘on	 the	 ground’.	 This	 reflexive	 interaction	 (between	 ideal	 and	
reality,	 between	 centre	 and	 periphery),	 the	 outcomes	 it	 produced	 and	 the	 roles	 that	
NGOs	like	Oxfam	adopted	in	particular	contexts	demands	detailed	historical	analysis:	the	
conceptual	 framework	 by	 which	 an	 NGO	 operates	 is	 rooted	 in	 the	 outcomes	 of	 these	
interactions,	and	in	such	a	way	the	periphery	acts	upon	an	NGO	as	much	as	the	NGO	acts	
on	the	future	of	its	host	nation.20	By	acknowledging	that	each	NGO	is	distinctive,	that	its	
role	 is	 based	 on	 how	 the	 interaction	 between	 ‘pragmatism’	 and	 ‘values’	 changes	 over	
time,	 and	 that	 it	 depends	 on	 the	 location	 in	 which	 it	 is	 working	 –	 as	 the	 political,	
economic,	 social	 and	 historical	 context	 differs	 –	 this	 dynamic	 perspective	 challenges	
researchers	to	uncover	a	deeper	history	of	NGO	interventions	in	the	‘global	south’.	At	the	
same	 time,	 the	 perspective	 adopted	 by	 Lorgen	 retains	 analytical	 utility	 by	 allowing	 for	
some	 degree	 of	 comparison	 between	 organisations,	 and	 across	 continents	 and	 time	
periods;	 it	 trains	 its	 focus	on	 the	minutiae	of	 the	 interactions	between	an	NGO	and	 its	
host	 environment	 that	 help	 to	 determine	 its	 role	 in	 specific	 contexts,	 but	 without	
descending	 into	 the	 paralysis	 of	 continual	 contextualisation	 and	 description.	 NGOs	 are	
thus	understood	as	an	arena	within	which	the	ideological	and	practical	tensions	regarding	
development	are	internalised,	debated	and	resolved.	
How	Oxfam	resolved	these	tensions	and	found	a	role	in	Kenya,	a	nation	for	which	
development	 was	 (and	 is)	 intimately	 related	 with	 the	 very	 political	 challenge	 of	
independent	nationhood,	is	the	primary	focus	of	the	following	thesis.	Unsurprisingly,	the	
study	avoids	making	grand	judgements	on	the	success	or	failure	of	Oxfam	interventions.	
While	 it	 includes	 some	discussion	of	 the	organisation’s	 relative	 successes,	 it	 is	 as	much	
focused	on	the	mechanisms,	dynamics,	structures	and	discourses	of	Oxfam’s	approach	to	
its	 work	 in	 Kenya,	 and	 the	 extent	 to	which	 these	were	 influenced	 by	 (and	 themselves	
influenced)	 internal	 organisational	 debates	 and	 the	 local	 context	 (in	 particular	 the	
fluctuating	 relationship	 between	 Oxfam	 and	 the	 Kenyan	 state).	 In	 1967,	 for	 instance,	
Oxfam	granted	£3,000	to	Gatundu	hospital;	this	was	a	relatively	uncontroversial	donation	
on	 the	 surface,	 but	 it	 takes	 on	more	 significance	 when	 it	 is	 understood	 that	 Gatundu	
hospital	 was	 an	 institution	 used	 by	 President	 Kenyatta	 to	 accumulate	 donated	 funds	
ready	 for	 dispersal	 elsewhere	 in	 order	 to	 buy	 political	 support.	 The	 thesis	 uses	 case	
																																																						
20	N.	Gilman,	Review	of	Special	Forum	for	H-Diplo	–	‘Modernization	as	a	Global	Project’,	Diplomatic	History,	
Vol.	23,	No.	3	(2009),	p.	6;	Jennings,	‘Surrogates	of	the	State’,	p.	29.	
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studies	such	as	this	to	assess	the	function	Oxfam	fulfilled	in	Kenya	and	to	contribute	to	a	
number	 of	 development	 ‘histories’:	 the	 history	 of	 Oxfam,	 the	 history	 of	 Kenyan	
development,	 and	 the	 history	 of	 development	 in	 Africa	 and	 as	 a	 broad	 international	
phenomenon.	 As	 such,	 it	 forms	 part	 of	 a	 wider	 endeavour	 to	 test	 the	 predominant	
theories	of	 social	 science	as	 regards	NGOs	and	development	empirically	and,	above	all,	
historically,	 updating	 Eric	 Hobsbawm’s	 call	 for	 historians	 to	 perform	 a	 useful	
interdisciplinary	 function	by	problematising	overarching	 social	 theories.	 For	Hobsbawm,	
social	history	could	never	equal	the	‘backward	projection	of	sociology’;	this	thesis	argues	
that	 development	 history	 does	 not	 equal	 the	 backward	 projection	 of	 contemporary	
theories	 about	 the	 form	 and	 function	 of	 development.	 Instead,	 the	 history	 of	
development	 as	 a	project	 requires	 that	 general	models	of	 the	 structure	 and	pattern	of	
development	interventions	are	challenged	and	nuanced	by	the	examination	of	the	highly	
contextualised	interaction	between	‘local’	and	‘global’	–	or	‘transnational’	–	forces.21	
The	major	 research	 questions	 the	 thesis	 seeks	 to	 answer	 include:	what	 role	 did	
Oxfam	 play	 in	 Kenyan	 development	 from	 1963-2002?;	 how	 did	 this	 role	 and	 Oxfam’s	
approach	change	during	that	time?;	how	far	were	these	changes	in	response	to	the	local	
Kenya	 context,	 Oxfam’s	 ‘pragmatism’	 and	 ‘values’	 or	 broader	 changes	 in	 development	
work	 globally?;	what	 did	 these	 changes	mean	 for	 the	 relationship	 between	Oxfam	and	
the	 Kenyan	 state?;	 how	 was	 this	 relationship	 constructed,	 shaped,	 understood	 and	
maintained?;	and	how	did	this	relationship	shift	over	time?	The	thesis	argues	that	Oxfam	
did	not	impose	an	‘off-the-shelf’	or	apolitical	development	solution	on	Kenya,	as	alleged	
by	the	foremost	academic	critics	of	NGOs.	On	the	contrary,	the	thesis	argues	that	Oxfam	
‘values’	predisposed	it	to	take	a	very	political	view	of	poverty	and	development.	Placing	
the	Gatundu	donation	 in	 its	wider	 context,	 for	 example,	 reveals	 that	 the	donation	was	
part	of	an	attempt	to	gain	favour	with	the	Kenyan	government	in	order	that	Oxfam	might	
encourage	it	to	take	on	board	the	organisation’s	ideas	about	the	appropriate	role	of	the	
developmental	 state	 in	 Africa.	 Case	 studies	 such	 as	 this,	 alongside	 copious	
correspondence	 and	 reports,	 illuminate	 that	 the	 unique	 combination	 of	 Oxfam’s	
‘pragmatism’	–	 in	particular	 its	need	to	adapt	to	the	shifting	politics	of	development	on	
the	ground	 in	Kenya	 (where	 the	 state	 sought	 to	maximise	 its	political	 control	using	 the	
powerful	 rhetoric	 and	 practical	 benefits	 offered	 by	 development)	 –	with	 changes	 in	 its	
‘values’	and	ideology	caused	the	organisation	to	adopt	three	distinct	roles	in	Kenya	across	
																																																						
21	E.	Hobsbawm,	‘From	Social	History	to	the	History	of	Society’,	Daedalus,	Vol.	100,	No.	1	(1971),	pp.	20-45;	
see	also	J.	Ferguson,	Global	Shadows:	Africa	in	the	Neoliberal	World	Order,	(London,	Duke	University	Press,	
2006),	pp.	89-103.	
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the	period.	 These	 included	 (but	were	not	 limited	 to)	 an	 effort	 to	 act	 as	 a	 supporter	 of	
state-led	 modernisation	 (as	 demonstrated	 by	 Gatundu),	 an	 attempt	 to	 back	 radical	
empowerment	movements	 to	 challenge	 the	 Kenyan	 state,	 and	 a	 late	 struggle	 to	 direct	
high-level	policy	change.	The	thesis	is	divided	chronologically	in	order	to	illuminate	these	
divergent	 approaches	 and,	 crucially,	 to	 historicise	 the	 fluctuations	 in	 Oxfam’s	
development	work	by	linking	them	with	their	underlying	causes.	As	a	textured	case	study	
of	 Oxfam	 in	 Kenya	 and	 of	 its	 relationship	 with	 the	 Kenyan	 state,	 the	 periodisation	 of	
chapters	two,	three	and	four	matches	distinct	phases	in	Kenyan	governance:	the	Kenyatta	
era	 (1963-1978),	 the	 de	 facto	 and	 de	 jure	 single-party	 Moi	 era	 (1978-1991)	 and	 the	
multiparty	Moi	era	 (1991-2002).	Precisely	because	 so	 little	 is	 known	of	 the	 interactions	
between	NGOs	and	their	local	environment,	laying	out	the	detail	of	Oxfam’s	workings	in	
Kenya	in	such	a	manner,	as	opposed	to	focusing	on	Oxfam’s	changing	role	in	the	context	
of	 an	 alternative	 chronology	 of	 development	 ideas	 at	 a	 global	 level	 (though	 this	 is	 an	
underlying	theme	of	the	thesis),	is	a	natural	starting	point	to	test	social	theories	regarding	
NGOs.	
The	 sources	 used	 to	 analyse	 the	 role	 of	 Oxfam	 in	 Kenya	 are	 for	 the	most	 part	
qualitative	 and	 archival	 in	 nature.	 (Quantitative	 sources	 are	 used	 more	 sparingly,	 and	
mostly	to	illustrate	the	shifting	scale	of	Oxfam	operations.22)	Unsurprisingly,	sources	from	
the	Oxfam	archive	formed	the	basis	of	the	research.	NGO	archives	such	as	this	offer	an	
unparalleled	 perspective	 on	 four	 decades	 of	 development,	written	 as	 they	were	 at	 the	
‘periphery’	and	close	to	the	 ‘targets’	of	development	work,	and	offering	 information	on	
the	relationship	between	the	 international	community	and	 ‘southern’	governments.	Yet	
the	 majority	 of	 the	 Oxfam	 archive	 has	 remained	 almost	 completely	 untapped	 by	
historians.	 Indeed,	 content	 to	 leave	 the	 study	 of	 development	 to	 economists	 and	
anthropologists	until	quite	recently,	historians	have	spent	 little	time	analysing	data	held	
by	 the	vast	array	of	 international	organisations,	described	elsewhere	as	 the	 ‘missionary	
archive	 of	 the	 late	 twentieth	 century’.23	Meanwhile,	 as	 mentioned	 above,	 NGOs	 have	
shown	little	interest	in	their	own	past.	In	a	sign	of	acknowledgement	that	their	past	may	
be	of	interest	to	external	researchers,	however,	Oxfam	consented	for	their	entire	archive	
																																																						
22	Crucially,	the	size	of	investment	was	not	seen	by	Oxfam	staff	as	the	most	significant	factor	for	
determining	the	success	or	failure	of	projects:	the	difference	spending	(on	whatever	scale)	made	to	
people’s	lives	was	felt	to	be	more	important	than	disbursing	ever-larger	amounts	of	money.	Nevertheless,	it	
could	still	loom	large	in	the	remote	locations	in	which	it	operated.	
23	A.	Burton	and	M.	Jennings,	‘Introduction:	The	Emperor’s	New	Clothes?	Continuities	in	Governance	in	Late	
Colonial	and	Early	Postcolonial	East	Africa’,	International	Journal	of	African	Historical	Studies,	Vol.	40,	No.	1	
(2007),	pp.	1-25.	
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to	 be	 moved	 to	 the	 Bodleian	 Library	 in	 Oxford,	 and	 cataloguing	 began	 in	 2013.24	The	
author	was	one	of	the	first	researchers	to	be	granted	access	to	the	archive	as	it	was	being	
catalogued.	 The	 following	 thesis	 is,	 moreover,	 the	 first	 attempt	 to	 use	 the	 newly	
organised	Oxfam	archive	 to	 research	 the	development	 encounter	 in	 Kenya,	 and	one	of	
very	few	to	use	the	archive	to	research	Oxfam	as	an	historical	actor.25	Unfortunately,	the	
on-going	 cataloguing	 effort	means	 that	 a	 significant	 portion	of	 the	 archive	was,	 and	 is,	
unavailable	for	researchers.	This	portion	includes	the	majority	of	the	project	reports	and	
evaluations	 for	 Kenya.	Nonetheless,	 by	 using	 the	materials	 available	 (for	 the	most	 part	
annual	 reports,	 correspondence	 and	 minutes	 of	 the	 Africa	 Committee),	 it	 has	 been	
possible	 to	 piece	 together	 an	 enlightening	 narrative	 as	 regards	 a	 number	 of	 significant	
Oxfam	projects	in	Kenya	as	well	as	to	show	how	they	reflected	and	influenced	the	overall	
shape	of	Oxfam’s	Kenya	programme.	The	opening	of	the	remainder	of	the	archive	in	2017	
thus	presents	a	novel	opportunity	for	postdoctoral	research,	not	only	on	Oxfam	in	Kenya,	
but	also	on	 its	 role	 in	Africa	 in	a	 comparative	 sense.26	Research	undertaken	 in	 the	next	
few	years	will	continue	to	push	the	frontiers	of	our	knowledge	of	how	Oxfam	operated	in	
the	past.	
The	archival	material	available	for	research	on	Kenya	included	a	number	of	project	
reports	 and	 evaluations	 as	well	 as	 annual	 reports	 on	 the	 Kenyan	 development	 context	
and	 Oxfam’s	 place	 therein.	 Field	 staff	 based	 in	 Nairobi	 for	 the	most	 part	 wrote	 these	
reports	 for	despatch	 to	Oxford.	Another	 large	portion	of	 the	archive	 is	 taken	up	by	 the	
minutes	and	proceedings	of	the	Africa	Committee,	first	established	in	1963	to	coordinate	
Oxfam’s	 work	 across	 the	 continent.	 The	 Committee	 met	 quarterly	 at	 Oxfam	 House	 to	
discuss	 Oxfam’s	 work	 in	 each	 target	 country	 and	 any	 changes	 that	 were	 required	 in	
outlook,	 aims	 or	 operation.	 There	 also	 exists	 a	 great	 deal	 of	 detailed	 correspondence	
between	Nairobi	 and	Oxford,	 often	 clarifying	 the	 decisions	 of	 the	 Africa	 Committee	 or	
querying	them	based	on	 local	knowledge.	As	discussed	 in	the	following	chapter,	 for	the	
majority	 of	 the	 period	 under	 examination,	 Oxfam	 operated	 in	 a	 decentralised	 fashion,	
with	much	 responsibility	 resting	 on	 the	 shoulders	 of	 its	 Field	 Directors.	 In	 1968,	 there	
																																																						
24	The	completed	archive	includes	34,000	project	files,	documenting	core	activity	between	1955	and	2005;	
correspondence	with	international	staff,	country	reports	and	records	of	programme	administration	and	
operations;	minute	books	of	the	Oxfam	executive;	and	campaign	materials.	For	more	information,	see	
https://www.bodleian.ox.ac.uk/weston/our-work/projects/saving-oxford-medicine.	
25	Chapter	one	discusses	the	historiography	of	Oxfam	in	greater	detail.	
26	There	is	also	potential	for	an	historical	comparison	of	the	approaches	taken	in	different	continents,	albeit	
with	a	focus	trained	at	country	or	project	level.	
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were	 only	 seven	 Field	 Directors	 to	 cover	 89	 countries	 and	 638	 projects. 27 	These	
individuals	 occupied	 a	 central	 position	 in	 project	 selection	 and	 execution	 due	 to	 their	
position	 ‘on	 the	 ground’,	 and	 their	 interpretation	 of	 local	 circumstances	 was	 vital	 for	
determining	the	direction	of	the	organisation	 in	each	 location	(as	the	three	chapters	on	
Oxfam	 in	 Kenya	 demonstrate).	 Unsurprisingly,	 therefore,	 much	 of	 the	 source	 material	
pertaining	 to	 this	 thesis	 was	 generated	 by	 either	 the	 Field	 Director	 or	 the	 Africa	
Committee	and	for	the	most	part	dwelt	on	their	relationship	and	on	the	rapport	between	
the	Field	Director	and	the	host	government.	With	very	few	staff	employed	in	Kenya	until	
the	 1980s	 and	 beyond	 –	 the	 first	 Kenyan	 employee	 joined	 the	 organisation	 in	 1984	 –	
there	 are	 few	 non-‘elite’	 voices	 to	 be	 heard,	 in	 any	 case.	 Consequently,	 the	 following	
thesis	is	necessarily	focused	for	the	most	part	on	the	voices	of	Field	Directors	and	other	
‘elite’	actors	in	Oxford.	Nonetheless,	since	the	documents	contained	in	the	archive	were,	
for	 the	most	part,	designed	 for	 internal	consumption	at	a	high	 level,	 they	offer	brutally	
honest	 opinions	 and	 appraisals	 of	 Oxfam’s	 programme	 in	 Kenya	 and	 elsewhere.	
Discussions	and	correspondence	concerning	shortcomings	and	failures	(as	seen	from	one	
perspective)	 often	 led	 to	 spirited	 ideological	 arguments	 for	 and	 against	 the	 approach	
taken	 on	 the	 ground,	 disagreements	 over	 the	 aims	 and	 ideals	 of	 the	 organisation,	 and	
tension	as	regards	the	compromises	necessary	to	achieve	its	objectives.	Internal	conflict	
thus	comes	to	the	fore	to	a	much	greater	extent	than	in	literature	released	into	the	public	
domain	by	NGOs	like	Oxfam,	many	of	which	attempt	to	present	a	coherent	message	on	
development	and	their	organisation’s	role	in	combating	poverty.	
The	 earlier	 sections	 of	 the	 study	 also	 make	 use	 of	 sources	 held	 at	 the	 Kenya	
National	 Archives	 (KNA)	 in	 Nairobi. 28 	Research	 in	 Kenya	 proved	 invaluable	 for	
understanding	the	development	policies	of	the	Kenya	government	across	the	period,	the	
government’s	 attitudes	 towards	 NGOs	 in	 general	 and	 its	 position	 on	 Oxfam’s	
developmental	efforts	inside	its	borders,	but	was	not	without	its	challenges.	As	the	size	of	
government	was	scaled	back	in	the	1980s	and	1990s,	facilities	such	as	the	KNA	were	some	
of	the	first	to	see	their	funding	reduced,	alongside	higher	education.29	Accordingly,	files	in	
the	KNA	were	often	difficult	to	find	or	in	poor	condition.	Moreover,	the	researcher	who	
wishes	to	learn	about	areas	in	the	arid	north	and	east	of	the	country	will	struggle	to	find	
as	much	as	those	interested	in	more	central	areas:	Kenya’s	periphery	is	marginal	in	more	
																																																						
27	Black,	A	Cause	for	Our	Times,	p.	299.	
28	The	thirty-year	closure	rule	meant	that	only	files	from	the	pre-1984	period	were	available	for	researchers.	
29	This	was,	of	course,	convenient	for	a	regime	that	saw	its	legitimacy	challenged	–	particularly	by	university	
students	and	academics.	
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than	 a	 geographical	 sense.	 Although	 the	 KNA	 staff	 are	 knowledgeable	 about	 the	
collection	and	 its	boundaries,	 the	 researcher	must	 spend	a	good	deal	of	 time	copiously	
reading	 and	 comparing	 the	numerous	 search	 guides	 and	 file	 indexes	 together	with	 the	
computer	database.	Both	aids	suffer	from	limitations:	for	 instance,	the	bound	indexes	–	
divided	 by	 geography	 and	 administrative	 department	 –	 often	 do	 not	 list	 files	
chronologically,	even	within	their	numerous	sub-sections,	and	give	either	very	general	or	
misleadingly	 specific	 short	 titles	 for	 each	 file.	 Meanwhile,	 the	 utility	 of	 the	 computer	
database	is	undermined	by	the	number	of	typing	errors	it	contains,	which	result	in	false	
negative	results	for	searches	by	keyword.30	Furthermore,	even	when	files	were	identified	
in	 one	 or	more	 of	 the	 indexes,	 it	 frequently	 transpired	 that	 they	 had	 been	 improperly	
catalogued	or	were	missing.	Regrettably,	this	was	a	common	occurrence	when	looking	for	
files	that	contained	information	specifically	about	Oxfam.31	Nonetheless,	by	adapting	the	
research	methodology	and	widening	 the	search	criteria	 to	 include	development	 reports	
and	 committee	 meetings	 from	 districts	 and	 provinces	 where	 Oxfam	 focused	 its	 work,	
departmental	 monthly	 and	 annual	 reports	 for	 departments	 related	 to	 Oxfam’s	
programme,	 and	 files	 that	 discussed	 the	 Kenya	 Freedom	 From	 Hunger	 Committee	
(KFFHC)	 –	with	which	Oxfam	was	 closely	 involved	 –	 it	was	 possible	 to	 supplement	 the	
findings	 from	Oxford.	 As	 a	 result	 of	 the	 30-year	 closure	 rule	 for	 official	 files,	 however,	
research	in	the	KNA	was	limited	to	the	period	between	1963	and	1984.	For	this	reason,	
chapters	 three	and	 four	contain	 less	 local	detail	 than	chapter	 two	and	rely	 to	a	greater	
extent	on	documentation	from	Oxford.	Fortunately,	the	early	1980s	saw	an	expansion	as	
regards	 the	 length	 and	 depth	 of	 Field	 Directors’	 reports.	 Furthermore,	 contacts	 made	
with	Oxfam	staff	in	Kenya	meant	that	research	was	possible	in	the	Oxfam	Head	Office	in	
Nairobi	as	well	as	at	the	Oxfam	guesthouse	for	expatriate	staff	in	Lavington.	Files	held	in	
both	locations	mirrored	the	nature	of	the	Oxfam	archive	in	the	UK,	though	they	offered	a	
greater	level	of	detail	as	no	effort	to	sort	and	remove	files	felt	to	be	of	lesser	importance	
has	been	made	for	a	number	of	years.	Finally,	21	interviews	were	arranged	with	current	
and	former	Oxfam	staff.32	These	helped	to	nuance	the	‘official’	side	of	the	story	contained	
in	 the	 archives,	 providing	 information	 (then	 corroborated)	 about	 controversial	 and	
sensitive	issues	that	were	not	documented	in	the	archives.		
																																																						
30	See	M.	Carotenuto	and	K.	Luongo,	‘Navigating	the	Kenya	National	Archives:	Research	and	its	Role	in	
Kenyan	Society’,	History	in	Africa,	Vol.	32	(2005),	pp.	445-455	for	a	helpful	guide	on	how	to	proceed	when	
undertaking	research	in	the	KNA.	
31	Only	the	first	of	a	number	of	files	on	Oxfam	was	even	catalogued;	moreover,	this	file	concentrated	on	the	
period	1962-1964	and	so	was	only	of	limited	use.	
32	These	interviewees	are	anonymised	in	the	thesis.	
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DEVELOPMENT? IT’S HISTORY.33 
 
For	a	time	during	the	1980s,	it	seemed	as	if	the	idea	of	development	had	been	banished	
from	 mainstream	 economics	 and	 was,	 in	 every	 sense	 of	 the	 word,	 history.	 Western	
economists	 and	policy-makers	 saw	 the	development	project	 as	 a	 relic	 of	 the	past:	 out-
dated	and	finished.	In	its	place	stood	faith	in	market	discipline,	orthodox	economic	policy	
and	 the	progressive	nature	of	 global	 capitalism,	 evidenced	by	 the	 (erroneous)	 example	
provided	 by	 South	 East	 Asia’s	 ‘Newly	 Industrialising	 Countries’	 (NICs).34	Hostility	 to	 the	
development	 project,	 and	 particularly	 to	 the	 dirigisme	 with	 which	 it	 was	 intimately	
related	 at	 that	 time,	 was	 to	 accelerate	 in	 the	 West	 throughout	 the	 decade	 as	
‘Reaganomics’	and	‘Thatcherism’	displaced	Keynesianism	and	ideas	of	redistribution	from	
mainstream	economic	debate.35	The	championing	of	 free-market	economic	policies	was	
based	 less	 on	 the	 ostensibly	 positive	 examples	 provided	 by	 NICs,	 however,	 than	 on	 a	
powerful	 ideological	 shift	 in	 the	 West	 caused	 by	 changes	 in	 the	 global	 economy	 that	
threatened	 to	 undermine	 Western	 economic	 prosperity.	 Most	 importantly,	 after	 the	
Nixon	 administration	 abandoned	 the	 gold	 exchange	 standard	 in	 1971,	 raw	 materials	
acquired	increased	price	variability,	and	oil-producing	nations	were	able	to	raise	the	price	
of	oil	by	embargoing	production,	which	 they	did	 in	October	 that	year.36	These	 rising	oil	
prices	 contributed	 to	 stagflation	 in	 the	West	 (in	 particular	 in	 the	 US	 and	 UK),	 and	 as	
‘developed’	 nations	 turned	 inwards	 to	 deal	 with	 their	 own	 problems	 of	 rising	
unemployment	 and	 inflation,	 the	 hitherto	 dominant	 welfarist,	 dirigiste	 and	 voluntarist	
concept	 of	 international	 development	 (discussed	 below)	 came	 under	 sustained	 attack	
from	economists	such	as	P.	T.	Bauer,	who	advocated	on	behalf	of	efficient	market	forces	
and	trickle-down	economic	growth	at	home	and	abroad.	
	 The	crippling	debt	crisis	faced	by	developing	nations	during	the	1980s	only	added	
fuel	 to	 the	 pro-market	 ‘employers’	 offensive’	 associated	 with	 Reagan,	 Thatcher	 and	
international	 financial	 institutions	 (IFIs)	 such	 as	 the	 World	 Bank	 and	 International	
																																																						
33	Much	of	the	early	inspiration	for	this	section,	as	well	as	its	title,	comes	from	two	articles:	N.	Cullather,	
‘Development?	It’s	History’,	Diplomatic	History,	Vol.	24,	No.	4	(2000),	pp.	641-653,	and	F.	Cooper,	‘Writing	
the	History	of	Development’,	Journal	of	Modern	European	History,	Vol.	8,	No.	1	(2010),	pp.	5-23.	
34	NICs	like	Taiwan	and	South	Korea	experienced	years	of	massive	state	intervention	and	ISI	policies,	
protectionism,	interest	rate	manipulations	and	labour	market	restrictions	–	the	antithesis	of	free	market	
principles.	See	M.	T.	Berger,	‘The	End	of	the	“Third	World”?’,	Third	World	Quarterly,	Vol.	15,	No.	2	(1994),	
pp.	257-275.	
35	Most	notably,	they	succeeded	in	suppressing	the	redistributive	recommendations	of	the	Brandt	Report.	
R.	Jolly,	et	al.	(eds.),	UN	Contributions	to	Development	Thinking	and	Practice	(Bloomington,	2004),	p.	112;	
Riddell,	Does	Foreign	Aid	Work?,	p.	35.	
36	C.	Leys,	The	Rise	and	Fall	of	Development	Theory	(London,	1996),	pp.	21-23.	
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Monetary	Fund	(IMF).	Though	caused	by	a	sudden	hike	in	the	interest	rate	on	petro-dollar	
loans	 that	 had	 flooded	 the	 global	 market	 after	 the	 oil	 embargo, 37 	the	 debt	 crisis	
reaffirmed	 the	 faith	 held	 by	many	 in	 the	West	 in	 the	 efficacy	 of	 supply-side	 economic	
reform	 and	 strengthened	 their	 belief	 that	 inefficient	 and	 corruption-riddled	
‘developmental	 states’	 in	 the	 South	 should	 succumb	 to	 the	 supreme	 rationality	 of	 the	
free	market.38	Thus	the	contemporary	concept	of	development	–	based	on	state	planning	
and	investment	–	faced	a	‘perfect	storm’	of	economic	and	ideological	opposition,	and	the	
politics	 of	 development	 quickly	 became	 the	 ‘politics	 of	 the	 write-off’	 as	 Western	
governments	and	IFIs	denied	Southern	claims	on	global	resources	and	placed	the	blame	
for	 failed	 development	 at	 the	 feet	 of	 crumbling	 Southern	 states.	 Indeed,	 state-led	
development	would	move	from	the	cornerstone	of	economics	to	the	millstone	around	its	
neck.39 	Bailout	 loans	 from	 the	 US-dominated	 IMF	 would	 stipulate	 as	 conditions	 for	
lending:	the	reduction	of	the	size	of	the	state	(both	in	terms	of	budget	and	the	number	of	
state-owned	enterprises),	the	devaluation	of	national	currencies	and	the	liberalisation	of	
the	host	economy	in	general.40	
	 Of	 course,	 such	 conditional	 loans	 –	 termed	 Structural	 Adjustment	 Programmes	
(SAPs)	–	ensured	that	 the	 incapacity	of	 the	state	 in	 the	developing	world	given	as	 their	
rationale	would	 become	a	 self-fulfilling	 prophecy.	 There	was,	moreover,	 little	 objective	
evidence	that	these	conditions	would	successfully	translate	into	broad	economic	growth:	
arguments	in	favour	of	the	free	market	‘solution’	to	underdevelopment	were	abstracted,	
decontextualised	 and	 ignorant	 of	 longer-term	 colonial	 and	more	 recent	 history,	 which	
had	predisposed	southern	states	to	follow	particular	(and	often	nefarious)	paths.41	Rather	
than	acknowledging	the	brutal	combination	of	an	inequitable	global	economic	structure,	
the	perverse	legacy	of	colonialism	and	predatory	post-colonial	leadership,	and	attempting	
																																																						
37	After	the	US	returned	to	a	strong	dollar	policy	in	the	mid-1970s,	interest	rates	on	petro-dollar	loans	to	
developing	countries	(hitherto	negative	in	real	terms	since	the	increase	in	the	price	of	oil	had	led	to	a	
surplus	of	petro-dollars)	became	prohibitively	expensive,	rising	from	0.7	per	cent	between	1972-75	to	
around	5	per	cent	between	1980-82.	This	resulted	in	the	combined	capital	accounts	of	developing	nations	
moving	from	a	surplus	of	$85.7	billion	between	1978-1980	to	a	cumulative	deficit	of	$54.8	billion	between	
1981-1984.	Jolly,	et	al.	(eds.),	UN	Contributions	to	Development	Thinking	and	Practice,	p.	140;	B.	R.	
Tomlinson,	‘What	was	the	Third	World?’,	Journal	of	Contemporary	History,	Vol.	38,	No.	2	(2003),	p.	316.	
38	The	nature	of	‘developmental	states’	is	discussed	further	below.	
39	Cooper,	‘Writing	the	History	of	Development’,	p.	8;	B.	Sanyal,	Cooperative	Autonomy:	The	Dialectics	of	
State-NGO	Relationships	in	Developing	Countries,	Research	Series	100	(Geneva:	ILO,	1994),	p.	28;	T.	
Mkandawire,	‘Thinking	about	Developmental	States	in	Africa’,	Cambridge	Journal	of	Economics,	Vol.	25	
(2001),	p.	293.	
40	J.	Sender,	‘Africa’s	Economic	Performance:	Limitations	of	the	Current	Consensus’,	Journal	of	Economic	
Perspectives,	Vol.	13,	No.	3	(1999),	p.	105.	
41	This	particular	history	is	dealt	with	in	greater	detail	below.	Mkandawire,	‘Thinking	about	Developmental	
States’,	p.	306.	
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to	mould	a	solution	to	fit	the	needs	of	developing	countries,	the	‘Washington	consensus’	
in	 fact	 advocated	 a	 solution	 that	 best	 served	 the	 interests	 of	 the	West.42	That	 such	 a	
solution	 had	 no	 understanding	 of	 the	 needs	 of	 developing	 countries	 is	 clear	 from	 the	
development	 record	 of	 the	 time.	 Now	 considered	 a	 ‘lost	 decade’	 of	 development,	 the	
1980s	was	almost	totally	negative	in	economic	and	political	terms,	and	often	entrenched	
the	negative	facets	of	African	and	other	Southern	states	which	the	SAP	regime	apparently	
aimed	to	eradicate.	As	Cooper	wrote:	
	
If	 the	 decline	 of	 development	 funding	 and	 state	 initiatives	 in	 economic	 matters,	
decreasing	 economic	 regulation,	 and	 the	 firing	 of	 bureaucrats	 and	 soldiers	 were	
supposed	to	unleash	a	wave	of	local	creativity,	that	creativity	often	took	the	form	of	
warlords	organizing	local	armies,	of	underpaid	civil	servants	organizing	rackets	of	all	
sorts,	or	of	structures	of	clientage	and	dependence	becoming	entrenched.43	
	
In	Kenya	for	instance,	as	SAPs	forced	a	reduction	in	the	size	of	the	state,	President	Daniel	
arap	Moi	struggled	to	maintain	the	patronage	networks	holding	together	the	fragile	inter-
ethnic	elite	alliance	at	the	top	of	government.	Partly	as	a	result	of	this,	the	elite	alliance	
fragmented,	encouraging	Moi	and	his	cronies	 to	manipulate	ethnic	divisions	 in	order	 to	
incite	 the	 violent	 displacement	 of	 ‘non-indigenous’	 (and	 coincidentally	 anti-Moi)	 ethnic	
groups	 from	 important	 constituencies,	 while	 also	 encouraging	 the	 President	 and	 his	
associates	to	loot	the	state	coffers	before	being	ousted.44	
	 Economists	reacted	in	different	ways	to	the	disastrous	results	of	the	SAP	regime	in	
Kenya	 and	 elsewhere.	 Some,	 such	 as	 Jeffrey	 Sachs,	 abandoned	 their	 advocacy	 of	
marketization	and	structural	adjustment	in	favour	of	a	return	to	state	planning	and	large-
scale	development	schemes.45	Others,	like	William	Easterly,	saw	the	corruption	and	state	
failure	 encouraged	 by	 SAPs	 as	 a	 vindication	 of	 their	 anti-state	 and	 anti-development	
position,	and	continued	to	argue	for	the	‘objective’	primacy	of	the	market.46	Evidence	of	
the	 failures	of	 the	SAP	regime	–	 including	 increasing	poverty	and	 inequality	–	was	used	
highlight	the	distance	between	the	aims	and	outcomes	of	development	and	to	question	
the	development	endeavour	in	its	entirety.47	
																																																						
42	Cooper,	‘Writing	the	History	of	Development’,	p.	8.	
43	Cooper,	‘Writing	the	History	of	Development’,	p.	8.	
44	See	chapter	two.	See	also	D.	Branch	and	N.	Cheeseman,	‘Conclusion’,	in	D.	Branch,	N.	Cheeseman	and	L.	
Gardner	(eds.),	Our	Turn	to	Eat:	Politics	in	Kenya	since	1950	(Berlin,	Lit.	Verlag,	2010),	pp.	244-252;	D.	
Branch	and	N.	Cheeseman,	‘Democratization,	Sequencing	and	State	Failure	in	Africa:	Lessons	from	Kenya’,	
African	Affairs,	Vol.	108,	No.	430	(2009),	pp.	3-4,	7.	
45	J.	Sachs,	The	End	of	Poverty:	Economic	Possibilities	for	Our	Time	(New	York,	2005).	
46	W.	Easterly,	The	White	Man’s	Burden:	Why	the	West’s	Efforts	to	Aid	the	Rest	Have	Done	So	Much	Ill	and	
So	Little	Good	(Oxford,	Oxford	University	Press,	2006).	
47	E.	Crewe	and	E.	Harrison,	Whose	Development?	An	Ethnography	of	Aid	(London,	Zed	Books,	1998),	p.	14.	
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	 If	 the	gap	between	 intention	and	effect	allowed	those	on	the	right	to	attack	the	
idea	 that	 development	 could	 be	 separated	 from	 trickle-down	 economics,	 those	 on	 the	
left	 understood	 the	 gap	 differently;	 nonetheless,	 their	 conclusions	 still	 questioned	 the	
very	concept	of	development.	Influenced	by	the	anti-developmental	effects	of	structural	
adjustment	and	by	the	work	of	Michel	Foucault,	the	left	attempted	to	explain	the	failure	
of	 development	 through	 discourse	 analysis. 48 	Criticism	 came	 in	 the	 assertion	 that	
development,	both	as	an	idea	and	as	experienced	reality,	 is,	 in	fact,	a	knowledge-power	
dyad,	in	which	power	(whether	economic,	political,	cultural	or	ideological	–	to	name	the	
most	 common	examples)	produces	 scientific	 ‘truth’	 (knowledge),	which	 is	 then	used	as	
justification	for	Western	development	interventions.	These,	in	turn,	support	and	maintain	
Western	 global	 hegemony	 and	 reinforce	 the	power	 structure	 that	 enables	 the	West	 to	
determine	what	is	and	is	not	‘scientific’	knowledge.49	For	writers	such	as	Arturo	Escobar	
and	James	Ferguson,	development	thus	serves	as	an	apparatus	of	control	and	surveillance	
over	 the	 South,	 integrating	 and	 managing	 countries	 and	 populations	 in	 increasingly	
encompassing	and	powerful	ways.50	According	to	this	interpretation,	development	makes	
the	world	safe	for	the	continued	dominance	of	Western	capitalist	imperialism.	
	 Most	 insidiously,	 if	development	discourse	reinforces	power	relations,	 it	does	so	
beneath	 a	 benign	 and	 outwardly-desirable	 surface:	 thus	 a	 development	 worker	 and	
recipient	of	development	aid	may	believe	 that	 they	are	helping	or	being	helped,	but	 in	
reality	 their	actions	 in	delivering	and	receiving	development	help	 to	naturalise	Western	
modernity	and	inscribe	on	the	world	a	single	path	for	betterment.	Whether	a	conspiracy	
of	 Western	 nations	 or	 an	 unintended	 consequence	 of	 well-intentioned	 development	
efforts,	 for	 many	 on	 the	 left,	 the	 development	 concept	 serves	 to	 reinforce	 global	
hierarchy	by	entrenching	the	dominant	positions	of	those	who	have	achieved	‘developed’	
status.51	Furthermore,	 it	 is	 argued	 that	 such	 an	 action	 is,	 in	 fact,	 depoliticised	 by	 a	
development	discourse	that	acts	as	an	‘anti-politics	machine’,	obscuring	the	historical	and	
political	 causes	 of	 poverty	 with	 references	 to	 apparently	 ‘neutral’	 science	 and	
																																																						
48	M.	Foucault,	Discipline	and	Punish:	The	Birth	of	the	Prison	(New	York,	Vintage	Books,	1979).	
49	Escobar,	Encountering	Development;	W.	Sachs	(ed.),	The	Development	Dictionary:	A	Guide	to	Knowledge	
as	Power	(London,	1992);	Cooper,	‘Writing	the	History	of	Development’,	p.	6;	M.	DuBois,	‘The	Governance	
of	the	Third	World:	A	Foucauldian	Perspective	on	Power	Relations	in	Development’,	Alternatives:	Global,	
Local,	Political,	Vol.	16,	No.	1	(1991),	pp.	1-30;	D.	B.	Moore	and	G.	J.	Schmitz	(eds.),	Debating	Development	
Discourse:	Institutional	and	Popular	Perspectives	(New	York,	St.	Martin’s	Press,	1995);	J.	Ferguson,	The	Anti-
Politics	Machine:	‘Development’,	Depoliticization,	and	Bureaucratic	Power	in	Lesotho	(Cambridge,	
Cambridge	University	Press,	1990).	
50	Escobar,	Encountering	Development;	Ferguson,	The	Anti-Politics	Machine.	
51	Cooper,	‘Writing	the	History	of	Development’,	p.	6;	
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technology.52	In	 this	 sense,	 even	 the	 failure	 of	 development	 interventions	 reinforces	
‘developmentalism’	by	defining	anew	a	 ‘target’	population	 in	need	of	 intervention.	This	
serves	 to	 expand	 the	 power	 of	 ‘neutral’	 bureaucracies	 and	 development	 institutions,	
which	offer	no	alternatives	to	the	dominant	development	paradigm.53	
	 The	 claim	 that	 development	 has	 played	 a	 crucial	 role	 in	 guaranteeing	 the	
hegemony	 of	 capitalism	 on	 a	 global	 scale	 explains	 to	 a	 large	 extent	 the	 common	
misnomer	that	development	and	underdevelopment	were	‘invented’	by	the	United	States	
in	 1945	 –	 or	 in	 1949	 with	 President	 Truman’s	 ‘Point	 Four’	 address	 –	 in	 order	 justify	
intervention	 in	 the	 South	 on	 behalf	 of	 its	 capitalist	 project.54	Development	 was,	 such	
authors	 allege,	 devised	 as	 a	 tool	 of	 modernisation	 and	 diplomacy.55	Together	 with	 its	
antonym	–	underdevelopment	–	development	justified	US	intervention	and	disguised	the	
export	of	 its	global	capitalist	 ‘imperialism’	 in	neutral,	technical	and	scientific	 language.56	
For	David	Moore	‘the	insertion	of	the	word	“development”	into	the	lexicon	of	legitimacy	
for	global	capitalism	is	the	most	 important	facet	of	 its	hegemonic	project’.57	Similarly	to	
the	charge	that	European	empires	produced,	and	thereby	controlled,	the	Oriental	‘other’	
‘politically,	 sociologically,	 ideologically,	 scientifically	 and	 imaginatively’	 through	
‘Orientalism’,	it	is	alleged	that	the	US	(with	other	Western	nations	following	its	footsteps)	
produced	and	controlled	the	South	through	‘developmentalism’.58	Yet	even	scholars	who	
see	 development	 as	 a	 tool	 of	 American	 diplomacy	 (or	 imperialism)	 are	 now	 forced	 to	
acknowledge	that	development	as	experienced	in	the	post-war	period	had	at	least	some	
of	 its	 roots	 in	 the	earlier	 colonial	 era.59	Unfortunately,	 for	many,	 this	 genealogy	merely	
confirms	their	suspicions	that	development	is	colonialism	by	another	means;	whereas	in	
actual	 fact	 the	 colonial	 history	 of	 the	 development	 concept	 challenges	 writing	 on	
																																																						
52	Ferguson,	The	Anti-Politics	Machine.	
53	Cooper	and	Packard,	International	Development	and	the	Social	Sciences,	pp.	2-3.	
54	Escobar,	Encountering	Development,	p.	22;	A.	Escobar,	‘Anthropology	and	the	Development	Encounter:	
The	Making	and	Marketing	of	Development	Anthropology’,	American	Ethnologist,	Vol.	18,	No.	4	(1991),	pp.	
675-676;	A.	Escobar,	‘Imagining	a	Post-Development	Era’	in	J.	Crush	(ed.),	Power	of	Development	(London,	
Routledge,	1995),	pp.	213-215;	G.	Rist,	The	History	of	Development:	From	Western	Origins	to	Global	Faith	
(New	York,	Zed	Books,	1997);	Sachs	(ed.),	The	Development	Dictionary;	W.	Sachs,	‘The	Archaeology	of	the	
Development	Idea’,	Interculture,	Vol.	109	(1990),	pp.	1-25.	
55	Among	American	scholars	in	particular,	a	prominent	master	narrative	asserts	that	the	discourse	of	
development	is	American,	starting	with	Truman’s	address	and	based	on	American	ideas	of	progress,	
Wilsonianism	and	the	New	Deal.	See	M.	Frey	and	S.	Kunkel,	‘Writing	the	History	of	Development:	A	Review	
of	the	Recent	Literature’,	Contemporary	European	History,	Vol.	20,	No.	2	(2011),	p.	217.	
56	Sachs	(ed.),	The	Development	Dictionary,	p.	1;	G.	Esteva,	‘Development’,	in	Sachs	(ed.),	The	Development	
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development	that	has	focused	on	abstraction	and	generalisation,	and	questions	theories	
about	 development	 that	 have	 been	 used	 frequently	 to	 try	 to	 ‘explain’	 history	 in	 ‘big	
picture’	narratives.60	
	 Although	 the	 idea	 of	 development	 goes	 back	 to	 at	 least	 the	 European	
enlightenment,	development	as	a	transitive	verb	came	into	common	usage	towards	the	
end	 of	 the	 nineteenth	 century.61	It	 became	 a	more	 orderly	 concept	 at	 the	 turn	 of	 the	
twentieth	 century	 after	 James	 Mill	 probed	 the	 connection	 between	 development	 and	
colonialism,	 and	 the	 concept	 was	 soon	 tied	 together	 with	 the	 idea	 of	 the	 ‘civilising	
mission’.	A	systematic	model,	which	linked	planning,	investment,	science	and	technology	
together	 for	 the	 first	 time	 under	 the	 name	 of	 ‘colonial	 development’,	 emerged	
concurrently	with	British	Colonial	Secretary	Joseph	Chamberlain’s	dictum	of	1895	that	
	
It	is	not	enough	to	occupy	certain	great	spaces	of	the	world’s	surface	unless	you	are	
willing	 to	 develop	 them.	We	 are	 landlords	 of	 a	 great	 estate;	 it	 is	 the	 duty	 of	 the	
landlord	to	develop	his	estate.62		
	
Admittedly,	 colonial	 development	 was	 as	 much	 about	 advancing	 British	 interests	 as	
developing	the	colonies:	a	developed	empire	would	provide	outlets	for	British	investment	
and	markets	for	British	manufactures;	it	would	thus	meet	domestic	demand	for	industrial	
expansion	 and	 employment,	 while	 staving	 off	 economic	 competition	 from	 America,	
Russia	 and	 Germany.63 	Equally,	 the	 colonies	 were	 imagined	 to	 be	 full	 of	 untapped	
resources	that	awaited	capital	and	technical	know-how	to	open	them	up.64	Although	the	
parsimonious	Gladstonian	Treasury	ultimately	blocked	Chamberlain’s	grandiose	plans	for	
colonial	roads,	railways	and	irrigation,	the	latter	had	placed	colonial	development	on	the	
agenda.	 Most	 importantly,	 his	 was	 a	 concept	 of	 development	 that	 linked	 science,	
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technology	 and	 state	 agency	 –	 a	 triumvirate	 that	 would	 resonate	 loudly	 in	 the	 near	
future.65	
	 For	 the	 time	 being,	 enthusiasm	 for	 colonial	 development	 along	 these	 lines	was	
muted.	When	officials	 in	Britain	and	France	(whose	own	commitment	to	mise	en	valeur	
was	 being	 challenged)	 tried	 to	 implement	 development	 schemes,	 their	 governments	
resisted.66	(Rejection	 stemmed	 from	 two	 sources:	 firstly,	 recalcitrant	 Treasuries	 insisted	
that	 colonies	 should	 be	 self-sufficient	 and	 that	 they	 should	 contribute	 to	 the	 imperial	
metropole	 –	 not	 the	 other	 way	 around.	 Secondly,	 there	 was	 some	 concern	 that	
development	 raised	 too	many	expectations	and	could	be	 tied	politically	 to	 the	wartime	
contributions	of	the	colonies.67)	The	British	government	 in	particular	promoted	the	idea	
that	development	for	‘natives’	was	to	be	along	the	lines	of	their	own	civilisation,	and	that	
the	 colonial	 power	 should	meddle	 as	 little	 as	 possible	 in	 this	 ‘natural’	 and	 ‘traditional’	
state	of	affairs.68	There	followed	a	struggle	in	the	Colonial	Office	to	combat	these	ideas,	
but	 they	 persisted	 into	 the	 1930s,	 during	 which	 time	 the	 depression	 deepened	 the	
inward-looking	nature	of	 the	 imperial	 regimes.69	Importantly,	 this	meant	 that	 structural	
problems	in	the	colonies	–	including	their	mono-export	economies,	their	lack	of	domestic	
markets	and	the	expatriation	of	profits	by	foreign	investors	–	were	left	unaddressed.70	
	 As	 the	 imperial	economy	 recovered	 from	 the	depression,	however,	wage	 labour	
and	 urbanisation	 undermined	 ‘tradition’	 in	 spite	 of	 efforts	 to	 protect	 it.71	Meanwhile,	
although	 the	 imperial	 economy	 was	 improving,	 social	 conflict	 worsened:	 a	 series	 of	
strikes	and	riots	took	place	in	the	West	Indies,	Northern	Rhodesia	and	African	port	cities,	
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including	Mombasa,	between	1935	and	1938.	Already	committed	to	a	more	‘constructive’	
concept	 of	 colonial	 development,	 the	 Colonial	 Office,	 and	 in	 particular	 the	 Colonial	
Secretary,	Malcolm	Macdonald,	used	these	riots	and	disturbances	as	a	lever	to	prise	open	
Treasury	coffers	for	social	and	welfare	spending	in	the	colonies.72	In	such	a	manner	was	
the	Colonial	Office	finally	able	to	‘get	away	from	the	old	principle	that	Colonies	can	only	
have	what	they	themselves	can	afford	to	pay	for…’;	thereafter,	they	would	have	‘what	a	
first-class	 Colonial	 power	 may	 reasonably	 be	 expected	 to	 provide’. 73 	The	 Colonial	
Development	and	Welfare	Act	of	1940	was	the	most	notable	result	of	these	internal	and	
external	pressures.	Under	the	act,	money	was	to	be	spent	for	the	first	time	on	housing,	
education	 and	 social	 services:	 the	 aim	 was	 to	 make	 colonial	 populations	 ‘happier,	
healthier	[and]	more	prosperous’,	morally	re-arming	the	entire	imperial	project.74	Though	
the	war	restricted	the	amount	that	could	be	spent	until	the	later	1940s,	there	followed	an	
obvious	 intensification	of	government	activity	 in	 the	colonies,	and	particularly	 in	British	
Africa,	 which	 has	 been	 termed	 the	 ‘second	 colonial	 occupation’.75 	This	 ‘occupation’	
promised	not	only	economic	development,	but	also	welfare	and	an	 improved	quality	of	
life	 to	 colonial	 peoples	who	 –	 in	 the	 context	 of	 ‘hot’	 and	 Cold	War,	 and	 the	 resultant	
economic	strife	for	a	severely	indebted	Britain	–	were	increasingly	referred	to	as	imperial	
citizens	as	opposed	to	inconsequential	subjects.76		
	 Where	 protective	 trusteeship	 and	 the	 civilising	 mission	 had	 sown	 economic	
stagnation,	social	unrest	and	political	dissent,	late	colonial	development	aimed	to	remove	
the	 grievances	 felt	 in	 the	 colonies,	 thereby	 defusing	 criticism	 of	 colonial	 rule	 and	
restabilising	the	imperial	ediface.	Citizenship,	and	the	entitlement	to	development	that	it	
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guaranteed,	was	supposed	to	bind	the	colonies	to	the	imperial	centre;	development	was	
about	 making	 citizenship	 worthwhile	 and	 integrating	 modernising	 citizens	 (and	 elites)	
more	closely	with	the	apparatus	of	empire	by	increasing	their	financial	and	political	stake	
in	its	institutions.77	Traditional	justifications	of	colonial	rule	had,	therefore,	been	replaced	
by	developmentalist	colonialism.	Importantly,	moreover,	the	‘second	colonial	occupation’	
was	based	on	science	and	 technology,	which	officials	 felt	would	help	 to	 rationalise	and	
restore	the	credibility	of	British	action	in	the	colonial	sphere.78	(As	discussed	below,	it	was	
around	 this	 time	 that	 the	modern	NGO	 –	 and	Oxfam	 itself	 –	 took	 shape,	 and	 this	 had	
profound	 implications	 for	 how	NGOs	 understood	 development	 as	 a	 concept,	 how	 they	
saw	their	own	place	in	the	development	endeavour	and	how	they	felt	their	efforts	ought	
to	complement	those	of	the	state.)	
	 Yet	if	colonial	officials	recognised	the	potential	for	the	concept	of	development	to	
depoliticise	the	colonial	origins	of	contemporary	poverty	(by	recasting	political,	social	and	
economic	 problems	 as	 technical	 ones	 that	 could	 be	 fixed	 by	 expert	 planning,	 scientific	
knowledge,	 modern	 technology	 and	 rational	 intervention)	 any	 hopes	 that	 the	 idea	 of	
development	 could	 turn	 political	 controversy	 into	 a	 technical	 issue	 were	 dashed	 fairly	
quickly. 79 	Instead,	 development	 rapidly	 became	 a	 ‘claim-making	 construct’	 for	 anti-
colonial	 movements. 80 	As	 development	 was	 quantifiable,	 it	 was	 possible	 to	 turn	
inadequate	colonial	efforts	back	against	the	empire	by	highlighting	their	insufficiency.	In	
Kenya,	 the	 Kikuyu	 Central	 Association	 (KCA)	 and	 Kenya	 African	 Union	 (KAU)	 began	 to	
measure	 their	 country’s	 lot	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 imperial	 rhetoric	 and	 criticised	 the	 local	
government	in	the	language	of	London.81	For	its	own	part,	the	Kenya	government	refused	
calls	for	development	that	did	not	fit	with	the	trope	of	the	lazy	African	(who	needed	to	be	
compelled	to	do	what	was	in	his	or	her	interests)	and	resisted	Colonial	Office	pressure	to	
establish	a	department	to	deal	with	the	social	welfare	of	all	races.82	Only	in	response	to	
the	 Mau	 Mau	 revolt	 did	 the	 local	 administration	 concede	 the	 principle	 of	 colonial	
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development	 outlined	 in	 London:	 from	 1952,	 the	 government	 removed	 the	 remaining	
restrictions	on	Africans	growing	cash	crops	and	 improved	access	to	 land	for	progressive	
African	farmers.83	Soon	after,	 the	Swynnerton	Plan	–	 implemented	 in	1954	–	attempted	
to	 create	 a	 buffer	 yeomanry	 class	 between	Mau	Mau	 rebels	 and	 the	 state	 by	 allowing	
African	production	 for	export	markets.84	Such	development	did	not,	however,	draw	 the	
sting	 from	 attacks	 on	 the	 colonial	 government,	 which	 were	 increasingly	 framed	 using	
metropolitan	 rhetoric.	 The	 Kenyan	 trade	 union	 leader	 Tom	 Mboya	 appropriated	
metropolitan	 development	 ideas	 particularly	 successfully,	 posing	 his	 demands	 in	 a	
language	of	modernity	and	development	that	could	not	be	rejected	easily	as	backward-
looking	 and	 atavistic.85	Indeed,	 his	 and	 other	 African	 political	 parties	 could	 now	 argue	
that	 true	 development	 required	 sovereign	 control.	 In	 such	 a	 way,	 the	 idea	 of	
development	served	to	bestow	added	utility	onto	the	idea	of	an	independent	nation	state	
and	 offered	 African	 elites	 the	 chance	 to	 temporarily	 disguise	 potentially	 destructive	
cultural	and	ethnic	cleavages	behind	an	inclusive	developmental	nationalism.86	
	 Hence,	 a	 development	 concept	 based	 on	 state	 intervention,	 economic	 growth,	
higher	 standards	 of	 living,	 technology	 and	 scientific	 or	 expert	 knowledge,	 became	 the	
cornerstone	of	decolonising	nations	 like	Kenya	 in	the	1950s	and	1960s.87	The	era	of	the	
‘developmental	state’	thus	crosses	the	colonial	–	post-colonial	divide,	stretching	from	the	
1940s	 into	 the	 1970s	 as	 post-colonial	 elites	 justified	 their	 positions	 (and	 sought	 to	
marginalise	 opponents)	 using	 the	 rhetoric	 of	 development.	 For	 James	 Ferguson,	 the	
concept	 of	 development	 subsequently	 facilitated	 the	 entrenchment	 and	 expansion	 of	
bureaucratic	state	power	in	these	newly	independent	nations.	By	prescribing	and	funding	
‘neutral’	 and	 technical	 solutions	 to	 poverty,	 Ferguson	 alleges,	 the	 concept	 of	
development	not	only	depoliticised	 the	 causes	of	poverty,	 but	 also	provided	 cover	 and	
legitimation	 for	 the	 spread	 of	 the	 bureaucratic	 developmental	 state	 machine	 as	 a	
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response	to	underdevelopment.	In	Lesotho,	he	found	the	development	apparatus	to	be	‘a	
machine	 for	 reinforcing	 and	 expanding	 the	 exercise	 of	 bureaucratic	 state	 power	which	
incidentally	 takes	 “poverty”	 as	 its	 point	 of	 entry’.88	With	 external	 support	 the	 Lesotho	
government	constructed	administrative	buildings,	a	police	station,	an	immigration	office	
and	 a	 connecting	 road,	 and	 established	 agricultural	 extension	 and	 medical	 services	 in	
areas	over	which	the	state	formerly	had	limited	control.	In	such	a	way,	Ferguson	argues,	
the	instrumental	effect	of	development	interventions	–	the	expansion	of	governance	into	
areas	 formerly	 weakly	 governed	 –	 combined	 with	 the	 failure	 of	 such	 interventions	 to	
‘solve’	underdevelopment,	drives	their	constant	renewal	ahead	of	any	limited	evidence	of	
success	in	their	much-publicised	developmental	objectives.	Theorising	from	this	example,	
Ferguson	 concludes	 that	 the	 removal	 of	 the	 political	 aspects	 of	 poverty	 from	
development	 interventions	 is	 an	 integral	 part	 of	 development	 discourse,	 and	 that	
development	 organisations	 such	 as	Oxfam	 are	 complicit	 –	 intentionally	 or	 not	 –	 in	 the	
‘suspension	of	politics’	from	highly	political	operations.	
	 In	Kenya,	the	challenge	and	purpose	of	independent	nationhood	was	certainly	felt	
to	 be	 synonymous	 with	 the	 idea	 of	 national	 development,	 and	 this	 justified	 the	
concretisation	of	the	colonial	‘developmental	state’	apparatus	alongside	many	other	(less	
savoury)	elements	of	the	colonial	state,	 including	the	powerful	provincial	administration	
and	the	ruthless	suppression	of	dissident	voices.	Development	would,	moreover,	perform	
a	 marked	 political	 function:	 the	 portrayal	 of	 the	 state	 as	 an	 agent	 of	 modernity	
legitimised	 the	 expansion	 of	 its	 bureaucratic	 control.	Meanwhile,	 in	 deciding	where	 to	
locate	 development	 projects,	 boreholes,	 schools,	 medical	 facilities	 and	 other	 services,	
President	Kenyatta’s	government	could	reward	allies	and	punish	enemies;	the	state	could	
create	jobs,	improve	the	quality	of	life	and	facilitate	access	to	agriculture	for	its	favourites	
and	supporters,	while	at	the	same	time	casting	a	watchful	eye	over	suspect	populations	
or	 denying	 opponents	 their	 place	 in	 Kenyan	 development.	 Furthermore,	 Kenyatta’s	
doctrine	of	 ‘African	Socialism’	was	an	attempt	to	obscure	the	political	action	performed	
by	the	government	through	development	interventions	and	to	silence	alternatives	to	his	
development	apparatus.	To	do	so,	it	combined	modernising	rhetoric	with	a	smattering	of	
African	 ‘tradition’;	 ‘African	Socialism’	was	an	archetypal	 ‘anti-politics	machine’	doctrine:	
by	reducing	poverty	to	a	technical	issue,	prescribing	‘neutral’	and	‘scientific’	solutions	to	
that	poverty,	and	condemning	and	silencing	opponents	to	such	interventions	by	labelling	
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them	as	 ‘backward’,	 it	was	an	attempt	to	shore	up	the	bureaucratic-executive	Kenyatta	
state.89	
	 Yet,	states’	attempts	to	portray	themselves	as	beneficent	agents	of	development	
do	 not	 completely	 insulate	 them	 from	 having	 their	 populist	 rhetoric	 thrust	 back	 upon	
them.	As	discussed	above	in	reference	to	the	era	of	decolonisation,	what	is	intended	as	a	
discourse	of	control	can	be	appropriated	and	turned	into	a	discourse	of	entitlement:	the	
Kenyatta	government	itself	soon	came	in	for	a	great	deal	of	criticism	due	to	its	failure	to	
distribute	 the	 ‘fruits	of	 independence’,	 and	Oxfam	would	attempt	 to	 cajole	 the	Kenyan	
state	to	 fulfil	 its	own	rhetoric.90	The	history	of	development	 is,	 therefore,	 the	history	of	
how	 the	 concept	 has	 been	 mobilised	 and	 deflected	 to	 myriad	 ends.91	Referring	 to	 a	
‘discourse	of	development’	that	serves	predictable	functions	imbues	the	concept	with	an	
artificially	unified	character.92	This	is	not	to	contend	that	development	does	not	perform,	
in	certain	contexts,	the	depoliticising	and	disempowering	functions	that	deconstructors	of	
development	 imply.	 Rather,	 it	 is	 to	make	 clear	 that	 the	 development	 apparatus	 is	 not	
monolithic.	As	Dorothy	Hodgson,	 Sabine	Planel	and	Hannah	Whittaker	have	written	 for	
colonial	 Tanganyika	 and	 post-colonial	 Ethiopia	 and	 North-Eastern	 Kenya	 respectively,	
state	 development	 interventions	 –	 through	 the	 distribution	 of	 fertilisers,	 seeds	 and	
agricultural	practices	or	through	the	settlement	of	pastoralists	–	can	serve	to	extend	state	
power	 and	 control	 over	 their	 (often	 troublesome)	 subject	 populations.93	Development	
experts	 can,	 meanwhile,	 neutralise	 conflict-laden	 encounters	 with	 scientific	 jargon	 or	
disguise	 political	 issues	 as	 technical	 ones.	 They	 can	 also	 help	 to	 camouflage	 the	
government	 of	 men	 as	 the	 mere	 administration	 of	 ‘things’,	 opening	 up	 the	 lives	 of	
supposed	 beneficiaries	 as	 objects	 of	 knowledge	 and	 intervention,	 and	 linking	 the	
‘periphery’	 with	 the	 ‘centre’	 –	 both	 in	 a	 global	 sense	 and	 within	 nations.94	But	 it	 is	
important	 not	 to	 assume	 that	 the	 functions	 that	 development	 may	 serve	 explain	 and	
delegitimise	 the	 institution	 as	 a	 whole.	 The	 following	 thesis	 demonstrates	 how	 Oxfam	
itself	performed	some	of	these	depoliticising	 functions,	but	only	 for	a	short	period	and,	
																																																						
89	Chapter	one	discusses	this	in	greater	detail.	
90	Cooper	and	Packard,	International	Development	and	the	Social	Sciences,	p.	4.	
91	Cooper	and	Packard,	International	Development	and	the	Social	Sciences,	p.	30.	
92	Crewe	and	Harrison,	Whose	Development?,	p.	17.	
93	D.	Hodgson,	‘Taking	Stock:	State	Control,	Ethnic	Identity	and	Pastoralist	Development	in	Tanganyika,	
1948-1958’,	The	Journal	of	African	History,	Vol.	41,	No.	1	(2000),	pp.	55-78;	S.	Planel,	‘A	View	of	a	
Bureaucratic	Developmental	State:	Local	Governance	and	Agricultural	Extension	in	Rural	Ethiopia’,	Journal	
of	Eastern	African	Studies,	Vol.	8,	No.	3	(2014),	pp.	420-437;	H.	Whittaker,	‘Forced	Villagization	During	the	
Shifta	Conflict	in	Kenya,	ca.	1963-1968’,	International	Journal	of	African	Historical	Studies,	Vol.	45,	No.	3	
(2012),	pp.	343-364.	
94	Crewe	and	Harrison,	Whose	Development?,	p.	109;	DuBois,	‘The	Governance	of	the	Third	World’,	p.	21.	
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importantly,	 only	 while	 it	 endeavoured	 to	 challenge	 the	 government	 to	 fulfil	 its	
developmental	 mandate.	 When	 this	 highly	 political	 objective	 failed,	 Oxfam	 ceased	 its	
direct	 support	 for	 state-led	 developmental	 efforts;	 thus	Oxfam	was	 never	 a	 cog	 in	 the	
‘anti-politics	machine’.	Hence,	 there	 is	no	substitute	 for	analysing	specific	 temporal	and	
spatial	 contexts	 and	 demonstrating	 the	 hybridity	 of	 development	 as	 promoted	 by	
organisations	like	Oxfam,	each	with	differing	and	shifting	motivations	and	constellations	
of	 interested	 individuals,	 each	 interacting	 with	 diverse	 national	 contexts,	 and	 each	
operating	with	varied	room	for	manoeuvre	–	as,	for	instance,	pertained	in	Kenya	between	
1963	 and	 2002.	 In	 this	 historicised	 sense,	 development	 intervention	 is	 a	much	messier	
process	than	theories	of	Western	hegemony	suppose.95	
	
	
	
NEO-COLONIALISM OR NEO-PATRIMONIALISM? THE ‘KENYA DEBATE’ 
 
The	 fallacy	 of	 assuming	 that	 development	 serves	 as	 a	 one-way	 expression	 of	 power	
(whether	internally	or	internationally)	is	perhaps	best	highlighted	by	an	academic	debate	
concerning	Kenya	 that	engaged	scholars	 in	 the	1970s.	The	 ‘Kenya	Debate’	 started	after	
Colin	 Leys	 attempted	 to	 prove	 that	 Kenya’s	 post-colonial	 development	 was	 inevitably	
(and	 permanently)	 ‘dependent’	 on	 external	 powers	 to	 the	 same	 extent	 as	 it	 had	 been	
during	 the	 colonial	 era.	 His	 argument	 was	 a	 product	 of	 its	 time,	 for	 during	 the	 1970s	
‘dependency’	 theory	 –	 the	 most	 prominent	 left-wing	 critique	 of	 capitalism	 and	
development	prior	to	the	shift	onto	discourse	analysis	–	was	in	vogue	in	academic	circles.	
Dependency	theory	was	the	 left’s	effort	to	update	Marx	to	fit	the	post-colonial	world.96	
One	of	 the	 first	attempts	 to	do	 this	was	made	by	Paul	Baran	 in	his	1957	book,	Political	
Economy	 of	 Growth,97	but	 it	 would	 take	 another	 decade	 of	 failed	 industrialisation	 and	
uneven	 development	 across	 the	 ‘third	 world’	 before	 his	 conclusion	 –	 that	 ‘the	 role	 of	
monopoly	capitalism	and	imperialism	in	the	advanced	countries	and	economic	and	social	
																																																						
95	E.	Harrison,	‘The	Monolithic	Development	Machine?’,	in	P.	van	Ufford	and	A.	Kumar	(eds.),	A	Moral	
Critique	of	Development:	In	Search	of	Global	Responsibilities	(New	York,	2003),	p.	103.	
96	Marx	had	said	little	about	development	in	the	colonial	periphery	other	than	that	colonialism	would	speed	
the	adoption	of	capitalism	in	‘backward’	parts	of	the	world,	hastening	their	eventual	embrace	of	socialism.	
See	Arndt,	Economic	Development:	The	History	of	an	Idea	(London,	University	of	Chicago	Press,	1987),	p.	
116.	
97	Baran	argued	that	rather	than	the	engine	of	development	on	the	road	to	socialism,	international	
capitalism	was	an	obstacle	to	true	development.	See	P.	Baran,	The	Political	Economy	of	Growth	(New	York,	
Monthly	Review	Press,	1957);	Arndt,	Economic	Development,	p.	118;	M.	Blomström	and	B.	Hettne,	
Development	Theory	in	Transition:	The	Dependency	Debate	and	Beyond:	Third	World	Responses	(London,	
Zed	Books,	1984),	p.	35.	
	 35	
backwardness	 in	 the	 underdeveloped	 countries	 are	 intimately	 related’	 –	 was	 readily	
adapted	into	a	‘dependency’	theory.98	In	1967,	Andre	Gunder	Frank	published	his	widely	
read	exposition	on	the	‘development	of	underdevelopment’,	which	postulated	that	rather	
than	 the	 mere	 persistence	 of	 feudal	 institutions,	 or	 a	 temporary	 deviation	 from	 the	
‘normal’	evolutionary	development	schema	(as	seen	in	the	West),	underdevelopment	in	
the	 ‘periphery’	was	a	necessary	partner	of	development	 in	the	West,	and	that	the	total	
penetration	 of	 the	 ‘periphery’	 by	 the	 capitalist	 system	 caused	 its	 underdevelopment.99	
Frank,	along	with	Dudley	Seers	and	Samir	Amin,	advocated	delinking	 from	the	Western	
capitalist	system	in	favour	of	self-reliance.100	
Applying	dependency	theory	to	Kenya,	Leys	wrote	of	three	insuperable	obstacles	
to	 Kenyan	 development:	 the	 structure	 of	 the	 economy	 inherited	 from	 colonialism;	 the	
monopoly	 power	 of	 foreign	 capital	 on	which	 African	 business	was	 dependent;	 and	 the	
personal	 and	 elite	 rule	 of	 the	 Kenyan	 state	 by	 the	 President	 and	 his	 associates.	 Other	
experts	on	the	country’s	economy	soon	disputed	his	application	of	dependency	theory	to	
Kenya,	however.	Noting	that	a	capital	accumulating	class	had	preceded	colonial	rule	and	
in	 some	 circumstances	 benefited	 from	 it	 –	 becoming	 dominant	 in	 post-colonial	 politics	
and	 the	post-colonial	 economy	–	 scholars	 such	as	Nicola	 Swainson	and	Michael	Cowen	
argued	 that	 Kenya	 had	 the	 means	 to	 overcome	 any	 constraints	 to	 capitalist	
development.101	Debate	 over	 whether	 economic	 growth	 was	 viable	 in	 the	 longer-term	
and	 how	 far	 capitalist	 relations	 of	 production	 had	 actually	 spread	 in	 Kenya	 eventually	
degenerated	 into	 two	 incompatible	 but	 equally	 plausible	 ways	 of	 reading	 the	 same	
evidence.	Nonetheless,	the	argument	that	development	in	the	‘periphery’	was	impossible	
																																																						
98	See	Blomström	and	Hettne,	Development	Theory	in	Transition,	pp.	49,	65;	Arndt,	Economic	Development,	
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99	A.	G.	Frank,	‘The	Development	of	Underdevelopment’,	in	R.	Rhodes	(ed.),	Imperialism	and	
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Leys,	Underdevelopment	in	Kenya:	The	Political	Economy	of	Neo-Colonialism	1964-1971	(London,	
Heinemann,	1974);	M.	Godfrey	and	S.	Langdon,	'Partners	in	Underdevelopment?:	The	Transnationalization	
Thesis	in	a	Kenyan	Context',	Journal	of	Commonwealth	and	Comparative	Politics,	Vol.	14,	No.	1	(1976),	pp.	
42-63;	N.	Swainson,	The	Development	of	Corporate	Capitalism	in	Kenya,	1918-1977	(Berkeley,	University	of	
California	Press,	1980);	C.	Leys	'Accumulation,	Class	Formation	and	Dependency:	Kenya',	in	M.	Fransman	
(ed.),	Industry	and	Accumulation	in	Africa	(London,	Heinemann,	1982);	N.	Swainson,	'Indigenous	Capitalism	
in	Postcolonial	Kenya',	in	P.	Lubeck	(ed.),	The	African	Bourgeoisie:	Capitalist	Development	in	Nigeria,	Kenya	
and	the	Ivory	Coast	(Colorado,	Lynne	Rienner	Publishers,	1987),	pp.	140-160;	S.	Langdon,	'Industry	and	
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was	 shown	 to	 be	 incorrect. 102 	Those	 who	 subscribed	 to	 dependency	 theory	 were,	
certainly,	 too	 deterministic	 and	 economistic,	 ignoring	 as	 they	 did	 the	 role	 of	 local	
exploiting	classes	 in	 the	economic	problems	 facing	developing	nations	and	 focusing	 too	
readily	on	the	need	to	sweep	away	the	capitalist	system	tout	court.	Attempts	to	make	the	
dependency	theory	universal	had	in	fact	made	it	tautological	and	oblivious	to	the	political	
struggles	as	regards	development	that	take	place	in	specific	contexts.103	
In	 reality,	 uneven	 development	 is	 far	 more	 ‘textured’,	 complex	 and	 historically	
contingent	than	an	overarching	theory	such	as	dependency	allows.104	Indeed,	Leys	would	
soon	 argue	 that	 the	 elite	 dominance	 of	 agricultural	 land	 and	 manufacturing,	 the	
particular	 ‘gatekeeping’	 state	 apparatus	 (discussed	 shortly)	 and	 the	 manipulation	 of	
ethnic	divisions	for	political	and	economic	power	–	each	to	a	certain	extent	resulting	from	
the	particular	 pattern	of	 development	 engendered	by	decolonisation	–	 created	 tension	
between	entrenched	capital	from	the	early	post-independence	years	and	the	longer-term	
needs	of	Kenya’s	economy.	Thus	historical	political	conditions,	not	structural	constraints,	
were	to	blame	for	Kenya’s	underwhelming	economic	performance	since	independence.105	
By	 taking	 history	 into	 account	 in	 such	 a	 way	 it	 is	 possible	 to	 talk	 of	 the	 asymmetrical	
nature	 of	 colonial	 and	 post-colonial	 development	 without	 subscribing	 to	 the	 idea	 that	
development	 is	an	exogenous	 imposition	on	Africa	by	the	West.106	Overarching	theories	
regarding	 the	 discourse	 of	 development	 (which,	 in	 fact,	 offered	 anti-colonial	 elites	 a	
chance	to	push	for	independence	and	assert	their	control	in	newly	decolonising	nations),	
and	 dependent	 development	 (shown	 to	 be	 misleading	 by	 the	 Kenya	 debate),	 are	 less	
useful	 for	 critiquing	 development	 practices	 than	 nuanced	 historical	 analyses	 of	 the	
particular	 pattern	 of	 colonial	 development	 and	 decolonisation,	 which	 defined	
development	as	a	relationship	between	unequal	states	(without	determining	the	precise	
outcome	 of	 such	 a	 relationship). 107 	Former	 colonies	 went	 from	 being	 entitled	 to	
development	assistance	from	colonial	metropoles	to	being	independent	countries	poorly	
endowed	for	the	future	due	to	the	deep	structural	distortions	in	economy	and	society	left	
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106	Cooper	argues	that	the	‘Washington	consensus’	itself	was	‘neither	a	full	consensus	nor	a	durable	one’.	
Cooper,	‘Writing	the	History	of	Development’,	p.	16.	
107	Cooper,	‘Writing	the	History	of	Development’,	p.	17.	
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by	economic	dualism	and	colonial	rule,	and	with	no	enforceable	claims	on	richer	nations	
for	assistance	to	overcome	these	problems.	Moreover,	at	the	moment	of	 independence	
there	was	already	a	European-dominated	development	apparatus	consisting	of	experts,	
administrators,	 scientists,	 bureaucracies	 and	 finance,	 which	 could	 be	 provided	 to	
adequately	 ‘supplicant’	 nations. 108 	As	 such,	 if	 development	 was	 not	 a	 hegemonic	
knowledge-power	 complex,	 there	 was	 unevenness	 in	 the	 relationship	 between	 donors	
and	recipients,	which	crystallised	immediately	with	decolonisation.109	
The	 particular	 intertwined	 history	 of	 development	 and	 decolonisation	 had	
important	legacies,	in	particular	for	post-colonial	governance.	Most	far-reaching	of	all	was	
the	 fact	 that	 governments	 of	 newly	 independent	 but	 impoverished	 nations	would	 find	
more	 utility	 in	 cultivating	 patron-client	 ties	 –	 both	 with	 certain	 politically	 important	
groups	 within	 their	 own	 borders	 and	 with	 rich	 nations	 outside	 –	 than	 in	 cultivating	
national	 legitimacy	 at	 home.	 As	 discussed	 above,	 inheriting	 a	 state	 apparatus,	
infrastructure	 and	 idea	 of	 development	 that	 was	 distinctly	 colonial,	 post-colonial	
governing	elites	 like	Kenyatta	used	repressive	colonial	 legislation	to	restrict	and	repress	
separatist	groups	or	challengers	to	government	authority	and	made	use	of	 technocratic	
development	 ideas	 in	 an	 attempt	 to	 silence	 alternatives	 to	 their	 economic	 policies.110	
Equally	 important	was	 the	 fact	 that	after	 taking	over	an	extraverted	economy,	open	 to	
and	 reliant	 on	 world	 markets,	 elites	 used	 their	 control	 over	 the	 ‘gate’	 between	 the	
national	 and	 international	 economy	 to	 centralise	 public	 resources	 in	 their	 own	 hands.	
These	 resources	 were	 then	 used	 to	 solidify	 the	 ediface	 of	 government	 by	 buying	 off	
potential	challengers	to	the	regime	in	complex	patronage	networks.	Termed	‘gatekeeper	
states’	 by	 Frederick	 Cooper,	 like	 colonial	 states	 before	 them	many	 newly	 independent	
governments	attempted	to	ensure	that	economic	and	political	relations	were	tied	tightly	
together	 and	 passed	 through	 ‘nodes’	 that	 only	 they	 controlled. 111 	In	 Kenya,	 the	
government	 elite	made	 sure	 to	position	 itself	 as	 a	 broker	of	 relations	between	Kenyan	
society,	 the	market	 and	 international	 organisations,	 controlling	 the	 all-important	 ‘gate’	
between	 peasant	 producers	 and	 multinational	 corporations.	 This	 control	 enriched	 the	
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elite	at	the	apex	of	government	through	kickbacks	and	other	forms	of	corruption	and	paid	
for	the	patronage	necessary	to	maintain	a	modicum	of	internal	legitimacy.112	
Across	Africa	 this	 patronage-based	 legitimacy	was	most	often	 reliant	on	 vertical	
ties	between	ethnic	 leaders	and	 their	 supporters.	As	politics	became	a	winner-takes-all	
struggle	for	control	of	the	‘gate’	between	national	elites	who	used	their	ethnic	groups	as	
a	support	base,	horizontal	ties	such	as	the	concept	of	the	nation	or	any	sense	of	national	
citizenship	 were	 debased	 in	 favour	 of	 ‘political	 tribalism’. 113 	The	 possibilities	 and	
experience	of	development	were,	then,	vastly	different	depending	on	the	extent	to	which	
networks	 of	 clientage	 and	 neo-patrimonialism	 –	 instead	 of	 citizenship	 or	 nationhood	 –	
shaped	 its	 contours.	 In	 Kenya	 and	 elsewhere,	 ‘gatekeeping’,	 ‘extraversion’	 and	 the	
structural	 distortions	 of	 economic	 dualism	 engendered	 by	 the	 particular	 pattern	 of	
colonial	development	–	and	cemented	in	place	by	the	statism	and	technocracy	adopted	
by	post-colonial	leaders	–	are	at	the	root	of	the	‘failure’	of	development	that	Oxfam	staff	
discussed	 in	 the	1980s.	This	 is	not	 to	absolve	 the	numerous	authoritarian	or	dictatorial	
past	 leaders	 of	 independent	 African	 nations	 of	 the	 repeated	 pillaging	 and	 violent	
destabilisation	 of	 their	 own	 countries.	 Rather,	 it	 is	 to	 acknowledge	 that	 many	 of	 the	
sources	 of	 neo-patrimonialism,	 rent-seeking	 and	 political	 tribalism	 can	 be	 found	 in	 the	
experience	 of	 indirect	 rule,	 decentralised	 despotism	 and	 the	 exploitation	 of	 ethnic	
difference	in	the	colonial	period,	while	the	post-colonial	pattern	of	trade,	investment	and	
aid	distribution	 reinforced	 the	 inegalitarian	political	 and	economic	 structures	of	 former	
colonies.114	For	Africans	at	all	levels,	agency	has	too	often	been	possible	only	possible	in	
the	tightest	of	corners.115	
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Constitutional	Referendum’,	African	Studies,	Vol.	65,	No.	2,	pp.	251-252;	F.	Holmquist,	F.	Weaver	and	M.	
Ford,	‘The	Structural	Development	of	Kenya’s	Political	Economy’,	African	Studies	Review,	Vol.	37,	No.	1	
(1994),	pp.	69-105.	
115	Unfortunately,	many	of	the	‘solutions’	advocated	in	response	to	theories	of	development	as	a	
hegemonic	project	reify	indigenous	agency,	practices	and	social	movements	uncritically,	ignoring	the	
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	 For	these	reasons,	it	is	no	longer	possible	to	avoid	the	analysis	of	specific	contexts	
by	 way	 of	 ahistorical	 and	 decontextualised	 praise	 or	 denunciation	 of	 development.	 To	
paraphrase	 Cooper,	 the	 foregoing	 emphasises	 the	 importance	 of	 questioning	
development	 interventions	 historically	 by	 asking	 who	 intervenes,	 for	 what	 reasons,	
through	what	relationships	and	to	what	effect.	The	following	thesis	responds	to	this	call	
and	takes	history	as	the	most	appropriate	methodology	for	studying	development,	since	
states,	development	experts,	international	organisations	and	financial	institutions	as	well	
as	the	‘objects’	of	intervention	–	the	farmer,	the	peasant	and	the	worker	among	others	–	
bring	their	own	pasts	and	interests	for	the	future	to	the	development	encounter.116	Non-
governmental	 organisations	 such	 as	 Oxfam	 are	 just	 one	 of	 these	 development	 ‘actors’	
about	which	researchers	need	to	ask	historical	questions,	but	the	task	takes	on	an	added	
urgency	 because	 to	 date	 NGOs	 have	 been	 treated	 generically,	 and	 therefore	
inappropriately,	by	critics	of	the	development	endeavour.	
	
	
	
NGOs: MAGIC BULLETS OR MERELY THE LATEST COMPRADORS 
(COMPRANGOs)? 
 
An	NGO	is	most	commonly	defined	as	an	organisation	that	is	private,	self-governing,	non-
profit,	 and	 where	 any	 income	 is	 channelled	 back	 into	 the	 primary	 focus	 of	 the	
organisation.	 This	 is	 most	 often	 the	 relief	 of	 poverty	 through	 humanitarian	 activity,	
whether	by	emergency	relief	or	programmes	of	economic	and	social	development.117	The	
term	 ‘NGO’	was	 first	 used	 in	 a	 1950	UN	 Resolution	 as	 a	 designation	 for	 the	 non-state	
organisations	 that	 could	be	accredited	 to	 the	Economic	 and	Social	 Council.118	However,	
the	 history	 of	 organisations	 that	 fall	 under	 such	 a	 definition	 dates	 back	much	 further,	
while	 the	history	of	 voluntary	 action	 itself	 far	 predates	 the	 appearance	of	NGOs	under	
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116	Cooper,	‘Writing	the	History	of	Development’,	p.	20.	
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32.	
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any	moniker.119	Charitable	activity	directed	at	Africa	by	the	West	at	first	accompanied	and	
supported	 the	 colonial	 empire.	 It	 was	 nearly	 exclusively	 missionary	 in	 character,	 with	
somewhere	between	40	and	60	per	cent	of	all	health,	education,	water	and	food-security	
services	 in	 colonial	 Africa	 provided	 by	 churches.	 Such	 intervention	 was	 justified	 as	 a	
manner	of	delivering	 civilisation	 to	 colonial	 subjects.120	Many	NGOs	 trace	 their	 roots	 to	
these	missionary	groups	–	opening	the	sector	up	to	the	criticism	that	NGOs	have	always	
served	 imperial	 projects	 (as	discussed	below)	–	but	 the	modern	NGO	 in	 fact	 started	 to	
take	 shape,	 alongside	 the	 development	 concept,	 in	 interwar	 Europe.	 It	was	 during	 this	
period	that	a	more	secular,	institutional	and	international	type	of	organisation	emerged,	
one	that	preferred	to	focus	on	need	rather	than	identity	when	providing	assistance.121	
	 Yet	if	the	interwar	period	was	important	for	the	emergence	of	the	modern	NGO,	
the	 Second	World	War	was	 formative.	 The	devastating	effects	of	 the	war	provided	 the	
grounds	 for	 the	 proliferation	 of	 secular,	 internationally	 oriented	 organisations	 such	 as	
Oxfam	 (established	 1942)	 and	 CARE	 (1946).	 In	 addition,	 the	 emergence	 of	 the	welfare	
state	 in	 the	 aftermath	of	 conflict	 had	 a	particularly	 strong	 impact	 on	organisations	 like	
Oxfam	 by	 redefining	 legitimate	 charity	 and	 the	 role	 of	 state	 and	 non-state	 actors.122	
Thereafter,	 Marshall	 Plan	 aid	 from	 1948	 –	 with	 its	 focus	 on	 long-term	 planning,	
construction	 and	 development	 –	 encouraged	 charitable	 organisations	 to	 adopt	 a	more	
specifically	 development-oriented	 approach	 to	 charitable	 giving	 as	 opposed	 to	 an	
exclusive	 focus	 on	 relief	 after	 disaster	 or	 conflict.123	Though	 emergency	 relief	 would	
remain	the	primary	focus	of	NGO	work	throughout	the	1950s,	post-war	NGOs	increasingly	
incorporated	 development	 into	 their	mandates,	 broadened	 their	 scope	 beyond	 Europe	
and	 North	 America	 and,	 in	 keeping	 with	 the	 ‘second	 colonial	 occupation’	 zeitgeist,	
asserted	 that	 governments	 should	 provide	 for	 citizens	 in	 order	 to	 make	 citizenship	
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worthwhile.124	They	 thus	 saw	 the	 need	 for	 their	 services	 as	 an	 indictment	 of	 a	 failing	
system,	 opening	 the	 door	 to	 a	more	 politically	 engaged	 understanding	 of	 poverty	 and	
development;	at	the	same	time,	NGOs	such	as	Oxfam	prescribed	remedial	action	by	the	
state	as	the	only	long-term	solution	to	underdevelopment.125	The	following	thesis	shows	
how	 this	 political	 understanding	 of	 poverty	 –	 rather	 than	 a	 technical	 or	 apolitical	
approach	–	influenced	Oxfam	and	helped	to	direct	its	work	on	the	ground	in	Kenya	after	
decolonisation.	
	 For	 it	was	 during	 the	 1960s	 that	 the	most	 substantial	 shift	 by	NGOs	 away	 from	
emergency	work	and	towards	the	adoption	of	a	developmental	outlook	took	place.	This	
shift	was	 influenced	 strongly	 by	 global	 trends	 in	 relief	 and	 development,	 including	 the	
invention	of	 the	 ‘Decade	of	Development’	and	 the	establishment	of	 the	Freedom	From	
Hunger	Campaign	and	the	World	Food	Programme.126	In	this	atmosphere,	NGOs	began	to	
see	 longer-term	development	as	 a	method	of	preventing	disasters	or	 at	 least	 lessening	
their	effects,	reducing	the	need	for	palliative	relief	work,	which	had	little	or	no	impact	on	
the	 frequency	 or	 scale	 of	 disasters	 in	 the	 future.127	By	 1970,	 NGOs	 were	 raising	 and	
distributing	 around	 $860	million	 in	 relief	 and	 development	 projects	 per	 year.128	At	 the	
start	 of	 the	 following	 decade,	 1,600	 NGOs	 were	 registered	 in	 the	 Organisation	 for	
Economic	Co-Operation	 and	Development	 (OECD),	 and	 they	distributed	$2.3	billion	per	
year.129	The	1980s	would	see	a	massive	expansion	in	NGO	numbers,	resources	and	duties	
as	the	state	fell	out	of	favour	in	the	West.	These	small,	flexible,	innovative,	efficient	and	
non-state	 actors	 were	 perceived	 as	 a	 ‘magic	 bullet’,	 a	 panacea	 for	 the	 suffocating	
dirigisme	 Western	 governments	 diagnosed	 in	 development	 as	 it	 stood	 in	 the	 early	
1980s.130	This	idea	held	sway	over	IFIs	and	Western	governments	into	the	1990s;	thus	an	
increasing	volume	of	official	aid	was	channelled	through	NGOs	in	this	period.	 In	the	ten	
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years	to	1994,	for	instance,	the	UK	government	increased	its	official	funding	of	NGOs	by	
400	per	cent.	As	the	World	Bank	noted	in	1991,	NGOs	‘have	become	an	important	force	
in	 the	development	 process	 [mitigating]	 the	 costs	 of	 developing	 countries’	 institutional	
weakness’.131	As	a	result,	by	1993	NGO	numbers	had	nearly	doubled	to	reach	3,000,	while	
their	spending	reached	$5.7	billion.	Ten	years	later,	NGOs	were	responsible	for	$23	billion	
worth	 of	 aid	 money,	 or	 30	 per	 cent	 of	 all	 overseas	 development	 assistance.132	Oxfam	
income	 illustrates	 this	 extraordinary	 growth	 in	 NGO	 funds:	 in	 1959	 it	 hovered	 around	
£500,000	 per	 annum;	 by	 1999	 it	 had	 reached	 £124.3	 million,	 and	 in	 2014	 it	 reached	
£389.1	million.133	
	 Precisely	because	NGOs	became	a	global	phenomenon	around	 the	 time	of	 SAPs	
and	neo-liberal	economic	theory,	 literature	on	NGOs	is	divided	between	those	who	saw	
NGOs	 as	 apolitical,	marketised	 institutions	 that	 could	work	where	 the	 state	 failed,	 and	
those	 on	 the	 other	 side	 of	 the	 political	 spectrum,	 who	 feared	 that	 the	 development	
‘machine’	 would	 absorb	 NGOs,	 which	 would	 become	 powerful	 pacific	 weapons	 of	
Western	 hegemony	 through	 recommending	 technical	 solutions	 to	 poverty	 and	
underdevelopment	rather	than	structural	or	political	change.134	Though	the	 latter	group	
hoped	 that	NGOs	might	offer	 radical	 alternatives	 to	development	 as	 conceptualised	by	
IFIs	 and	Western	 governments,	 many	 feared	 that	 Ferguson	 was	 correct	 to	 argue	 that	
international	 development	 agencies	 benefit	 as	much	 as	 host	 states	 from	 depoliticising	
development	 interventions	 and	 disempowering	 local	 populations,	 since	 an	 apolitical	
development	discourse	reinforces	their	raison	d’être.135	In	a	related	manner	Firoze	Manji	
and	 Carl	 O’Coill	 alleged	 that	 NGOs	 are	 part	 of	 a	 long	 history	 of	 voluntary	 action	
reinforcing	imperial	projects,	and	that	NGO	service	delivery	palliates	against	social	unrest,	
constantly	undermining	the	struggle	of	African	people	for	emancipation	from	economic,	
social	and	political	oppression.136	
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	 Writers	 in	 this	 vein	 maintained	 that	 even	 if	 motivated	 by	 charity	 rather	 than	
conspiracy,	too	many	NGOs	adopt	a	‘missionary	position’,	succumbing	to	pressure	to	pick	
up	the	social	costs	of	neo-liberal	restructuring,	and	ending	up	 ‘too	close	for	comfort’	to	
Western	 actors	 who	 co-opt	 them	 for	 their	 ability	 to	 disguise	 the	 need	 for	 radical	
change.137	Thus	Julie	Hearn	wrote	that	 the	 ‘NGO-isation’	of	Kenyan	healthcare	–	and	by	
extension	 Kenyan	 society	 –	 in	 the	 1990s,	 in	 which	 USAID	 encouraged	 the	 Kenyan	
government	 (at	policy	 level	and	by	example)	 to	 favour	privately	 run	hospitals,	was	 ‘the	
clear	outworking	of	western	 foreign	policy	aimed	at	 redefining	the	central	 relationships	
between	 the	 state,	 society	 and	 external	 actors’.138	NGOs	 were	 considered	 complicit	 in	
such	a	process:	their	leaders	were	compradors,	deriving	status	from	‘imperial’	(Northern)	
funding	 and	 their	 capacity	 to	 control	 significant	 popular	 groups.	 African	 NGOs,	 in	
particular,	 were	 described	 as	 ‘appendages’	 of	 Northern	 agencies	 or	 COMPRANGOs,	
whose	major	 function	was	 to	act	as	Western	agents,	pacifying	populations	by	diverting	
attention	from	the	root	causes	of	African	poverty	and	peddling	Western	values.139	Other	
researchers	notice	similarities	in	the	language	that	NGOs,	IFIs	and	Western	governments	
have	used	when	talking	about	development	since	the	1980s,	and	argue	that	the	latter	use	
NGOs	as	a	channel	for	the	transmission	of	development-speak	neutered	by	the	West.140	
Articles	and	monographs	document	the	change	in	NGO	rhetoric	from	offering	alternatives	
to	development	–	challenging	the	very	 idea	of	development	under	capitalism	–	towards	
offering	 development	 alternatives	 –	 techniques	 and	 processes	 to	 maximise	 benefits	
within	the	global	neo-liberal	capitalist	order.141	In	the	post-Cold	War	era,	moreover,	 it	 is	
alleged	that	NGOs	have	become	firmly	entrenched	in	Western	foreign	policy,	which	has	
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now	 substituted	 short-term	 relief	 and	 crisis	management	 for	 longer-term	development	
and	bilateral	aid.142	
	 Yet	 both	 abstract	 faith	 in	 NGOs	 as	 ‘magic	 bullets’	 and	 criticism	 of	 NGOs	 as	
COMPRANGOs	 are	 far	 too	 generalising	 about	 NGOs	 and	 are,	 in	 fact,	 caught	 up	 in	 the	
debate	over	what	it	is	to	‘do	good’.	Their	arguments	depend	more	on	whether	the	author	
believes	the	world	needs	development	alternatives	or	alternatives	to	development	than	
any	objective	study	of	NGO	interventions.	Moreover,	since	NGOs	have	fallen	out	of	favour	
on	 the	 left,	and	have	been	 removed	 from	concepts	of	civil	 society	 that	 reify	 ‘the	 local’,	
their	 varied	 transnational	 or	 a-national	 roles	 –	 as	 local,	 national	 and	 global	 actors	
simultaneously,	 state-like	 in	 some	 respects,	 sub-national	 and	 supra-national	 in	others	–	
are	 understudied.143	More	 utility	 can	 be	 found	 by	 taking	 a	 neo-Gramscian	 approach,	
which	emphasises	that	NGOs	are	fully	part	of	African	civil	society	–	the	site	of	struggles	
for	 ideological	hegemony	–	and	so	are	best	seen	as	an	‘arena	within	which	battles	from	
society	 at	 large	 are	 internalised’.144 	When	 looked	 at	 from	 such	 a	 perspective,	 it	 is	
unsurprising	 that	 NGOs	 like	 Oxfam	 present	 a	 fluid	 and	 often	 contradictory	 image	
depending	on	where	and	when	they	are	examined,	and	depending	also	on	the	particular	
set	 of	 values,	 motives	 and	 individuals	 that	 make	 up	 each	 individual	 NGO.145	For	 this	
reason,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 avoid	 simple	 generalisations	 and	 instead	 concentrate	 on	
studying	the	agents	themselves	to	reveal	their	rich	ideological	and	functional	diversity.146	
	 If	 the	 question	 of	who	 intervenes	 is	 historical,	 so	 too	 is	 the	 question	 of	 how	 a	
developmental	actor	intervenes,	and	particularly	through	what	relationships	it	operates.	
Fortunately,	 political	 scientists	 have	 re-evaluated	 the	 role	 of	 voluntary	 organisations	 in	
civil	 society	 and	 the	 relations	 between	 civil	 society	 and	 the	 state	 in	 Africa.	Many	 have	
come	to	the	conclusion	that	conflict	or	congruence	between	state	and	civil	society	cannot	
be	 predicted	 in	 a	 straightforward	 manner.147	Instead,	 relations	 can	 be	 any	 mixture	 of	
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(NGOs)	and	Politics	in	the	Developing	World’,	Centre	for	Development	Studies,	University	of	Swansea,	
Paper	No.	20	(1996),	p.	5,	cited	in	Fisher,	‘Doing	Good?’,	p.	449;	Mawdsley,	Townsend	and	Porter,	‘Creating	
Spaces	of	Resistance’,	p.	872.	
145	Mawdsley,	Townsend	and	Porter,	‘Creating	Spaces	of	Resistance’,	p.	872.	
146	Fisher,	‘Doing	Good?’,	p.	441.	
147	M.	Bratton,	‘Beyond	the	State:	Civil	Society	and	Associational	Life	in	Africa’,	World	Politics,	Vol.	41,	No.	3	
(1989),	pp.	407-430;	M.	Bratton,	‘The	Politics	of	Government-NGO	Relations	in	Africa’,	World	Development,	
Vol.	17,	No.	4	(1989),	pp.	569-587;	D.	Rothchild	and	N.	Chazan	(eds.),	The	Precarious	Balance:	State	and	
Society	in	Africa	(Boulder,	Westview,	1988);	D.	Rothchild,	N.	Chazan	and	J.	Harbeson	(eds.),	Civil	Society	and	
the	State	in	Africa	(Lynne	Rienner,	1994).	
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collaboration,	 confrontation,	 complementation	 and	 consciousness-raising.148 	Crawford	
Young	has	suggested	five	potential	areas	of	conflict	between	the	state	and	NGOs.	These	
areas	of	 tension	 include:	 revenue;	hegemony	over	 territory;	 security	of	 the	 status	quo;	
autonomy	of	the	regime	from	the	‘people’;	and	legitimacy.149	Elsewhere,	Michael	Bratton	
and	 Alan	 Fowler	 have	 suggested	 that	 conflict	 between	 NGOs	 and	 states	 is	more	 likely	
when	the	former	challenge	the	state	politically,	rather	than	economically,	by	attempting	
to	 operate	 in	 areas	 or	 sectors	 that	 the	 state	 occupies	 or	 intends	 to	 control.	 Even	
seemingly	 innocuous	 service	 delivery	 can	 fall	 into	 this	 pattern	 since	 it	 is	 a	 politically	
charged	process.150	This	is	particularly	the	case	in	Kenya,	where	(as	chapter	two	discusses	
in	greater	detail)	 the	provision	of	services	reflects	on	the	fundamental	 task	of	the	post-
colonial	 state	 –	 that	 of	 development	 –	 and	 politics	 revolves	 around	 the	 promise	 and	
distribution	of	 resources	and	services.151	Furthermore,	as	 the	state	struggled	 to	 fulfil	 its	
obligations	under	 the	SAP	 regime	and	NGOs	 filled	 the	gap,	development	 space	became	
increasingly	politicised.152	
	 Of	course,	 it	 is	equally	conceivable	that	NGO-state	relations	are	characterised	by	
congruence,	particularly	if	the	NGO	in	question	occupies	space	that	the	state	had	not	yet	
managed	 to	 penetrate	 or	 control.	 In	 such	 a	 scenario	 the	 NGO	 can	 –	 in	 the	 manner	
discussed	by	Ferguson	–	serve	to	legitimise	and	bolster	a	regime	that	basks	in	the	glory	of	
new	boreholes	or	hospitals.	NGO	work	can	also	help	to	expand	state	reach	into	areas	not	
yet	 penetrated	 by	 state	 institutions:	 thus	NGOs	 can,	 for	 instance,	 fund	 state	 extension	
workers	who	assess	and	prescribe	solutions	to	local	problems,	expanding	state	control	in	
the	manner	of	 the	 ‘anti-politics’	machine	discussed	above.153	Moreover,	NGOs	do	bring	
desperately	 needed	 resources	 into	 a	 polity,	 resources	 which	 the	 state	may	 be	 able	 to	
appropriate	or	direct	towards	politically	important	regions	or	constituencies,	or	which	the	
elite	 at	 the	 apex	 of	 the	 state	 may	 use	 to	 ‘sustain	 themselves	 by	 providing	 a	 needed	
diversification	of	patronage	resources	as	those	of	the	state	shrink’.154	Thus	NGOs	can	be	
																																																						
148	S.	Dicklitch,	The	Elusive	Promise	of	NGOs	in	Africa:	Lessons	from	Uganda	(Basingstoke,	Macmillan	Press,	
1998),	p.	98.	
149	C.	Young,	‘The	African	Colonial	State	and	its	Political	Legacy’,	in	Rothchild	and	Chazan,	The	Precarious	
Balance,	p.	31.	
150	Bratton,	‘The	Politics	of	Government-NGO	Relations	in	Africa’,	p.	576;	A.	Fowler,	‘The	Role	of	NGOs	in	
Changing	State-Society	Relations:	Perspectives	from	Eastern	and	Southern	Africa’,	Development	Policy	
Review,	Vol.	9,	No.1	(1991),	p.	57.	
151	J.	Semboja	and	O.	Therkildsen,	‘A	New	Look	at	Service	Provision	in	East	Africa’,	in	Semboja	and	
Therkildsen	(eds.),	Service	Provision	under	Stress,	p.	20.	
152	K.	Kanyinga,	‘The	Politics	of	Development	Space	in	Kenya:	State	and	Voluntary	Organisations	in	the	
Delivery	of	Basic	Services’,	in	Semboja	and	Therkildsen	(eds.),	Service	Provision	under	Stress,	p.	70.	
153	Dicklitch,	The	Elusive	Promise	of	NGOs	in	Africa,	p.	18.	
154	Fowler,	‘The	Role	of	NGOs	in	Changing	State-Society	Relations’,	pp.	62-64.	
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co-opted	by	states	to	prop	up	discredited	regimes.155	But	just	because	NGOs	can	serve	to	
support	the	expansion	of	a	bureaucratic	state	does	not	mean	that	they	will	in	all	cases,	as	
is	 suggested	 by	 the	 school	 of	 thought	 that	 considers	 development	 to	 be	 a	 Western	
discourse	implanted	elsewhere	through	COMPRANGOs.	Whether	NGOs	are	an	asset	or	a	
liability	for	the	developmental	state	depends	on	the	precise	nature	of	the	state	and	of	the	
NGO	 with	 which	 it	 is	 interacting. 156 	State	 responses	 to	 NGOs	 can,	 therefore,	 vary	
markedly,	 but	 often	 include	 some	 elements	 of	 the	 following:	 controlling	 legislation,	
emasculation,	 co-optation,	 appropriation,	 reconstitution,	 harassment	 and	
deregistration.157	
	 Clearly,	any	assessment	of	NGOs	and	NGO-state	relations	requires	historicism	and	
empiricism	 rather	 than	 theoretical	 assumptions.	 ‘Big	 picture’	 narratives	 that	 look	 at	
multiple	NGOs	in	numerous	 locations	often	overlook	the	 internal	dynamics	of	 individual	
NGOs	and	 the	particular	 relations	each	has	with	 the	 state	 in	different	 countries	 and	at	
different	 times,	 both	 of	 which	 help	 to	 define	 their	 activities.	 The	 following	 thesis	
contributes	to	our	understanding	of	how	an	NGO	develops	policy	and	selects	action	based	
on	the	interaction	of	its	needs,	finances	and	relation	with	the	host	nation	(pragmatism),	
its	mandate,	approach	to	development	and	its	perception	of	the	role	of	the	state	(values)	
and	 the	 political,	 economic,	 social	 and	 historical	 context	 in	 which	 it	 is	 active.158	The	
interaction	 of	 pragmatism	 and	 values	 is	 highly	 contextual	 and	 so	 an	 NGO’s	 role	 in	
development	and	its	relationship	with	the	state	is	procedural	not	paradigmatic.	As	such,	
to	quote	Adil	Najam,	‘almost	anything	that	one	can	say	about	[NGOs]	is	true	–	or	false	–	in	
at	least	some	instance,	somewhere’.159	Rather	than	casting	the	net	sufficiently	wide	as	to	
stumble	 onto	 at	 least	 a	 partial	 truth	 about	 NGOs,	 by	 way	 of	 an	 historically	 and	
theoretically	informed	case	study	of	a	particular	NGO	in	a	particular	historical	context	the	
following	 thesis	 attempts	 to	 historicise	 literature	 about	 NGOs	 and	 their	 role	 in	
development	 and	 hopes	 to	 forge	 new	 links	 (and	 strengthen	 existing	 ties)	 between	 the	
disciplines	of	history	and	development	studies.	As	the	thesis	concludes,	consolidating	the	
																																																						
155	In	Uganda,	Susan	Dicklitch	asserts	that	this	has	been	the	dominant	dynamic	as	government	registration,	
regulation	and	supervision	of	NGOs	forces	them	to	play	a	supportive	role	for	the	state.	Dicklitch,	The	Elusive	
Promise	of	NGOs	in	Africa,	p.	102.	
156	Fowler,	‘The	Role	of	NGOs	in	Changing	State-Society	Relations’,	p.	64.	
157	F.	Matanga,	‘Civil	Society	and	Politics	in	Africa:	The	Case	of	Kenya’,	presented	at	the	Fourth	International	
Conference	of	the	ISTR,	Trinity	College,	Dublin	(2000),	p.	24.	See	also	Whaites,	‘Let’s	Get	Civil	Society	
Straight’,	pp.	132-133.	
158	Lorgen,	‘Dancing	with	the	State’,	p.	326.	
159	Najam	is	paraphrasing	from	M.	Esman	and	N.	Uphoff,	Local	Organizations:	Intermediaries	in	Rural	
Development	(Ithaca,	N.Y.,	Cornell	University	Press,	1984),	p.	58.	Cited	in	A.	Najam,	‘Reviews’,	Nonprofit	and	
Voluntary	Sector	Quarterly,	Vol.	28	(1999),	p.	365.	
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ties	 between	 the	 disciplines	 may	 have	 important	 implications	 not	 only	 for	 our	
understanding	 of	 past	 development	 efforts,	 but	 for	 our	 ability	 to	 impact	 on	 a	 policy	
environment	 increasingly	 fractured	 between	 grand,	 technocratic,	 one-size-fits-all	
development	 ‘solutions’,	 and	 public	 scepticism	 and	 hostility	 to	 the	 development	
endeavour.	
	 The	 thesis	 is	 divided	 into	 four	 chapters	 and	 a	 short	 conclusion.	 The	 following	
chapter	provides	 a	brief	 historical	 survey	of	Oxfam’s	origins	 and	work	 across	 the	 globe	
before	 discussing	 the	 precise	 contours	 of	 development	 space	 in	 which	 it	 operated	 in	
Kenya	across	the	period	under	examination.	Chapter	two	describes	how	between	Kenyan	
independence	in	1963	and	the	early	1970s,	Oxfam	offered	its	support	to	the	Kenyan	state	
apparatus	 in	 its	attempt	to	fulfil	 the	challenge	of	nationhood	through	development	and	
service	provision.	In	so	doing,	Oxfam	extended	the	reach	and	control	of	the	Kenyan	state	
over	recalcitrant	populations.	Yet	Oxfam	was	not	depoliticising	poverty	or	reducing	it	to	a	
technical	 issue.	Rather,	 it	was	identifying	with	a	political	agenda	in	favour	of	the	central	
developmental	 role	 of	 the	 state	 and	 aimed	 to	 encourage	 the	 Kenyan	 government	 to	
behave	in	a	way	that	would	reduce	exploitation	and	promote	equality.	By	the	late	1960s,	
such	an	approach	was	seen	to	be	ineffective,	and	was	also	challenged	by	a	shift	in	Oxfam	
ideology	towards	‘conscientisation’.	For	these	reasons,	Oxfam	disengaged	from	the	state	
and	no	longer	worked	directly	with	the	government	in	the	hope	of	expanding	its	horizons	
(and	reach)	into	formerly	lightly	governed	areas;	instead,	Oxfam	began	working	from	the	
bottom	 up	 to	 ‘empower’	 marginalised	 Kenyans.	 Chapter	 three	 focuses	 on	 the	 clash	
between	Oxfam’s	new	 ‘values’	and	 realities	on	 the	ground	 in	Kenya	between	1978	and	
1991.	For,	 soon	after	Oxfam	started	work	 to	 ‘conscientise’	and	 ‘empower’	marginalised	
Kenyan	citizens	in	the	late	1970s	and	early	1980s,	 it	noted	the	hostility	on	behalf	of	the	
Moi	state	to	any	such	‘foreign’	ideologies,	and	witnessed	the	closure	of	local	partners	and	
the	detention	and	torture	of	their	members.	At	the	same	time,	Oxfam’s	commitment	to	
‘conscientisation’	was	challenged	in	the	face	of	drought	and	starvation	in	the	north	of	the	
country.	The	Field	Director’s	top-down	and	technical	response	to	the	complex	emergency	
situation	 contradicted	 Oxfam	 ‘values’,	 however,	 and	 made	 Oxfam	 too	 high-profile	 a	
target	for	the	Moi	state.	A	middle-ground	approach	that	aimed	to	avoid	the	wrath	of	the	
Kenyan	state	and	Oxford	alike	was	taken	by	his	successor	in	1985.	
	 Chapter	four	begins	with	the	apparent	‘opening’	of	Kenyan	politics	that	took	place	
with	 the	 reintroduction	 of	 multipartyism	 in	 1991.	 Despite	 Moi’s	 obvious	 distaste	 for	
democracy	 and	 civil	 society,	 the	 opportunity	 to	 reengage	with	 the	 Kenyan	 state	would	
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prove	too	good	to	pass	up	for	Oxfam,	and	the	organisation	is	shown	to	have	been	drawn	
ever	 closer	 to	 Moi’s	 development-politics	 nexus.	 This	 resulted	 in	 one	 of	 its	 most	
ambitious	projects	alongside	the	state	and	a	number	of	its	higher	profile	local	employees	
being	sucked	 into	 the	political	machinations	of	 the	 late	Moi	 regime.	Regardless	of	 their	
success	 or	 failure,	Oxfam’s	 approach	 to	 Kenya	 and	 its	 attempts	 to	 define	 a	 role	 in	 the	
country	 reveal	 the	 true	complexity	of	development	 interventions.	 Indeed,	each	chapter	
tells	the	story	of	a	complex	series	of	actions	and	reactions	on	the	part	of	Oxfam	and	the	
Kenyan	 state	 in	 particular,	 and	 emphasises	 that	 Oxfam	 shifted	 its	 tactics	 to	 meet	 the	
demands	 of	 the	 local	 context	 and	 the	 ideological	 demands	 emanating	 from	 Oxford.	
Moreover,	 the	 thesis	 reveals	 that	 Oxfam	 had	 a	 deep	 engagement	 with	 the	 politics	 of	
poverty	and	strived	to	have	an	impact	on	the	policies	that	served	to	marginalise	Kenya’s	
poorest	citizens.	Thus	although	Oxfam	tactics	on	the	ground	shifted	almost	continuously	
in	response	to	the	interaction	between	the	local	context	and	its	organisational	values,	its	
overarching	strategy	for	Kenya	was	defined	by	its	aim	to	induce	a	more	responsible	state	
apparatus.	 By	 demonstrating	 Oxfam’s	 political	 understanding	 of	 poverty	 and	
development,	 and	 its	 tactical	 shifts	 to	 adapt	 its	 overarching	 strategy	 to	 local	
circumstances,	 the	 thesis	 challenges	 static	 and	 generalising	 theories	 and	 calls	 for	
historicism	and	empiricism	when	analysing	NGOs	and	the	messy	reality	of	development.	
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Chapter One 
	
‘TO	CHOOSE	WHICH	SIDE	SHALL	FEEL	THE	STUBBORN	OUNCES	OF	MY	
WEIGHT…’	OXFAM	AND	THE	INTROVERTED	KENYAN	STATE,	1942-2002	
	
	
	
	
	
	
You	say	the	efforts	that	I	make	/	will	do	no	good;	/	they	will	never	prevail	/	to	tip	the	
hovering	scale	/	where	 justice	hangs	 in	 the	balance.	/	 I	don’t	 think	/	 I	ever	 thought	
they	would,	/	but	 I	am	prejudiced	beyond	debate	/	 in	 favour	of	my	right	 to	choose	
which	side	/	shall	feel	the	stubborn	ounces	of	my	weight.	
Excerpt	from	a	poem	by	Bonaro	W.	Overstreet,	an	American	author	and	psychologist.	Quoted	by	a	
former	Oxfam	Field	Director	as	regards	the	imperatives	of	charitable	work.	
	
	
Today,	 Oxfam	 has	 a	 strong	 claim	 to	 be	 one	 of	 the	 world’s	 largest	 and	 best-known	
charitable	 organisations.	 In	 2013/14	 its	 work	 helped	 an	 estimated	 eleven	 million	
individuals	directly,	and	countless	more	through	lobbying	and	advocacy;	it	supported	over	
six	million	people	in	twenty-four	distinct	humanitarian	emergencies;	it	made	grants	to	81	
partner	organisations;	and	it	received	regular	donations	from	over	400,000	people	in	the	
UK.	 Its	 total	 expenditure	 for	 the	 year	 was	 just	 under	 £269	 million.1	Unsurprisingly,	
therefore,	the	organisation	has	received	a	good	deal	of	academic	attention.	Contributions	
to	 our	 knowledge	 about	 Oxfam	 vary	 methodologically,	 from	 overarching	 monographs	
concerning	the	history	of	the	organisation	as	a	whole,	to	discussions	of	particularly	novel	
projects	or	approaches.	The	former	include	works	by	Maggie	Black	and	Ben	Whitaker	on	
Oxfam’s	first	fifty	years.2	Somewhat	unavoidably,	however,	such	an	approach	focuses	on	
the	organisational	 structure	and	 ‘values’	 to	 the	detriment	of	our	understanding	of	how	
the	NGO	and	 its	 field	staff	operate	 in	 the	periphery,	 its	 impact	 in	specific	contexts,	and	
the	 influence	of	 the	periphery	on	the	central	organisation.	Equally,	works	 that	 focus	on	
the	language	that	Oxfam	uses	in	policy	papers	spend	little	time	analysing	the	realities	of	
what	the	organisation	was	doing	on	the	ground.3	On	the	other	hand,	articles	that	discuss	
the	 impact	of	 the	organisation’s	emergency	or	development	work	 in	particular	contexts	
																																																						
1	‘Oxfam	Annual	Report	&	Accounts,	2013/14’,	pp.	9-10,	13.	
2	Black,	A	Cause	for	Our	Times;	Whitaker,	A	Bridge	of	People.	
3	As	chapter	three	discusses	in	relation	to	the	‘onion	skin’	approach,	the	two	do	not	always	mirror	each	
other.	See	below	and	S.	Ilcan	and	A.	Lacey,	‘Governing	through	Empowerment:	Oxfam’s	Global	Reform	and	
Trade	Campaigns’,	Globalizations,	Vol.	3,	No.	2	(2006),	pp.	207-225;	Berry	and	Gabay,	‘Transnational	
Political	Action’,	pp.	339-358.	
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are	often	very	narrowly	focused	and	less	interested	in	how	the	specific	intervention	might	
have	 influenced	 Oxfam	 or	 how	 the	 history	 and	 nature	 of	 the	 organisation	might	 have	
predisposed	 it	 to	 adopt	 certain	 modes	 of	 operation.4	Meanwhile,	 the	 work	 of	 former	
Oxfam	 staff	 has	 sometimes	 veered	 towards	 the	 polemical,	 arguing	 for	 a	 particular	
conception	of	development	or	humanitarianism	using	examples	of	apparent	success	and	
failure	from	their	direct	experience	with	the	organisation.5	The	following	thesis	adopts	a	
different	method	of	analysis	–	one	first	used	by	Michael	Jennings	in	relation	to	Oxfam	in	
Tanzania	(discussed	below)	–	focusing	as	it	does	on	assessing	how	Oxfam	operated	within	
a	specific	context	and	how	the	periphery	impacted	on	the	NGO	(chapters	two,	three	and	
four)	 while	 remaining	 alert	 to	 the	ways	 in	which	 Oxfam’s	 origins,	 values	 and	 changing	
organisational	structure	(as	outlined	in	this	chapter)	impacted	on	its	work	in	Kenya.	
	 In	 scale	 at	 least	 today’s	Oxfam	 is	 far	 removed	 from	 its	 origins	 in	 the	University	
Church	of	St.	Mary	the	Virgin	 in	Oxford.	 It	was	 in	the	Old	Library	of	the	church	that	the	
first	meeting	of	the	Oxford	offshoot	of	the	National	Famine	Relief	Committee	took	place	
on	 October	 5,	 1942.	 The	 immediate	 catalyst	 for	 the	 meeting	 was	 the	 increasingly	
desperate	situation	in	Greece	resulting	from	the	allied	blockade	of	the	then	German-held	
territory.	Despite	the	widespread	starvation	that	was	evident	in	Greece	by	this	date,	the	
British	government	was	set	against	any	attempt	to	provide	relief	to	the	Greek	population	
because	it	feared	that	food	distributions	and	other	aid	would	be	appropriated	by	German	
soldiers.	But	at	its	peak,	the	death	toll	reached	2,000	per	day,	and	in	total	over	200,000	
people	 would	 die	 of	 starvation	 or	 related	 illnesses.6	The	 Famine	 Relief	 Committee	 felt	
that	Britain	had	an	obligation	to	alleviate	the	worst	of	 the	food	crisis	and	attempted	to	
lobby	 Parliament	 for	 a	 change	 of	 policy.	 To	 pressure	 the	 government,	 the	 Committee	
referenced	 the	heroic	 resistance	of	 the	Greek	people	 in	 the	 face	of	 Italian	and	German	
bombardments,	which	itself	brought	about	severe	reprisals	from	the	occupying	force.7		
	 Lobbying	for	a	change	of	policy	was	potentially	politically	explosive,	however,	for	
challenging	wartime	policy	was	at	best	unpatriotic	and	at	worst	subversive.	Several	of	the	
speakers	at	 the	 first	Oxfam	meeting	thus	urged	caution	 lest	 their	efforts	be	 interpreted	
negatively.	 Nonetheless,	 there	 was	 a	 consensus	 in	 favour	 of	 lobbying	 strongly	 for	
																																																						
4	K.	Pushpanath,	‘Disaster	without	Memory:	Oxfam’s	Drought	Programme	in	Zambia’,	Development	in	
Practice,	Vol.	4,	No.	2	(1994),	pp.	81-91.	One	notable	exception	is	I.	Birch	and	A.	Shuria,	Perspectives	on	
Pastoral	Development:	A	Casebook	from	Kenya	(Oxford,	Oxfam	GB,	2001).	
5	Vaux,	The	Selfish	Altruist.	
6	Barnett,	Empire	of	Humanity,	p.	117.	
7	Reprisals	included	the	requisition	of	all	food,	clothing	and	medical	supplies	for	the	German	campaign	in	
Africa.	This	alone	would	have	caused	a	humanitarian	disaster;	the	allied	blockade	made	things	worse.	
	 51	
humanitarian	 assistance	 to	 those	 in	 desperate	 need,	 and	 this	 formed	 the	 basis	 of	 the	
Oxford	Committee’s	work	for	the	next	two	years.	Although	the	Committee	was	a	‘broad	
church’,	 with	 no	 denomination	 particularly	 prevalent	 –	 it	 certainly	 lacked	 the	 formal	
religious	connections	and	motivations	that	had	characterised	missionary	organisations	in	
their	battles	against	clitoridectomy,	for	 instance	–	it	 is	 likely	that	the	Quaker	ideals	held	
by	founding	members	such	as	Dr.	Henry	Gillett	impacted	on	the	ethos	and	philosophy	of	
organisation	 and	 helped	 to	 create	 a	 consensus	 in	 favour	 of	 action	 during	 these	 early	
months. 8 	Alongside	 pacifism	 and	 radicalism,	 there	 was	 a	 long	 Quaker	 tradition	 of	
providing	 relief	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 need,	 not	 political	 calculation:	 the	 Friends	War	 Victims	
Relief	Committee	had	been	established	during	the	Franco-Prussian	War	with	a	founding	
principle	that	relief	should	be	distributed	to	those	who	needed	it	most,	without	regard	to	
nationality	or	‘side’.9	Furthermore,	Oxfam’s	Quaker	members	believed	that	the	donor	or	
advocate	 fulfilled	 a	 ‘mission’	 as	 spiritually	 significant	 as	 a	 relief	 worker.	 According	 to	
Black,	 this	 meant	 that	 those	 joining	 Oxfam	 would	 feel	 like	 they	 were	 joining	 an	
organisation	 akin	 to	 a	 secular	 church	 with	 its	 own	 overarching	 purpose	 –	 to	 combat	
suffering	–	and	this	position	helped	to	shape	the	organisation	as	a	donor	agency	rather	
than	 an	 implementing	 agency.	 Consequently,	 through	 the	 1940s	 and	 1950s	 Oxfam	
provided	funds	and	materials	for	relief	without	a	direct	presence	on	the	ground.	It	would	
continue	to	work	on	a	collaborative	basis	with	 local	groups,	churches,	governments	and	
other	 international	 organisations	 –	 ranging	 from	 small	 organisations	 such	 as	 Catholic	
Relief	Services	 to	 larger	 IFIs	 like	 the	World	Bank	–	 throughout	 the	period	considered	 in	
this	thesis.	(Nonetheless,	chapter	three	details	how	local	circumstances	could	encourage	
the	organisation	to	alter	this	collaborative	orientation,	even	if	temporarily).10	Regardless	
of	the	influence	of	Quakerism,	Oxfam’s	early	efforts	had	mixed	success:	although	nearly	
£13,000	was	raised	from	the	British	public	in	donations	and	from	purchases	made	at	the	
first	 (temporary)	 Oxfam	 gift	 shop,	 the	 lobbying	 effort	 regarding	 Greece	 was	
unsuccessful.11	Yet	unlike	many	of	the	other	200	offshoots	of	the	National	Famine	Relief	
Committee,	the	Oxford	Committee	did	not	disband	once	the	war	ended;	instead	it	shifted	
																																																						
8	Missionary	campaigns	against	clitoridectomy	in	Kenya	split	the	Africa	congregations	of	Protestant	
churches.	See	Anderson,	Histories	of	the	Hanged,	p.	13.	Black	and	Vaux	note	that	Quaker	principles	could	be	
seen	in	the	respect	Oxfam	held	for	the	individual	and	the	strongly	pacifist	orientation	of	the	organisation.	
Black,	A	Cause	for	Our	Times,	p.	81;	Vaux,	The	Selfish	Altruist,	p.	15.	
9	For	this	reason,	Oxfam	was	comfortable	working	outside	Anglophone	areas,	as	its	efforts	in	the	Congo	
(1960)	and	Cambodia	(called	Kampuchea	in	1979)	demonstrate	particularly	well.	Black,	A	Cause	for	Our	
Times,	pp.	63-69,	214-235.	
10	Jennings,	‘Surrogates	of	the	State’,	p.	19;	Black,	A	Cause	for	Our	Times,	pp.	37,	81.	
11	Black,	A	Cause	for	Our	Times,	p.	16.	
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its	focus	to	post-war	Europe	and,	soon	after,	the	‘third	world’.12	Indeed,	by	1949	Oxfam’s	
mandate	had	expanded	to	encompass	the	‘relief	of	suffering	arising	as	a	result	of	wars	or	
of	other	causes	in	any	part	of	the	world’:	as	well	as	the	expansion	of	Oxfam’s	geographic	
horizons,	 it	 was	 now	 also	 mandated	 to	 relieve	 suffering	 not	 associated	 with	 conflict.	
Throughout	 the	 1950s,	 therefore,	 Oxfam	 responded	 to	 all	manner	 of	 crises	 across	 the	
globe,	including	famine	in	independent	India	in	1951,	earthquakes	in	Europe	in	1953	and	
civil	war	in	Korea	between	1950	and	1953.13	
	 Early	in	the	following	decade	Oxfam	would	widen	its	focus	to	include	development	
as	 one	 of	 its	 primary	 objectives	 and	 would	 begin	 the	 transition	 from	 a	 famine	 relief	
organisation	to	an	organisation	interested	in	the	causes	of	suffering	and	their	 long-term	
solutions.	 Around	 the	 same	 time,	 organisations	 that	 shared	Oxfam’s	 interest	 in	 longer-
term	development,	such	as	the	Cooperative	for	American	Relief	Everywhere	(CARE),	the	
United	 States	 Agency	 for	 International	 Development	 (USAID)	 and	 the	 Canadian	
International	 Development	 Agency	 (CIDA),	 were	 being	 created.	 These	 organisations,	
however,	worked	much	more	closely	with	their	donor	governments	than	Oxfam,	which,	
until	 the	1990s	had	 little	contact	with	the	British	government.14	Rather	than	responding	
to	 donor	 imperatives,	Oxfam	members	were	 inspired	 by	 post-war	 development	 efforts	
including	 the	 creation	 of	 the	 welfare	 state	 in	 Britain	 in	 1945,	 the	 Marshall	 Plan-led	
recovery	 in	Europe	 from	1948,	 the	 ‘second	colonial	occupation’	 in	 the	empire	 from	the	
mid-1940s,	 and	 the	 launch	 of	 the	 ‘decade	 of	 development’	 and	 the	 Freedom	 From	
Hunger	 Campaign	 (FFHC)	 on	 a	 global	 scale	 in	 the	 early	 1960s.	 Crucially,	 each	 of	 these	
initiatives	 recognised	 the	 central	 role	 of	 the	 state	 and	 ‘scientific’	 planning	 in	 the	
alleviation	of	suffering.	By	the	end	of	the	decade	less	than	ten	per	cent	of	Oxfam	funds	
was	 spent	 on	 disaster	 relief:	 more	 than	 half	 went	 towards	 longer-term	 medical	 and	
welfare	 projects	 and	 the	 remainder	 was	 reserved	 for	 agricultural	 development	 and	
technical	 training.15	The	 Congo	 famine	 of	 1960-1961	 further	 influenced	 Oxfam	 in	 this	
direction	 since	 although	 immediate	 relief	was	 necessary,	 it	was	 clear	 that	 the	 cause	of	
																																																						
12	Alfred	Sauvy	coined	the	term	‘third	world’	in	1952,	which	he	felt	was	treated	similarly	to	the	‘third	estate’	
in	pre-revolutionary	France.	Ilcan	and	Lacey,	‘Governing	through	Empowerment’,	p.	211.	
13	Black,	A	Cause	for	Our	Times,	p.	40;	Barnett,	Empire	of	Humanity,	p.	112.	
14	USAID	(1961)	and	CIDA	(1968)	have	received	much	criticism	for	their	role	in	legitimising	the	modernising	
and	‘scientific’	development	discourse	promulgated	by	the	West.	T.	Mitchell,	Rule	of	Experts:	Egypt,	
Techno-Politics,	Modernity	(Berkeley,	University	of	California	Press,	2002),	pp.	210-242;	Ferguson,	The	Anti-
Politics	Machine,	p.	256.	
15	In	the	early	1960s	only	around	10	per	cent	of	Oxfam	funds	were	spent	on	projects	requiring	support	over	
a	number	of	years.	Black,	A	Cause	for	Our	Times,	p.	73.	The	FFHC,	with	whom	Oxfam	worked	closely,	was	
particularly	important	in	stimulating	the	latter’s	move	towards	a	developmental,	preventive	model	of	
international	aid.	Whitaker,	A	Bridge	of	People,	p.	21;	Barnett,	Empire	of	Humanity,	pp.	122-123;	Black,	A	
Cause	for	Our	Times,	pp.	62-63;	Hilton,	‘International	Aid	and	Development	NGOs’,	p.	459.	
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suffering	 was	 longer-term	 and	 political:	 the	 Belgian	 withdrawal	 and	 politics	 of	
decolonisation	were	as	much	to	blame	as	any	natural	disaster.16	
	 The	Congo	relief	effort	also	helped	to	convince	Oxfam	staff	of	the	importance	of	
intervention	 in	 Africa	 (Oxfam	disbursed	 around	 50	 per	 cent	 of	 its	 grants	 budget	 in	 the	
continent	from	the	early	1960s	to	the	early	1970s),	but	it	had	another	long-term	impact	
on	 the	 organisation:	 for	 it	 was	 there	 that	 Oxfam	 Secretary	 Leslie	 Kirkley	 personally	
supervised	 Oxfam	 interventions	 for	 the	 first	 time	 and	 became	 convinced	 that	 such	
supervision	 should	 be	 replicated	 in	 future.	 Accordingly,	 Kirkley	 appointed	 Tristram	
‘Jimmy’	Betts	as	Oxfam’s	first	Field	Director	in	1961.17	As	discussed	in	more	detail	below,	
Betts	was	a	former	colonial	civil	servant	(having	worked	as	a	Forestry	Officer	in	Nigeria	for	
24	 years)	 and	 a	 prominent	member	 of	 the	 Fabian	 Commonwealth	 Bureau.	 Along	with	
many	 civil	 servants	 and	 Fabians,	 Betts	 found	 certain	 jingoistic	 aspects	 of	 empire	
distasteful,	 but	 felt	 that	 the	 state-led,	modernising	 impulse	 of	 late	 colonial	 governance	
could,	and	should,	be	maintained	in	the	decolonising	world	through	the	encouragement	
of	NGOs	such	as	Oxfam.	Betts’	first	task	was	to	oversee	Oxfam’s	FFHC	programme	in	the	
British	High	Commission	territories	of	Bechuanaland,	Basutoland	and	Swaziland.	There	he	
promoted	development	schemes	for	progressive	farmers	(including	dams,	education	and	
extension	services)	that	had	been	pioneered	during	the	colonial	period	in	an	attempt	to	
gain	support	among	rich	and	middle-income	Africans.18	
	 Oxfam	would	expand	the	Field	Director	system	over	the	coming	years	to	each	area	
of	 particular	 interest,	 and	 Field	 Offices	 became	 a	 hub	 of	 contact	 with	 the	 NGO’s	
constituents,	 controlled	 local	 policy	 and	 filtered	 local	 applications	 for	 funding.19	By	 the	
mid-1960s	Humphrey	Hilton	had	been	installed	as	an	intermediary	between	Betts	and	the	
Grants	Sub-Committee	in	Oxford	(which	made	the	final	decisions	on	financial	allocations),	
creating	 a	 de	 facto	 ‘Africa	 Desk’,	 and	 staff	 numbers	 had	 increased	 sevenfold	 to	 over	
200.20	(See	Diagram	1	 for	 an	 idea	of	 how	policy,	 ideas	 and	 funding	moved	 through	 the	
organisation.)	Moreover,	 the	 formerly	ad	hoc	approach	 to	grant	making,	which	 focused	
on	the	merits	of	particular	schemes	rather	than	any	coherence	of	approach,	was	phased	
out	and	replaced	by	a	concern	with	the	overarching	strategy	within	which	projects	should	
																																																						
16	Whitaker,	A	Bridge	of	People,	p.	21;	Barnett,	Empire	of	Humanity,	p.	43.	
17	Betts	was	the	brother	of	Barbara	Castle,	Minister	for	Overseas	Development	in	the	British	government	
from	1964.	
18	Black,	A	Cause	for	Our	Times,	pp.	76-79;	Hodge,	‘British	Colonial	Expertise’,	pp.	24-44.	
19	Black,	A	Cause	for	Our	Times,	p.	76.	
20	Within	a	few	years	other	regions	had	begun	to	follow	suit,	installing	their	own	intermediaries	between	
Field	Office	and	Grants	Sub-Committee.	Black,	A	Cause	for	Our	Times,	pp.	56,	73-81.	
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fit.	 As	 Jennings	writes,	Oxfam	had	evolved	 ‘from	a	war-time	 volunteer	 organisation	 for	
the	relief	of	European	suffering	to	an	international	NGO	dedicated	to	the	development	of	
the	 poor	 and	 the	 relief	 of	 suffering	 worldwide’.21	Yet	 even	 if	 bureaucratisation	 and	
formalisation	sought	to	restrict	the	level	of	influence	that	individuals	such	as	Betts	could	
have	on	the	organisation,	Oxfam	remained	responsive	to	experience	and	was	shaped	by	
the	context	 in	which	 it	operated.	As	 structures	were	 formalised	 in	Oxford,	a	process	of	
decentralisation	was	also	set	in	motion.	In	its	Field	Directors	Oxfam	had	men	and	women	
‘on	the	ground’	able	to	judge	applications	and	assess	Oxfam’s	local	programme.	Indeed,	
Field	Directors	and	the	periphery	became	increasingly	influential	in	setting	the	course	for	
Oxfam’s	programmes	and	in	defining	policy	and	philosophy	for	the	NGO	as	a	whole	–	the	
recommendations	of	the	Field	Director	were	rarely	refused	in	Oxford.22	
	
	
	 Diagram	1:	An	Outline	of	the	Oxfam	Hierarchy	
	 	
	 One	 important	 issue	Field	Directors	had	 to	 contend	with	was	balancing	Oxfam’s	
primary	 objectives:	 the	 relief	 of	 suffering	 and	 developmental	 schemes.	 This	 was	more	
than	an	accounting	issue,	for	the	relief	of	suffering	was	ostensibly	more	‘charitable’	than	
development	aid.	The	latter	did	not	always	fit	so	comfortably	with	Oxfam’s	status	as	a	UK-
based	charity,	particularly	as	it	often	went	hand	in	hand	with	implicit	or	explicit	criticism	
of	government	action	or	inaction.	Oxfam’s	shift	towards	development	work	thus	brought	
it	 into	 conflict	 with	 the	 UK	 Charity	 Commission,	 which	 had	 judged	 in	 1962	 that	
																																																						
21	Jennings,	‘Surrogates	of	the	State’,	p.	22.	
22	Jennings,	‘“Almost	an	Oxfam	in	Itself”’,	pp.	514-515.	
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‘propaganda	and	advocacy	for	 legislation…	[are]	political	and	not	charitable;	so,	too,	[is]	
the	promotion	of	international	friendship’.	Endeavouring	to	perpetuate	the	older	colonial	
mind-set	 discussed	 above,	 the	 Charity	 Commission	 was	 concerned	 to	 maintain	 the	
‘neutrality’	 of	 aid,	 and	 sought	 to	 downplay	 the	 political	 causes	 of	 impoverishment	 and	
their	 contemporary	 political	 solutions.23	Its	 judgement	 against	 Oxfam	 was	 merely	 an	
opening	salvo	in	a	long	struggle	between	the	two	institutions	over	the	appropriateness	of	
overseas	development	assistance	for	a	British	charity,	but	it	was	a	serious	shot	across	the	
bows	 nonetheless	 for	 an	 organisation	 that	 intended	 to	 lobby	 governments	 to	 expand	
development	assistance	and	alter	their	policies,	and	at	the	same	time	wished	to	organise	
grassroots	 campaigns	 for	 social	 and	 political	 change. 24 	In	 1964,	 moreover,	 the	
Commission	 announced	 that	 it	 was	 going	 to	 place	 the	 activities	 of	 charities	 working	
overseas	 under	 greater	 scrutiny,	 and	 although	not	 singled	out	 for	 criticism	 it	was	 clear	
that	Oxfam	was	one	of	the	primary	targets.	As	chapter	two	discusses	in	greater	detail,	the	
attention	of	the	Commission	would	put	Oxfam’s	development	work	on	hold	in	Kenya	and	
elsewhere.	 Fortunately,	 in	May,	 the	House	 of	 Lords	 debated	 the	 issue	 and	 determined	
that	 all	 humanitarian	 relief	 was	 charitable;	 nevertheless,	 the	 Charity	 Commission	
demanded	that	Oxfam	spell	out	its	intentions	with	much	greater	clarity,	which	the	latter	
did	in	1965:	
	
[Oxfam	 aims]	 to	 relieve	 poverty,	 distress	 and	 suffering	 in	 any	 part	 of	 the	 world	
(including	 starvation,	 sickness	 or	 any	 physical	 disability	 or	 affliction)	 and	 primarily	
when	arising	from	any	public	calamity	(including	famine,	earthquake,	pestilence,	war,	
or	 civil	 disturbance),	 or	 the	 immediate	 or	 continuing	 result	 of	 want	 of	 natural	 or	
artificial	 resources,	 or	 the	means	 to	develop	 them,	 and	whether	 acting	 alone	or	 in	
association	with	others.25	
	
Notably,	in	this	lengthened	mandate	Oxfam	gave	equal	priority	to	calamity	and	the	lack	of	
resources	(or	the	means	to	develop	them)	in	underdeveloped	nations.	The	latter	were,	of	
course,	 potentially	 political	 issues	 since	 they	 could	 be	 the	 result	 of	 anything	 from	
international	 trade	 and	 aid	 agreements	 that	 stipulated	 the	 transfer	 of	 unsuitable	
																																																						
23	Anna	Bocking-Welch	has	shown	how	the	Freedom	From	Hunger	Campaign	downplayed	political	issues,	
and	served	to	increase	public	engagement	with	formerly	imperial	spaces	in	the	neutral	language	of	aid	and	
development.	A.	Bocking-Welch,	‘Imperial	Legacies	and	Internationalist	Discourses:	British	Involvement	in	
the	United	Nations	Freedom	from	Hunger	Campaign,	1960-70’,	The	Journal	of	Imperial	and	Commonwealth	
History,	Vol.	40,	No.	5	(2012),	pp.	879-896.	
24	The	following	year,	the	Charity	Commission	declared	Oxfam	to	be	a	charitable	and	political	organisation,	
forcing	the	latter	to	readjust	its	mandate	to	the	liking	of	the	Commission.	Barnett,	Empire	of	Humanity,	p.	
128.	
25	Jennings,	‘Surrogates	of	the	State’,	p.	24.	
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technology,	 to	 the	 corrupt	 governance	 and	 overstretched	 education	 services	 of	 newly	
independent	nations.	
	 Such	an	emphasis	was,	 in	fact,	part	of	an	attempt	by	a	politically	engaged	group	
within	 Oxfam	 to	 encourage	 the	 organisation	 and	 its	 donors	 to	 focus	 on	 the	 structural	
issues	 that	 lay	 behind	 emergencies,	 poverty	 and	 suffering	 and	 to	 dispel	 the	myth	 that	
Oxfam	could	make	a	difference	 in	the	absence	of	structural	changes	 led	by	Southern	or	
Western	 states.	 Indeed,	 a	 report	prepared	 for	Oxfam	 in	1967	by	 its	 Secretary,	Dr.	 Cyril	
James,	 called	 on	 the	 organisation	 to	 stoke	 political	 awareness	 amongst	 Oxfam	
contributors	and	to	‘play	the	role	of	Socrates	and	be	a	gadfly	to	sting	the	state	to	action’	
by	 raising	 the	 pressure	 on	Western	 and	 Southern	 governments	 to	 help	 the	 poorest.26	
Chapter	 two	 demonstrates	 how	 Betts	 took	 up	 this	 mantle	 in	 Kenya	 in	 the	 1960s	 by	
encouraging	the	state	to	intervene	in	‘backward’	and	politically	unimportant	areas	of	the	
country.	Soon	after	the	James	Report,	Oxfam	published	the	Haslemere	Declaration	with	
Christian	Aid	and	the	Overseas	Development	Institute.	The	Declaration	committed	these	
British	charitable	NGOs	to	a	more	politically	active	role,	calling	as	it	did	for	an	increase	in	
the	quality	and	quantity	of	official	aid	and	adjustments	to	international	trade,	which,	the	
committee	alleged,	favoured	the	rich.	It	concluded	that	charity	was	no	longer	enough:		
	
Too	often	 it	 is	the	equivalent	of	tossing	sixpence	 in	a	beggar’s	cap:	money	given	by	
those	who	have	no	intention	of	changing	the	system	that	produces	beggars,	and	no	
understanding	that	they	are	part	of	it.27	
	
	 Nonetheless,	there	was	a	certain	amount	of	tension	within	Oxfam	between	those	
who	 sensed	 the	 need	 for	 a	 more	 political	 focus	 and	 those	 who	 emphasised	 the	
importance	of	 the	principle	of	apparently	 ‘neutral’	humanitarian	 interventions.	 Inspired	
by	 the	writing	 of	 Renée	 Dumont	 and	 Frantz	 Fanon,	 and	 by	 the	work	 of	 Des	Wilson	 at	
Shelter,	Deputy	Director	Reverend	Nicholas	Stacey	wanted	 to	 increase	Oxfam’s	political	
role	 by	 changing	 the	 organisation	 into	 an	 educational	 and	 lobbying	 body	 –	 a	 pressure	
group	to	influence	the	British	government	and	the	public	regarding	development	issues.28	
He	was,	 however,	 unable	 to	 convince	 the	Council	 of	Management	of	 this	 change:	 they	
feared	that	contributions	would	drop	as	soon	as	Oxfam	was	no	 longer	actively	relieving	
																																																						
26	Black,	A	Cause	for	Our	Times,	pp.	107,	154-155.	
27	To	some	extent	these	interventions	were	the	product	of	an	intellectual	context	influenced	by	academic	
publications	by	renowned	authors	such	as	Gunnar	Myrdal.	Quoted	in	Hilton,	‘International	Aid	and	
Development	NGOs’,	p.	453.	
28	Stacey	identified	with	the	activist	elements	of	Oxfam	and	supported	the	creation	of	‘Third	World	First’	
network	across	British	universities.	Whitaker,	A	Bridge	of	People,	p.	25;	Black,	A	Cause	for	Our	Times,	pp.	
156-161.	
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suffering	 and	 that	 the	 Charity	 Commission	would	 use	 any	 shift	 towards	 lobbying	 as	 an	
opportunity	 to	 strip	 Oxfam	 of	 its	 charitable	 status.29	Stacey’s	 subsequent	 resignation	
eased	 the	 crisis,	 but	 he	 and	 others	 who	 remained	 in	 the	 organisation	 –	 and	 not	 least	
those	on	the	ground	in	Kenya	–	were	disappointed	at	the	Council’s	decision.	Stacey	later	
wrote	in	the	Times	that	he	had	resigned	because:	
	
I	 think	 [Oxfam]	has	missed	an	opportunity	 to	 influence	events	which	will	dominate	
our	history	in	the	remaining	years	of	this	century,	and	I	do	not	fancy	myself	primarily	
as	a	fund	raiser.30	
	
	 In	 Oxfam’s	 1969	 annual	 report	 Leslie	 Kirkley	 offered	 some	 belated	 support	 to	
those	within	the	organisation	who	remained	committed	to	Stacey’s	position,	writing	that	
increasing	donations	and	income	year	after	year	would	mean	nothing	
	
if	 governmental	 and	 inter-governmental	 aid	 from	 the	 rich	 nations	 continues	 to	
diminish	while	public	apathy	about	the	Third	World	spreads…	To	go	on	increasing	the	
size	of	our	income	is	just	not	enough	in	itself	–	unless	we	are	satisfied	to	end	up	as	a	
mere	sop	to	the	national	conscience	–	a	gesture	in	the	face	of	crisis.31	
	
Buoyed	by	Kirkley’s	words,	those	within	the	organisation	who	had	supported	Stacey	and	
his	 ideals	 continued	 to	 push	 for	 the	 principle	 of	 political	 interventions.	 Gradually,	 they	
gained	the	upper	hand:	soon	after	Stacey’s	resignation	Oxfam	helped	to	form	Action	for	
World	 Development	 (an	 independent	 lobbying	 body	 free	 of	 UK	 charity	 legislation),	
offered	 financial	 support	 to	 the	 New	 Internationalist	 (a	 magazine	 designed	 to	
complement	 local	 activism	 and	 central	 lobbying)	 and	 began	 to	 take	 membership	 of	
organisations	dedicated	to	campaigns	for	political	change.32	Over	the	next	two	years	the	
move	towards	a	more	educational	and	political	Oxfam	was	codified,	first	by	the	allocation	
of	 five	 per	 cent	 of	 Oxfam	 income	 to	 educational	 activity,	 and	 then	 in	 a	 1975	
memorandum,	which	noted	that	Oxfam	
	
recognise[s]	 our	 responsibility,	 as	 citizens,	 to	 influence,	 where	 appropriate,	 the	
organisations	and	institutions	in	this	country,	including	Parliament,	that	are	involved	
in	the	wider	aspects	of	our	relationships	with	the	poor	countries.33	
	
	 Nonetheless,	 the	 type	 of	 development	 Oxfam	 advocated	 in	 the	mid-1970s	 was	
qualitatively	different	from	the	modernising	and	colonial-esque	efforts	promoted	by	Betts	
																																																						
29	Whitaker,	A	Bridge	of	People,	p.	25.	
30	Cited	in	Whitaker,	A	Bridge	of	People,	p.	26.	
31	Whitaker,	A	Bridge	of	People,	pp.	27-28.	
32	Hilton,	‘International	Aid	and	Development	NGOs’,	p.	455.	
33	Whitaker,	A	Bridge	of	People,	p.	30.	
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in	Kenya	during	the	1960s	 (discussed	 in	detail	 in	 the	 following	chapter).	 Indeed,	behind	
the	 final	 triumph	of	 the	more	political	wing	of	Oxfam	was	the	 influence	of	 the	Marxist-
inspired	 conscientisation	 movement,	 associated	 with	 Paulo	 Freire.	 In	 Pedagogy	 of	 the	
Oppressed	(1970),	Freire	argued	that	the	poor	and	downtrodden	would	only	achieve	full	
emancipation	 if	 and	 when	 they	 brought	 it	 about	 themselves.	 For	 development	 to	 be	
successful,	 therefore,	 it	 needed	 to	 originate	 from	 within	 the	 community. 34 	Most	
importantly,	people	needed	 to	be	helped	 to	understand	 the	political	blockages	 to	 their	
own	development	and	to	be	assisted	when	challenging	their	governments	to	install	more	
appropriate	 development	 policies.35 	Conscientisation	 had	 strong	 links	 with	 liberation	
theology	and	was	a	deeply	controversial	development	philosophy	because	of	its	political	
content,	yet	according	to	Black,	the	impact	of	the	ideology	‘on	the	more	radical	minds	in	
Oxfam	 was	 profound’.36	In	 particular,	 Adrian	 Moyes	 and	 Michael	 Harris	 (Development	
Secretary	and	Director	of	Overseas	Aid	respectively	from	1972)	were	fully	committed	to	
Freire’s	 ideas	 and	 pushed	 the	 Executive	 Committee	 to	 accept	 the	 conscientisation	
interpretation	 of	 development	 and	 the	 need	 for	 attitudinal	 rather	 than	 technological	
change.37	By	 the	mid-1970s,	Oxfam	would	 regard	 the	 ‘rediscovery	of	 the	will’	 as	 a	 vital	
part	 of	 the	 process	 of	 development.	 In	 Kenya	 and	 elsewhere	 its	 projects	 would	 be	
designed	for	the	poorest	to	‘have	more’	in	terms	of	food,	health	and	wealth,	but	also	to	
‘be	more’	–	 to	 improve	 the	 confidence	and	ability	of	 the	poorest	 to	manage	 their	own	
future.	 No	 longer	 were	 the	 poor	 merely	 the	 recipients	 of	 external	 aid;	 in	 fact,	 Oxfam	
argued	 that	 it	 was	 working	 to	 undo	 the	 unequal	 effects	 of	 previous	 ‘top-down’	
programmes.	Instead,	the	poor	were	integral	to	the	development	process	and	needed	to	
participate	 fully	 in	 their	 economic	 and	 social	 development.38	Lingering	 questions	 over	
whether	Oxfam	was	championing	the	‘wretched	of	the	earth’	or	merely	reinterpreting	the	
‘white	man’s	burden’	for	charitable	purposes	resulted	in	the	preparation	and	publication	
in	 1975	 of	 Oxfam:	 An	 Interpretation.	 Examined	 more	 thoroughly	 in	 chapter	 two,	 the	
document	emphasised	Oxfam’s	political	 ‘solidarity’	with	 the	poor,	and	helped	 to	define	
the	1970s	as	a	period	of	‘anti-institutionalism’	for	the	organisation.39	
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36	Black,	A	Cause	for	Our	Times,	p.	183.	
37	Reggie	Norton,	the	Latin	American	Field	Secretary,	had	also	absorbed	such	ideas	and	led	a	
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39	Black,	A	Cause	for	Our	Times,	pp.	197,	208.	
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‘ALL AID IS POLITICAL’ 
 
Regardless	 of	 whether	 the	 organisation	 was	 acting	 as	 a	 ‘gadfly’	 to	 the	 state	 or	 as	 a	
‘partner’	 of	 radical	 movements,	 Oxfam’s	 political	 understanding	 of	 poverty	 inevitably	
interacted	 with	 circumstances	 on	 the	 ground	 prior	 to	 being	 translated	 into	 action.	
Oxfam’s	work	during	the	conflict	between	the	Nigerian	government	and	Biafra	separatists	
(1967-69)	 provides	 a	 notable	 example	 of	 how	 this	 process	 unfolded.	 In	 fact,	 Oxfam	
approached	 the	 conflict	 to	 some	 extent	 blinkered	 by	 the	 emerging	 liberation	 ideology	
discussed	above:	 it	was	 the	 first	NGO	 to	break	 ranks	and	declare	 support	 for	 the	 rebel	
movement	 (contradicting	 British	 foreign	 policy),	 claiming	 that	 ‘the	 price	 for	 a	 united	
Nigeria	is	likely	to	be	millions	of	lives’.	With	hindsight	it	is	clear	that	the	Biafrans	actively	
manipulated	 aid	 agencies	 like	 Oxfam,	 using	 disaster	 relief	 interventions	 and	 publicity	
surrounding	 them	 as	 political	 capital	 in	 their	 struggle	 for	 separation	 from	Nigeria.40	On	
top	 of	 food	 deliveries	 and	 publicity	 for	 the	 cause,	 Oxfam	 also	 helped	 to	 support	 the	
breakaway	 Biafran	 state	 by	 purchasing	 its	 currency	 at	 inflated	 rates.	 The	 organisation	
was,	indeed,	the	sole	source	of	foreign	currency	for	the	Biafran	regime	(which	it	used	to	
purchase	weapons)	between	April	and	September	of	1968.41	A	related	criticism	concerns	
Oxfam’s	 relief	 efforts	 during	 the	 Ethiopian	 famine	 in	 1983-84.42	Not	 only	 was	 Oxfam’s	
relief	 effort	 delayed	 by	 its	 investment	 in	 the	 ‘extraordinarily	 optimistic	 ideology’	 of	
‘revolution	through	development’	(which	was	so	strong	‘that	aid	agencies	[like	Oxfam]	did	
not	turn	away	from	their	developmentalist	beliefs,	even	when	poor	people	were	suffering	
from	the	effects	of	famine’).43	It	is	also	alleged	that	that	Oxfam	was	blind	to	the	extent	to	
which	the	Ethiopian	government	manipulated	donated	funds	because	of	its	commitment	
to	 radical	 politics	 and	 a	 ‘politico-ideological	 development	 philosophy’.44	Invested	 in	 the	
‘radical’	Ethiopian	regime,	many	in	Oxfam	became	apologists	for	the	administration	and	
																																																						
40	The	Biafran	authorities	stubbornly	resisted	calls	to	open	up	relief	channels	from	Nigeria	in	order	to	
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41	D.	Rieff,	A	Bed	for	the	Night:	Humanitarianism	in	Crisis	(New	York,	Simon	and	Schuster,	2002),	pp.	81-85.	
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to	reach	£51	million.	However,	it	is	now	alleged	that	much	of	the	money	donated	to	the	combined	efforts	
to	end	the	famine	was	wasted	or	misused.	Barnett,	Empire	of	Humanity,	pp.	156-157.	
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considered	 rumours	 of	 the	misappropriation	 of	 aid	 funds	 to	 be	 the	 propaganda	 of	 its	
internal	and	external	political	opponents.45	
Oxfam	was	 not	 alone	 in	 supporting	 the	 Biafran	 secessionists	 and	 the	 Ethiopian	
state;	 nor	 was	 it	 alone	 in	 accepting	 the	 political	 nature	 of	 poverty	 and	 emergencies.	
Médecins	Sans	Frontières	(MSF)	had	long	been	critical	of	the	International	Committee	of	
the	 Red	 Cross	 for	 its	 unwavering	 neutrality,	 for	 instance.	 Yet	 MSF	 was	 divided	 over	
whether	it	was	justifiable	to	criticise	governments	for	their	role	in	humanitarian	crises	in	
the	knowledge	that	such	criticism	would	likely	curtail	the	organisation’s	ability	to	provide	
relief.46	Thus	while	others	hesitated	to	define	their	attitude	towards	the	interaction	with	
politics	and	governments,	Oxfam	was	one	of	the	first	NGOs	of	the	post-war	era	to	adopt	a	
political	 stance	 in	 full	 cognisance	 of	 the	 consequences.	 Brian	Walker,	 Director-General	
from	1974,	later	admitted	that	‘all	aid	is	political’:	
	
The	 simplest	 grant…	 a	 new	 well	 in,	 say,	 a	 remote	 African	 village…	 A	 manifestly	
humanitarian	gesture.	But	political,	too	–	for	a	well	belonging	to	the	people	disturbs	
the	balance	of	power	in	that	village.	Whoever	owned	the	watering	place	hitherto	is	
now	disadvantaged.	Normally	that	means	the	landlord,	the	moneylender	or	the	local	
political	power	boss.	Sometimes	all	three	in	one.	If	the	people	have	their	own	water	
they	do	not	need	to	work	for	the	landlord,	or	pay	him	a	tithe,	or	vote	for	him	in	the	
election…	 The	 political	 power	 structure	 has	 been	 disturbed	 –	 with	 a	 measure	 of	
justice	flowing	towards	the	poor	and	away	from	the	powerful.	Even	when	multiplied	
many	 times	over…	 this	 remains	a	modest	enough	gesture,	and	 is	neither	 radical	or	
revolutionary.	Nonetheless,	it	is	a	beginning	–	a	threat	to	the	power	base	of	the	rich	
and	powerful	and	hence	profoundly	political.47	
	
The	outcome	of	Oxfam’s	engagement	with	the	politics	of	development	in	its	host	nation	
is,	 of	 course,	 highly	 contextual.	 In	 Nigeria,	 Oxfam	 served	 to	 challenge	 the	 territorial	
integrity	of	the	state,	while	its	aid	propped	up	the	Ethiopian	state	and	helped	to	maintain	
its	hold	in	Tigre	and	Eritrea.	Unfortunately,	much	recent	literature	on	Oxfam	has	focused	
on	discourse	analysis	of	the	kind	described	in	the	introduction.	Thus	Oxfam’s	engagement	
with	issues	of	human	rights	and	its	acknowledgement	of	some	of	the	positive	aspects	of	
globalisation	have	seen	it	tarred	with	the	same	brush	as	the	IMF	and	World	Bank	as	part	
of	Western	hegemony.	
	 Certainly,	 during	 the	 1980s	 a	 human	 rights	 framework	 emerged	 (in	 a	 fairly	
incoherent	 and	 haphazard	manner)	 to	 become	 an	 organising	motif	 for	Oxfam.48	Seeing	
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individuals	as	‘rights-bearers’	and	governments	as	‘rights-protectors’	tied	poverty,	politics	
and	development	together	in	a	relief-rights-development	continuum.49	Many	also	hoped	
that	 a	 human	 rights	 framework	 would	 encourage	 the	 translation	 of	 NGOs’	 grassroots	
work	into	a	global	agenda,	allowing	Oxfam	to	do	more	than	‘put	Band-Aids	on	malignant	
tumours’.50	Discussion	 of	 rights	 such	 as	 these	 presented	 a	 challenge	 to	 authoritarian	
governments,	not	least	that	of	President	Moi	in	Kenya	(as	examined	in	chapters	three	and	
four).	 Broadly	 speaking,	 however,	 the	 end	 of	 the	 Cold	War	 in	 1989	 opened	 space	 for	
rights	talk	and	for	Oxfam	to	attempt	to	give	expression	to	the	different	groupings	of	civil	
society	 that	had	been	 ‘marginalised	 into	poverty’.51	Oxfam	also	began	to	 lobby	national	
governments	 and	 international	 organisations	 for	 policy	 change,	 and	 the	 World	 Bank	
regarded	the	organisation	as	‘the	unofficial	leader	of	the	non-governmental	aid	groups’.52	
Relations	 were	 particularly	 warm	 with	 the	 British	 Department	 for	 International	
Development	(DfID)	under	New	Labour	from	1997.	After	the	horrific	genocide	in	Rwanda	
in	1994,	and	in	an	era	of	increasing	levels	of	conflict	in	the	South,	Oxfam	welcomed	British	
government	 and	 NATO	 intervention	 in	 the	 Kosovo	 crisis	 in	 1999.	 Indeed,	 Oxfam	
advocated	 the	 use	 of	 force	 to	 Robin	 Cook,	 then	 British	 Foreign	 Secretary,	 as	 the	 ‘only	
remaining	 option	 to	 uphold	 citizens’	 rights	 in	 war’.53	Matthew	 Hilton	 is	 critical	 of	 this	
closer	 engagement	 between	NGOs	 and	Western	 institutions,	 and	 also	 of	 the	 dominant	
language	 of	 ‘rights’	 used	 by	 aid	 and	 development	 NGOs.	 He	 alleges	 that	 NGOs	
communicate	‘in	a	language	influenced	and	directed	by’	powerful	Western	interests	and	
official	 development	 agencies,	 and	 as	 such	 form	 part	 of	 a	 pernicious	 system	 of	 global	
governance.54	Moreover,	 questions	 remain	 over	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 Western	 military	
power	used	a	new	model	of	‘moral	triage’	based	on	human	rights	to	justify	intervention	in	
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Kosovo	 and	 to	 demonstrate	 the	 strength	 of	 NATO.55	Of	 course,	 close	 links	 with	 New	
Labour	 and	 DfID	 had	 positives	 for	 Oxfam	 and	 its	 beneficiaries.	 For	 instance,	 donor	
requirements	 from	DfID	were	 relaxed	 for	 Oxfam.	One	 interviewee	 involved	 in	Oxfam’s	
humanitarian	work	in	Kenya	over	a	number	of	years	noted	how	straightforward	it	was	at	
that	 time	 to	 get	 government	 support	 for	 Oxfam’s	 humanitarian	 interventions:	 ‘if	 you	
wanted	two	million	[pounds]	to	airdrop	something	in	Wajir	you	[just]	phoned	them	up’.56	
Hilton	 and	 others	would	 undoubtedly	 argue	 that	 the	 proximity	 of	Oxfam	 to	 the	 British	
government	came	at	the	cost	of	its	independence.	
	 Others	see	Oxfam	as	having	become	institutionalised	in	another	fashion,	and	are	
particularly	 critical	 of	 the	 NGO	 for	 its	 attitude	 towards	 globalisation.	 In	 2002	 Oxfam	
produced	 a	 report	 titled	Rigged	 Rules	 and	Double	 Standards:	 Trade,	 Globalisation,	 and	
the	 Fight	 Against	 Poverty.	 In	 Rigged	 Rules,	 the	 organisation	 advocated	 on	 behalf	 of	
international	 trade	 and	 globalisation	 as	 the	 means	 to	 lift	 millions	 of	 people	 out	 of	
poverty.57	Somewhat	unsurprisingly,	the	NGO	received	much	disapproval	from	the	left	for	
what	critics	called	a	‘schizophrenic	analysis’	that	promoted	democracy	while	at	the	same	
time	 calling	 for	 free	 trade,	 which,	 critics	 alleged,	 only	 serves	 to	 override	 democratic	
rights.58	Moreover,	detractors	argued	that	Oxfam’s	stress	on	‘market	access’	was	merely	
a	 linguistic	 camouflage	 for	 the	 World	 Bank	 policy	 of	 ‘export	 first’.59	In	 publishing	 its	
report,	Oxfam	was	 thus	 considered	 complicit	with	 institutions	 (such	 as	 the	 IMF,	World	
Bank	and	World	Trade	Organisation)	at	 the	helm	of	neo-liberal	 initiatives	 to	govern	the	
South	 through	 its	 inclusion	 in	 the	 global	marketplace.60	Although	Oxfam	 contested	 the	
neo-liberal	approach	 to	development,	 its	attitude	 towards	globalisation	was	considered	
too	close	to	the	ideological	terrain	the	World	Bank	et	al.61	Instead	of	offering	alternatives	
to	 a	 flawed	 international	 trading	 regime,	 therefore,	 critics	 saw	 Oxfam	 employing	 the	
language	and	remedies	prescribed	by	that	very	regime.62	
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	 Unfortunately,	 as	 outlined	 in	 the	 introduction,	 such	 a	 critique	 has	 much	 less	
weight	 than	 one	 based	 on	 a	 precise	 and	 contextualised	 history	 of	 developmental	
interventions.	 The	 most	 comprehensive	 attempt	 to	 do	 this	 for	 Oxfam	 to	 date	 has	
concerned	 Tanzania.	 Michael	 Jennings	 has	 written	 that	 Oxfam’s	 conscientisation	
approach	and	its	willingness	to	accept	a	politicised	understanding	of	poverty	–	and	of	the	
power	 relations	 behind	 underdevelopment	 –	 had	 a	 perverse	 impact	 on	 the	 ground	 in	
Tanzania.	 Indeed,	 precisely	 because	 Oxfam	 envisaged	 development	 in	 the	 newly	
decolonised	nation	to	be	explicitly	and	inherently	political,	its	staff	formed	an	ideological	
attachment	 to	 the	 host	 government,	 which	 followed	 President	 Nyerere’s	 Ujamaa	
philosophy. 63 	Outwardly,	 the	 Ujamaa	 philosophy	 seemed	 to	 be	 conscientisation	 in	
practice:	 it	was	a	community-based	scheme	for	rural	development	that	matched	Oxfam	
concerns	 for	grassroots	democracy	and	 involvement	 in	 the	development	process	and	 it	
focused	 on	 awakening	 the	 poorest	 to	 their	 plight	 rather	 than	 on	 technical	 or	 scientific	
methods	to	increase	productivity	or	per	capita	income.64	The	NGO	thus	threw	its	weight	
behind	 the	 government,	 providing	 funding	 and	 advice	 on	 this	 apparent	 large-scale	
implementation	of	 its	own	ideas	and	became	a	‘surrogate	of	the	state’	 in	the	process.65	
Yet	 in	 undertaking	 projects	 in	 concert	 with	 the	 state,	 Oxfam	 actually	 weakened	 the	
position	 of	 the	 poor	 vis	 à	 vis	 the	 administration	 in	 Tanzania:	 the	 government	 was,	 in	
reality,	 implementing	a	system	of	rural	control	that	reduced	any	 local-level	 involvement	
in	 the	 development	 process.	 ‘Villagisation’	 was,	 in	 fact,	 a	 method	 of	 increasing	 state	
power	by	drawing	peasant	farmers	into	the	state	system	of	production	and	marketing.66	
Turning	 Ferguson’s	 ‘anti-politics	 machine’	 theory	 on	 its	 head,	 Jennings	 argues	 that	
Oxfam’s	political	development	philosophy	meant	it	placed	less	emphasis	on	the	technical	
results	of	its	development	work	than	its	political	intent,	thereby	effectively	blinding	itself	
to	the	way	its	actions	supported	a	centralised	authoritarian	state.67	Ensnared	by	its	own	
discourse,	 Oxfam	 failed	 to	 realise	 that	 the	 results	 of	 its	 work	 –	 the	 extension	 of	 state	
power,	 the	marginalisation	of	 opposition	 to	 the	 government	 and	 the	weakening	of	 the	
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poor	–	were	contradictory	to	its	aims.68	Hence	Jennings	comes	to	a	similar	conclusion	to	
James	Ferguson,	lamenting	that	even	where	development	is	made	political,	NGOs	end	up	
reinforcing	 state	 expansion	 and	 control.	 The	 following	 thesis	 questions	whether	 such	 a	
conclusion	 stands	 up	 to	 examination	 for	 a	 country	 where	 there	 was	 little	 obvious	
coincidence	between	Oxfam	and	the	state	in	terms	of	development	ideology:	the	Kenyan	
development	 context	 was,	 indeed,	 markedly	 different	 from	 that	 pertaining	 across	 the	
border.	 In	so	doing,	 it	asks	whether	 it	 is	possible	to	come	to	any	general	conclusions	as	
regards	the	role	that	NGOs	play	in	development,	especially	when	considering	our	limited	
historical	 knowledge	 of	 their	 varied	 organisational	 forms,	 modes	 of	 operation	 and	
ideologies.	
	
	
	
‘DEVELOPING COUNTRIES FACE THE CHALLENGE OF DEVELOPMENT… 
INDEPENDENCE WOULD BE REDUCED TO A MERE SLOGAN IF THIS 
CHALLENGE IS NOT MET BOLDLY’.69 
 
The	 remainder	 of	 this	 chapter	 demonstrates	 the	 tight	 nexus	 between	 politics	 and	
development	 in	Kenya	under	both	President	Kenyatta	and	President	Moi.	 It	documents	
the	ways	 in	which	each	leader	sought	to	manipulate	and	appropriate	the	funds	and	the	
ideology	of	development	with	the	 intention	to	serve	their	ethno-regional	constituencies	
and	 shore	up	 their	 hold	 on	political	 power.	 But	 before	 discussing	 the	 intricacies	 of	 the	
‘introverted’	developmental	state	 in	Kenya,	 it	 is	 important	to	note	that	the	roots	of	the	
connection	 between	 development	 and	 political	 power	 in	 Kenya	 are	 to	 be	 found	 in	 the	
country’s	 experience	 of	 colonialism;	 meanwhile,	 the	 ethnic	 nationalisms	 to	 which	
Kenyatta	 and	 Moi	 played	 using	 development	 were	 also	 formed	 in	 response	 to	 the	
‘industrialisation,	 urbanisation	 and	 the	 intensification	 of	 state	 power’	 that	 Kenya	
underwent	 during	 colonial	 rule.70	For	 prior	 to	 the	 advent	 of	 British	 rule	 in	 the	 late	
nineteenth	 century,	 the	 indigenous	 society	 in	 the	 region	 comprised	 diverse	 inter-and	
intra-related	 ethnic	 groups	 co-existing	 in	 decentralised	 economies.	 Each	 ethnic	 group	
filled	a	specific	niche	in	the	localised	exchange	of	specialised	products.	For	the	most	part,	
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pre-colonial	 ethnic	 groups	avoided	direct	 competition;	 instead	of	 clashing	 they	 ‘formed	
and	re-formed	by	fission	and	fusion,	like	slivers	of	glass	in	a	kaleidoscope’.71	However,	as	
labour	markets	became	generalised	and	state	 institutions	 formalised	under	colonialism,	
ethnic	difference	began	to	matter	in	the	competition	for	employment	and	security.	Since	
the	early	colonial	regime	focused	much	of	 its	attention	on	supporting	the	white	settlers	
who	were	concentrated	on	high-potential	Kenyan	farmland,	the	ethnic	groups	located	in	
those	areas	suffered	displacement,	but	also	benefited	 from	opportunities	 for	education	
(by	missionary	groups	responding	to	their	dislocation)	and	employment	by	the	state	–	as	
tax	collectors	or	police,	for	example.	These	opportunities	allowed	for	increased	levels	of	
accumulation	amongst	the	Kikuyu	and	Luo	in	particular,	and	their	elite	became	wealthier	
and	 better	 integrated	 into	 the	 colonial	 system	 than	 other	 ethnic	 leaders.72	Those	 who	
received	 education	 and	 off-farm	 incomes	were,	 therefore,	 ready	 and	 able	 to	 purchase	
land,	 invest	 in	 manufacturing	 and	 engage	 in	 commerce	 come	 independence;	 those	
subsisting	 on	 unproductive	 land	 that	 held	 no	 interest	 for	 settlers,	 or	 those	 living	
‘backward’	nomadic	lifestyles	were	left	behind.73	The	former	were	also	able	to	entrench	
these	 advantages	 as	 employment	 by	 the	 state	 gave	 them	 an	 unprecedented	 ability	 to	
‘help	 their	 friends	 and	hurt	 their	 enemies’.74	In	 this	way	 the	 ‘complementary	modes	of	
subsistence’	 of	 pre-colonial	 Africa	 were	 skewed	 by	 colonialism	 and	 replaced	 by	
‘sharpening	 consciousness	 of	 difference’,	 and	 ethnicity	 acquired	 a	 patriotism	 normally	
associated	–	in	Europe,	at	least	–	with	the	nation.	
Moreover,	 as	 discussed	 in	 the	 introduction,	 colonial	 development	 schemes	 in	
Kenya	aimed	to	draw	the	sting	from	criticism	of	colonialism	and	to	dissipate	likely	unrest;	
for	this	reason	they	were	most	often	directed	to	Kikuyu-	and	Luo-dominated	areas	such	
as	Central	and	Western	Province,	areas	that	had	suffered	maximum	displacement	under	
colonial	 rule.75	Indeed,	 the	Kenya	government	would	 finally	 relent	 to	pressure	 from	the	
Colonial	 Office,	 KCA	 and	 KAU	 as	 regards	 encouraging	more	 African	 participation	 in	 the	
development	of	Kenya’s	economy	during	the	Mau	Mau	revolt,	itself	partly	a	consequence	
																																																						
71	Lonsdale,	‘Moral	Ethnicity	and	Political	Tribalism’,	p.	137.	
72	Branch,	Kenya:	Between	Hope	and	Despair,	p.	8.	
73	Although	inequality	was	most	clearly	visible	between	ethnic	groups,	not	all	Kikuyu	or	Luo	benefitted	from	
colonialism.	In	fact,	there	was	a	degree	of	internal	differentiation	between	members	of	a	new	African	petite	
bourgeoisie	and	a	class	of	landless	labourers.	Yet	for	the	time	being	ethnic	groups	were	held	together	by	
traditions	of	mutual	obligation	and	reciprocity	wherein	the	success	of	ethnic	elites	in	acquiring	wealth	and	
positions	of	power	was	considered	beneficial	for	all	members	of	the	group.	Lonsdale,	‘Moral	Ethnicity	and	
Political	Tribalism’,	pp.	138,	141.	
74	Lonsdale,	‘Moral	Ethnicity	and	Political	Tribalism’,	p.	138.	
75	See	Hodgson,	‘Taking	Stock’	for	an	example	of	how	colonial	development	sought	to	control	populations	in	
neighbouring	Tanganyika.	
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of	the	skewed	nature	of	colonial	development.76	Hence,	whereas	around	£29	million	was	
spent	on	Kenyan	development	between	1945	and	1953,	 from	1954	around	£10	million	
per	 annum	was	 budgeted	 for	 development	 as	 a	method	of	 countering	 insurgency.77	By	
opening	development	opportunities	to	those	loyal	to	the	state	through	initiatives	such	as	
the	 Swynnerton	 Plan,	which	 abolished	 restrictions	 on	African	 involvement	 in	 cash	 crop	
exports	from	1954,	the	government	hoped	to	establish	a	stable	yeomanry	farming	class	
(with	 conservative	 and	 property-respecting	 interests)	 as	 a	 buffer	 between	 Mau	 Mau	
radicals	and	the	state.78	The	plan	succeeded	in	practical	terms,	with	over	300,000	farms	
and	2.4	million	acres	consolidated	and	enclosed	by	1962,	but	 it	also	helped	to	entrench	
pernicious	 features	 of	 the	 colonial	 political	 economy,	 including	 the	 dualist	 pattern	 of	
traditional	 and	 modern	 agriculture.	 Furthermore	 –	 as	 discussed	 above	 –	 the	 ideal	 of	
development	 opened	 the	 colonial	 government	 to	 the	 charge	 that	 truly	 national	
development	required	independence.79	
In	 reality,	 however,	 Kenya’s	African	elite	was	 jostling	 for	position	 to	 replace	 the	
white	settlers	at	the	apogee	of	the	‘gatekeeper’	state:	experience	during	the	late	colonial	
period	 convinced	 this	 elite	 that	 access	 to	 the	 levers	 of	 the	 bureaucratic	 and	
developmental	state	came	with	the	opportunity	to	direct	public	investment	according	to	
their	personal	–	or	their	ethnic	group’s	–	interests,	cementing	their	economic	and	political	
hegemony	in	much	the	same	way	as	settlers	had	done	previously.80	If	the	skewed	nature	
of	colonial	economic	development	meant	it	was	always	likely	that	competition	to	replace	
the	 settler	 elite	 would	 be	 framed	 in	 terms	 of	 ethnicity,	 the	 ban	 on	 national	 political	
parties	 implemented	 during	 the	 Mau	 Mau	 revolt	 guaranteed	 such	 a	 scenario,	 since	
district-level	parties	–	for	the	most	part	ethnically	homogeneous	–	had	flourished	in	the	
vacuum.	 The	 parties	 that	 emerged	 once	 the	 ban	 on	 national	 parties	 was	 lifted	 were,	
therefore,	coalitions	of	convenience	among	ethnic	barons	in	order	to	gather	ethnic	voting	
																																																						
76	The	skewed	nature	of	colonial	development	was	particularly	troubling	for	a	Kikuyu	moral	economy	that	
equated	wealth	and	poverty	with	morality.	Mau	Mau	was,	therefore,	as	much	a	Kikuyu	civil	war	–	a	violent	
debate	over	the	meaning	of	‘being	Kikuyu’,	and	thus	who	best	should	expel	the	British	–	as	a	war	of	
insurgency.	Lewis,	Empire-State	Building,	p.	109;	J.	Lonsdale,	‘The	Moral	Economy	of	Mau	Mau:	Wealth,	
Poverty	and	Civil	Virtue	in	Kikuyu	Political	Thought’,	in	B.	Berman	and	J.	Lonsdale,	Unhappy	Valley:	Conflict	
in	Kenya	and	Africa,	Book	Two:	Violence	and	Ethnicity	(Oxford,	James	Currey,	1992).	
77	M.	McWilliam,	‘The	Managed	Economy:	Agricultural	Change,	Development	and	Finance	in	Kenya’,	in	Low	
and	Smith	(eds.),	History	of	East	Africa,	pp.	281-284.	
78	Chege,	‘Swapping	Development	Strategies’,	p.	255;	Hodge,	‘British	Colonial	Expertise’,	p.	32.	
79	McWilliam,	‘The	Managed	Economy’,	in	Low	and	Smith	(eds.),	History	of	East	Africa,	p.	264.	
80	Moreover,	increasing	African	representation	in	cash	crop	agriculture	did	not	have	any	effect	on	the	
sector’s	reliance	on	unpredictable	commodity	prices	and	left	independent	Kenya	with	a	fiscal	system	
vulnerable	to	exogenous	shocks.	L.	Gardner,	‘An	Unstable	Foundation:	Taxation	and	Development	in	Kenya,	
1945-63’,	in	Branch,	Cheeseman	and	Gardner	(eds.),	Our	Turn	to	Eat,	p.	57.	
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blocs	 large	enough	to	negotiate	access	 to	state	power	as	Britain	withdrew.81	The	Kenya	
African	 National	 Union	 (KANU)	 party	 thus	 had	 only	 ‘transient	 unity’	 as	 its	 leaders	
‘temporarily	buried	their	differences	to	eject	an	oppressive	minority’.82	Its	opponent,	the	
Kenya	 African	 Democratic	 Union	 (KADU),	 was	made	 up	 of	 a	 number	 of	 smaller	 ethnic	
groups	and	formed	only	in	response	to	the	strategic	alliance	between	the	most	dominant	
ethnic	groups	in	Kenya	–	the	Kikuyu	and	Luo	–	within	KANU.	KADU	hoped	to	restrict	the	
putative	dominance	of	the	Kikuyu	and	Luo	by	negotiating	a	federal	constitution	with	the	
British.	 At	 independence	 the	 competitive	multiculturalism	 engendered	 by	 colonial	 rule	
and	the	skewed	nature	of	colonial	development	manifested	itself	 in	political	differences	
over	 the	 federal	 or	 ‘majimbo’	 constitution	 put	 in	 place	 by	 the	 British. 83 	KANU	 –	
dominated	as	it	was	by	the	most	populous	ethnic	groups	–	was	successful	in	the	general	
election	 to	 decide	 the	 first	 post-independence	 government	 in	 1963,	 and	 sought	 to	
destroy	 a	 constitution	 that	 opened	 the	 possibility	 of	 decentralised	 power	 and	
accumulation.84	Its	leader	and	Kenya’s	Prime	Minister,	Jomo	Kenyatta,	sought	a	return	to	
the	colonial	system	of	governance	and	development,	whereby	the	central	state	(which	he	
and	 his	 cabal	 would	 almost	 certainly	 dominate)	 was	 the	 node	 of	 power	 and	 wealth.	
Making	 use	 of	 what	 was	 left	 of	 the	 colonial	 bureaucracy,	 Kenyatta	 would	 starve	 the	
supposedly	 empowered	 districts	 of	 funds	 until	 they	 withered	 and	 could	 no	 longer	
function.	Within	two	years	of	 independence,	KADU	had	crumpled,	Kenya	had	become	a	
de	facto	one	party	state	and	economic	and	political	power	was	concentrated	in	the	hands	
of	whoever	had	control	over	the	state	apparatus.85	
	
	
	
	
	
																																																						
81	M.	Gthinji	and	F.	Holmquist,	‘Reform	and	Political	Impunity	in	Kenya:	Transparency	without	
Accountability’,	African	Studies	Review,	Vol.	55,	No.	1	(2012),	p.	58.	
82	P.	Anyang	Nyongo,	‘State	and	Society	in	Kenya:	The	Disintegration	of	the	Nationalist	Coalition	and	the	
Rise	of	Presidential	Authoritarianism,	1963-78’,	African	Affairs,	Vol.	88,	No.	351	(1989),	p.	233;	D.	Ndegwa,	
Walking	in	Kenyatta	Struggles	(Nairobi,	2006),	p.	251,	cited	in	Branch,	Kenya:	Between	Hope	and	Despair,	p.	
7.	
83	Majimbo	is	the	Swahili	word	for	region.	
84	Branch,	Kenya:	Between	Hope	and	Despair,	p.	14.	
85	Majimboism	was	a	dead	letter	by	1965;	those	in	KADU	had	seen	sense	beforehand,	jumping	ship	to	KANU	
in	late	1964.	In	common	with	his	aim	to	re-assert	central	control	over	Kenya’s	political	economy,	Kenyatta	
reinforced	the	position	of	Provincial	Commissioners	as	representatives	of	the	President.	Branch,	Kenya:	
Between	Hope	and	Despair,	pp.	14-15;	D.	Branch	and	N.	Cheeseman,	‘The	Politics	of	Control	in	Kenya:	
Understanding	the	Bureaucratic-Executive	State’,	Review	of	African	Political	Economy,	Vol.	33,	No.	107	
(2006),	pp.	18-21;	A.	Fowler,	‘Non-Governmental	Organisations	and	the	Promotion	of	Democracy	in	Kenya’,	
Ph.D.	Thesis	submitted	to	University	of	Sussex	(1993),	p.	88.	
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FROM ‘FATHER OF THE NATION’ TO THE ‘LITTLE KILLER’:  KENYA UNDER 
KENYATTA, 1963-1978 
 
Kenyatta	and	his	government	quickly	took	over	the	‘gatekeeping’	function	of	the	colonial	
state.	 Capitalising	 on	 the	 already	 existing	 infrastructure	 and	 economic	 base	 of	 the	
country,	 the	 elite	 at	 the	 apex	 of	 government	 acquired	 great	 personal	 fortunes	 and	
positions	of	influence	by	sitting	astride	the	‘gate’	between	multinational	corporations	and	
peasant	producers.86	Control	of	the	state	gave	this	elite	control	of	inward	financial	flows	–	
whether	aid,	payment	for	exports	or	investment	–	and	over	exports	(of	the	legal	or	illegal	
variety).87	Using	 their	 political	 influence,	 this	 elite	 also	 had	 the	 opportunity	 to	 write	
legislation	 favourable	 to	 their	 economic	 interests	 and	 to	 insert	 allies	 into	 positions	 of	
power	 within	 marketing	 boards	 and	 boardrooms	 of	 parastatals	 relevant	 to	 their	
investments.	 The	 Kenyanisation	 of	 posts	 held	 by	 expatriates	 in	 private	 business	 also	
provided	opportunities	to	reward	allies	and	buttress	the	‘gatekeeping’	economic	system.	
As	such,	the	boundary	between	public	and	private	was	porous	to	the	extreme,	with	each	
sector	reliant	on	the	other	for	its	success.88	The	wealth	generated	from	political	contacts	
and	connections	would,	to	complete	the	cycle,	be	used	reinforce	political	power	through	
a	system	of	patronage:	clamour	for	the	‘fruits	of	independence’	gave	great	sway	to	those	
with	 control	over	 resources	 that	 could	be	distributed	 to	an	ethnic	bloc	 in	exchange	 for	
votes.	Most	 important,	 in	 this	 regard,	was	 the	unquestioned	ability	of	 the	President	 to	
direct	state	development	resources	as	he	saw	fit.	
	 Kenyatta’s	 status	 as	 the	 ‘father	 of	 the	 nation’	 during	 the	 early	 years	 of	
independence	 ensured	 that	 the	 development	 programme	 of	 the	 KANU	 government	
followed	his	own	prejudices.	For	him	development	was	a	matter	of	individual	hard	work,	
a	concept	that	reflected	Kikuyu	notions	of	civil	society	and	the	high-value	members	of	the	
community	placed	on	individual	enterprise.89	Accordingly,	there	would	be	no	large-scale	
redistribution	 of	 private	 property	 formerly	 owned	 by	 Europeans	 or	 nationalisation	 of	
																																																						
86	Cooper,	Africa	since	1940,	p.	157.	
87	Branch,	Kenya:	Between	Hope	and	Despair,	pp.	122-123.	
88	In	1967	the	Ndegwa	Commission	recommended	that	civil	servants	should	be	permitted	to	have	business	
interests.	Inevitably,	these	government	employees	would	use	their	public	positions	to	further	their	own	
private	enterprises.	Branch,	Kenya:	Between	Hope	and	Despair,	pp.	122-123.	
89	E.	S.	Atieno	Odhiambo,	‘Hegemonic	Enterprises	and	Instrumentalities	of	Survival:	Ethnicity	and	
Democracy	in	Kenya’,	African	Studies,	Vol.	61,	No.	2	(2002),	p.	241.	
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foreign-owned	assets.90	State	 investment,	meanwhile,	was	 to	be	directed	 to	productive	
activities	such	as	modernising	agriculture	and	incentivising	 industry	rather	than	welfare.	
At	 the	 same	 time,	 Kenyatta	 had	 a	 personal	 and	 political	 interest	 in	 promoting	 such	 a	
development	policy:	as	mentioned	above,	the	Kenyan	elite	(of	which	he	was	the	leading	
member)	had	enriched	and	strengthened	 itself	during	the	final	years	of	colonialism	and	
was	in	a	strong	position	vis	à	vis	the	nexus	between	the	state	and	the	economy.	This	elite,	
and	Kenyatta’s	Kikuyu	allies	in	particular,	had	benefitted	hugely	from	the	transfer	of	vast	
tracts	of	 land	–	and	with	them	the	large-holder	export	sector	–	from	white	settlers	who	
sold	their	land	on	a	‘willing	seller,	willing	buyer’	basis.	Moreover,	they	stood	to	gain	not	
only	from	the	protection	of	what	they	had	already	acquired,	but	also	from	the	continued	
promotion	 of	 individual	 enterprise:	 by	 taking	 out	 loans	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 their	 inherited	
collateral	 they	were	 in	 an	 ideal	 position	 to	 invest	 in	 newly	 vacated	 land	 and	 industrial	
opportunities.	Elite	Kikuyu	would,	therefore,	soon	expand	their	ownership	and	influence	
into	parastatals,	trade,	finance	and	manufacturing.	
	 Except	 for	the	conversion	twenty	per	cent	of	transferred	 land	 into	smallholdings	
for	less	wealthy	Africans,	the	idea	and	reality	of	Kenyan	development	had	barely	changed	
since	independence.	As	in	the	colonial	period,	development	would	be	focused	on	areas	of	
political	 and	 economic	 importance	 for	 Kenya’s	 elite:	 thus	 the	 interests	 of	 large-scale	
agriculture	 and	 the	 burgeoning	modern	 urban	 sector	 remained	 paramount	 for	 Kenya’s	
economic	 planners. 91 	The	 state	 –	 dominated	 as	 in	 the	 colonial	 period	 by	 an	 aloof	
economic	and	political	elite	–	would	play	a	protective	role	for	these	sectors	in	the	form	of	
tariffs,	 subsidisation	 and	 credit,	 and	 would	 invest	 heavily	 in	 the	 infrastructure	 they	
required.92	Meanwhile,	steady	economic	growth	at	around	seven	per	cent	per	annum	and	
the	distribution	of	 land,	 jobs,	businesses	 (particularly	Asian	businesses	 from	1967),	 and	
international	 credit	 provided	 for	 the	 patronage	 necessary	 to	 placate	 Kenyatta’s	 allies	
outside	 the	 Kikuyu	 elite.93	Until	 the	 early	 1970s	 such	 distribution	 was	 not	 a	 zero-sum	
calculation	since	economic	growth	provided	employment,	white	settlers’	land	was	being	
																																																						
90	Republic	of	Kenya,	African	Socialism	and	its	Application	to	Planning	in	Kenya	(Nairobi,	1965),	p.	19;	C.	
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vacated	and	Asians	were	 leaving	Kenya.	Once	these	avenues	for	accumulation	dried	up,	
however,	 the	 ruling	 regime	 would	 have	 to	 find	 other,	 and	 more	 nefarious,	 ways	 of	
buttressing	a	top-heavy	system.94	
For	 the	 time	 being,	 Kenyatta	 privileged	 the	 needs	 of	 his	 ethnic	 group,	
concentrating	 the	 resources	 of	 the	 developmental	 state	 on	 Central	 Province	 or	 on	
settlement	schemes	for	migrating	Kikuyu.	Since	the	majority	of	Kenya’s	citizens	could	not	
expect	 to	 benefit	 directly	 from	 the	 President’s	 largesse,	 they	 established	 ‘harambee’	
development	initiatives.	Harambee	–	which	translates	loosely	as	‘all	pull	together’	–	was	a	
way	for	local	populations	to	get	development	initiatives,	such	as	schools	and	hospitals,	off	
the	ground	by	pooling	 resources.95	Yet	despite	 the	best	efforts	of	 the	 local	 community,	
these	initiatives	often	lacked	the	funds	required	for	their	proper	completion	and	the	local	
political	elite	would	be	called	on	respond	to	their	constituents’	demands	for	assistance	by	
organising	a	harambee	meeting	to	raise	funds.	The	ability	of	local	elites	to	intervene	was,	
however,	 contingent	 on	 the	 ‘recognition’	 of	 the	 President:	 only	 politicians	 loyal	 to	
Kenyatta	 would	 receive	 a	 fund-raising	 licence	 from	 the	 Provincial	 or	 District	
Commissioners.	If	the	politician	jumped	this	hurdle,	they	would	then	attempt	to	secure	a	
powerful	and	influential	‘patron’	for	the	project,	who	would	bring	a	personal	contribution	
as	well	 as	 contributions	 from	 their	 ‘friends’	 or	 clients.	 The	 ability	 to	 attract	 a	 powerful	
donor	also	relied	on	the	good	relations	between	the	local	politician	and	Kenyatta	(or	his	
inner	 circle),	 and	 this,	more	 often	 than	 not,	 depended	 on	 the	 ability	 of	 the	 former	 to	
guarantee	 votes	 for	 KANU	 in	 elections.	 If	 a	 politician	 was	 loyal	 and	 likely	 to	 win	 the	
constituency	for	KANU,	they	could	expect	to	receive	patronage	from	a	high-level	Minister	
or	 even	 the	 President	 himself.96	The	 urge	 for	 an	 equitable	 redistribution	 of	 Kenya’s	
resources	as	expressed	 in	 calls	 for	majimboism	was,	 therefore,	quickly	 supplanted	by	a	
system	of	Presidential	‘recognition’,	in	which	ethnicity	became	the	currency	for	claims	on	
development	resources.97	
Aside	 from	 self-enrichment,	 such	 an	 introverted	 and	 politicised	 development	
system	 served	 two	 political	 purposes	 for	 Kenyatta:	 firstly,	 it	 served	 to	 restrict	 the	
possibility	 of	 any	 truly	 ‘nationalist’	 coalition	 forming	 against	 the	 Kenyatta	 government.	
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The	 President	 retained	 ultimate	 control	 to	 recognise	 or	 refuse	 claims	 as	 regards	
development,	 and	 different	 ethnic	 groups	 would	 compete	 with	 one	 another	 for	 his	
patronage	and	Kenya’s	scarce	resources.98	Secondly,	by	appealing	to	the	people	over	the	
heads	of	local	politicians	and	demanding	that	the	latter	be	judged	on	what	they	had	done	
for	the	constituency	through	harambee,	Kenyatta	was	able	turn	elections	 into	primaries	
on	the	ability	of	an	MP	to	bring	development	to	their	area.99	If	a	constituency’s	demands	
for	development	went	unfulfilled,	 it	was	most	often	was	blamed	on	 the	 local	MP,	who	
was	considered	less	than	useful	at	extracting	resources	from	the	centre.	Thus	the	system	
of	service	provision	and	development	insulated	Kenyatta’s	government	from	criticism	for	
the	non-appearance	of	 the	 ‘fruits	of	 independence’	 in	 less	politically	salient	areas.100	By	
turning	local	elections	into	primaries	on	the	capacity	of	individual	MPs	to	bring	resources	
to	‘their’	people,	Kenyatta’s	patrimonial	alternative	to	the	tax	and	spend	model	helped	to	
restrict	 discussion	 about	 alternatives	 to	 the	 development	 policies	 advanced	 by	 the	
government.101	
Suppressing	 dissent	 over	 development	 was	 a	 vitally	 important	 feature	 of	
Kenyatta’s	 development	 system,	 for	 KANU	was,	 as	 discussed	 above,	 little	more	 than	 a	
tactical	alliance	of	individuals	with	vastly	different	ideas	as	to	how	Kenya	should	proceed	
as	 an	 independent	 nation.	 After	 independence	 removed	 the	 common	 enemy,	 these	
differing	ideologies	threatened	to	spill	out	into	the	open,	an	event	that	would	potentially	
challenge	Kenyatta’s	hold	on	the	Kenyan	state.	Kenyatta’s	Minister	of	Home	Affairs	(and	
later	 Vice	 President)	 Oginga	 Odinga,	 for	 instance,	 held	 more	 communocratic	 and	
egalitarian	views	than	Kenyatta,	inspired	by	his	own	Luo	culture.102	Odinga	wished	to	see	
Kenya’s	 resources	 –	 in	 particular	 formerly	 European-owned	 land	 –	 redistributed	 to	 the	
poorest	 immediately	 at	 independence. 103 	Even	 Tom	 Mboya,	 Kenyatta’s	 Minister	 for	
Economic	 Planning	 and	 Development,	 considered	 a	 significant	 redistribution	 of	 wealth	
necessary,	 albeit	 not	 immediately.	 Yet	 as	 the	 undisputed	 ‘father	 of	 the	 nation’,	 and	
																																																						
98	B.	Berman,	‘Ethnicity,	Patronage	and	the	African	State:	The	Politics	of	Uncivil	Nationalism’,	African	Affairs,	
Vol.	97,	No.	388	(1998),	p.	331;	Fowler,	‘Non-Governmental	Organisations	and	the	Promotion	of	Democracy	
in	Kenya’,	p.	85.	
99	Fowler,	‘Non-Governmental	Organisations	and	the	Promotion	of	Democracy	in	Kenya’,	p.	96.	
100	Fowler,	‘Non-Governmental	Organisations	and	the	Promotion	of	Democracy	in	Kenya’,	pp.	96-97.	
101	Branch	and	Cheeseman,	‘Conclusion’,	in	Branch,	Cheeseman	and	Gardner	(eds.),	Our	Turn	to	Eat,	p.	246;	
Cowen	and	Shenton,	Doctrines	of	Development,	p.	313.	
102	Atieno	Odhiambo,	‘Hegemonic	Enterprises’,	p.	241.	
103	He	articulated	this	position	in	a	book	whose	title,	Not	Yet	Uhuru,	served	to	make	clear	his	opinion	that	
freedom	was	not	contingent	on	the	substitution	of	the	Kenyan	flag	for	the	British	flag,	but	depended	
instead	on	the	equitable	distribution	of	the	‘fruits	of	independence’	which	had	been	denied	to	Kenyans	
under	colonialism.	O.	Odinga,	Not	Yet	Uhuru.	The	Autobiography	of	Oginga	Odinga	(Heinemann,	1967);	
Speich,	‘The	Kenyan	Style	of	“African	Socialism”’,	p.	454.	
	 72	
entrenched	at	the	centre	of	the	development	system,	Kenyatta	brooked	no	dissent.	For	
the	 President,	 unity	 meant	 obedience,	 and	 so	 Mboya	 was	 tasked	 with	 creating	 a	
philosophy	 of	 development	 that	 fitted	 with	 Kenyatta’s	 ideas	 but	 could	 be	 sold	 to	 the	
people	 in	 such	 a	way	 as	 to	 inspire	 them	 to	 take	up	 the	 ‘challenge	of	 nationhood’.	 The	
same	man	 that	 had	 used	 the	 concept	 of	 development	 in	 the	 colonial	 era	 to	 rally	 the	
troops	 against	 colonialism	 was	 now	 given	 the	 colonial-esque	 assignment	 of	 using	 the	
development	 idea	to	help	close	down	debate	and	to	reassert	 the	authority	of	 the	state	
that	nationalists	had	spent	so	long	attacking.104	
In	 this	vein,	Mboya	turned	his	Ministry	 for	Economic	Planning	and	Development	
into	 a	 ‘policy	 formation	 laboratory’,	 staffed	 by	 colonial	 planning	 experts	 and	 orthodox	
economists,	and	advised	by	foreign	missions.105	Its	first	‘scientific’	theory	of	development	
was	 presented	 in	 the	 (in)famous	 Sessional	 Paper	 No.	 10	 of	 1965.	 Sessional	 Paper	 10	
defined	 development	 as	 modern	 state	 engineering	 to	 solve	 social	 problems	 through	
economic	growth:	social	justice	and	humane	living	conditions	would	be	the	result,	not	the	
prerequisite,	of	such	growth.106	‘The	most	important	policy’	was,	therefore,	‘to	provide	a	
firm	basis	for	rapid	economic	growth.	Other	problems	such	as	Africanisation,	education,	
unemployment	 [and]	welfare	services	must	be	handled	 in	ways	 that	will	not	 jeopardise	
growth’.	 ‘African	 Socialism’	 –	 the	 name	 given	 to	 the	 development	 philosophy	 –	 was	 a	
mixture	of	 free	market	 economy	and	 strong	 government	 control:	 it	 described	 a	 ‘mixed	
economy’,	where	the	key	concept	was	state	planning	based	on	the	colonial	pattern.107	For	
Mboya,	 development	 was	 to	 be	 understood	 in	 the	 restricted	 colonial	 fashion	 as	 the	
implementation	of	technical	procedures:	Kenya	was	thus	conceptualised	as	a	‘laboratory	
of	 development’	 in	which	 the	 application	 of	 ‘neutral’	 technical	 knowledge	by	 the	 state	
apparatus	would	test	and	refine	the	key	assumptions	of	orthodox	development	theory.108	
‘African	Socialism’	was	thus	a	classic	‘anti-politics	machine’	discourse,	seeking	to	smother	
alternatives	to	the	capitalistic	and	individualistic	nature	of	development	in	Kenya	with	the	
language	 and	 governance	 of	 technocrats	 and	 the	 promise	 of	 technical	 solutions	 to	
poverty,	 and	 to	 protect	 the	 privileged	 urban	 elite	 who	 served	 as	 ‘gatekeepers’	 of	 the	
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development	 idea	 itself	 by	 invoking	 progress	 and	 condemning	 the	 backwardness	 of	
opponents	 or	 those	 resistant	 to	 change.109	Though	 Mboya	 tacked	 on	 to	 the	 Sessional	
Paper	the	African	‘tradition’	of	‘mutual	social	responsibility’,	in	reality	African	‘traditions’	
were	 considered	obstacles	 to	development	by	 those	who	mattered.	 Indeed,	 in	 another	
echo	of	 colonial	policy,	development	and	 service	delivery	were	used	as	part	of	a	wider	
counter-insurgency	 movement	 against	 ‘backward’	 irredentists,	 this	 time	 in	 the	 newly	
created	North	Eastern	Province.	
Under	colonial	rule,	the	arid	north	and	northeast	of	Kenya	had	been	left	mostly	to	
its	 own	 devices.	 It	 held	 no	 interest	 for	 British	 officials	 who	 were	 content	 merely	 to	
maintain	 order.	 Understandably,	 therefore,	 the	 Somalis	 in	 the	 region	 felt	 little	
attachment	 to	 the	 Kenyan	 state	 and	 instead	 hoped	 for	 unification	 with	 a	 Greater	
Somalia.110	In	 1960,	 inspired	 by	 the	 union	 of	 British	 and	 Italian	 Somaliland	 to	 form	 the	
Somali	Republic,	 Somalis	 in	 the	Northern	Frontier	District	 (NFD),	 as	 it	was	 then	known,	
formed	the	Northern	Province	People’s	Progressive	Party	(NPPPP)	to	press	for	secession	
from	Kenya.	The	party	would	win	the	support	of	a	significant	majority	of	Somalis	 in	the	
election	of	1961,	and	when	 the	British	appointed	a	 commission	 to	gather	views	on	 the	
issue	of	secession	in	the	following	year,	they	reported	back	that	over	eighty	per	cent	of	
the	region’s	population	favoured	separation	from	Kenya.	Near	unanimity	on	the	issue	was	
recorded	 in	 Mandera,	 Wajir	 and	 Garissa. 111 	Notwithstanding	 such	 public	 clamour,	
representatives	of	KANU,	consistent	with	 its	centrist	philosophy	and	 its	strangulation	of	
majimbo,	rejected	any	consideration	of	separation	for	what	amounted	to	around	a	fifth	
of	 the	 landmass	 of	 Kenya.	 KANU’s	 guarantee	 to	 protect	 settler	 farmers	 after	
independence	 was	 made	 contingent	 on	 the	 British	 government	 conceding	 this	 issue,	
which	they	did	in	1963:	areas	of	the	NFD	that	had	overwhelmingly	supported	separation	
from	Kenya	would,	therefore,	become	North	Eastern	Province.112	
Anger	 at	 the	 decision	 spurred	 protests,	 which	 soon	 turned	 violent	 as	
administrators	 implemented	 restrictive	 security	 measures.	 Attacks	 on	 Kenyan	 military	
personnel	immediately	after	independence	led	to	the	declaration	of	a	state	of	emergency	
on	 28	 December:	 the	 Shifta	 War	 (shifta	 being	 a	 common	 term	 for	 bandit)	 began	 in	
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earnest	 only	 two	 weeks	 after	 independence. 113 	Armed	 by	 the	 Somali	 government,	
insurgents	 engaged	 the	 Kenyan	military	 in	 a	 small-scale	 conflict	 until	 1967.	 Reports	 of	
indiscriminate	and	violent	reprisals	by	the	security	forces	were	all	too	common	over	these	
years;	 yet	 as	 well	 as	 violent	 repression	 the	 Kenyan	 government	 followed	 the	 colonial	
government’s	 counter-insurgency	 playbook	 and	 attempted	 to	 pacify	 and	 control	 the	
population	 of	 North	 Eastern	 Province	 through	 development	 interventions,	 in	 this	 case	
enabled	 by	 compulsory	 villagisation.114	From	 1966	 Somalis	were	 corralled	 into	 guarded	
settlements	 –	 manyattas	 –	 while	 the	 security	 forces	 engaged	 the	 shifta	 outside.	
‘Manyattarization’	 served	 a	 double	 purpose	 for	 the	 government:	 it	 was	 a	 security	
measure	in	so	far	as	it	would	deny	the	shifta	easy	access	to	supplies,	but	it	also	offered	
the	 Kenyan	 state	 an	 opportunity	 to	 win	 the	 ‘hearts	 and	 minds’	 of	 the	 recalcitrant	
population	by	offering	development	 and	 services.115	The	Ministry	of	 Economic	Planning	
and	 Development	 dangled	 the	 ‘carrot’	 of	 development	 in	 front	 of	 Somalis	 not	 yet	
convinced	by	the	shifta	cause,	promising	that:	
	
the	 Government	 could	 carry	 out	 a	 number	 of	 economic	 and	 social	 projects	 in	 the	
area	 if	 the	 funds	 now	 being	 spent	 on	 military	 activities	 to	 restore	 peace	 were	
available	for	development.116	
	
	 Whether	 voluntarily	 or	 not,	 by	 1967,	 around	 ten	 per	 cent	 of	 the	 population	 of	
North	 Eastern	 Province	 and	 the	 northern	 and	 eastern	 districts	 of	 neighbouring	 Eastern	
Province	were	 ‘villagised’.117	Notably,	 it	was	hoped	that	villagisation	would	 ‘rehabilitate’	
the	 nomad	 to	 the	 settled	 form	 of	 life	 considered	 vital	 for	 the	 modernisation	 of	 the	
province	 and	 to	 finally	 end	 all	 talk	 of	 separation.118 	Indeed,	 during	 a	 period	 when	
development	 was	 synonymous	 with	 increases	 in	 gross	 national	 product,	 the	 entire	
pastoral	 sector	 was	 an	 image	 of	 non-viability	 and	 non-productivity,	 and	 efforts	 were	
made	 to	 move	 pastoralists	 into	 a	 more	 productive	 way	 of	 life	 through	 settlement.119	
Villages	 were	 to	 be	 the	 focal	 point	 of	 state	 development	 efforts	 in	 North	 Eastern	
Province,	albeit	limited	as	they	were	to	infrastructural	development	such	as	the	building	
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of	 classrooms	and	medical	 facilities.120	Inadequate	 resources	and	 the	arbitrary	 selection	
of	 the	 sites	 for	 villages,	 however,	meant	 that	 these	 facilities	were	 soon	 overburdened:	
within	a	year	of	villagisation	residents	of	villages	in	Mandera	were	wholly	dependent	on	
famine	relief	food.121	Chapter	two	outlines	how	Oxfam	stepped	in	to	support	the	state	in	
many	such	endeavours,	both	in	North	Eastern	Province	and	in	other	areas	populated	by	
‘troublesome’	 pastoralists.	 It	 thus	 questions	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 Oxfam	 enabled	 the	
expansion	 of	 an	 authoritarian	 developmental	 state	 that	 sought	 to	 impose	
‘sedentarisation’	 on	 recalcitrant	 citizens	 and	 to	 suppress	 dissenting	 development	 ideas	
that	challenged	the	political	and	economic	elite.	
	 Villagisation	 in	North	 Eastern	 Province	 certainly	 aimed	 to	 delegitimise,	 and	 to	 a	
certain	extent	criminalise,	pastoral	activity	as	a	backward	and	non-developmental	way	of	
life	that	posed	a	threat	not	only	to	the	territorial	integrity	of	the	Kenyan	state,	but	also	to	
its	 ideological	 integrity.122	As	Geoffrey	Gitahi	Kariuki	 (MP	 for	Laikipia-Nanyuki)	 stated	 to	
Parliament	in	1965:	
	
let	 loyal	 Somalis	 come	 out	 and	 show	 us	 their	 loyalty.	 Let	 them	 be	 put	 in	 a	 camp	
where	we	can	scrutinize	them	and	know	who	[amongst	them]	are	good.123	
	
Settlement	was	thus	as	much	about	integration	into	Kenyan	state	developmentalism	as	it	
was	about	spatial	integration	into	the	Kenyan	nation.	As	already	discussed,	the	two	ideas	
were	closely	related	and	Kenya’s	elite	in	government	attempted	to	act	as	‘gatekeepers’	of	
development	 knowledge	 in	 order	 to	 maintain	 compliance	 with	 their	 self-interested	
economic	 programme.	 Crucially,	 Somalis	were	 only	 the	most	 obvious	 threat	 to	 Kenyan	
nationhood	at	that	time.	Villagisation	was,	therefore,	merely	one	of	the	first	examples	of	
what	Daniel	 Branch,	 taking	his	 cue	 from	E.	 S.	Atieno	Odhiambo,	has	 referred	 to	 as	 the	
‘fetishisation	 of	 order’	 in	 post-colonial	 Kenya:	 the	 often	 violent	 efforts	 to	 discredit	 any	
group	 or	 individual	 who	 dissented	 from	 state-led	 development	 policies.124	Dissenters	
were	 to	 be	 marginalised,	 like	 pastoralists,	 as	 disorderly,	 backward	 and	 anti-
developmental	 and	 political	 decisions	 were	 recast	 as	 purely	 technical	 processes.	 In	
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facilitating	 this,	 Oxfam	 potentially	 helped	 to	 displace	 and	 obscure	 questions	 about	 the	
meaning	and	aims	of	Kenyan	independence.125	
	 NGOs	were	not,	however,	forced	to	comply	with	the	government’s	development	
agenda.	Indeed,	NGOs	in	Kenya	faced	little	difficulty	under	Kenyatta.	His	positive	attitude	
towards	 individual	 private	 endeavour	meant	 that	 foreign	 investment	 and	 incoming	 aid	
funds	 (which	 had	 potential	 utility	 as	 patronage	 resources)	 were	 welcomed	 with	 open	
arms.	Domestic	and	foreign	NGOs	were	allowed	to	operate	freely	for	the	most	part	as	a	
result.126	Between	 1963	 and	 1978	 the	 number	 of	 NGOs	 in	 Kenya	 increased	 from	 45	 to	
132,	 and	 they	 operated	 under	 only	 loose	 central	 supervision.	 Kenyatta’s	 promotion	 of	
local	harambee	 initiatives	 also	meant	NGOs	had	a	wide	array	of	possible	projects	 from	
which	 to	 choose	 when	 looking	 to	 distribute	 their	 resources.	 Moreover,	 the	 type	 of	
development	articulated	by	Kenyatta	–	state-directed	and	technical	–	suited	NGOs	as	they	
stood	 in	 the	 1960s:	 as	 supporters	 of	 state-led	 development	 or	 providers	 of	 services	 to	
complement	 those	 efforts,	 NGOs	 on	 the	whole	were	 not	 predisposed	 to	 challenge	 the	
regime.	
	 If	not	unheard	of,	therefore,	questioning	of	Kenyatta’s	development	policies	was	
at	 the	very	 least	dampened	for	the	first	year	of	 independence,	allowing	the	elite	at	 the	
top	of	the	Kenya	government	to	accumulate	wealth	and	entrench	their	position	of	power.	
Nonetheless,	 as	 the	 colonial	 regime	 had	 found	 out	 previously,	 it	 was	 impossible	 to	
contain	 all	 dissent	 indefinitely:	 the	 rhetoric	 of	 development	 –	 which	 the	 government	
hoped	would	deflect	demands	on	the	regime	–	had	in	fact	served	only	to	delay	the	now	
heightened	 expectations	 around	 independence.	 Development	 was	 –	 in	 part	 thanks	 to	
Mboya’s	efforts	during	the	anti-colonial	struggle	–	felt	to	be	the	very	raison	d’être	of	the	
independent	 Kenyan	 state,	 and	 so,	 after	 a	 year	 of	 independence	 passed	 without	 the	
general	population	 tasting	 its	 fruits,	demands	 for	 redistribution	would	begin	 to	 take	on	
the	form	of	a	national	movement	led	by	Oginga	Odinga.127	As	Branch	notes,	the	ensuing	
battle	 between	 Kenyatta	 and	 Odinga	 was	 not	 merely	 a	 tussle	 for	 power	 between	
interested	individuals,	but	also	an	ideological	struggle	about	the	morality	of	development	
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and	the	nature	of	the	nexus	between	politics,	the	developmental	state	and	the	economy	
in	Kenya.128	
	 In	 response	 to	 the	 challenge	 from	 Odinga,	 Kenyatta	 set	 about	 undermining	 his	
former	ally.	This	was	done	first	by	increasing	the	volume	of	attacks	on	Odinga’s	concept	
of	development,	characterising	it	as	conservative	and	communalistic	–	the	very	antithesis	
of	 the	 modernising	 development	 outlined	 in	 Sessional	 10.129	For	 Kenyatta,	 Odinga’s	
theory	of	development	was	fundamentally	flawed,	since	it	conceived	of	a	world	where	
	
effort	is	not	needed…	production	is	not	necessary,	and…	in	which	all	possessions	and	
needs	and	services	are	given	free.130	
	
The	 attempt	 to	 side-line	Odinga	 and	his	 allies	 –	 in	 order	 to	 secure	hegemony	over	 the	
idea	of	development	and	the	developmental	state	–	was	also	supplemented	by	the	use	of	
more	 tangible	 methods:	 thus	 Kenyatta	 made	 sure	 that	 the	 republican	 constitution	 of	
December	1964	did	not	allow	for	the	Vice	President	to	succeed	should	the	President	die	
in	 office.131	Further	marginalised	 within	 KANU	 during	 1966,	 Odinga	 resigned	 to	 form	 a	
new	political	party	to	argue	for	redistributive	development	policies	–	the	Kenya	People’s	
Union	(KPU).	
	 Kenyatta	 set	out	 to	 crush	 the	new	party	as	quickly	 as	possible:	 sitting	MPs	who	
joined	 the	party	were	made	 to	 fight	 for	 re-election	 in	 the	 ‘Little	General	 Election’	 later	
that	year	amidst	an	atmosphere	of	intimidation	by	the	paramilitary	General	Service	Unit	
(GSU)	 and	 petty	 bureaucratic	 disruption	 by	 the	 provincial	 administration.	 Its	 main	
activists	were,	moreover,	harassed	and	detained.	Government	interference	was	greatest	
outside	the	KPU’s	main	support	base	 in	Nyanza.	The	 flourishing	of	 the	KPU	 in	Nyanza	–	
which	did	not	benefit	to	the	same	extent	as	Central	Province	had	under	colonialism	and	
during	the	early	years	of	independence	–	allowed	Kenyatta	to	characterise	the	opposition	
as	a	vehicle	for	the	disgruntled	and	devious	Luo	ethnic	group.	Nevertheless,	the	KPU	won	
nine	 of	 the	 twenty-nine	 by-elections	 and	 polled	 20,000	 more	 votes	 that	 KANU. 132	
Kenyatta	 could	 not	 risk	 the	 same	 scale	 of	 revolt	 in	 the	 local	 elections	 in	 1968,	 and	 so	
personally	ordered	returning	officers	across	the	country	to	reject	the	nomination	papers	
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the	former	leader	of	KADU	crossed	the	floor	of	parliament	to	join	KANU.	Other	allies	of	Odinga,	such	as	Pio	
Gama	Pinto,	were	dealt	with	more	brutally.	Branch,	Kenya:	Between	Hope	and	Despair,	pp.	45-47.	
132	R.	Ajulu,	‘Politicised	Ethnicity,	Competitive	Politics	and	Conflict	in	Kenya:	A	Historical	Perspective’,	
African	Studies,	Vol.	61,	No.	2	(2002),	p.	254.	
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for	 KPU	 candidates:	 KANU	 candidates	 were	 returned	 unopposed.	 Meanwhile,	 having	
successfully	side-lined	the	opposition,	Mboya	had	outlived	his	usefulness	to	Kenyatta.	A	
popular	politician,	Mboya	was	the	standout	candidate	for	the	presidency	once	Kenyatta	
departed	 the	 scene,	 but	 threatened	 the	 continuation	 of	 Kikuyu	 accumulation.	 Once	
Kenyatta	 began	 suffering	 from	 ill	 health,	 the	 Kikuyu	 elite	 took	 things	 into	 their	 own	
hands:	the	architect	of	Kenya’s	development	policy	was	murdered	on	5	July,	1969.133	
	 Though	 individuals	 other	 than	 Kenyatta	were	 implicated	 in	 the	 orchestration	 of	
the	assassination,	the	President	took	advantage	of	the	ethnic	divisions	caused	by	Mboya’s	
murder.	 Facing	 increased	 criticism	 from	 non-Kikuyu	 and	 particularly	 Luo	 citizens	 as	
regards	their	inability	to	‘eat’	the	fruits	of	independence,	Kenyatta	organised	the	‘oathing’	
of	Kikuyu,	transporting	300,000	Kikuyu	to	his	home	in	Gatundu	to	swear	an	oath	never	to	
allow	the	Luo	to	lead	the	country.	Moreover,	rather	than	making	any	attempt	to	cool	the	
temperature	across	Kenya,	 the	President	travelled	to	Nyanza	with	the	specific	 intention	
to	goad	and	aggravate	the	Luo	population	into	striking	first.	Violence	between	KANU	and	
KPU	 supporters	 at	 a	 Presidential	 event	 gave	 Kenyatta	 the	 pretext	 to	 ban	 the	 KPU	 and	
arrest	Odinga.	As	during	the	colonial	period,	the	government	had	stoked	ethnic	tensions	
and	resorted	to	repression	in	order	to	obscure	ideological	debate	over	development	and	
the	future	of	the	nation	as	well	as	to	restrict	any	chance	of	a	truly	national	class	uniting	to	
challenge	elite	accumulation.134		
	 As	a	result	of	these	machinations,	the	introverted	development	system	in	Kenya	–	
a	 programme-less	 and	 clientelist	 system,	 dominated	 by	 a	 President	 who	 manipulated	
ethnic	competition	under	a	de	facto	one-party	state,	and	oriented	towards	the	protection	
of	large-holder	agriculture	and	the	urban	sector	of	the	economy	–	was	sustained	into	the	
1970s.	 But	 the	 system	 was	 not	 impervious	 to	 economic	 difficulties;	 indeed,	 the	
extraverted	nature	of	 the	 economy	made	Kenya	extremely	 vulnerable	 to	 cyclical	 boom	
and	bust,	and	the	country	would	experience	the	latter	at	a	time	of	drought	and	recession	
in	 the	 early	 1970s.	 Moreover,	 the	 country	 was	 becoming	 increasingly	 unequal:	 the	
International	 Labour	Organisation	 (ILO)	mission	 in	 1972	discovered	 that	 the	 bottom	40	
per	 cent	 of	 the	 population	 (in	 terms	 of	 income)	 received	 a	mere	 11	 per	 cent	 of	 GDP.	
Meanwhile,	the	highest	20	per	cent	of	earners	collected	68	per	cent,	the	highest	10	per	
																																																						
133	With	no	obvious	Kikuyu	candidate	to	replace	Kenyatta,	Mboya	posed	a	threat	to	the	elite	Kikuyu	cabal	
who	had	come	to	dominate	Kenya’s	political	economy.	Branch,	Kenya:	Between	Hope	and	Despair,	pp.	69-
88.	
134	Atieno	Odhiambo,	‘Hegemonic	Enterprises’,	p.	241;	Ajulu,	‘Politicised	Ethnicity’,	p.	260.	
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cent	received	56	per	cent	and	the	highest	5	per	cent	pocketed	44	per	cent	of	GDP.135	The	
number	of	unemployed	Kenyans	was	also	rising,	and	was	equivalent	to	46	per	cent	of	all	
wage	earners	in	1969.136	In	response,	the	government	attempted	to	buy	off	some	of	the	
disaffected	 through	 tripartite	 agreements	 between	 state,	 business	 and	 unions	 that	
promised	the	expansion	of	employment	in	return	for	wage	restraint.137	Nonetheless,	the	
‘system’	 came	under	 further	pressure	 in	1973	as	 inflation	 took	hold,	 growth	came	 to	a	
halt	and	a	new	rival,	 in	the	form	of	J.	M.	Kariuki,	challenged	Kenyatta	not	to	rule	over	a	
country	‘of	ten	millionaires	and	ten	million	beggars’.	Coming	from	Kariuki,	the	challenge	
was	particularly	troubling	for	Kenyatta	because,	as	a	Kikuyu,	Kariuki	threatened	to	divide	
Kenyatta’s	ethnic	base.138	His	call	resonated	particularly	with	Mau	Mau	veterans	who	had	
yet	 to	 see	 any	 benefit	 from	 their	 sacrifice	 to	 replace	 the	 British	with	 Kenyatta	 and	 his	
crony	capitalist	elite.	Kenyatta	attempted	to	placate	Kikuyu	farmers	and	cohere	his	ethnic	
support	 base	 by	 providing	 them	 with	 land:	 threats	 against	 remaining	 British	 settlers,	
combined	with	 the	offer	of	 a	quick	 sale,	 helped	 to	 free	up	agricultural	 land,	 as	did	 the	
opening	of	formerly	‘closed’	districts	to	non-resident	Kikuyu.139	
Promoting	 large-scale	agriculture	and	the	modern	urban	sector,	buying	off	elites	
and	pacifying	the	disillusioned	did	not,	of	course,	come	cheap,	particularly	for	a	 low	tax	
regime	aiming	to	attract	foreign	investment.	In	such	a	way,	Kenya	developed	a	‘structural	
tendency	 to	 fiscal	 crisis’,	 and	 deficit	 financing	 increased	 into	 the	 mid-1970s.140	As	 the	
following	 chapter	 describes,	 NGOs	 offered	 another	 means	 of	 defraying	 the	 cost	 of	
settlement	schemes:	for	instance,	the	Lake	Kenyatta	Settlement	Scheme,	which	sought	to	
settle	 Kikuyu	 on	 the	 coast,	 received	 significant	 financial	 support	 from	 Oxfam.	
Nonetheless,	 by	 this	 time,	 Oxfam’s	 support	 to	 the	 Kenyatta	 state	 had	 dwindled	 for	 a	
combination	 of	 ideological	 and	 practical	 reasons:	 connected	 to	 the	 shift	 towards	
conscientisation	within	the	organisation,	Oxfam	began	to	take	much	greater	notice	of	the	
inequitable	 and	 corrupt	 nature	 of	 Kenyatta’s	 development	 system	 and	 lamented	 its	
inability	to	wield	any	influence	over	the	administration.	The	ediface	of	Kenyatta’s	regime	
																																																						
135	Leys,	‘Development	Strategy	in	Kenya	since	1971’,	p.	300.	
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137	This	had	been	done	once	before	in	1964,	and	was	repeated	in	1970	and	1978.	Holmquist,	Weaver	and	
Ford,	‘The	Structural	Development	of	Kenya’s	Political	Economy’,	p.	84.	
138	Moreover,	he	did	not	call	for	redistribution	as	the	KPU	had,	but	instead	asked	for	improved	reciprocal	
relations	between	the	‘big	men’	at	the	top	of	government	and	those	struggling	to	make	ends	meet.	He	was	
thus	challenging	his	fellow	Kikuyu	not	to	accept	poverty	just	because	their	man	was	in	State	House.	Branch	
and	Cheeseman,	‘The	Politics	of	Control	in	Kenya’,	p.	24;	Widner,	The	Rise	of	a	Party-State	in	Kenya,	p.	77;	
Ajulu,	‘Politicised	Ethnicity’,	p.	261.	
139	Branch,	Kenya:	Between	Hope	and	Despair,	pp.	96,	99,	102.	
140	Holmquist,	Weaver	and	Ford,	‘The	Structural	Development	of	Kenya’s	Political	Economy’,	p.	87.	
	 80	
was,	 however,	 already	 being	 placed	 under	 stress	 by	 revelations	 (linked	 with	 Kariuki)	
about	the	extent	of	corruption	at	the	top	of	government,	not	least	within	Kenyatta’s	own	
family.	The	appropriation	of	land	and	the	ostentatious	wealth	of	public	servants	caused	a	
great	deal	of	public	anger:	 in	the	election	of	1974	fifty	per	cent	of	MPs	would	be	voted	
out	 of	 office	 in	 a	 display	 of	 the	 public’s	 frustration	 with	 a	 corrupt	 and	 self-serving	
government	elite.	Kariuki	–	a	lightening	rod	for	such	anger	–	was,	somewhat	predictably,	
assassinated	with	the	approval	of	the	President	in	1975.141	
The	 murder	 cost	 Kenyatta	 his	 legitimacy	 with	 the	 Kenyan	 public,	 who	 were	
incredulous	at	 the	cover	up:	he	was	now	nicknamed	 ‘The	Little	Killer’.	Yet	by	 this	 stage	
the	President	was	declining	in	both	health	and	authority,	and	his	remaining	years	would	
be	dominated	by	an	internal	elite	struggle	for	the	presidency	and	its	control	over	Kenya’s	
networks	of	extraversion	and	patronage.142	As	Vice	President,	Moi	was	first	in	line	to	the	
presidency	and	he	had	the	backing	of	Njonjo	and	other	influential	brokers.	But	Moi	faced	
a	 challenge	 from	 a	 breakaway	 Kikuyu	 faction	 that	 supported	 Njoroge	 Mungai	 and	
campaigned	to	stop	the	Vice	President	automatically	succeeding	on	the	President’s	death	
in	the	Change	the	Constitution	Movement.	Nonetheless,	with	Njonjo’s	help	(the	Attorney	
General	issued	a	statement	that	any	discussion	of	the	President’s	death	would	amount	to	
treason,	 silencing	 discussion	 around	 the	 constitution)	 Moi	 was	 able	 to	 assume	 the	
presidency	without	too	much	trouble	when	Kenyatta	died	on	22	August	1978.		
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Moi’s	difficulties	were	not	over	once	he	was	safely	ensconced	at	State	House,	however.	
The	 new	President	 faced	 a	 difficult	 economic	 inheritance:	 inflation	 followed	 quickly	 on	
the	tail	of	the	late	1970s	coffee	boom	and	there	was	no	obvious	method	of	creating	the	
growth	required	to	match	Kenya’s	growing	population.	Formerly	European	land	had	been	
mostly	 distributed,	 most	 export	 avenues	 had	 been	 tried	 and	 by	 now	 the	 public	 and	
private	sectors	of	the	economy	rested	 in	Kenyan,	as	opposed	to	foreign,	hands.	Neither	
were	 Moi’s	 political	 troubles	 over,	 and	 it	 was	 here	 that	 he	 concentrated	 most	 of	 his	
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coffee	prices	rocketed	in	response	to	the	collapse	of	the	Brazilian	coffee	crop.	Branch,	Kenya:	Between	
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attention.	Using	anti-corruption	as	a	populist	cover,	the	President	set	about	removing	his	
opponents	 from	 positions	 of	 influence.	 Kenyatta’s	 former	 courtiers	 and	 those	 who	
opposed	 Moi’s	 succession	 thus	 found	 themselves	 in	 court	 over	 allegedly	 irregular	
financial	 dealings	 or	 were	 defeated	 in	 their	 attempt	 to	 stand	 in	 the	 1979	 election.	
Meanwhile,	Moi	had	ousted	all	but	one	of	Kenyatta’s	Provincial	Commissioners	by	1980,	
and	 private	 sector	 boardrooms	 were	 encouraged	 to	 have	 a	 Kalenjin	 or	 pro-Moi	
representative	in	order	to	facilitate	good	relations	with	the	state.143	
	 There	was	 a	 great	 deal	 of	 tension,	 though,	 between	Moi’s	 efforts	 to	 solidify	 his	
position	politically	and	the	need	to	put	the	economy	on	a	sound	footing.	Notably,	for	the	
first	 time	the	political	centre	of	gravity	had	shifted	away	from	Kenya’s	economic	power	
holders	 –	 the	 Kikuyu.	 Although	 influential	 Kikuyu	 like	 Njonjo	 and	 Mwai	 Kibaki	 were	
operating	 behind	 the	 scenes	 to	maintain	 Kenyatta’s	 system	 of	 elite	 accumulation,	Moi	
faced	pressure	to	allow	his	own	ethnic	group	to	‘eat’	some	of	the	fruits	of	independence	
in	 a	 ‘Kalenjin	 ascendancy’.	 From	 an	 economic	 point	 of	 view	 a	 pre-occupation	 with	
substituting	Kalenjin	for	Kikuyu	was	a	risk,	but	for	a	politician	as	concerned	with	ethnicity	
as	Moi	(clearly	demonstrated	during	his	time	with	KADU)	it	was	a	risk	worth	taking.	The	
President	 quickly	 assumed	 control	 over	 patronage	 and	 development	 system	 that	 he	
inherited	 from	Kenyatta	and	used	 it	 to	kick	 the	props	 from	beneath	 the	ethno-regional	
power	 base	 of	 the	 previous	 regime,	 suffocating	 clientelist	 networks	 that	 he	 did	 not	
control	 and	 destroying	 the	 ability	 of	 the	 Kikuyu	 elite	 to	 operate	 and	 accumulate	
independently	of	the	presidency.144	
	 While	a	central	 theme	of	Moi’s	Nyayo	 (‘footsteps’)	philosophy	was	 the	need	 for	
more	 equitable	 development,	 this	was,	 therefore,	mostly	 rhetoric	 to	 cover	 for	 the	 fact	
that	 Kalenjin	 and	 members	 of	 Moi’s	 allied	 ethno-regional	 groups	 would	 receive	 the	
limited	 benefits	 on	 offer	 during	 the	 early	 years	 of	 his	 presidency.145	John	 Cohen	 (who	
served	as	an	advisor	to	the	Kenya	government	between	1979	and	1992)	has	revealed	how	
Moi	was	able	to	satisfy	his	clients’	demands	for	patronage	by	offering	them	development	
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resources.146	For	 instance,	his	Ministers	and	government	officials	pressured	the	Harvard	
Institute	for	International	Development	to	train	members	of	Moi’s	ethnic	group	and	those	
of	his	allies	ahead	of	Kikuyu.147	Better	employment	opportunities	were	thus	on	offer	from	
Moi’s	 allies	 through	 the	 project.	 As	well	 as	 employment	 in	 public	 service,	 Kalenjin	 and	
their	 allies	 were	 offered	 positions	 of	 power	 within	 KANU,	 while	 appointments	 to	
important	parastatals	were	reserved	for	members	of	Moi’s	ethnic	coalition	without	any	
regard	for	the	impact	such	appointments	would	have	on	the	economy.	Parastatals	were,	
indeed,	 routinely	pillaged	–	particularly	ahead	of	elections	–	 to	build	Kalenjin	wealth	so	
that	they	could	compete	with	the	Kikuyu	wabenzi	class.148	
	 The	 Arid	 and	 Semi-Arid	 Lands	 (ASAL)	 Programme,	 launched	 in	 1979,	 was	 also	
aimed	 at	 boosting	 the	 wealth	 and	 status	 of	 elites	 and	 their	 patrons	 in	 constituencies	
whose	boundaries	were	coterminous	with	Moi’s	ethno-regional	support	bases.	Since	the	
idea	 for	 the	 programme	 originated	 with	 the	 Permanent	 Secretary	 of	 the	 Ministry	 of	
Planning	 and	 Economic	 Development,	 a	 Kamba,	 the	 first	 project	 –	 the	 Machakos	
Integrated	Development	 Project	 –	was,	 unsurprisingly,	 based	 in	 a	major	 Kamba	 region.	
The	second,	fourth,	fifth	and	sixth	projects	from	this	initiative	were	located	in	the	home	
areas	of	the	President	and	his	supporters	 in	the	Rift	Valley.	 In	addition,	Rural	Trade	and	
Production	Projects	were	manipulated	by	powerful	politicians	and	located	in	their	home	
areas	 in	order	to	generate	political	support	and	rents.	 In	the	 initial	selection	system	for	
these	projects,	Kalenjin	areas	were	not	included;	only	after	pressure	from	the	Ministry	of	
Planning	 and	 Economic	Development	 and	 the	Ministry	 of	 Finance	were	 the	 criteria	 for	
selection	adjusted	to	ensure	the	presence	of	projects	in	the	President’s	home	district	and	
the	Rift	Valley.	Finally,	there	were	egregious	examples	of	outright	corruption:	in	1986,	for	
example,	Moi	gave	the	go-ahead	to	a	project	to	install	a	dam	on	the	Turkwell	River	at	a	
cost	of	$400	million.	The	European	Economic	Community	(EEC)	offered	a	soft	loan	for	the	
project,	 but	 when	 a	 set	 of	 French	 construction	 firms	 –	 supported	 by	 French	 banks	 –	
offered	Moi	and	his	colleagues	$30	million,	the	decision	was	overturned	and	French	firms	
were	 chosen	 instead.	 As	 the	 EEC	 representative	 outlined	 in	 a	 memorandum	 to	 all	 aid	
agency	missions	in	Kenya:	
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[The]	 French	 contract	 and	 financing	 conditions	 are	 extremely	 disadvantageous	 for	
Kenya.	The	price	of	 the	French	 ‘turnkey’	offer	 is	more	than	double	 the	amount	 the	
Kenyan	Government	would	have	had	to	pay	for	the	project	based	on	an	international	
competitive	 tender,	 and	 it	 is	 surprising	 that	 this	was	 accepted	 at	 a	 time	when	 the	
Kenyan	Government	is	cutting	down	on	investment	in	the	country	because	of	[a]	lack	
of	budgetary	 funds.	A	major	portion	 (78	per	 cent)	of	 the	 total	price	quoted	by	 the	
French	contractor	 is	proposed	to	be	financed	by	commercial	 loans	payable	at	16.01	
per	cent,	much	higher	than	the	current	commercial	borrowing	rate	of	12	per	cent.149	
	
Kickbacks	of	 twenty	per	 cent	or	more	were	 common	under	Moi,	 and	 corruption	would	
only	 get	 worse	 as	 Kenya	 underwent	 the	 final	 stages	 of	 the	 transition	 from	 a	
developmental	to	a	kleptocratic	state.150	
	 Whilst	 Moi	 did	 his	 best	 to	 loot	 the	 state,	 the	 Kenyan	 economy	 continued	 to	
crumble.	 In	 the	 late	 1970s	 and	 early	 1980s	 unemployment	 reached	 twenty	 per	 cent,	
inflation	for	the	poorest	peaked	at	around	seventeen	per	cent,	and	trade	deficits	widened	
as	 the	 cost	 of	 oil	 rose	 sharply	 and	 prices	 for	 Kenya’s	 exports	 collapsed.	 As	 a	 result	
economic	growth	slowed	markedly	and	GDP	per	capita	declined	by	one	per	cent	per	year	
between	1980	and	1985.	Government	borrowing	increased	to	meet	the	associated	costs	
and	Kenya’s	deficit	reached	$517	million	in	1981;	overall	government	debt	had	breached	
the	 $1	 billion	 barrier	 a	 year	 earlier.	 At	 twenty	 per	 cent	 of	 GDP,	 such	 borrowing	 was	
unsustainable,	and	the	IMF	stepped	in	with	a	structural	adjustment	loan	of	$310	million	
in	1981.	Conditions	for	the	loan	included	the	elimination	of	tariffs	and	the	devaluation	of	
Kenya’s	currency	to	slow	the	growth	of	the	trade	deficit,	but	this	only	served	to	strangle	
Kenya’s	already	weak	 industrial	 sector.	To	add	to	 the	economic	misery,	Kenya	was	only	
just	 emerging	 from	a	 serious	 drought	 (and	would	 suffer	 another	 in	 1983)	 and	was	 still	
struggling	 with	 a	 booming	 population.	 All	 of	 this	 meant	 that	 Moi’s	 task	 of	 building	 a	
‘Kalenjin	ascendancy’	would	be	a	zero-sum	game	of	redistribution	at	the	expense	of	the	
Kikuyu.151	
	 In	order	 to	cover	 for	 the	redistribution	of	development	 funding	towards	the	Rift	
Valley,	Moi	promoted	the	District	Focus	for	Rural	Development	(DFRD)	policy.152	District	
Focus	 embodies	 much	 of	 Moi’s	 governance	 style:	 its	 rhetoric	 was	 egalitarian	 but	 its	
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substance	 allowed	 for	 the	 distribution	 of	 assets	 to	 his	 ethno-regional	 allies.153	In	 fact,	
DFRD	was	an	echo	of	KADU’s	majimbo	policy	from	twenty	years	previously:	it	promoted	
the	 interests	 of	 Moi’s	 support	 base	 by	 making	 districts	 the	 ‘operational	 units’	 for	 the	
planning	and	implementation	of	development.	The	results	were	as	Moi	planned:	in	terms	
of	road	construction,	for	instance,	the	President’s	support	base	experienced	a	growth	in	
their	share	of	central	government	funds	from	32	per	cent	in	1979-1980	to	68	per	cent	in	
1984-1985.	Most	of	these	new	roads	would	be	built	around	the	President’s	home	area	in	
the	 Rift	 Valley,	 buying	 him	 political	 support	 and	 generating	 lucrative	 rents.	 Kenyatta’s	
base,	meanwhile,	saw	its	share	collapse	from	44	per	cent	to	24	per	cent	over	the	same	
period.154	Just	 as	 importantly,	 DFRD	 served	 to	 reduce	 the	 ability	 of	 MPs	 and	 Cabinet	
Ministers	 to	 build	 up	 independent	 power	 bases	 through	 patronising	 development	
projects.	 By	 forcing	 MPs	 to	 lobby	 District	 Development	 Committees	 rather	 than	
influential	 patrons	 in	 Nairobi,	 DFRD	 restricted	 the	 access	 the	 former	 had	 enjoyed	
previously	 to	 development	 resources	 from	 the	 centre.	 This	 weakened	 their	 electoral	
position	–	and	also	reduced	the	number	of	clients	available	to	powerful	Ministers	and	civil	
servants	 –	 undermining	 potential	 challengers	 to	 the	 President. 155 	The	 district	
administration	itself	saw	its	power	enhanced	at	the	expense	of	Provincial	Commissioners,	
previously	a	significant	part	of	Kenyatta’s	bureaucratic-executive	state.	
	 Nonetheless,	cuts	to	public	spending	negotiated	with	the	IMF	in	return	for	bailout	
loans	and	general	economic	decline	reduced	the	overall	level	of	patronage	available	from	
the	 centre.	 Dwindling	 state	 resources	were	 increasingly	 used	 to	 divide	 opponents	 into	
factions,	and	harambee	became	an	almost	mandatory	tax	imposed	by	Moi	when	visiting	
an	 area:	 the	 proceeds	 were	 placed	 under	 his	 complete	 control.156	Meanwhile,	 NGOs	 –	
flush	with	cash	under	the	logic	of	the	New	Policy	Agenda	(NPA)	and	SAPs	–	were	funding	
ever-larger	swathes	of	formerly	state-run	services	(40	per	cent	of	health	care	was	NGO	or	
private	 sector	 funded	 by	 1990,	 for	 example).157	Oxfam,	 for	 instance,	 was	 criticised	 for	
‘taking	over’	marginal	areas	of	Kenya	and	setting	up	an	‘alternative	government’	in	places	
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such	 as	 Turkana,	 since	 its	 access	 to	 funds	 and	 inputs	 far	 outstripped	 that	 of	 the	 state	
apparatus	 in	 these	 regions.	 Development	 space	 thus	 became	 increasingly	 politicised	 as	
NGOs	challenged	the	state	monopoly	on	development	resources.	Moreover,	not	only	was	
their	 presence	 on	 such	 a	 scale	 a	 challenge	 to	 the	 legitimacy	 of	 the	 state	 –	 since	 their	
funding	 evaded	 governments	 –	 it	was	 also	 a	 political	 challenge	 to	 the	Moi	 regime	 at	 a	
time	when	Kenyan	civil	society	was	organising	to	protest	the	abuse	of	power	by	Moi	and	
his	allies.	
	 They	had	much	 to	protest	 against,	 for	 as	 avenues	 for	 corruption	 and	patronage	
became	 exhausted	 (at	 one	 point	 humanitarian	 aid	 was	 even	 sold	 back	 onto	 the	
market158),	Moi	 had	begun	 to	 resort	 to	 colonial-esque	 repression:	 control	 of	 the	police	
was	placed	in	the	Office	of	the	President	and	troublesome	ethnic	associations	such	as	the	
Gikuyu	 Embu	 and	 Meru	 Association	 (GEMA)	 were	 banned	 in	 1980.159 	Furthermore,	
protests	over	the	state	of	the	economy	were	disrupted,	Odinga	was	barred	from	standing	
for	 KANU	 in	 a	 1981	 by-election	 and	 reporters	 and	 Parliamentarians	 critical	 of	 the	Moi	
regime	were	arrested	and	intimidated.160	Indeed,	when	Odinga	and	others	discussed	the	
formation	of	a	new	second	party,	Moi	arranged	for	an	intimidated	Parliament	to	change	
the	constitution	and	codify	Kenya	as	a	de	jure	single-party	state.	A	failed	coup	attempt	in	
August	1982	allowed	Moi	to	further	marginalise	any	remaining	rivals:	he	arranged	for	the	
arrest	and	detention	of	any	who	might	pose	a	threat	to	his	position	for	their	suspected	
involvement	in	the	attempt	to	topple	the	government.161	The	electoral	process	was	also	
circumscribed	 by	 introducing	 queue	 voting	 as	 the	 method	 for	 the	 selection	 of	 KANU	
candidates	 for	 unopposed	 election	 to	 Parliament.	 This	 method	 of	 election	 –	 in	 which	
voters	 would	 stand	 behind	 an	 image	 of	 their	 chosen	 candidate	 –	 was	 so	 obviously	 an	
attempt	 to	 coerce	 and	 frighten	 citizens	 into	 voting	 for	 Moi’s	 nominee	 that	 it	 inspired	
criticism	 from	Kenya’s	extremely	powerful	 churches	 in	concert	with	prominent	 lawyers.	
NGOs	such	as	the	National	Council	of	Churches	of	Kenya	(NCCK)	were	conspicuous	in	their	
campaign	 for	 the	 removal	 of	 the	 queue	 voting	 method	 and	 for	 the	 reinstatement	 of	
multipartyism.	
	 Yet	 the	 flourishing	 of	 domestic	 and	 international	 NGOs	 also	 presented	 an	
opportunity	for	the	President,	for	if	the	state	could	be	used	to	control	them	sufficiently	to	
silence	 their	 criticism	 and	 to	 direct	 their	 resources	 in	 such	 a	 way	 as	 to	 sustain	 elite	
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patronage	networks	then	his	power	would	be	secured,	 if	not	enhanced.	His	attempts	to	
gain	 control	 over	 the	 sector	 in	 response	 to	 this	 calculation	 received	 a	mixed	 response:	
some	 NGOs	 like	 Maendeleo	 ya	 Wanawake	 –	 a	 Kenyan	 NGO	 focused	 on	 women’s	
development	–	were	easily	co-opted	into	the	regime	in	the	late	1980s.	Others,	such	as	the	
Undungu	 Society	 are	 shown	 by	 Stephen	 Ndegwa	 to	 have	 worked	 within	 the	 accepted	
bounds	 of	 the	 regime,	 slotting	 into	 already	 existing	 patronage	 networks	 to	 protect	
themselves	from	the	state.162	Others	still	were	established	as	little	more	than	‘briefcase’	
NGOs	with	links	to	prominent	politicians.	As	one	donor	noted:	
	
There	are	basically	four	ways	of	making	money	in	Kenya:	coffee,	tea,	tourism	and	aid	
–	and	since	the	first	three	are	spoken	for,	the	last	remains	the	only	option.163	
	
As	discussed	in	chapter	three,	Oxfam	would	resist	outright	co-optation	by	the	Moi	state,	
but	worked	‘with	the	grain’	of	Kenya’s	development	system	to	enable	space	for	work	that	
would	challenge	the	Moi	state	from	the	ground	up.	In	fact,	notwithstanding	the	climate	of	
fear	that	Moi	created,	another	‘face’	of	civil	society	was	shown	by	NGOs	like	Oxfam	and	
the	Green	Belt	Movement.	The	latter,	for	instance,	stood	up	to	Moi	over	his	plans	to	build	
on	Uhuru	Park.164	Meanwhile,	there	was	a	concerted	movement	to	resist	Moi’s	attempts	
for	control	over	the	NGO	sector,	and	particularly	his	effort	to	change	the	law	in	1990	to	
give	 absolute	 executive	 and	 judicial	 power	over	NGOs	 to	 the	 relevant	Cabinet	Minister	
(with	no	recourse	to	the	courts	for	aggrieved	parties).	Lobbied	by	NGOs	including	Oxfam,	
and	 in	 fear	 of	 losing	 the	 resources	 that	 foreign	 NGOs	 brought	 into	 the	 country,	 the	
government	watered	down	many	of	 the	most	obnoxious	clauses,	but	as	a	consequence	
relations	 between	 the	 state	 and	 NGOs	 (with	 the	 exception	 of	 Oxfam	 –	 as	 discussed	
shortly)	soured	significantly.165	
	 Criticism	of	 the	government	 (if	not	of	 the	President	himself)	was	 thus	becoming	
increasingly	 voluble	 by	 the	 late	 1980s.	 Having	 destroyed	 any	 notion	 of	 unity	 amongst	
Kenya’s	 ethnic	 elite	 by	 alienating	 the	 Kikuyu,	 the	 demobilisation	 of	 opposition	
movements	 in	 civil	 society	 was	much	 tougher.166	In	 addition,	 the	 end	 of	 the	 Cold	War	
meant	that	the	West	had	less	utility	for	‘friendly’	autocrats:	many	donors	began	to	argue	
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that	aid	should	become	conditional	on	democratic	reforms.	In	response	to	these	internal	
and	external	 threats,	Moi	 improvised	new	ways	 to	maintain	his	hold	on	power	and	 the	
patronage	 and	 wealth	 that	 it	 brought.	 Ostensibly	 following	 IMF	 advice,	Moi	 privatised	
state	 assets	 like	 parastatals.	 These	 assets	 were	 often	 sold	 at	 a	 knockdown	 price	 to	
businessmen	with	politicians	as	silent	partners.	The	owners	could	then	sell	the	asset	(or	
shares	in	the	asset)	at	its	full	market	price,	sustaining	patronage	networks	and	the	wealth	
of	the	elite	at	the	top	of	government.167	The	President	and	his	allies	also	took	advantage	
of	 laws	 allowing	 for	 export	 compensation	 funds:	 the	 Goldenberg	 scandal	 implicated	
several	high-ranking	politicians	with	links	to	the	President	in	the	manipulation	of	the	law	
in	order	to	claim	compensation	of	around	$850	million	for	the	export	of	minerals	that	did	
not	exist.	State	finances	were	not	the	only	part	of	the	apparatus	to	be	‘informalised’	by	
Moi	as	he	tried	to	hold	on	to	power,	however:	the	indiscriminate	use	of	violence	against	
protestors	in	favour	of	multipartyism	on	7	July	1990	(twenty	protestors	were	killed	during	
the	day	thereafter	known	as	Saba	Saba	or	7/7)	was	a	green	light	for	all	allied	politicians	to	
whip	 up	 ethnic	 tensions	 and	 encourage	 the	 violent	 displacement	 of	 ‘suspect’	
populations.168	
	 Witnessing	 these	 trends,	 foreign	 donors	 reduced	 the	 level	 of	 development	 aid	
offered	 to	Kenya	pending	 such	 time	as	economic	mismanagement,	human	 rights	abuse	
and	 political	 constraints	 were	 ended.	 In	 September	 1991	 the	 Danish	 government	
suspended	 all	 new	 aid	 to	 Kenya,	 the	 British	 government	 cancelled	 $7	 million	 in	 oil	
subsidies	and	the	World	Bank	refused	to	grant	a	$100	million	loan	for	the	energy	sector.	
In	November,	the	US,	Canada,	Germany,	Sweden,	Denmark,	Finland,	Australia	and	the	UK	
protested	against	the	arrest	of	twelve	opposition	leaders;	later	that	month	the	Paris	Club	
of	 donors	 suspended	 all	 new	 aid	 to	 Kenya	 until	 corruption	 stopped	 and	 the	 political	
system	was	liberalised.169	Desperate	for	sources	of	patronage,	Moi	for	a	time	attempted	
to	make	ends	meet	by	appropriating	humanitarian	aid	delivered	to	deal	with	the	shortage	
of	maize	throughout	the	country.	Cognisant	of	the	intricacies	of	the	emergency	situation	
on	 the	 ground,	Oxfam	would	manage	 to	work	 around	 the	Kenyan	 state	 in	 targeting	 its	
own	 humanitarian	 response	 (though	 this	 raised	 ideological	 questions	 over	 whether	
Oxfam	 was	 justified	 in	 supplanting	 the	 state	 in	 such	 a	 manner).	 Moi	 did,	 however,	
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succeed	 in	 painting	 a	 politically	 useful	 picture	 of	 the	 humanitarian	 crisis	 to	 other	
organisations,	such	as	the	World	Food	Programme,	and	increased	the	number	of	districts	
apparently	 in	 need	 of	 assistance	 in	 each	 application	 for	 aid.	 According	 to	 later	
evaluations,	 the	 only	 crisis	 this	 aid	 eased	was	 the	 crisis	 taking	 hold	 in	Moi’s	 patronage	
system.	 Indeed,	 once	 conventional	 development	 assistance	 resumed	 the	 state-led	
humanitarian	 programme	 would	 be	 closed	 within	 six	 months	 without	 explanation.170	
Evaluators	 acknowledged	 the	 ‘extraordinary	 convenience’	 of	 the	 emergency	 assistance	
provided	by	WFP:	
	
Transferring	 development	 aid	 to	 humanitarian	 assistance	 rather	 neatly	 resolved	
[Moi’s]	problem…	In	 retrospect,	 it	does	seem	unusual	 that	Kenya,	 for	 the	 first	 time	
since	independence,	should	declare	an	international	appeal	[for	assistance].171	
	
	 Unfortunately	for	Moi,	the	$121	million	or	so	that	entered	the	country	in	cash	or	
kind	 as	 a	 result	 of	 the	 humanitarian	 appeal	 was	 not	 enough	 to	 sustain	 Presidential	
patronage	networks	or	his	hold	on	power.	The	President	thus	took	the	calculated	risk	that	
it	would	be	easier	 to	 retain	control	over	a	 flawed	democracy	 than	 it	would	be	 to	 run	a	
patronage	 system	 without	 any	 money,	 finally	 caving	 to	 pressure	 to	 reinstate	
multipartyism	on	3	December	1991.172	He	did	so	with	foreboding,	however,	warning	that	
in	a	land	so	poor	and	riven	by	ethnic	tension	as	Kenya	multipartyism	would	undoubtedly	
cause	violence	and	ethnic	conflict.	Over	the	remaining	years	of	his	rule	Moi	did	everything	
in	his	power	to	make	those	words	seem	prophetic.	In	particular,	Moi	and	his	supporters	
raised	the	spectre	of	majimboism	as	they	had	thirty	years	previously,	only	this	time	it	was	
not	used	to	create	an	abstract	fear	of	Kikuyu	hegemony	amongst	Kalenjin	and	other	allied	
ethno-regional	 groupings,	but	 to	equate	 the	 loss	of	 future	elections	with	 the	 loss	of	 all	
that	the	Kalenjin	had	(apparently)	gained	during	Moi’s	time	as	President.	Moi	would	thus	
instrumentalise	disorder	and	encourage	the	ethnic	cleansing	of	the	Rift	Valley	in	the	early	
1990s.173	Yet	although	 the	President	and	his	 allies	whipped	up	ethnic	 tensions	 for	 their	
own	personal	gain,	there	was	a	great	deal	of	grievance,	 in	particular	against	the	Kikuyu,	
upon	which	 the	elite	could	draw.	The	movement	of	Kikuyu	 into	areas	where	 they	were	
considered	foreign	–	which	took	place	under	Kenyatta	and	his	‘Kikuyu	ascendancy’	–	left	a	
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legacy	of	anger	and	frustration	all	too	easily	tapped	by	unscrupulous	politicians	who	could	
raise	fears	that	similar	dispossessions	would	happen	again	if	KANU	and	Moi	were	ejected	
from	power.	
Aided	 by	 the	 fracture	 of	 the	 opposition,	 Moi	 won	 the	 election	 in	 1992	 by	 the	
narrowest	 of	 margins.	 Sensing	 an	 opportunity	 to	 work	 with	 a	 less	 dominating	 state	
apparatus,	 Oxfam	 re-engaged	with	 the	 Kenya	 government	 at	 a	 time	when	most	 NGOs	
remained	severely	hostile	 to	 the	Moi	 regime.	Hoping	 that	 the	state	would	be	 forced	 to	
listen	 to	 its	 marginalised	 constituents	 for	 the	 first	 time	 as	 a	 result	 of	 the	 multiparty	
system,	Oxfam	sought	 to	encourage	 reforms	 to	 the	development	of	pastoral	areas.	But	
the	 fragile	position	of	 the	Presidential	elite	–	by	 the	mid-1990s	 the	press	 reported	 that	
‘Ministers	with	a	strong	 local	following’	could	not	guarantee	a	 ‘large	pro-KANU	turnout’	
without	 ‘favours	 for	 these	 ethnic	 loyalties’	 –	 only	 encouraged	 the	 President	 and	 his	
supporters	 to	 behave	 as	 ‘agents	 of	 disorder’	 and	 to	 plunder	 the	 state	 with	 newfound	
vigour.174	Kickbacks	thus	reached	a	peak	of	sixty	per	cent	of	the	value	of	the	contract,	and	
Kenya	continued	to	slide	from	a	prebendal	to	a	predatory	state.	A	joint	Oxfam	and	World	
Bank	project	would	thus	succumb	to	the	patronage	demands	of	the	Moi	state,	and	Oxfam	
staff	–	popular	as	a	result	of	Oxfam	projects	–	were	tempted	to	cross	over	into	Parliament	
in	the	1997	election.	(Unsurprisingly,	upon	entering	Parliament	some	former	Oxfam	staff	
were	 sucked	 into	 the	 politicised	 and	 corrupted	 development	 system	 perpetuated	 by	
Kenyatta	and	Moi,	allegedly	losing	interest	in	development	schemes	that	did	not	line	their	
own	 pockets.)	 After	 using	 violence	 to	 divide	 the	 opposition	 once	 more,	 Moi	 was,	
however,	able	to	win	a	more	convincing	electoral	victory	in	1997,	and	he	would	remain	in	
power	until	the	end	of	his	constitutionally	mandated	term	of	office	in	2002.	
	
	
	
‘OLD WINE IN NEW SKINS’? THE NARC GOVERNMENT AFTER 2002 
 
Notwithstanding	 the	 sense	 of	 opportunity	 that	 Kenyans	 felt	 in	 2002,	 the	 National	
Rainbow	 Coalition	 (NARC)	 that	 replaced	 Moi	 offered	 little	 in	 the	 way	 of	 alternative	
policies	to	those	that	had	characterised	the	previous	regime.	Headed	by	Mwai	Kibaki,	a	
central	figure	in	both	the	Kenyatta	and	Moi	governments,	it	was	also	just	as	criminal	and	
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corrupt.	The	Anglo	Leasing	affair	saw	around	$1	billion	siphoned	from	the	state	to	build	
the	personal	wealth	and	war	chests	of	Kibaki	and	his	allies	ahead	of	the	2007	election.	Yet	
with	 members	 of	 civil	 society	 having	 ‘crossed	 over’	 into	 Parliament,	 there	 was	 less	
outright	 criticism	of	Kibaki	 than	 there	had	been	of	Moi	 towards	 the	end	of	his	 term	 in	
office,	 allowing	 Kibaki	 to	 concentrate	 on	 entrenching	 the	 political	 and	 economic	
dominance	of	his	 ‘Mount	Kenya	Mafia’	 through	ethnic-based	patronage	politics	and	the	
capture	of	public	 institutions.	Oxfam	would	note	–	with	much	poignancy	 in	hindsight	–	
that	 the	 government	was	 leaving	 ‘historical	 grievances’	 open	 to	 political	manipulation;	
but	its	staff	hoped	that	progress	would	be	broadly	linear	in	the	new,	post-Moi	era.	Their	
hopes,	along	with	many	observers,	would	be	dashed	 in	2007/08,	when	those	 ‘historical	
grievances’	 felt	 by	non-Kikuyu	were	 compounded	by	 the	desperate	 attempt	by	Kibaki’s	
‘mafia’	 to	 retain	 power	 through	 electoral	 fraud.	 Protests	 against	 the	 election	 result	
quickly	turned	into	violence	against	Kikuyu	in	the	Rift	Valley	as	local	politicians	capitalised	
on	historical	and	contemporary	grievances	against	the	Kikuyu	and	called	for	the	revival	of	
majimboism.		
	 Kenya’s	frustrated	aspirations	as	regards	the	promise	of	development	–	the	very	
raison	d’être	of	the	 independent	nation	state	–	meant	that	a	slogan	nearly	50	years	old	
still	held	enormous	over	the	population.	Those	long	denied	their	chance	to	‘eat’	sought	to	
stake	their	claim	to	the	‘gatekeeper’	state	and	the	‘fruits’	that	it	offered	for	its	denizens.	
For	his	part,	Kibaki	continued	Moi’s	ruinous	 legacy	of	 informalising	the	state,	 turning	to	
private	militias	 like	 the	Mungiki	 to	 fight	 back.175	As	 a	 result,	 half	 a	million	people	were	
displaced	 and	 over	 1,200	 people	 were	 killed.	 Kenya’s	 elite	 had	 for	 too	 long	 failed	 the	
‘challenge	of	nationhood’,	and	ordinary	Kenyans	reaped	the	destruction	wrought	by	this	
failure. 176 	The	 following	 chapters	 demonstrate	 how	 Oxfam,	 with	 its	 politicised	
understanding	 of	 poverty	 and	 underdevelopment,	 adopted	 a	 variety	 of	 tactical	
approaches	to	advance	towards	its	overarching	strategic	objective	in	Kenya:	to	cajole	the	
Kenyan	state	to	become	more	responsible	for	its	marginalised	citizens,	to	encourage	it	to	
spread	the	‘fruits’	of	independence	broadly,	and	thus	to	ensure	that	the	state	fulfilled	its	
original	 purpose.	 The	 near	 impossibility	 of	 such	 a	 task,	 given	 Kenya’s	 particular	
development-politics	nexus,	should	not	detract	from	the	importance	today	of	recounting	
																																																						
175	See	G.	Murunga	and	S.	Nasong’o,	‘Bent	on	Self-Destruction:	The	Kibaki	Regime	in	Kenya’,	Journal	of	
Contemporary	African	Studies,	Vol.	24,	No.	1	(2006),	pp.	1-28	and	Branch,	Kenya:	Between	Hope	and	
Despair,	p.	245-287	for	a	detailed	discussion	of	the	NARC	government.	
176	Indeed,	the	need	to	keep	the	post-violence	coalition	together	contradicted	the	need	to	prosecute	those	
responsible	for	the	violence.	Uhuru	Kenyatta	and	William	Ruto	–	suspected	of	orchestrating	the	violence	on	
both	sides	–	were	thus	able	to	avoid	trial	in	Kenya.	
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this	 historical	 process.	 For	 it	 is	 by	 such	 an	 investigation	 that	 researchers	 can	 begin	 to	
deconstruct	overarching	narratives	around	discourse	and	Western	hegemony	in	favour	of	
a	 nuanced	 and	 historicised	 understanding	 of	 the	 development	 encounter	 in	 all	 its	
complexity.	
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Chapter Two 
	
A	‘MESSIANIC	VISION	OF	THE	POSSIBILITIES’	–	OXFAM	IN	KENYA,	1963-1978	
	
	
	
	
	
	
Experts,	Advisors	and	Officials	flock...	like	so	many	migratory	birds	and,	like	the	birds,	
leave	little	trace	of	their	passage.	
C.	L.	Ryland,	Regional	Government	Agent,	Turkana	in	his	Annual	Report	for	1963.	
	
The	 following	 chapter	 concentrates	 on	 the	 relationship	 between	 Oxfam	 and	 the	 Kenya	
government	 between	 1963	 and	 1978.	 During	 the	 first	 half	 of	 this	 period	 Oxfam	 was	
ideologically	 committed	 to	 supporting	 the	 Kenyan	 state	 as	 an	 institution	 and	was	 thus	
agnostic	 as	 to	 its	 political	 orientation.	 Influenced	 by	 its	 Field	 Directors	 –	 who	 had	
previously	worked	alongside	modernising	colonial	governments	in	Africa	–	and	by	its	faith	
in	the	remedial	power	of	the	state	as	exhibited	powerfully	by	welfare	reforms	in	the	UK	(its	
‘values’),	Oxfam	operated	in	partnership	with	the	Kenyatta	state	on	projects	to	modernise	
Kenyan	agriculture	and	settle	troublesome	pastoralists.	Such	projects	were	consistent	with	
the	Kenyatta	 regime’s	own	 ‘modernisation’	 efforts	and	accepted	 its	 contention	 that	 the	
state	was	a	pivotal	development	actor.	Importantly,	Oxfam	understood	the	development-
politics	nexus	 in	Kenya	and	hoped	 to	gently	 cajole	and	 convince	 the	 state	 to	expand	 its	
horizons	 beyond	 ethno-centric	 patronage	 and	 clientelism	 and	 to	 develop	 ‘backward’	
pastoral	areas.	 The	Kenyatta	 regime	was	unmoved;	nonetheless	 it	was	happy	 to	accept	
Oxfam	aid	as	it	freed	up	government	funds	for	its	more	politically	important	clients	while	
at	 the	 same	 time	 entrenching	 government	 control	 over	 ‘backward’	 pastoralists.	 For	 a	
time,	Oxfam’s	faith	in	the	remedial	power	of	the	state	meant	it	was	pragmatic	about	the	
lack	 of	 response	 from	 the	 Kenya	 government	 to	 its	 blandishments.	 Yet	 once	 the	 state-
centric	 ideology	 of	 the	 first	 Field	 Directors	 was	 challenged	 by	 an	 organisational	 shift	
towards	 ‘conscientisation’,	 Oxfam	 could	 no	 longer	 ignore	 the	 litany	 of	 failures	 that	 its	
work	alongside	 the	Kenya	 state	had	produced,	 and	 the	organisation	withdrew	 from	 co-
operation	 with	 the	 state.	 The	 chapter	 concludes	 that	 the	 outcome	 of	 the	 interaction	
between	 ‘pragmatism’	 and	 ‘values’	 in	 the	 Kenya	 context	 pointed	 in	 two	 very	 different	
directions	 in	the	1960s	and	the	1970s,	and	this	served	to	define	the	nature	of	the	Kenya	
programme	in	markedly	different	ways.	
	
Kenya	 first	 appeared	 on	 Oxfam's	 radar	 in	 the	 mid-1950s	 as	 a	 result	 of	 the	 Mau	Mau	
revolt.	More	specifically,	what	first	attracted	Oxfam’s	attention	was	the	ruthless	counter-
insurgency	movement	that	enveloped	areas	of	the	country	and	caused	displacement	and	
suffering	 for	 the	 local	 population.	 The	 organisation	 donated	 funds	 in	 the	 hope	 of	
lessening	 the	effect	 of	 the	 ‘removal	 of	 bread-winners	 from	 their	 families’,	which	was	 a	
		 93	
consequence	 of	 the	 detention	 and	 repatriation	 of	 suspected	 rebels.1	Although	 Oxfam	
might	have	reflected	colonial	attitudes	when	it	noted	that	some	of	the	malnutrition	and	
illness	among	children	was	due	to	‘ignorance	and	fecklessness	on	the	part	of	the	parents’	
rather	 than	 the	 escalating	 conflict,	 along	 with	 its	 partners	 it	 acknowledged	 that	 the	
misery	 it	 witnessed	 was	 ‘mostly	 due	 to	 emergency	 conditions’	 and	 the	 ‘long	 hours	 of	
communal	 labour	 that	 make	 it	 almost	 impossible	 for	 people	 to	 attend	 to	 their	 own	
gardens’.2	The	response	to	suffering	in	Kenya	was	in	keeping	with	the	organisation’s	work	
elsewhere	at	this	time.	Across	the	globe,	from	Bihar,	India	–	which	suffered	a	devastating	
famine	 in	1951	–	to	the	Ionian	Islands	–	which	experienced	a	devastating	earthquake	 in	
1953;	and	from	Korea	–	which	was	consumed	by	civil	war	until	1953	–	to	Algeria	–	which	
endured	its	own	visceral	conflict	from	1954	–	Oxfam	had	started	down	the	path	of	direct	
involvement	 in	 disaster	 relief,	 dispatching	 clothing,	 footwear,	 blankets	 and	milk,	 along	
with	small	amounts	of	cash	to	welfare	schemes	and	orphanages.	But	the	organisation	was	
careful	 not	 to	 involve	 itself	 in	 the	politics	 of	 these	 crises.3	In	 Kenya,	 the	NGO	made	no	
attempt	 to	criticise	government	heavy-handedness	or	 the	 revolt	 itself;	 it	 saw	 its	 role	as	
one	 of	 gap-filling:	 in	 places	where	 the	 impact	 of	 the	 revolt	was	 particularly	 severe	 but	
where	 (perhaps	 unsurprisingly)	 the	 government	 was	 unable	 or	 unwilling	 to	 ease	 the	
situation,	Oxfam	would	act	through	partners	on	the	ground	to	provide	short-term	relief.	
For	 instance,	 after	 the	 Catholic	 Missionary	 Society	 reported	 to	 Oxfam	 that	 feeding	
schemes	were	needed	to	save	around	200	vulnerable	people	from	starvation	at	Fort	Hall	
(later	 Murang’a),	 Oxfam	 donated	 £900	 between	 1955	 and	 1957.	 Other	 grants	 for	 this	
effort	 and	 related	 rehabilitation	 and	 feeding	 schemes	 included	 £1,000	 to	 Save	 the	
Children,	£1,250	to	the	Salvation	Army	and	£1,000	to	the	Friends'	Service	Council.4	
	 Oxfam	continued	to	operate	in	this	ad	hoc	manner	into	the	early	1960s.	In	January	
1962,	the	organisation	donated	£25,000	to	the	Kenya	government	through	the	National	
Food	Relief	Committee	in	order	to	support	the	latter	in	its	relief	efforts	after	droughts	and	
floods	killed	upwards	of	60	per	cent	of	the	livestock	in	areas	such	as	Turkana,	Kajiado	and	
Samburu.	Livestock	deaths	on	such	a	scale	threatened	the	 lives	and	 livelihoods	of	many	
thousands	 of	 Kenya's	 poorest	 and	 most	 marginalised	 citizens.	 In	 addition,	 the	 NGO	
earmarked	 £15,000	 to	 assist	 local	 authorities	 having	 difficulties	with	 their	medical	 and	
																																																						
1	'First	Grants	to	Kenya',	No	Date,	OxA,	MS.	Oxfam	COM/2/9/10,	Folder	2.	
2	'First	Grants	to	Kenya',	No	Date,	OxA,	MS.	Oxfam	COM/2/9/10,	Folder	2.	
3	Black,	A	Cause	for	Our	Times,	pp.	40-63.	
4	'First	Grants	to	Kenya',	No	Date,	OxA,	MS.	Oxfam	COM/2/9/10,	Folder	2.	
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health	 services	 following	 the	 floods;	 the	 sum	 was	 supplemented	 by	 five	 tons	 of	 dried	
milk.5	The	 following	 year	 Leslie	 Kirkley	 visited	 Turkana	 and	 recommended	 that	 Oxfam	
provide	finance	for	the	maintenance	of	famine	camps	in	the	region.	Jimmy	Betts,	newly	in	
place	as	Field	Director	for	East	and	Southern	Africa,	seconded	Kirkley's	recommendation	
and	Oxfam	committed	to	provide	50	per	cent	of	the	cost	of	running	five	famine	camps	in	
Turkana,	up	 to	a	 limit	of	£12,000	per	annum.6	The	Permanent	Secretary	at	 the	Ministry	
for	Constitutional	Affairs	and	Administration	admitted	that	the	grant	had	come	'at	a	very	
opportune	time',	for	the	UK	government	–	with	one	eye	on	Kenyan	independence	–	had	
refused	 to	 allocate	 the	 funds	 necessary	 for	 an	 increased	 famine	 relief	 budget.	 (The	
original	 budget	 of	 £284,000,	 based	 on	 optimistic	 estimates	 of	 rainfall	 and	 crop	
production,	 was	 considered	 woefully	 inaccurate,	 and	 a	 ‘top-up’	 of	 £25,000	 had	 been	
requested	 from	 the	 British	 government.)	 The	 only	 alternative	 for	 Neil	 was	 to	 find	 the	
same	amount	 in	 savings;	 yet	 this	was,	 he	 admitted	 in	 an	 internal	memo,	 equivalent	 to	
reducing	 the	 ration	 from	 9	 lbs.	 to	 5	 lbs.	 per	 head	 per	 week.7	As	 the	 general	 election	
approached,	the	political	ramifications	of	such	‘draconic	[sic]	measures’	were	obvious	and	
the	 Permanent	 Secretary	 wrote	 to	 District	 Commissioners	 lamenting	 the	 dire	 financial	
situation	in	which	the	government	found	itself,	particularly	at	a	time	of	increased	political	
pressure	 to	 distribute	 food	 to	 constituencies	 attracted	 by	 radical	 nationalism.	 A	 direct	
application	 to	Oxfam	 for	assistance	was	mooted,	but	was	considered	unnecessary	once	
the	organisation’s	donation	for	the	famine	camps	had	been	received.	Oxfam's	assistance	
in	Turkana	allowed	 the	government	 to	 cut	 less	 from	 its	own	allocation,	 in	all	 likelihood	
giving	the	administration	a	little	more	room	for	manoeuvre	in	its	battle	to	undermine	the	
rhetoric	of	radical	nationalists.8	
	
	
																																																						
5	'Famine	and	Floods	in	Kenya,	1961',	Kenya	National	Archives,	Nairobi	(hereafter	KNA),	Report	on	Famine	
Relief	in	Kenya,	1965/66,	KA/8/5;	'Turkana	Fishing	Scheme,	Lake	Rudolf,	1963,	OxA,	MS.	Oxfam	
COM/2/9/10,	Folder	3;	'Letter	to	the	Permanent	Secretary	of	the	Treasury	(unsigned)'	1	October,	1962,	
KNA,	Famine	Relief	Reserve	Crops	(Oxford	Committee	for	Famine	Relief),	MOH/47/3.	
6	'Monthly	Report,	November	1962',	7	December,	1962,	KNA,	Monthly	Reports,	Turkana,	PC/NKU/2/27/29;	
'Letter	from	Mr.	Betts	to	Mr.	Dearden',	14	January,	1963,	KNA,	OFTA	–	Oxford	Committee	for	Famine	Relief,	
BV/93/12;	'Letter	from	Mr.	Ellerton	to	Dr.	Haupt',	27	March,	1963,	KNA,	Famine	Relief	Crops	(Oxford	
Committee	for	Famine	Relief)	MOH/47/3.	
7	It	would	have	involved	cutting	15,000	bags	of	maize	from	a	total	allocation	of	36,800.	
8	'Letter	from	Mr.	Neil	to	Mr.	Butter',	29	January,	1963,	KNA,	Famine	Relief	Reserve	Crops	(Oxford	
Committee	for	Famine	Relief),	MOH/47/3;	'Letter	from	Mr.	Neil	to	all	District	Commissioners',	no	date,	KNA,	
Famine	Relief	Reserve	Crops	(Oxford	Committee	for	Famine	Relief),	MOH/47/3;	'£14,000	to	help	feed	
Turkana',	newspaper	clipping	–	no	date/author,	KNA,	Famine	Relief	Reserve	Crops	(Oxford	Committee	for	
Famine	Relief),	MOH/47/3.	
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Map	 1:	 Oxfam	 projects	 1963-1978.	 1	 =	 Fishing	 project	 on	 Lake	 Rudolf/Lake	 Turkana	 (1963);	 2	 =	 Toretet	
dams	 (1963)	&	Chemase	 road	 scheme	 (1963);	3	=	Perkerra	 irrigation	 scheme	 (1962);	4	=	Turkana	 famine	
camps	 (1962);	 5	 =	 Lorengippe	 water	 spreading	 scheme	 (1963);	 6	 =	 Rombo	 &	 Kimana	 irrigation	 scheme	
(1965);	7	=	Turkana	mobile	film	unit	(1966);	8	=	Isiolo	development	project	(1970);	9	=	Garissa	settlement	
scheme	 (1971);	 10	 =	Maasai	 rural	 development	 centre	 (1968);	 11	 =	 Samburu	 rural	 development	 centre	
(1973);	12	=	Hybrid	maize	seed	distribution	(1965);	13	=	Narosurra	farm	mechanisation	scheme	(1967);	14	=	
Gatundu	 hospital	 (1967);	 15	 =	 Lokichar	 irrigation	 scheme	 (1967);	 16	 =	 Lake	 Kenyatta	 settlement	 scheme	
(1976).	
	
	
	 While	 the	 government	 appreciated	 the	 breathing	 room	 that	 the	 Oxfam	 grant	
supplied,	 the	 organisation’s	 commitment	 to	 the	 famine	 camps	 did	 have	 one	 string	
attached:	it	was	conditional	on	the	government	maintaining	support	for	the	camps	over	
the	 longer-term.	 The	 dynamic	 of	 the	 relationship	 between	 Oxfam	 and	 the	 Kenya	
government	 was	 thus	 set	 before	 independence:	 over	 the	 following	 four	 decades	 the	
organisation	 would	 work	 in	 areas	 of	 minimal	 political	 importance	 to	 the	 government	
(note	the	concentration	of	Oxfam	projects	in	the	Rift	Valley,	and	particularly	in	Turkana,	
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as	 shown	 by	 Map	 1)	 while	 gently	 trying	 to	 cajole	 the	 state	 to	 take	 on	 long-term	
responsibility	 for	 these	areas.	The	question	of	whether	 this	was	an	appropriate	 form	of	
gap-filling	or	a	neo-colonial	imposition	from	an	external	agency	with	the	(limited)	power	
provided	 by	 its	 ability	 to	 provide	 funding	 –	 as	 well	 as	 the	 anxiety	 that	 Oxfam	merely	
served	to	get	the	government	off	the	hook	for	its	ethnic	and	regional	biases	in	the	short-
term	–	would	plague	staff	right	across	the	period	as	the	true	nature	of	the	Kenyatta	and	
Moi	states	came	into	view.	For	the	time	being,	the	imposition	of	conditions	on	its	aid	was	
accepted	 as	 part	 of	 the	 broader	 shift	 within	 the	 organisation	 towards	 sustainable	 and	
truly	 developmental	 projects.	 Betts	 had,	 in	 fact,	 written	 to	 the	 Ministry	 of	 Lands	 and	
Settlement	a	 few	months	earlier,	noting	that	while	over	the	previous	18	months	Oxfam	
had	 concentrated	 on	 Kenya’s	 famine	 situation,	 during	 that	 time	 the	 organisation	 had	
‘turned	 its	attention	more	and	more	 to	 longer	 term	possibilities...	 and	we	 feel	 that	 the	
time	 is	 ripe	 for	 us	 to	 reconnoitre	 [such]	 possibilities	 in	 Kenya’. 9 	In	 his	 letter	 Betts	
requested	that	he	and	Kirkley	be	allowed	to	visit	Kenya	to	discuss	how	Oxfam	could	best	
work	 alongside	 the	 government	 for	 the	 longer-term	 development	 of	 the	 country.	 The	
conversation	 which	 unfolded	 between	 the	 Oxfam	 representatives	 and	 assorted	
Ministerial	 officials	 on	 1	 November	 focused	 on	 the	 specific	 projects	 for	 which	 the	
government	wanted	support:	 considering	Oxfam’s	expertise,	 the	government	suggested	
that	 post-famine	 rehabilitation	 schemes	 for	 the	Maasai	 and	 Turkana	 regions	 as	well	 as	
assistance	with	agricultural	education	might	be	acceptable.10	
	 There	was	nothing	particularly	unusual	about	these	discussions	in	a	general	sense:	
Oxfam	was	 attempting	 to	 formalise	 its	 often	ad	hoc	 relations	with	 governments	 across	
Africa	 at	 the	 time	 and	 the	 pattern	 of	 its	 aid	 was	 slowly	 shifting	 from	 famine	 relief	 to	
famine	prevention.11	Moreover,	such	an	approach	was	not	out	of	character	for	the	Field	
Director.	An	ex-colonial	civil	servant,	Jimmy	Betts	had	spent	24	years	as	a	Forestry	Officer	
in	Nigeria	before	 joining	 the	 Fabian	Commonwealth	Bureau.	 ‘Betts	 the	Bolshie’	worked	
for	the	bureau	for	five	years,	during	which	time	he	got	to	know	many	of	the	personalities	
																																																						
9	‘Letter	from	Mr.	Betts	to	the	Permanent	Secretary	at	the	Ministry	of	Lands	and	Settlement’,	2	October,	
1962,	KNA,	OFTA	–	Oxford	Committee	for	Famine	Relief,	BV/93/12.	
10	‘File	No.	Visit/Betts-Kirkley/5’,	16	October,	1962,	KNA,	OFTA	–	Oxford	Committee	for	Famine	Relief,	
BV/93/12;	‘Letter	from	Mr.	Dearden	to	Mr.	Knowles’,	19	October,	1962,	KNA,	OFTA	–	Oxford	Committee	for	
Famine	Relief,	BV/93/12.	
11	A	year	later	at	a	meeting	of	the	Africa	Committee,	the	chairman	would	note	that	Oxfam	had	completed	
this	transition.	Minutes	of	the	Africa	Committee,	5	December,	1963,	OxA,	MS.	Oxfam	PRG/1/3/1	Folder	1:	
December	1963	-	November	1965.	
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of	 African	 nationalism.12	Such	 contacts	 proved	 important	 in	 setting	 up	 meetings	 with	
government	officials.	 In	his	 introductory	 letters	 to	 the	Kenya	 government,	 for	 instance,	
the	 Field	 Director	 was	 careful	 to	 mention	 his	 ‘old	 acquaintance’	 Tom	 Mboya. 13 	In	
addition,	although	his	left-wing	sympathies	and	his	attempt	to	move	the	centre	of	gravity	
of	 the	 Oxfam	 programme	 to	 the	 field	 made	 him	 something	 of	 a	 ‘legend’	 within	 the	
organisation,	on	 the	ground	Betts	 ‘assumed	 the	colonial	officer	 role	with	which	he	was	
familiar’,	making	 the	 ‘seamless	 transition’	 from	 late	colonial	 technocrat	 to	post-colonial	
development	expert	that	both	Kothari	and	Hodge	discuss	elsewhere.14	Indeed,	before	his	
work	began	 in	earnest	 in	Kenya,	Betts	had	spent	time	working	with	governments	 in	the	
High	 Commission	 territories,	 concentrating	 on	 long-term	 schemes	 for	 progressive	
farmers,	 including	dams,	education	and	extension	services.	These	were	akin	to	previous	
government	 efforts	 to	 target	 rich	 and	 middle-income	 farmers	 in	 Kenya	 through	 the	
Swynnerton	 Plan	 and	 Million	 Acre	 Scheme	 and	 suggested	 his	 willingness	 to	 promote	
approaches	 to	development	pioneered	during	 the	colonial	period.	As	Betts	 remarked	 in	
an	interview	with	a	Kenyan	newspaper:	‘I	have	always	been	very	keen	on	the	longer-term	
aspect…	 I’m	 not	 a	 do-gooder	 in	 this	 way.	 I	 have	 concepts	 and	 ideas	 about	 rural	
development	 in	 Africa…	 and	we’ve	 slowly	 swung	Oxfam	 around’.15	For	 his	 part,	 Kirkley	
was	 equally	 committed	 to	 the	 idea	 that	 long-term	 projects	 to	 prevent	 hunger	 and	
destitution	were	charitable,	and	he	pushed	this	line	strongly	during	his	time	at	the	head	
of	Oxfam.16	Nonetheless,	both	he	and	Betts	kept	 their	cards	close	to	 their	chest	 for	 the	
duration	 of	 the	 meeting	 with	 Kenyan	 government	 officials,	 reminding	 the	 latter	
frequently	 that	 support	 for	 the	 schemes	 discussed	 was	 contingent	 on	 approval	 from	
Oxford.		
	 Government	 representatives	were	 similarly	 cautious,	 using	 the	meeting	 to	 learn	
the	 ‘likes	 and	 dislikes’	 of	 Oxfam	 and	 its	 ‘local	 rules’	 for	 funding.	 They	 were	 seriously	
concerned	 about	 ‘the	 tendency	 of	 the	 volunteer	 agencies	 to	 slip	 outside	 the	 ordinary	
																																																						
12	He	joked	that	this	helped	in	his	role	with	Oxfam,	as	‘they	can	never	accuse	me	of	neo-colonialism	if	they	
think	I’m	holding	the	purse-strings	a	bit	too	tight	now	and	again’.	‘We	Forced	Aid	Out	of	Britain’,	Sunday	
Nation,	9	April,	1967,	pp.	15-16,	Daily	Nation	Archive,	Nairobi.	
13	‘Letter	from	Mr.	Betts	to	the	Permanent	Secretary	at	the	Ministry	of	Lands	and	Settlement’,	2	October,	
1962,	KNA,	OFTA	–	Oxford	Committee	for	Famine	Relief,	BV/93/12.	
14	For	Uma	Kothari,	the	common	movement	of	colonial	development	experts	into	post-colonial	
development	organisations	was	part	of	the	‘intertwining	of	these	fields	wherein	heterogeneous	and	shifting	
ideologies	and	practices	were	imbricated	in	each	other’.	U.	Kothari,	‘Authority	and	Expertise:	The	
Professionalisation	of	International	Development	and	the	Ordering	of	Dissent’,	Antipode,	Vol.	37,	No.	3	
(2005),	p.	433;	Hodge,	‘British	Colonial	Expertise’,	pp.	24-44;	Black,	A	Cause	for	Our	Times,	pp.	76-79.	
15	‘We	Forced	Aid	Out	of	Britain’,	Sunday	Nation,	9	April,	1967,	pp.	15-16,	Daily	Nation	Archive,	Nairobi.	
16	Black,	A	Cause	for	Our	Times,	pp.	85-91.	
		 98	
priority	net	 in	 connection	with	 the	allocation	of	development	 funds’	 (which	were	 to	be	
focused	 on	 high-potential	 agricultural	 areas),	 and	 wished	 to	 acquaint	 the	 Oxfam	
representatives	with	Kenya	government	procedures.17	As	 it	happened,	 the	civil	 servants	
present	at	the	meeting	were	justified	in	their	concern	about	voluntary	agencies	operating	
outside	 of	 the	 government’s	 development	 priorities,	 for	 one	 of	 the	 first	 Oxfam	
development	projects	in	Kenya	was,	according	to	the	government	at	least,	unsolicited	and	
unwelcome.	The	project	 itself	–	to	help	dig	dams	for	the	Kipsigis	 living	 in	Kericho	 in	the	
Rift	 Valley	 –	 was	 on	 a	 fairly	 large	 scale	 considering	 Oxfam’s	 recent	 conversion	 to	
development:	 100	 dams	 were	 to	 be	 dug	 by	 a	 local	 partner	 during	 1963	 at	 a	 cost	 of	
£10,000.18	These	 dams	 would	 provide	 standing	 water	 for	 cattle,	 which,	 Oxfam	 hoped,	
would	 lead	 to	 improved	milk	 quality	 and	 reduced	workloads	 for	 local	women	who	had	
previously	travelled	long	distances	each	day	to	fetch	water.	Each	dam	would	hold	around	
two	million	gallons	of	water	–	enough	 to	 support	20	 families	with	15	 cattle	 for	 around	
four	months	without	rain.	Richard	Exley,	an	Oxfam	representative	who	visited	the	project,	
lauded	 his	 organisation’s	 newfound	 ability	 to	 support	 and	 initiate	 such	 large-scale,	
‘government-esque’	 schemes,	 boasting	 that	 the	project	 demonstrated	 the	way	 forward	
for	 NGOs	 in	 filling	 the	 development	 gaps	 left	 by	 government.19	According	 to	 Exley	 the	
project	even	impressed	local	MPs,	hitherto	sceptical	of	the	utility	of	NGOs	and	protective	
of	 the	 government’s	 role	 in	 development	 projects:	 the	 MP	 for	 Bomet	 was	 quoted	 as	
saying	that	‘because	we	have	uhuru,	let	no-one	think	we	do	not	need	help	from	overseas.	
There	is	no	end	to	what	this	water	has	done	to	the	Kipsigis.	 It	means	money,	education	
and	development’.20	Encouraged	by	such	praise,	Oxfam	continued	to	support	the	project	
and	by	1965	the	organisation	had	donated	£26,000.	This	financed	the	completion	of	181	
																																																						
17	‘Letter	from	Mr.	Dearden	to	the	Permanent	Secretary,	Ministry	of	Land	Settlement	and	Water	
Development’,	12	October,	1962,	KNA,	OFTA	–	Oxford	Committee	for	Famine	Relief,	BV/93/12;	‘Letter	from	
Mr.	Knowles	to	Mr.	Carey-Jones’,	15	October,	1962,	KNA,	OFTA	–	Oxford	Committee	for	Famine	Relief,	
BV/93/12.	
18	Though	Oxfam	income	around	this	time	was	around	£2	million,	the	organisation	had	expanded	its	interest	
from	56	countries	in	1960	to	73	by	1963.	Divided	equally,	each	country	would	receive	on	average	only	
£27,000.	Of	course,	not	all	countries	were	treated	equally:	some	(such	as	the	Congo)	required	large	
expenditure	for	relief	efforts;	others	had	only	one	or	two	minor	projects	supported	by	the	organisation.	As	
a	single	commitment,	however,	the	Kericho	dams	were	a	relatively	large	developmental	investment	at	the	
time.	
19	Exley,	who	had	joined	Oxfam	in	1957,	was	the	architect	of	the	‘Hunger	£Million’	campaign	of	1963.	
Perhaps	he	had	such	publicity	in	mind	when	reporting	on	the	Toretet	scheme.	See	Black,	A	Cause	for	Our	
Times,	pp.	79-83.	
20	‘Quotes	from	Oxfam’s	Representative’s	Report’,	April	1964,	OxA,	MS.	Oxfam	COM/2/9/10	Folder	1;	
‘Richard	Exley,	Oxfam’,	no	date,	OxA,	MS.	Oxfam	COM/2/9/10	Folder	1;	R.	Exley,	‘A	Few	Observations	on	
Visits	to	Oxfam	Projects	in	Africa’,	1	May,	1964,	OxA,	MS.	Oxfam	PRG/1/3/1	Folder	1:	December	1963	–	
November	1965;	‘The	Construction	of	Cattle	Dips,	Kipsigis	District’,	no	date,	OxA,	MS.	Oxfam	COM/2/9/9	
Folder	11.	
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dams	 on	 the	way	 towards	 a	 new	 target	 of	 200.	Over	 the	 following	 decade	 the	 project	
(which	would	 come	 to	 include	 funding	 for	 cattle	dips)	would	 receive	a	 total	of	£48,000	
from	Oxfam.	Visiting	the	project	 in	1969,	Oxfam’s	overseas	aid	appraiser	noted	that	the	
dams	and	cattle	dips	were	impressive	and	performed	their	functions	well.21		
	 Representatives	of	the	central	government	were	less	impressed	with	the	scheme.	
Firstly,	they	were	irritated	to	not	have	heard	of	the	project	before	Betts	had	been	given	
an	‘outing’	by	local	officials	and	had	been	convinced	of	the	idea.22	Secondly,	civil	servants	
discussing	 the	 project	 considered	 it	 rather	 ‘off	 beam’	 and	 mysterious,	 judging	 that	 it	
would	be	of	only	very	limited	economic	benefit.23	Officials	were	exasperated	that	Oxfam	
had	not	been	better	advised	by	local	technical	officers	and	believed	that	the	organisation	
had	 been	misled	 into	 supporting	 a	 project	 that	 should	 never	 have	 been	 a	 priority	 for	
charitable	 assistance.24	For	 the	 Kenya	 government,	 development	 projects	 were	 to	 be	
geared	 towards	 increasing	 the	 productive	 potential	 of	 agricultural	 land	 and	 inculcating	
modern	attitudes	among	farmers	in	high-potential	areas.	In	Kericho,	the	government	was	
focused	on	producing	tea,	not	improving	the	quality	of	life	of	its	citizens.	It	is	unsurprising,	
therefore,	that	Oxfam’s	efforts	in	Toretet	would	receive	a	lukewarm	reception.	
Elsewhere	 in	 the	Rift	Valley	 the	central	government	was	bounced	 into	accepting	
another	development	project	promoted	by	a	local	administration	seemingly	emboldened	
by	the	temporary	experiment	in	majimboism.	The	Chemase	road	scheme	was	an	attempt	
to	develop	a	 ‘poverty-stricken	and	malaria-infested’	area	of	the	Rift	Valley,	an	area	that	
had	not	benefitted	from	the	gradual	development	of	other	areas	of	Nandi	district	because	
of	 its	 difficult	 climate	 and	 topography.	 As	with	 Toretet,	 rehabilitating	 Chemase	was	 far	
down	the	 list	of	priorities	 for	 the	Kenya	government.	However,	 in	1959	the	Agricultural	
Department	of	the	colonial	government	had	planted	an	experimental	sugar	plot	that	had	
flourished	beyond	all	expectations,	encouraging	local	farmers	to	plant	their	own	plots:	by	
1962,	 475	 acres	 had	been	prepared.	According	 to	 local	 proponents	 of	 the	 scheme,	 the	
																																																						
21	‘The	Construction	of	Cattle	Dips,	Kipsigis	District’,	no	date,	OxA,	MS.	Oxfam	COM/2/9/9	Folder	11.	
22	‘Letter	from	Mr.	Roemer	to	Mr.	Dearden’,	22	November,	1962,	KNA,	OFTA	–	Oxford	Committee	for	
Famine	Relief,	BV/93/12;	‘Letter	from	Mr.	Dearden	to	Mr.	Roemer’,	23	November,	1962,	KNA,	OFTA	–	
Oxford	Committee	for	Famine	Relief,	BV/93/12;	‘Letter	from	Mr.	Dearden	to	Mr.	Classen’,	6	March,	1963,	
KNA,	OFTA	–	Oxford	Committee	for	Famine	Relief,	BV/93/12.	
23	One	civil	servant	argued	that	the	project	was	useful	only	in	providing	the	local	administration	with	
employment	now	that	the	hut	tax	had	been	abolished.	‘Letter	from	Mr.	Dearden	to	Mr.	Roemer’,	22	
January,	1963,	KNA,	OFTA	–	Oxford	Committee	for	Famine	Relief,	BV/93/12;	‘Letter	from	Mr.	Dearden	to	
Mr.	Betts’,	22	January,	1963,	KNA,	OFTA	–	Oxford	Committee	for	Famine	Relief,	BV/93/12;	‘Letter	from	Mr.	
Dearden	to	Mr.	Classen’,	6	March,	1963,	KNA,	OFTA	–	Oxford	Committee	for	Famine	Relief,	BV/93/12.	
24	‘Letter	from	Mr.	Classen	to	Mr.	Dearden’,	21	February,	1963,	KNA,	OFTA	–	Oxford	Committee	for	Famine	
Relief,	BV/93/12.	
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sugar	crop	had	offered	the	potential	to	revolutionise	the	area’s	economy,	making	poverty	
and	 famine	 ‘a	 thing	 of	 the	 past’.	 Unfortunately,	 the	 rapid	 expansion	 of	 the	 sugar	 crop	
exceeded	 the	 infrastructural	 capabilities	of	 the	area,	 in	particular	 the	 inadequate	 roads	
that	 became	 a	 ‘sea	 of	mud’	with	 every	 rain	 shower.	Given	 the	 limited	 potential	 of	 the	
area	in	the	opinion	of	the	government,	the	provincial	administration	lacked	the	resources	
necessary	 to	 deal	 with	 the	 problem	 and	 so	 the	 community	 development	 officer	
approached	Oxfam	directly,	asking	for	£6,000	for	a	road-building	scheme	to	link	the	sugar	
cane	plots	with	the	processing	factories	24	miles	away.25	
In	 April	 the	 following	 year,	 once	 Oxfam	 received	 a	 guarantee	 that	 the	 local	
authority	would	maintain	the	road	–	ensuring	in	Betts’	mind	that	the	government	would	
continue	to	develop	the	area	–	the	organisation	provided	the	required	funds.	The	Oxfam	
representative	 who	 visited	 the	 project	 was	 delighted	 with	 the	 prospects	 that	 Oxfam	
assistance	would	give	the	area,	noting	that	the	crop	for	1963	alone	would	bring	 in	over	
£12,500.	 Jeanne	 Townsend	 also	 noted	 how,	 much	 like	 the	 Kipsigis	 dam	 project,	 the	
Chemase	 scheme	 showed	 ‘how	money	made	quickly	 available	 can	 fill	 an	 urgent	 gap	 in	
government	 programmes	 in	 a	 developing	 country’. 26 	Oxfam	 staff	 were,	 however,	
unaware	that	civil	servants	from	the	central	government	had	earlier	refused	to	send	the	
application	to	KFFHC	because	‘stripped	absolutely	of	unnecessary	verbiage…	this	is	a	try-
on’.	Officials	had	rejected	completely	the	premise	that	the	area	was	suffering	from	food	
shortages.27	When	 the	 Treasury	 was	 informed	 that	 the	 application	 had	 been	 sent	 to	
Oxfam,	 it	was	embarrassed	but	resigned	to	the	fact	that	the	project	had	‘got	to	a	stage	
where	our	support,	or	lack	of	it,	will	make	little	difference’.28	Indeed,	in	neither	case	did	
officials	consider	it	judicious	to	share	their	reservations	about	Oxfam	projects	with	Betts	
since	he	had	personally	recommended	the	schemes.	To	do	so	would,	officials	feared,	only	
embarrass	Betts	and	jeopardise	the	chances	of	the	government	receiving	funding	for	 its	
own	priority	projects.	 Instead,	civil	servants	resolved	to	co-ordinate	Oxfam’s	work	more	
closely	with	government	priorities	in	future.	
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	 The	intensity	of	discussions	between	the	two	parties	would,	therefore,	increase	in	
early	1963,	and	government	representatives	reemphasised	that	Oxfam	would	contribute	
most	towards	Kenyan	development	by	working	with	the	state	in	its	efforts	to	modernise	
Kenya’s	 agriculture.	 Accordingly,	 government	 representatives	 discussed	 with	 Betts	 the	
possibility	of	Oxfam	funding	farmer	training	centres	(FTCs)	and	the	purchase	of	improved	
planting	materials.29	The	former	request	was	for	£6,000	per	annum	for	three	years,	which	
would	 provide	 a	 subsidy	 for	 the	 neediest	 farmers	 to	 attend	 training.	 The	 government	
hoped	that	in	time	13	FTCs	would	receive	upwards	of	20,000	farmers	per	year	and	would	
be	 a	 major	 instrument	 of	 its	 agricultural	 extension	 policy.30	Meanwhile,	 the	 funds	 for	
improved	planting	material	would	help	the	poorest	farmers	afford	hardier	and	healthier	
varieties	 of	 food	 crops.	 The	 latter	 request	 was	 for	 over	 £73,000.31	In	 the	 event,	 Betts	
recommended	to	Oxford	grants	totalling	around	£100,000	for	1963.	This	amount	included	
the	Kipsigis	dams,	 the	Turkana	 famine	camps	and	 the	extension	of	 the	government-run	
Perkerra	 irrigation	 scheme	 (on	 which	 more	 later),	 but	 not	 (yet)	 the	 FTC	 or	 improved	
planting	 schemes.	For	 this	Betts	apologised,	noting	his	 limited	budget	and	 the	 fact	 that	
‘Kenya	is	more	fortunate	than	other	territories	we	are	considering	in	the	amount	of	aid	it	
is	receiving	from	alternative	sources’.32	
	 Nonetheless,	 the	 idea	 that	 Oxfam	 could	 support	 or	 plug	 holes	 in	 government	
development	plans	in	Kenya	gained	increasing	support	in	Oxford.	As	the	Deputy	Director	
of	 Oxfam,	 Henry	 Fletcher,	 remarked	 after	 his	 visit	 to	 East	 Africa	 in	 the	 same	 year,	 ‘if	
Oxfam	really	wants	its	help	in	this	area	to	be	significant,	it	must	be	prepared	to	work	with	
governments’.	Indeed,	the	faith	that	many	in	the	organisation	placed	in	the	decolonising	
state	as	a	central	developmental	actor	in	the	region	meant	that	Oxfam	would	work	with	
governments	of	all	 ideological	persuasions,	not	just	those	with	whom	it	had	a	particular	
affinity,	as	Jennings	notes	for	Tanzania.33	In	Kenya,	for	instance,	Oxfam	faced	a	capitalist	
government	committed	to	growth	above	all	else	–	a	position	that	might	have	upset	the	
																																																						
29	‘Application	for	Assistance	towards	Courses	at	Farmers	Training	Centres’,	10	November,	1962,	KNA,	OFTA	
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left-wing	 sensibilities	 of	many	members	 of	 the	 organisation;	 yet	 Fletcher	 asserted	 that	
‘there	 is	no	doubt	 in	my	mind	that	Kenya	Oxfam	ought	to	concentrate	on	development	
schemes	with	the	government,	mainly	the	Ministry	of	Agriculture’.34	Inevitably,	the	desire	
to	 work	 with	 the	 Kenya	 government	 also	 had	 something	 to	 do	 with	 the	 sense	 of	
possibility	 that	 independence	 conjured	 for	 Kenyans	 and	 foreigners	 alike.	 For	 Kenyans,	
independence	promised	the	opportunity	to	take	control	over	their	political	and	economic	
future,	 and	 foreign	 well-wishers	 were,	 for	 a	 time,	 swept	 along	 by	 this	 hopefulness,	
believing	 that	 the	 scale	 and	 speed	 of	 change	 since	 the	 Second	 World	 War	 could,	 if	
anything,	 be	 increased	by	working	with	 those	who	had	 fought	 for	 the	 right	 to	manage	
their	 own	 destiny.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 the	 stress	 Fletcher	 placed	 on	 working	 with	
governments	was,	 in	 part,	 another	 symptom	of	Oxfam’s	 shift	 towards	 supporting	 long-
term,	planned	development	 schemes	 and	away	 from	 reactive,	 emergency	 assistance.	A	
sub-committee	of	the	Africa	Committee	was	established	in	late	1964	to	consider	precisely	
this	issue,	and	recommended	that	60	per	cent	of	Oxfam’s	Africa	budget	should	be	spent	
on	planned	development	projects	with	the	advice	and	participation	of	governments.35	In	
this	recommendation	the	Committee	was	following	the	advice	of	Roger	Swynnerton,	who	
wrote	 a	 paper	 for	 Oxfam	 advocating	 the	 use	 of	 ‘modern	 knowledge’	 –	 such	 as	
conservation,	 composting,	 drought-resistance	 and	 irrigation	 –	 to	 improve	 agricultural	
production	 (much	as	he	had	advised	 in	his	development	plans	 for	colonial	Kenya	 in	 the	
1950s).36 	Of	 course,	 for	 a	 charitable	 body,	 such	 work	 was	 controversial	 and	 raised	
eyebrows	 at	 the	 Charity	 Commission.	 In	 her	 report	 on	 Chemase,	 Townsend	 had	
attempted	 to	 pre-empt	 the	 inevitable	 criticism	 by	 providing	 the	 answer	 to	 those	 who	
asked	‘are	roads	really	the	concern	of	charity?’:	
	
The	 concern	 of	 any	 charitable	 organisation	 interested	 in	 the	 progress	 of	 the	
struggling	people	of	the	world	 is	to	fill	the	gap	wherever	there	is	need.	Needs…	are	
legion	 –	 but	 they	 are	 not	 confined	 to	 vitamins,	 milk-powder,	 antibiotics,	 seeds	 or	
even	tractors.	Of	all	 the	urgent	requirements	needed	by	underdeveloped	countries,	
improved	 roads	 and	 communications	 are	 amongst	 the	 most	 vital	 –	 without	 them	
development	is	an	empty	thought	and	itself	is	doomed	to	failure.37	
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	 Unfortunately	 for	 Oxfam,	 the	 attempt	 to	 justify	 its	 work	 in	 Chemase	 was	
unsuccessful	 and	 for	 a	 few	 months	 in	 1964	 the	 organisation’s	 support	 for	 any	 new	
schemes	in	concert	with	the	Kenyan	government	was	put	on	hold	as	the	House	of	Lords	
debated	the	extent	to	which	development	aid	such	as	road	building	was	charitable.	At	the	
same	time,	the	Charity	Commission	considered	the	appropriateness	of	Oxfam	routing	its	
funds	through	governments.	Betts	was	furious,	noting	that	that	‘a	decision	against	Oxfam	
[on	 these	 matters]	 would…	 strike	 at	 the	 roots	 of	 the	 whole	 Freedom	 From	 Hunger	
Campaign’,	which,	as	its	Director	pointed	out,	was	focused	on	public	works	because	‘it	is	
only	 by	 public	 works	 that	 we	 can	 tackle	 the	 problem	 of	 poverty	 at	 its	 roots’.38	Just	 as	
concerning	for	Oxfam	was	the	fact	that	the	increased	scrutiny	on	the	organisation	and	its	
work	 had	 caused	 reservations	 to	 creep	 into	 the	 Africa	 Committee	 as	 regards	 its	 policy	
towards	governments.	Fletcher	was	quick	to	remind	the	Committee	that	if	Oxfam	did	not	
work	with	states,	its	‘help	will	always	be	on	the	fringe,	rather	than	getting	to	the	root	of	
the	problem’.	Thus	
	
whatever	misgivings	there	may	be,	the	Committee	should	be	of	good	courage	in	this	
respect…	 [for]	 in	many	cases,	our	most	effective	help	will	be	given	 in	 collaboration	
with	government	departments.39	
	
Importantly,	 as	 Fletcher	 revealed	 in	 a	memorandum	on	 the	 organisation’s	 aid	 policy	 in	
Africa,	Oxfam	had	always	allowed	 for	a	wide	 interpretation	of	 its	mandate	 to	 cover	 ‘all	
types	of	assistance	to	those	in	need,	both	by	way	of	immediate	aid	and	through	measures	
to	 help	 them	 to	 self-sufficiency’.	 The	 ‘narrower	 interpretation	 placed	 on	 Oxfam’s	
activities	 by	 the	 Chief	 Charity	 Commissioner	 and	 others	 has’,	 he	 pointed	 out,	 ‘never	
formed	 part	 of	 the	 [Africa]	 Committee’s	 thinking’,	 and	 their	 ‘too	 cautious	 “safety-first”	
attitude	would	 [have	 achieved]	 far	 less’.40	In	 the	 event,	 the	 Lords	 backed	 the	 charities’	
positive	 case	 ahead	 of	 the	 reservations	 of	 the	 Commission,	 and	measures	 ‘reasonably	
closely	connected	with	the	relief	of	poor	people’	were	now	to	be	seen	as	charitable;	yet	
public	 works	 and	 schemes	 for	 economic	 improvement	 were	 still	 for	 the	 time	 being	
unjustifiable.41	Kirkley	 continued	 to	 press	 the	 Commission	 for	 the	 acceptance	 of	 such	
schemes.	He	was	convinced	that	the	state,	wherever	located,	had	a	set	of	responsibilities	
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to	 its	 citizens	 along	 the	 lines	 of	 the	 welfare	 state	 in	 Britain.	 To	 freedom	 from	 want,	
disease,	 ignorance,	 squalor	and	 idleness,	he	wished	 to	add	 freedom	 from	hunger.	With	
the	 amendment	 of	 Oxfam’s	 ‘objects’	 clause	 in	 1965	 (as	 described	 in	 chapter	 two),	 the	
organisation	was	finally	free	to	engage	in	public	works	alongside	governments	in	order	to	
push	this	agenda.	Later	in	the	year	the	Africa	Committee	would	resolve	that	
	
while	projects	for	the	immediate	relief	of	suffering	had	a	very	important	part	to	play,	
it	was	 considered	 that	preference	 should	be	given	 to	applications	designed	 to	help	
people	to	help	themselves,	rather	than	those	that	just	kept	people	alive.42	
	
	 With	 only	 a	 brief	 interruption,	 therefore,	 Oxfam	would	 expand	 its	 engagement	
with	the	government	in	Kenya	during	the	1960s.	As	well	as	maintaining	its	support	for	the	
famine	camps	in	Turkana,	the	NGO	supported	the	establishment	of	fishing	on	Lake	Rudolf	
(now	 Lake	 Turkana). 43 	Turkana	 attracted	 Betts’	 interest	 because,	 with	 none	 of	 the	
advantages	 of	 climate	 or	 topography	 held	 by	 areas	 to	 the	 south,	 it	 was	 considered	
severely	underdeveloped.	This	arid	and	inhospitable	region	was	also	sparsely	populated,	
for	the	most	part	by	nomadic	pastoralists,	and	since	it	produced	neither	crops	nor	votes,	
its	development	held	very	 little	economic	or	political	 importance	 for	either	 the	colonial	
government	or	the	Kenyatta	regime.	The	few	government	interventions	in	the	region	had	
aimed	 to	 provide	 a	more	 settled	 way	 of	 life	 for	 these	 nomadic	 pastoralists	 (and	 in	 so	
doing	 to	help	ease	 the	 famine	crisis	 taking	hold),	but	were	 severely	underfunded.	Thus	
although	the	colonial	government	first	attempted	to	encourage	fishing	on	Lake	Rudolf	in	
the	early	1960s,	the	scheme	had	ground	to	a	halt	by	1962	and	Oxfam	was	asked	to	step	in	
to	 rescue	 the	 enterprise.	 Betts	 gladly	 supported	 the	 scheme,	 providing	 £2,600	 in	 the	
following	 year	 for	 a	 launch	 for	 boats	 and	 for	 a	 small	 road	 to	 transport	 the	 catch	 for	
processing.	Around	200	fishermen	were	to	benefit	from	the	investment	in	the	short-term,	
though	the	longer-term	prospects	for	the	project	were	uncertain;	for	the	time	being	the	
National	Food	Relief	Committee	purchased	the	fish	on	behalf	of	the	famine	camps	(also	
supported	by	Oxfam).44	Indeed,	 as	 the	district	 annual	 report	 for	 1963	pointed	out,	 ‘the	
darker	side	of	the	picture’	was	that	‘apart	from	the	purchase	of	dried	fish	for	famine	relief	
																																																						
42	‘Minutes	of	the	Africa	Committee’,	2	September,	1965,	OxA,	MS.	Oxfam	PRG/1/3/1	Folder	1:	December	
1963	–	November	1965.	
43	At	nearly	300	kilometres	in	length	and	with	a	surface	area	of	over	6,000	square	kilometres,	Lake	Turkana	
is	the	world’s	largest	desert	lake.	
44	R.	Cox,	‘Turkana	Fishing	Scheme,	Lake	Rudolf’,	1963,	OxA,	MS.	Oxfam	COM/2/9/10	Folder	3;	‘Letter	from	
G.	Ellerton	to	Dr.	Haupt’,	27	March,	1963,	KNA,	Famine	Relief	Reserve	Crops	(Oxford	Committee	for	Famine	
Relief),	MOH/47/3;	‘Background	on	Turkana	Fishing’,	3	October,	1963,	KNA,	Turkana	District	–	
Development,	BV/33/19.	
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there	was	 virtually	no	market’,	 and	by	 the	end	of	 the	 year	 ‘most	of	 the	 fishermen	had	
ceased	 fishing	and	the	whole	scheme	[faced]	disaster’.	The	author	criticised	the	project	
and	 the	 ‘experts,	 advisors	 and	 officials’,	 who	 ‘flock	 to	 the	 Gulf	 like	 so	many	migratory	
birds	and,	like	the	birds,	leave	little	trace	of	their	passage’.45	
	 Of	course,	if	one	sees	the	fishing	project	in	isolation,	it	 is	 insignificant	other	than	
as	a	‘white	elephant’	project	for	which	NGOs	are	often	criticised.	Yet	the	project	takes	on	
broader	 significance	 if	 it	 is	 seen	 in	 its	 wider	 historical	 context	 as	 but	 one	 of	 many	
government	projects	 that	Oxfam	supported	 in	Kenya	which	aimed	 to	 settle	pastoralists	
and	 ‘rehabilitate’	 them	to	a	more	 ‘modern’	and	 ‘developed’	way	of	 life.	These	schemes	
varied	 in	 size	 and	 scope,	 but	 retained	 a	 modernising	 focus.	 In	 Baringo	 district,	 for	
instance,	 Oxfam	 supported	 an	 attempt	 by	 the	 state	 to	 destock	 part	 of	 the	 region	 and	
introduce	 controlled	 grazing	 and	 agriculture	 in	 spite	 of	 the	 resistance	 of	 the	 local	
population.	The	Perkerra	irrigation	scheme,	to	which	Oxfam	donated	£7,000	in	1962	(on	
condition	of	a	government	contribution	of	£5,000),	aimed	to	irrigate	16,000	acres	of	land	
considered	 ‘unproductive’	 for	 settlement	 by	 the	 local	 Tugen	 and	 Njemps	 and	 for	
conversion	 into	 agricultural	 land	producing	onions,	 bananas	 and	maize.46	By	 the	end	of	
1963	over	300	 tenants	and	 their	 families	were	 in	occupation	of	 land	holdings	and	over	
1,380	acres	of	land	had	been	irrigated	(an	increase	of	536	acres	on	the	previous	year).	The	
scheme	 would	 produce	 a	 good	 crop	 that	 year,	 bringing	 in	 over	 £23,000	 for	 local	
producers	after	expenses	had	been	deducted.47	Notwithstanding	its	success,	local	people	
and	their	elected	representatives	voiced	their	anger	at	the	imposition	of	the	project	and	
the	changes	in	land	tenure	it	presupposed.		
	 Elsewhere	in	the	Rift	Valley	resistance	to	settlement	at	the	behest	of	government	
was	 even	 greater:	 in	Rombo	and	Kimana,	 the	 irrigation	of	 over	 600	 acres	 of	 land	–	 for	
which	Oxfam	donated	£5,000	in	1965	–	was	supposed	to	overcome	the	‘human	problems’	
in	the	region,	pushing	the	local	Maasai	to	abandon	their	‘semi-nomadic,	ancient	ways’	in	
																																																						
45	C.	L.	Ryland,	‘Turkana	Annual	Report,	1963’,	23	March,	1964,	KNA,	no	reference.	
46	‘Extension	of	the	Perkerra	Irrigation	Scheme’,	March	1967,	OxA,	MS.	Oxfam	COM/2/9/9	Folder	11;	‘Note	
from	E.	Green,	File	No.	FAO/8/Case	16/41’,	27	April,	1963,	KNA,	OFTA	–	Oxford	Committee	for	Famine	Relief	
(OXFAM),	BV/93/12;	‘Letter	from	Mr.	Dearden	to	Mr.	Betts’,	18	June,	1963,	KNA,	OFTA	–	Oxford	Committee	
for	Famine	Relief	(OXFAM),	BV/93/12;	‘General	Summary	of	the	Perkerra	Catchment	Grazing	Scheme’,	14	
December,	1963,	KNA,	Range	Management,	Baringo,	AN/40/27.	
47	‘Annual	Report,	Department	of	Agriculture,	Rift	Valley	Region’,	1963,	KNA,	Annual	Reports	–	Agriculture,	
AN/42/160.	
		 106	
favour	of	 settlement	on	 farmland.48	A	successful	pilot	 scheme	 led	 to	 the	application	 for	
£65,439	 from	Oxfam,	 but	 local	 leaders	 noted	 the	 difficulty	 for	 the	Maasai	 in	 accepting	
rigid	conditions	such	as	boundary	redistribution	and	stock	limitation.49	Nevertheless,	with	
Betts’	 encouragement,	 Oxfam	 granted	 £20,000	 to	 the	 government	 for	 the	 scheme	 in	
September	 1966	 and	 left	 open	 the	 potential	 for	 a	 further	 grant.50	Within	 a	 month,	
however,	local	resistance	to	changes	in	land	tenure	led	by	the	local	MP	Stanley	Oloitiptip	
forced	 government	 officials	 to	 ask	 Betts	 to	 withdraw	 the	 grant.51	The	 local	 provincial	
agricultural	board	roundly	criticised	the	Maasai	for	their	obstinacy	and	for	not	taking	the	
government’s	advice,	warning	that	‘if	these	people	wanted	financial	assistance’,	they	had	
to	learn	to	accept	government	conditions.52	
	 Back	in	the	arid	north,	a	government	assessment	concluded	that	the	combination	
of	settlement	 (with	 the	provision	of	 schooling	and	technical	 training)	and	 irrigation	was	
the	only	realistic	solution	to	the	‘Turkana	problem’,	defined	as	the	‘backwardness	of	the	
human	element’	and	their	tendency	to	 ‘want	to	remain	unchanged	and	to	cling	to	their	
old	 ways	 of	 life’. 53 	In	 fact,	 the	 government	 considered	 Turkana	 so	 ‘extraordinarily	
backward’	that	a	slow	and	studied	approach	was	useless;	instead,	a	complete	overhaul	of	
the	Turkana	culture	was	necessary,	for	‘no	solution	of	the	Turkana	problem	is	possible	by	
which	all	the	people	can	continue	their	traditional	way	of	life’.54	Other	than	the	enforced	
modernisation	of	the	Turkana,	the	only	other	options	–	to	do	nothing	or	to	continue	to	
find	 famine	 relief	 funds	 –	 were	 considered	 inhumane	 and	 wasteful,	 respectively. 55	
																																																						
48	‘The	Rombo	Agricultural	Scheme’,	November	1967,	OxA,	MS.	Oxfam	COM/2/9/9	Folder	11;	‘Minutes	of	
the	Executive	Committee	of	the	Kajiado	District	Agricultural	Committee	Meeting’,	7	September,	1967,	KNA,	
DC/KAJ/4/7/4.	
49	‘Minutes	of	the	Kajiado	District	Agricultural	Committee’,	9	June,	1966,	KNA,	DC/KAJ/4/1/17.	
50	‘List	of	Recommended	Grants,	Africa	Committee	Meeting’,	1	September,	1966,	OxA,	MS.	Oxfam	
PRG/1/3/1	Folder	2:	January	–	September	1966;	‘Minutes	of	the	Executive	Committee	of	the	Kajiado	District	
Agricultural	Committee’,	16	September,	1966,	KNA,	DC/KAJ/4/1/17.	
51	‘Minutes	of	the	Africa	Committee’,	27	October,	1966,	OxA,	MS.	Oxfam	PRG/1/3/2	Folder	1:	October	1966	
-	November	1967;	‘Monthly	Report	for	February’,	14	March,	1967,	KNA,	Monthly	Reports	Kajiado	(Vol.	II),	
DC/KAJ/4/1/11;	‘Minutes	of	the	Kajiado	District	Agricultural	Committee’,	7	November,	1967,	KNA,	
DC/KAJ/4/7/4.	
52	‘Minutes	of	the	Provincial	Water	Committee,	Rift	Valley	Province’,	15	March,	1968,	KNA,	DC/NKI/4/8/8;	
‘Annual	Report,	Department	of	Agriculture,	Rift	Valley	Province’,	1966,	KNA,	Annual	Reports	for	the	Rift	
Valley	from	1965,	AN/42/43.	
53	‘Rehabilitation	in	Turkana	–	Scheme	A,	Paper	for	Ministry	of	Agriculture	Planning	Committee’,	1962,	KNA,	
Project	–	Turkana	Rehabilitation,	BV/104/103;	‘Minutes	of	the	Turkana	Development	Committee’,	20	July,	
1963,	KNA,	Turkana	Development	Committee,	AN/16/6;	‘Annual	Report,	Department	of	Agriculture,	Rift	
Valley	Province’,	1964,	KNA,	Annual	Reports	–	Agriculture,	AN/42/160.	
54	‘File	No.	Proj/Turk/1/(TY)/8’,	27	October,	1964,	KNA,	Range	Management,	Turkana,	AN/40/33.	
55	‘Ministry	of	Agriculture	and	Animal	Husbandry,	Report	on	a	Visit	to	Turkana	District	to	Assess	the	
Rehabilitation	Problem’,	27	August,	1962,	KNA,	Turkana	Rehabilitation,	BV/104/104;	‘Reconnaissance	of	the	
Agricultural	Potential	of	the	Turkana	District’,	1964,	KNA,	BV/111/118.		
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Furthermore,	 in	 the	 latter	 case	 civil	 servants	 argued	 that	 the	Turkana	were	 ‘content	 to	
idle	under	the	hot	sun	 if	someone	supplies	them	with	free	food’,	and	estimated	that	at	
the	present	rate	of	population	increase	(and	even	with	good	rainfall)	famine	camps	would	
receive	 around	 3,500	 new	 claimants	 per	 year	 –	 an	 unsustainable	 rate	 of	 growth.56	
Officials	 in	 the	Ministry	of	Agriculture	 thus	called	on	 the	government	 to	employ	drastic	
remedies	 to	wean	the	population	 from	continual	 feeding	before	 it	was	 too	 late.57	Aside	
from	the	fishing	scheme	already	mentioned,	of	particular	interest	to	the	Ministry	was	an	
experimental	 water-spreading	 scheme	 for	 minor	 subsistence	 crops	 and	 fodder	 at	
Lorengippe.58	The	 scheme	 aimed	 to	 divert	 run	 off	water	 onto	 land	 ready	 for	 crops	 and	
grasses.	 Yet	because	 it	was	 at	 first	 an	uneconomic	 investment	 government	officials	 did	
not	consider	it	a	priority	for	loan	funds;	rather,	they	hoped	that	saving	the	Turkana	from	
‘human	degradation’	would	be	an	‘open	and	shut	case’	for	Oxfam.59	For	this	reason,	the	
organisation	was	approached	to	supplement	the	government	investment	of	£7,000	with	
£10,000	from	its	development	budget.	According	to	government	officials,	£17,000	would	
irrigate	 500	 acres	 of	 land	 and	 provide	 subsistence	 carbohydrates	 for	 2,400	 people.	
Ominously,	 they	 also	 noted	 that	 such	 a	 project	 would	 avoid	 the	 necessity	 of	 moving	
people	out	of	Turkana	by	force	of	arms.60	Oxfam	agreed	very	quickly	to	fund	the	scheme	
in	 late	 1963	 after	 Betts	 treated	 the	 application	 as	 one	 of	 emergency	 need,	 and	 initial	
results	were	positive:	four	fields	of	grasses	had	sprung	up	by	April	1964,	each	supporting	
local	inhabitants	and	their	cattle.61	
	 Jennings	 has	 argued	 elsewhere	 that	 Betts	 and	 Oxfam	 were	 beginning	 to	 shift	
towards	 a	 self-help	 and	 community-based	 model	 of	 development	 around	 this	 time,	
influenced	by	the	programme	in	Tanzania.62	If	this	is	interpretation	is	correct,	the	fact	that	
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Betts	 and	 Oxfam	 were	 simultaneously	 supporting	 the	 state-led	 and	 top-down	
development	 of	 ‘backward’	 communities	 in	 a	 neighbouring	 country	 might	 appear	
somewhat	 perplexing.	 What	 the	 Kenya	 programme	 reveals,	 however,	 is	 that	 Oxfam	
supported	 the	 state	 as	 a	 vital	 development	 institution	 for	 the	 modernisation	 of	 post-
colonial	 Africa	 and	 was	 somewhat	 agnostic	 as	 to	 each	 regime’s	 ideological	 fixations.	
Oxfam	values	–	which	were	forged	in	a	left-liberal	consciousness	that	stressed	the	failure	
of	 government	 while	 at	 the	 same	 time	 prescribing	 remedial	 action	 by	 the	 state	 –	
emphasised	 the	 central	 importance	 of	 the	 state	 to	 development	 and	 so	 engendered	
pragmatism	 as	 to	 its	 precise	 characteristics.	 In	 such	 a	 way	 Oxfam	 and	 Betts’	
‘developmentalist	 paternalism’	 encouraged	 the	 organisation	 to	 support	 the	 Kenyatta	
state	in	its	modernising	developmental	efforts	in	Kenya	at	the	same	time	as	it	adopted	a	
community-based	development	approach	 in	support	of	 the	Nyerere	state	 in	Tanzania.63	
The	fact	that	Oxfam	would	later	embrace	community-led	development	as	 its	focus	does	
not,	 therefore,	necessarily	mean	that	 it	was	adopting	 it	out	of	an	 ideological	conviction	
forged	by	Betts	and	others	 in	Tanzania	 in	the	mid-1960s.	 If	so,	Oxfam	would	have	most	
likely	 ceased	 to	 work	 directly	 with	 the	 Kenya	 state,	 which	 was	 promoting	 top-down	
development.	Rather,	before	adopting	the	‘conscientisation’	ideology	in	1969-70,	Oxfam	
sought	to	expand	its	support	to	the	Kenyan	government	as	its	primary	concern	and	was	
pragmatic	about	its	developmental	orientation.	(The	precise	nature	of	this	pragmatism	–	
its	 limits	and	how	far	 it	served	to	disguise	Oxfam	motives	 in	Kenya	–	 is	discussed	 in	the	
following	section.)	
	 Hence,	by	the	mid-1960s,	Oxfam	was	heavily	involved	with	the	government	in	its	
attempt	 to	 educate	 and	 modernise	 the	 Turkana	 out	 of	 their	 ‘economic	 and	 social	
slumber’	and	into	the	cash	economy	and	nation-building	project	of	independent	Kenya.64	
Betts	would	 regularly	 attend	 the	 Turkana	Development	 Committee	 at	 this	 time,	 and	 in	
early	 1966	 he	 emphasised	 that	 Oxfam	 could	 provide	 further	 support	 to	 government	
efforts	in	the	region	on	top	of	the	£20,000-£30,000	Oxfam	was	already	spending	annually	
in	Turkana.	The	Field	Director	offered	no	dissent	to	the	conclusion	of	the	Committee	that	
the	Turkana	had	 to	 change	 their	way	of	 life	before	development	 could	proceed,	 asking	
only	that	Oxfam	be	given	enough	notice	of	government	intentions	by	officials	in	order	to	
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allow	 the	 full	 consideration	 of	 projects	 in	 Oxford.65	Furthermore,	 as	 Betts	 revealed	 to	
officials	 in	 government,	 he	was	 anxious	 to	 ‘inculcate’	 the	 same	 level	 of	 interest	 in	 the	
modernisation	of	Turkana	in	Michael	Harris	(Field	Secretary	to	the	Africa	Committee	and	
another	 former	 colonial	 official),	 ‘since	 [Harris]	 will	 be	 the	 advocate	 of	 our	 future	
applications	 to	 [Oxford]’. 66 	To	 do	 so,	 Betts	 arranged	 meetings	 between	 Harris	 and	
government	representatives	during	Harris’	tour	of	Eastern	Africa	in	May	1966.	
	 These	meetings	proved	 important	 in	convincing	Harris	and	the	Africa	Committee	
to	accept	Betts’	recommendation	to	support	the	creation	of	a	mobile	educational	unit,	as	
requested	by	Turkana’s	District	Commissioner	(DC).67	For	the	DC,	the	mobile	educational	
units	would	 ‘combat	 ignorance	and	 re-orientate	 the	maskinis	 (‘poor’)	 to	 the	new	social	
and	economic	values’	–	‘African	Socialism’	–	pertaining	in	independent	Kenya.	Prior	to	his	
meetings	 in	Nairobi,	Harris	had	warned	Betts	 that	 the	 idea	of	 a	 film	unit	was	 less	 than	
popular	at	Oxford,	with	some	members	of	the	Africa	Committee	expressing	themselves,	
unofficially,	fairly	negatively	on	several	issues	to	do	with	its	aims	and	scope.	After	his	trip	
to	Eastern	Africa,	however,	and	with	Betts’	assurances,	Harris	was	able	 to	convince	 the	
Committee	 to	donate	nearly	 £8,000	 for	 the	project,	which	would	be	 spent	on	 teaching	
Turkana	 how	 to	 inoculate	 their	 animals	 and	 improve	 animal	 husbandry	 in	 the	 hope	 of	
creating	a	market	for	animals	from	the	area.68	Unfortunately	for	Betts	and	Harris,	despite	
reaching	nearly	8,000	people	in	the	region	the	film	unit	was	quickly	written	off	as	a	failure	
due	to	the	limited	nature	of	the	film	material	both	in	quantity	and	quality	and	the	lack	of	
interest	 shown	 by	 the	 Turkana. 69 	Perhaps	 somewhat	 embarrassed	 that	 his	 close	
relationship	 with	 government	 officials	 had	 inclined	 him	 to	 advocate	 for,	 rather	 than	
thoroughly	 evaluate,	 the	 scheme,	 Betts	 wrote	 a	 particularly	 hostile	 letter	 about	 the	
project	 as	 the	 unit	 was	 withdrawn	 from	 Lodwar,	making	 clear	 his	 anger	 that	 so	many	
factors	 that	 militated	 against	 its	 successful	 operation	 were	 not	 made	 clear	 in	 the	
application	 for	 funding.70	The	 resignation	of	 the	unit’s	operating	officer	 soon	after	was,	
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accordingly,	 considered	 merely	 ‘another	 unfortunate	 occurrence	 in	 the	 history	 of	 a	
project	which	has	proved	ill-fated	from	the	start’	and	expenditure	was	frozen	from	May	
1968	until	such	time	as	a	complete	‘re-think’	of	the	project	had	been	concluded.71	
	 The	mobile	film	unit	was	an	embarrassing	setback	for	Betts,	but	it	did	not	stop	him	
and	his	successors	from	building	on	Oxfam’s	development	profile	and	strengthening	the	
organisation’s	 relationship	 with	 the	 Kenyan	 state.	 Indeed,	 Oxfam	 would	 become	 so	
deeply	entrenched	 in	Turkana	 that	by	 the	 late	1960s	 it	had	almost	become	part	of	 the	
administration;	 thus	 when	 the	 organisation	 reduced	 its	 commitment	 in	 the	 region	 in	
1969,	the	Range	Department	found	that	it	had	exhausted	its	own	funding	fully	six	months	
before	the	next	central	government	allocation,	rendering	it	unable	to	operate	for	half	the	
year.72	During	the	later	1960s	and	early	1970s	Oxfam	was	also	supportive	of	government	
initiatives	outside	Turkana.	In	Isiolo,	in	Eastern	Province,	for	instance,	the	NGO	aided	the	
government	 in	 its	effort	 to	 ‘rehabilitate’	 the	region	 following	the	shifta	 conflict	 through	
the	creation	of	group	ranches	for	the	cultivation	of	maize.	Irrigated	by	the	Isiolo	and	Uaso	
Nyiro	 rivers,	 these	ranches	would,	 the	government	argued,	allow	service	provision	on	a	
scale	 large	 enough	 to	 generate	 development.73	In	 November	 1968,	 Malcolm	 Harper	 –	
who	 replaced	 Betts	 as	 Field	 Director	 from	 August	 of	 that	 year	 –	 visited	 the	 region	 to	
discuss	the	issue	with	local	government	officers.	He	agreed	with	their	assessment,	stating	
that	settlement	schemes	offered	the	only	 long-term	solution	to	the	shifta	 ‘menace’	and	
the	 underdevelopment	 of	 the	 region.74	In	 April	 1970	Oxfam	would	 grant	 nearly	 £4,000	
towards	 the	 capital	 expenditure	 for	 buildings	 and	 recurrent	 expenditure	on	 salaries	 for	
one	 such	 ranch,	 allowing	100	 families	 to	be	placed	on	150	acres	of	 land.75	Five	months	
later,	 Harper	 reported	 that	 ‘the	 atmosphere	 of	 hopelessness	 and	 helplessness’	 that	
characterised	 the	 area	 after	 the	 shifta	 emergency	 had	 begun	 to	 lift,	 and	 that	 Oxfam	
should	be	gratified	to	be	associated	with	the	change	alongside	the	government.76	
																																																						
71	‘Letter	from	Mr.	Betts	to	Mr.	Ndeti’,	10	May,	1968,	KNA,	Turkana	Development	Committee	–	Mobile	Film	
Unit,	AN/16/7;	‘Letter	from	Mr.	Sweetman	to	Mr.	Betts’,	24	May,	1968,	KNA,	Turkana	Development	
Committee	–	Mobile	Film	Unit,	AN/16/7.	
72	‘Monthly	Report	for	October,	Turkana	District’,	20	November,	1969,	KNA,	Monthly	Reports,	Turkana,	
AN/42/42.	
73	‘Minutes	of	the	Isiolo	District	Development	Committee’,	17	February,	1969,	KNA,	District	Development	
Committee	Meetings,	DC/ISO/4/1/27;	‘Note	on	the	Meeting	of	the	Isiolo	District	Development	Committee’,	
30	August,	1968,	KNA,	District	Development	Committee	Meetings,	DC/ISO/4/1/27.	
74	‘Isiolo	District	Development	Project’,	7	July,	1969,	KNA,	Agriculture,	Food	Situation,	Famine	Relief	
General,	PC/EST/2/2/23.	
75	‘Isiolo	Development	Project’,	4	June,	1970,	OxA,	MS.	Oxfam	COM/2/9/9	Folder	11;	‘Isiolo	Development	
Project’,	23	March,	1973,	OxA,	MS.	Oxfam	COM/2/9/10	Folder	3.	
76	‘Visit	to	Central	Kenya,	August,	1970’,	2	September,	1970,	OxA,	MS.	Oxfam	PRG/3/5/8	Folder	2:	Jamaica	–	
Kenya.	
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	 Meanwhile,	 Oxfam	 supported	 the	 government	 take-over	 of	 a	 pilot	 irrigation	
scheme	 that	 aimed	 to	 settle	 nomadic	 Kenyan	 Somalis	 near	 the	 town	 of	 Garissa,	 North	
Eastern	Province.	A	local	self-help	group	had	formed	in	the	area	in	1967	with	the	hope	of	
developing	 irrigated	 cultivation	 in	 the	 region.	 Taken	 with	 the	 idea,	 the	 government	
adopted	 the	 scheme	 in	 1970	 and	 asked	 Oxfam	 for	 funds	 to	 enable	 its	 three-fold	
expansion	 to	 300	 acres	 and	 100	 families.77	Through	 the	 demonstration	 effect	 of	 the	
project,	the	government	hoped	to	rid	the	area	of	the	nomadic	‘habit’,	which,	it	argued	in	
its	application	to	Oxfam,	‘militates	against	any	sort	of	development	in	the	province’	and	
only	 encouraged	 famine	 crises.	 As	 in	 Isiolo,	 the	 solution	 to	 underdevelopment	 and	
chronic	 famine	 in	 the	 region	 was	 settlement:	 development,	 according	 to	 government	
officials,	 ‘requires	people	to	settle	in	one	place	to	effect	it,	for	example	building	schools	
and	 sending	 children	 [there]’.78	The	 pilot	 irrigation	 scheme	was,	 therefore,	 intended	 to	
further	 encourage	 ‘villagisation’	 and	 to	enable	 the	provision	of	 essential	 services	 –	 and	
the	extension	of	government	apparatus	–	in	the	region.79	The	new	Field	Director	for	East	
Africa,	 Toby	 Gooch,	 thought	 the	 scheme	 was	 valuable	 as	 a	 demonstration	 of	 an	
‘alternative	 to	 the	 nomadic	 life…	 so	 vulnerable	 during	 drought’,	 and	 Oxfam	 granted	
£6,274	in	1971	to	help	cover	the	cost	of	new	irrigation	equipment,	construction	and	the	
payment	of	workers	on	the	scheme.80	Initially,	the	project	was	a	success,	with	all	35	of	the	
original	members	(and	their	dependents)	off	famine	relief	by	1972	and	the	majority	of	the	
crops	 making	 profit.	 40	 new	 members	 were	 accepted	 in	 1973,	 and	 Oxfam	 donated	
another	£3,200	for	the	further	expansion	of	the	scheme.81	By	late	1973,	however,	it	had	
become	 clear	 to	 the	manager	 of	 the	 scheme	 that	wealthier	 participants	 (including	 one	
MP)	dominated	the	group	and	manipulated	the	poorer	members	 into	working	for	them	
while	 they	 were	 absent.	 He	 reported	 to	 Oxfam	 that	 the	 well-to-do	 members	 had	
																																																						
77	The	scheme	would	focus	on	growing	onions,	tomatoes,	cowpeas,	bananas	and	melons.	‘Proposed	Crop	
Development	in	the	North	Eastern	Province	for	the	Period	1970/74	Development	Plan	Period’,	no	date,	
KNA,	Irrigation	Scheme	(Garissa),	PS/2/2;	‘Copy	of	Application	to	Oxfam	Prepared	by	Agricultural	
Department,	Garissa	Self-Help	Irrigation	Scheme	Application	for	Oxfam	Grant’,	no	date,	KNA,	Irrigation	
Scheme	(Garissa),	PS/2/2.	
78	‘Minor	Irrigation	Schemes	–	North	Eastern	Province’,	3	November,	1971,	KNA,	Irrigation	Scheme	(Garissa),	
PS/2/2.	
79	‘The	Development	of	Minor	Irrigation	Schemes	in	the	Dry	Areas	of	Kenya’,	28	March,	1972,	KNA,	
Irrigation	Scheme	(Garissa),	PS/2/2;	‘Annual	Report,	Garissa	District’,	1972,	KNA,	Annual	Report,	Garissa	
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80	‘Letter	from	Mr.	Merryman	to	Mrs.	Mbogo’,	16	February,	1972,	KNA,	Freedom	From	Hunger	
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81	‘Garissa	Self-Help	Farming	and	Irrigation	Scheme,	Ministry	of	Agriculture,	Kenya’,	16	December,	1974,	
OxA,	MS.	Oxfam	COM/2/9/9	Folder	11.	
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essentially	become	‘parasitic’	to	the	project.82	Nonetheless,	Oxfam	remained	hopeful	that	
the	 local	 committee	would	 remove	 absentee	members	 and	 retained	 an	 interest	 in	 the	
project	until	1977.83	
	 The	 interlinked	 story	 of	 these	 relatively	 small-scale	 projects	 helps	 to	 illustrate	
Oxfam	thinking	as	 regards	 the	development	of	Kenya’s	marginalised	areas	and	peoples,	
and	particularly	 its	 support	 for	modernising	alternatives	 to	pastoralism,	 something	 that	
tallied	 well	 with	 government	 attitudes	 in	 Kenya	 and	 across	 Africa	 at	 the	 time.	 The	
organisation’s	early	efforts	 in	support	of	the	state	 in	the	region	were,	 indeed,	premised	
on	the	dominant	caricature	of	pastoralists	as	out-dated	primitives	destroying	potentially	
cultivatable	land.	Considering	that	Betts	had	worked	for	over	twenty	years	in	the	colonial	
administration,	 it	 is	 perhaps	 unsurprising	 that	 he	 retained	 older	 colonial	 ideas	 about	
human	 progress.	 For	 the	 idea	 that	 pastoralists	 were	 ‘backward’	 had	 filtered	 into	
development	thinking	during	the	colonial	period	along	with	the	 image	of	pastoralists	as	
exotic	and	primeval,	and	had	encouraged	contemporary	development	planners	to	impose	
restrictions	 on	 pastoralist	 mobility	 in	 order	 to	 discourage	 the	 pastoralist	 lifestyle.84	As	
David	Anderson	has	written,	colonial	governments	were	‘unable	or	unwilling	to	confront	
the	 otherness	 of	 pastoralist	 communities’,	 and	 officials	 predicted	 the	 swift	 demise	 of	
pastoralists	in	the	face	of	western	ideas	and	technologies.85	In	the	1930s,	and	throughout	
the	 ‘second	colonial	occupation’,	 the	British	mounted	some	of	 the	 first	 interventions	 in	
pastoral	 areas	 in	 order	 to	 accomplish	 this	 feat.	 These	 interventions	 most	 often	 began	
from	the	premise	that	pastoralism	was	a	destructive	system,	and	that	 the	only	solution	
was	to	steer	 ‘backward’	pastoralists	 into	modern	and	secure	 livelihoods.	As	 in	the	post-
colonial	 period,	 narratives	 of	 overstocking	 and	 primitivism	 justified	 the	 constraint	 of	
pastoral	 land	use	and	 characterised	 the	 intrusion	of	 government	as	 a	neutral	 and	even	
benevolent	act.86	
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83	‘Garissa	Self-Help	Farming	and	Irrigation	Scheme,	Ministry	of	Agriculture’,	27	April,	1977,	OxA,	MS.	Oxfam	
COM/2/9/9	Folder	11.	
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Anti-Politics	Machine,	pp.	135-168;	Birch	and	Shuria,	Perspectives	on	Pastoral	Development,	pp.	1-10.	
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p.	121.	
86	Interventions	in	pastoralist	areas	were,	however,	often	extremely	expensive,	partly	because	they	
required	constant	policing	(as	would	a	number	of	Oxfam	projects	in	Turkana)	in	order	to	stop	pastoralists	
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	 By	 the	mid-1960s,	 the	 development	 paradigm	 as	 regards	 pastoralists	 (for	 NGOs	
and	developmental	states	alike)	was	‘resettlement’:	 in	the	minds	of	 ‘scientific’	planners,	
pastoralism	 as	 a	 way	 of	 life	 was	 finished.87	Theoretical	 underpinning	 for	 this	 approach	
was	 later	 provided	 by	 Garrett	 Hardin’s	 1968	 article	 ‘Tragedy	 of	 the	 Commons’,	 which	
offered	a	powerful	image	of	the	inherently	destructive	and	non-viable	nature	of	pastoral	
nomadism;	 its	 prescription	 of	 development	 schemes	 that	 privatised	 communal	
rangelands	 had	 powerful	 advocates	 in	 government	 and	 donor	 circles	 at	 the	 time.88	
Predictably,	 the	 Kenyan	 state	 had	 political	 as	 well	 as	 the	 socio-economic	 motives	 for	
engaging	 in	development	schemes	 in	pastoral	areas	alongside	Oxfam.	As	discussed	with	
regard	 to	 the	 shifta	 conflict	 in	 the	 previous	 chapter,	 settlement	 schemes	 and	 the	
expansion	of	irrigated	agriculture	in	the	Rift	Valley	were	as	much	about	the	imposition	of	
government	 control	 –	 through	 observation	 and	 management	 –	 over	 areas	 and	
populations	that	were	neither	culturally	nor	territorially	integrated	in	the	Kenyan	state,	as	
they	 were	 about	 economic	 improvement	 for	 its	 own	 sake.	 As	 C.	 L.	 Ryland,	 Regional	
Government	Agent	for	Turkana,	noted	in	early	1964,	
	
This	 has	 been	 a	 bewildering	 year	 for	 the	 Turkana	 tribesman.	 Before	 the	 general	
election	he	was	still	imbibing	the	heady	wine	of	an	‘uhuru’	where	there	would	be	no	
police	 or	 chiefs	 and	 unlimited	 rifles	 and	 no	 boundaries.	 After	 the	 election	 he	 saw	
little	 change	 from	 the	 old	 routine.	 The	 “Serikali”	 [government]	 still	 went	 about	 its	
duties,	 the	 police	 were	 ubiquitous,	 taxes	 were	 demanded	 and	 grazing	 and	
international	boundaries	remained.	They	cannot	be	blamed	if	the	wine	has	turned	a	
little	 sour	 in	 their	 mouths,	 and	 there	 have	 therefore	 been	 some	 rumblings	 of	
dissatisfaction…89	
	
The	local	District	Commissioner	reported	with	some	relief	a	year	later	that	the	district	for	
now	lacked	full	‘political	awareness’.	However,	he	acknowledged	that:	
	
once	 this	 consciousness	 develops	 it	 will	 be	 directed	 against	 the	 up	 country	 civil	
servants,	who	are	seen	as	agents	of	a	regime	from	‘Kenya’.	Such	a	trend	of	thought	
can	only	be	arrested	by	rapid	economic	development.90	
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‘The	 resulting	 residential	 stability’,	 argued	 the	 DC,	 ‘would	 pave	 the	 way	 for	 the	
establishment	of	other	social	services	like	education,	health	and	even	security;	which	are	
inhibited	by	the	present	nomadism’.91	He	envisaged	development	‘along	the	lines	of	the	
growth	of	centres	of	population…	the	connecting	of	these	centres	by	adequate	roads,	the	
improvement	 of	 grazing	 by	 water	 spreading…	 such	 increase	 of	 irrigation	 schemes	 for	
agricultural	 purposes	 as	 financially	 possible,	 and	 the	 most	 efficient	 development	 of	
educational	 and	medical	 facilities’.	At	 the	 same	 time,	 a	 ‘reasonable	 [sic]	 good	 road	will	
enable	supervision	to	be	made	by	Government	officers	from	Lodwar’.92	
	 Less	threatening	than	separatists	in	North	Eastern	Province,	perhaps,	the	Turkana	
were	still	looked	on	with	suspicion	and	not	a	small	amount	of	embarrassment:	they	were	
considered	‘lazy,	quarrelsome,	greedy,	ignorant,	ungrateful	and	primitive’.	Thus	although	
the	 response	 to	 the	 ‘primitiveness’	of	each	of	 these	areas	was	not	equal	 in	 its	 ferocity,	
both	 regions	were	 to	be	 settled,	 villagised	and	pushed	 into	commercial	 agriculture.	 For	
the	 Turkana,	 such	 developmental	 interventions	 were	 unwelcome:	 irrigation	 schemes	
were	named	Amana	emoit,	or	‘fields	of	the	foe’.93	Yet	the	government	was	unconcerned	
with	 their	opinion;	 for	development	along	 these	 lines	would	allow	 the	observation	and	
management	of	a	segment	of	 the	population	not	yet	culturally,	politically,	economically	
or	 territorially	assimilated	 into	 the	Kenyan	state.	 In	such	a	way,	 it	 could	be	argued	that	
Oxfam	behaved	in	the	manner	predicted	by	James	Ferguson	and	functioned	as	part	of	the	
‘anti-politics	machine’	 in	 Kenya	 by	 supporting	 the	 expansion	 of	 the	 state	 into	marginal	
areas;	certainly,	Oxfam’s	support	for	the	state	in	its	modernisation	efforts	meant	that	the	
problematic	 aspects	 of	 facilitating	 state	 expansion	 into	 pastoral	 areas	 –	 in	 particular	
enhanced	 state	 control	 and	 surveillance	 –	 could	 be	 rendered	 in	 a	 positive	 light	 as	
necessary	 steps	 on	 the	 path	 to	 development	 taken	 by	 a	 ‘neutral’	 and	 benevolent	
bureaucratic	 state.	 The	 thesis	 returns	 to	 this	 issue	 at	 the	 end	 of	 the	 present	 section,	
however,	 for	 Oxfam	 in	 fact	 supported	 a	much	 wider	 range	 of	 state-led	modernisation	
efforts	than	discussed	hitherto.	
	 Before	 moving	 onto	 these	 efforts,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 note	 that	 aside	 from	 the	
element	 of	 supervision	 and	 control	 over	 awkward	 populations	 that	 modernisation	
schemes	offered	the	government,	there	was	also	the	important	question	of	self-interest	
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among	elite	Kenyans	who	saw	the	expansion	of	settled	agriculture	and	land	consolidation	
as	an	opportunity	to	expand	their	investment	portfolios.	Often	highly	placed	in	the	state,	
these	 elites	 had	 a	 vested	 interest	 in	 stigmatising	 pastoralists	 as	 backward	 and	
conservative	 in	 order	 to	 make	 them	 vulnerable	 to	 criticism	 and	 to	 legitimise	 the	
privatisation	 of	 formerly	 communal	 land.94	As	 Harper	 reported	 to	 Oxford	 in	 1969,	 one	
hugely	expensive	 FAO/government	 irrigation	 scheme	on	 the	Turkwell	River	–	 costing	 in	
the	region	of	£150,000	–	had	developed	a	meagre	50	acres	of	land	for	mixed	cultivation	in	
its	first	year.	Notably,	of	these	50	acres,	the	Provincial	Commissioner	pushed	for	30	acres	
to	be	set	aside	for	the	three	Turkana	MPs.95	Indeed,	it	was	relatively	simple	for	elites	to	
manipulate	 such	 schemes	 to	 their	 advantage	 because	 there	 was	 little	 discussion	 with	
pastoralists	about	development	interventions	other	than	to	tell	those	present	at	barazas	
–	who	were	often	town-based,	not	nomadic,	pastoralists	–	that	they	were	happening.96	
Inevitably,	 given	 these	 issues,	 villagisation	 has	 since	 been	 found	 to	 have	 been	
mostly	 haphazard,	 while	 irrigated	 agriculture	 has	 been	 criticised	 for	 its	 unsuitability	 in	
areas	where	there	was	no	reliable	labour	force	to	generate	a	product	for	which	there	was	
also	no	market.	Schemes	in	Turkana	and	elsewhere	would	thus	draw	in	the	desperate,	but	
were	barely	functional	in	reality.	For	instance,	three	government	schemes	in	Turkana	(for	
which	the	Oxfam	scheme	served	as	a	pilot)	cost	on	average	over	£40,400	per	hectare,	or	
£14,400	per	 tenant	household,	 and	operating	 costs	 alone	were	 three	 times	 the	margin	
that	 farmers	 could	expect	 to	 generate.97	The	Katilu	 irrigation	 scheme	was,	 according	 to	
Vigdis	 Broch-Due,	 an	 ‘over-mechanis[ed],	 over-staffed,	 uncoordinated	 and	 costly	
operation,	coupled	with	a	decision	making	structure	in	which	farmers	are	only	allowed	to	
play	 a	 nominal	 role’. 98 	In	 Isiolo,	 the	 Malka	 Dakaa	 scheme,	 started	 in	 1976	 by	 the	
government	with	support	from	the	FAO	and	the	United	Nations	Development	Programme	
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(UNDP),	aimed	to	develop	food	production	to	provide	an	opportunity	for	nomads	to	lead	
‘stable	 and	prosperous	 lives	 through	 irrigated	agriculture	 and	 settlement,	 and	 to	offset	
the	destructive	effects	of	desertification’	caused	by	pastoralism.99	This,	too,	was	a	failure,	
with	production	not	coming	anywhere	near	to	meeting	high	recurrent	costs,	let	alone	the	
enormous	capital	costs.	Upon	realising	that	the	scheme	was	costing	around	£11,200	per	
hectare,	 the	 FAO	 and	 UNDP	 withdrew	 in	 1980.	 In	 his	 assessment	 of	 these	 irrigation	
projects,	Richard	Hogg	is	highly	critical	of	the	way	in	which	agriculture	was	presumed	to	
be	 the	 answer	 to	 the	perceived	 lack	 of	 development	 in	 the	northern	 and	 arid	 areas	 of	
Kenya;	 but	 this	 should	 come	 as	 no	 surprise	 when	 one	 considers	 the	 faith	 and	 vested	
interest	 that	 Kenyan	 politicians	 and	 development	 planners	 had	 in	 agriculture	 and	
modernisation.	 In	the	1965	Sessional	10	Paper,	nearly	one	third	of	planned	expenditure	
was	earmarked	for	land	consolidation,	registration,	irrigation	and	settlement	schemes.100	
Later,	 Tom	Mboya	would	 lecture	 the	 KFFHC	on	 the	 importance	 of	 irrigation,	 fertilisers,	
improved	crop	varieties,	better	tools	and	the	modernisation	of	the	farmer	himself	in	the	
battle	to	avoid	a	Malthusian	final	solution	in	Kenya:	 ‘backward’	farmers	and	pastoralists	
were	a	handicap	to	development.101	
	 Oxfam,	heavily	invested	as	it	was	in	supporting	the	state	in	its	efforts	to	overcome	
the	human	 ‘obstacle’	 to	development	 through	the	extension	of	modernised	agriculture,	
would,	 in	 fact,	 tick	 off	many	 of	Mboya’s	 demands	 during	 the	mid-1960s.	 Thus,	 having	
been	convinced	that	agricultural	education	had	a	‘vital	part	to	play’	in	the	‘future	progress	
and	development’	of	Kenya,	Oxfam	donated	£18,000	for	 the	 foundation	and	support	of	
Farmer	 Training	 Centres	 (FTCs)	 in	 1963.	 The	 FTCs	 were	 to	 be	 the	 site	 of	 modernising	
education	in	cultivation,	animal	husbandry	and	modern	farm	management	for	‘backward’	
farmers;	 the	Oxfam	grant	provided	support	 for	around	3,000	pupils.102	Betts	considered	
the	 centres	 particularly	 important	 in	 areas	 where	 pastoralists	 were	 beginning	 to	 be	
settled	and	had	to	be	taught	how	to	farm	land	for	commercial	gain.	For	this	reason,	from	
1966	 Oxfam	 concentrated	 its	 support	 for	 FTCs	 in	 the	 Rift	 Valley,	 providing	 a	 further	
£19,000	 between	 1966	 and	 1968	 to	 help	 nearly	 6,000	 students	 receive	 an	 education	
																																																						
99	R.	Hogg,	‘Irrigation	Agriculture	and	Pastoral	Development:	A	Lesson	from	Kenya’,	Development	and	
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suitable	for	Kenya’s	modernisation	of	farming.103	Other	educational	institutions	to	receive	
Oxfam	 support	 included	 the	 Maasai	 Rural	 Development	 Centre	 in	 Kajiado.	 First	
established	 by	 the	 Presbyterian	 Church	 to	 encourage	 the	 Maasai	 to	 abandon	 their	
nomadic	 life	 and	 adopt	 settled	 ranching,	 the	 centre	 provided	 education	 in	 line	 with	
government	 policy	 (an	 agricultural	 officer	 advised	 the	 project).	 Oxfam	 donated	 nearly	
£7,000	 to	 the	centre	 in	1968	 for	 the	creation	of	a	demonstration	ranch	of	500	acres	 to	
showcase	 the	 principles	 of	 modern	 agriculture	 to	 the	 Maasai.	 Harper	 noted	 that	 the	
‘conversion’	of	the	Maasai	to	a	‘more	modern	form	of	agriculture	is	likely	to	be	a	long	and	
laborious	effort	 since	 the	Maasai…	 love	 their	cattle	 [and]	do	not	 take	easily	 to	change’.	
Nonetheless,	 it	 was	 considered	 a	 task	 worth	 completing	 in	 order	 to	 help	 develop	 the	
region.104	A	few	years	later	the	organisation	donated	over	£23,000	(or	83	per	cent	of	the	
total	 cost)	 to	 the	 Samburu	 Rural	 Development	 Centre	 in	 Nakuru.	 The	 centre	 aimed	 to	
combat	the	desertification	of	the	area	–	which	was	blamed	on	overstocking,	overgrazing	
and	soil	erosion	–	by	encouraging	the	settlement	of	pastoralists.105	
	 In	addition,	Oxfam	supported	government	efforts	to	convince	farmers	of	modern	
methods,	 including	the	use	of	 fertiliser	and	 improved	maize	seeds.	The	former	was	first	
discussed	in	1963	in	response	to	a	World	Bank	recommendation	that	phosphatic	fertiliser	
be	introduced	in	Kenya.	The	Bank	convinced	the	Kenya	government	to	provide	£150,000	
per	 annum	 for	 a	 fertiliser	 subsidy,	 but	 there	 still	 remained	 the	 question	 of	 convincing	
farmers	 of	 its	 merits.	 The	 government	 turned	 to	 Oxfam	 for	 £17,000	 to	 allow	 for	 the	
demonstration	of	fertilisers	in	a	‘blitz’	campaign.106	The	plan	for	the	campaign	noted	that	
2,000	 one-acre	 units	 would	 each	 receive	 30	 bags	 of	 fertiliser.	 With	 enough	 staff	 to	
supervise	 6,000	 demonstrations	 per	 year,	 each	 serving	 60	 farmers,	 the	 scale	 of	 the	
project	was	large,	and	720,000	farmers	were	to	be	targeted	in	the	course	of	the	two	years	
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funded	by	Oxfam.107	By	mid-1965	2,649	plots	had	been	planted	using	Oxfam	funds,	and	
reports	on	 the	 scheme	noted	 that	 ‘there	 is	no	doubt	 that	 the	plots	helped	 to	 convince	
farmers	 that	 it	 pays	 to	 use	 better	 seed,	 apply	 fertilisers,	 plant	 early	 [and]	 follow	 good	
husbandry	practices	in	order	to	get	better	yields’.108	In	some	areas	Oxfam	plots	were	said	
to	 ‘out-yield’	 local	 plots	 by	 as	 much	 as	 400	 per	 cent,	 and	 demonstration	 plots	 were	
considered	more	convincing	than	‘all	the	talks	given	to	farmers	in	barazas’.109	Meanwhile,	
the	introduction	of	improved	varieties	of	maize	was	first	discussed	with	Oxfam	in	1965	as	
a	response	to	the	food	shortage	taking	hold	in	certain	areas	of	Kenya	following	the	failure	
of	 the	 long	 rains.110	The	 government	 blamed	 farmers	 who	 had	 not	 adopted	 modern	
practices	 for	 the	 severity	 of	 the	 shortage,	 and	 thus	 the	 Department	 of	 Agriculture	
developed	a	campaign	to	demonstrate	better	husbandry	and	distribute	 improved	maize	
seed	 from	 the	 Katumani	 research	 station.111	In	 essence,	 the	 project	 would	 follow	 the	
same	pattern	as	the	fertiliser	distribution:	the	government	hoped	to	encourage	the	use	of	
drought-resistant	 maize	 in	 areas	 of	 low	 rainfall	 using	 demonstration	 plots.112	Oxfam	
provided	£10,000	as	an	emergency	grant	to	help	the	government	establish	the	project	in	
Kitui	and	Machakos:	 the	 funds	were	used	 to	bulk	sufficient	seed	 for	distribution	and	 to	
enable	a	five-shilling	subsidy	for	farmers	to	purchase	the	improved	maize.113	According	to	
numerous	 government	 reports,	 the	 demonstration	 plots	 in	Machakos	were	 particularly	
successful	 at	 convincing	 farmers	 to	 purchase	 improved	 seed	 and	 follow	 improved	
methods	of	crop	husbandry.114	
	 Importantly,	 each	 of	 these	 interventions	 in	 which	 Oxfam	 was	 a	 partner	 –	 the	
spread	of	 fertiliser,	seeds	and	modern	practices	to	 ‘backward’	 farmers	–	points	towards	
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the	extension	of	state	control	in	the	same	manner	as	the	settlement	of	pastoralists.	This	
is	 hardly	 surprising	 given	 that	 Oxfam	 was	 steeped	 in	 a	 left-liberal	 consciousness	 that	
prescribed	 remedial	 action	 by	 the	 state.	 Yet	 as	 discussed	 above,	 the	 highly	 technical	
developmental	approach	of	such	interventions	can	become	a	mechanism	for	the	exercise	
of	 state	 power,	 because	 their	 successful	 implementation	 relies	 on	 the	 extension	 of	
governmental	bureaucracy	‘at	the	coalface	of	the	subjugation	process’.115	Each	technical	
intervention	in	which	Oxfam	was	involved	certainly	encouraged	the	adoption	of	practices	
that	 generate	dependence	on	 state-mediated	 resources	 such	as	 education	 in	 the	 latest	
techniques	or	 the	purchase	of	 the	most	modern	types	of	 fertiliser	and	seed.	For	Sabine	
Planel,	 this	 exacerbates	 the	 vulnerability	 of	 the	 already	 vulnerable,	 disempowering	
farmers	and	 subordinating	 their	 local	 knowledge	vis-à-vis	 the	 state	and	 its	 scientism.116	
Such	an	outcome	is	particularly	noteworthy	in	Kenya,	as	Mboya	was	tasked	with	asserting	
state	control	as	part	of	Kenyatta’s	‘fetishisation	of	order’	through	silencing	development	
alternatives.	Mboya	 set	 about	 this	 task	 by	 using	modernisation	 rhetoric	 to	marginalise	
political	opponents	and	to	recast	political	choices	as	technical	solutions,	thereby	painting	
as	‘backward’	–	and	thus	denying	them	the	right	to	dissent	–	those	who	resisted	‘neutral’	
state-led	modernisation	 schemes	 (such	 as	 those	 pursued	 in	 collaboration	with	Oxfam).	
For	 James	Ferguson	and	Timothy	Mitchell,	development	discourse	serves	 in	 this	way	 to	
disguise	social	inequality	and	powerlessness:	by	prescribing	technical	solutions	to	political	
problems	 development	 discourse	 can	 serve	 to	 entrench	 the	 apparently	 ‘neutral’	
bureaucratic	 state	 apparatus	 in	 a	 position	 of	 domination	 over	 its	 citizenry. 117 	The	
evidence	 presented	 so	 far	 suggests	 that	Oxfam	was	 at	 best	 an	 unwitting	 participant	 in	
such	 a	 project	 and	 at	 worst	 had	 unwavering	 faith	 in	 the	 capacity	 of	 the	 state	 as	 a	
development	actor	and	was	blinded	by	the	idea	of	modernisation	in	the	heady	climate	of	
possibility	 in	the	1960s.	 Its	development	projects	alongside	the	state	not	only	helped	to	
expand	state	surveillance	and	control	over	recalcitrant	subjects	in	a	physical	sense;	they	
also	helped	to	depoliticise	Kenyatta’s	(very	political)	act	of	enforcing	‘order’	by	reifying	a	
‘neutral’	 development	 discourse	 based	 on	 ‘science’	 and	 technological	 progress.	
Nevertheless,	 as	 the	 following	 section	makes	 clear,	Oxfam’s	 analysis	 of	 the	 situation	 in	
Kenya	was	not	so	one-dimensional	and	the	question	of	its	complicity	in	the	construction	
of	 an	 hegemonic	 knowledge-power	 regime	 is	 far	 from	 straightforward:	 indeed,	 Oxfam	
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had	concluded	that	given	the	politics	of	development	in	Kenya,	the	only	way	to	integrate	
marginalised	 regions	 in	 the	 project	 of	 national	 development	 was	 to	 encourage	 the	
expansion	of	the	developmental	state.	
	
	
	
OXFAM IN KENYA: THE TWO FACES OF AN NGO 
 
From	the	evidence	above,	it	is	clear	that	Betts	supported	Kenyatta’s	developmental	state	
in	the	early	years	of	independence	and	that	he	successfully	convinced	many	on	the	Africa	
Committee	 to	 back	 his	 commitment	 to	 aiding	 the	 government	 in	 the	modernisation	 of	
‘backward’	regions	of	Kenya.	There	was,	however,	a	certain	amount	of	tension	between	
idealists	such	as	Betts,	Harris	and	Fletcher,	who	wished	to	work	closely	with	governments	
for	the	impact	such	collaboration	offered,	and	sceptics	on	the	Committee	who	wished	to	
avoid	 co-optation	 by	 those	 same	 governments	 or	 were	 concerned	 that	 Oxfam	
interventions	would	weaken	the	 incentive	 for	governments	 to	act.	 Indeed,	a	number	of	
Committee	 members	 were	 careful	 to	 warn	 Field	 Directors	 like	 Betts	 ‘not	 to	 become	
involved	 in	 projects	 that	 should	 be	 a	 direct	 government	 responsibility’,	 and	 reminded	
them	 to	 exclude	 schemes,	 which	 ‘are	 really	 the	 job	 of	 indigenous	 or	 foreign	
governments’. 118 	Dame	 Margery	 Perham,	 for	 instance,	 advised	 field	 staff	 to	 ‘study’	
governments	 to	 ‘discover	 which	 border-line	 activities	 lie	 nearest	 to	 their	 interests’	 in	
order	 that	 Oxfam	 could	 work	 together	 with	 states	 without	 taking	 on	 their	
responsibilities. 119 	She	 argued	 that	 this	 would	 help	 the	 organisation	 avoid	 ‘being	
increasingly	 regarded	by	 overseas	 governments…	 as	merely	 another	 source	 of	 financial	
assistance	by	which	budgetary	gaps	can	be	bridged’.120	Long	a	proponent	of	state-centric	
development	in	colonial	Kenya	and	Africa	and	strongly	in	favour	of	‘native	paramountcy’	
in	political	and	economic	terms,	Perham’s	position	on	Oxfam	working	by	way	of	a	delicate	
partnership	with	the	host	state	was	to	be	expected.	 Indeed,	Perham	had	argued	during	
the	colonial	era	that	the	British	had	a	duty	and	 interest	 in	working	with	the	 ‘awakening	
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African	desire	 to	 catch	up	quickly	with	 the	 rest	of	 the	world’,	 and	called	 for	a	 ‘massive	
application	of	capital’	by	the	state	‘to	reconstruct	the	economic	as	well	as	the	social	and	
political	 life	 of	 colonial	 territories’.	 This	 effort	 also	 required	 ‘large	 numbers	 of	 experts	
discovering	the	lessons	of	science	and	applying	them	in	campaigns	for	the	betterment	of	
life’.	 In	the	post-colonial	world,	Perham	continued	to	advocate	on	behalf	of	experts	and	
their	vital	role	in	supporting	the	state	as	the	central	development	actor;	but	she	was	clear	
in	her	advisory	position	for	Oxfam	that	 just	as	Oxfam	projects	were	not	always	suitable	
for	 government	 participation,	 government	 projects	 were	 not	 always	 suitable	 for	
Oxfam.121	
As	regards	Oxfam’s	work	 in	Kenya,	one	project	 in	particular	came	in	for	criticism	
from	 those	 more	 sceptical	 about	 working	 with	 the	 state.	 The	 Narosurra	 Farm	
Mechanisation	Project,	located	in	the	arid	Baringo	district	of	the	Rift	Valley,	was	a	training	
scheme	 for	 farmers	 in	 modern	 methods	 and	 tractor	 operation.	 It	 ran	 three	 12-week	
courses	in	machinery	operation	for	around	80	students	each	year,	and	sought	to	ensure	
that	modern	methods	 of	 farming	 ‘percolate	 to	 the	 smallest	 landowner’.122	The	 scheme	
received	 financial	 assistance	 from	 the	 Kenya	 government	 and	 its	 board	 included	 high-
level	state	officials	such	as	the	Minister	for	Natural	Resources,	Jeremiah	Nyagah,	and	the	
Permanent	 Secretary	 of	 the	 Office	 of	 the	 President,	 Geoffrey	 Kariithi.	 The	 arch-
moderniser	 Tom	 Mboya	 would	 open	 the	 scheme	 in	 1967,	 promising	 government	
assistance	in	making	tractors	available	to	‘progressive	farmers’	on	extended	credit	terms	
in	order	that	‘farmers…	have	the	knowledge	and	the	implements	together	with	the	right	
spirit	to	serve	the	nation’.123	Like	Mboya	–	and	the	World	Bank,	which	recommended	the	
scheme	–	Betts	considered	the	project	to	have	immense	potential	for	the	modernisation	
of	 the	 region.	 He	 thus	 asked	 the	 Africa	 Committee	 for	 £27,575	 as	 a	 capital	 grant	 and	
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£82,748	 over	 three	 years	 for	 recurrent	 expenditure.124	In	 March	 1967	 the	 Committee	
agreed	at	 first	 to	grant	£4,500	with	which	 the	scheme	could	purchase	 three	 tractors.	A	
year	 later,	 and	 noting	 the	 hand-to-mouth	 existence	 of	 the	 project,	 the	 Committee	
approved	 a	 grant	 of	 £17,630	 for	 recurrent	 costs	 for	 two	 years. 125 	The	 grant	 was	
conditional	on	the	Kenya	government	formalising	its	commitment	to	funding	the	scheme	
at	£2,000	per	 annum	and	undertaking	 to	not	 allow	 the	project	 to	 collapse	after	Oxfam	
funding	ceased.126	A	 letter	from	the	Minister	of	Agriculture	confirmed	the	government’s	
position	shortly	thereafter.127	
	 Soon	after	the	grant	had	been	allocated,	Betts	admitted	to	the	KFFHC	that	he	had	
received	 serious	 criticism	 from	 Oxford	 concerning	 the	 scheme. 128 	In	 fact,	 several	
members	of	the	Committee	‘still	considered	this	to	be	a	scheme	suitable	for	Government,	
rather	 than	 Oxfam,	 support’.129	Moreover,	 ‘doubts	 were	 raised	 whether	 mechanised	
farming	 in	 marginal	 areas	 was	 a	 good	 investment	 of	 Oxfam	 funds’.130 	This	 pointed	
towards	the	central	question	of	Oxfam’s	function	in	Kenya.	As	Bernard	Llewellyn,	Oxfam’s	
overseas	aid	appraiser,	reported	
	
In	 a	 country	 where	 the	 average	 per	 capita	 income	 is	 £90,	 it	 seems	 slightly	
inappropriate	to	be	subsidising	the	training	of	some	men	thought	by	the	Government	
credit-worthy	enough	 for	 a	 £1,500	 tractor	which,	when	paid	 for,	will	 provide	 them	
with	an	 income	way	above	 the	national	average…	 I	 suspect	 such	development	as	a	
means	 to	 the	 gradual	 eradication	 of	 need	 is	 too	 indirect	 and	 is	 not	 obviously	
appropriate	 for	 a	 charity…	 If	 World	 Bank	 consultants	 are	 needed	 to	 advise	 us	 on	
schemes	appropriate	for	our	support,	I	suspect	we	have	moved	into	an	operation	or	
role	for	which	we	are	probably	unfitted…131	
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Indeed,	Llewellyn	was	personally	of	the	opinion	that	small	projects	were	as	justifiable	as	
schemes	alongside	governments,	because	they	were	the	‘most	important	thing	that	ever	
happened’	 in	 the	 lives	 of	 the	 beneficiaries. 132 	Crucially,	 he	 also	 considered	 it	 a	
‘questionable	 part	 of	 Oxfam’s	 role’	 to	 urge	 the	 Ministry	 of	 Economic	 Planning	 and	
development	to	give	extra	support	to	the	Ministry	of	Agriculture	‘in	the	hope	of	getting	
funds	for	Narosurra’.	He	criticised	Betts	and	Harper	for	their	‘pre-empting	of	government	
choice’	 in	 pushing	 ‘government	 into	 a	 decision	 because	 it	 does	 not	 wish	 to	 lose	 help	
already	given’.	Llewellyn	thought	this	‘arrogance’	contrary	to	the	‘spirit	of	the	times’	and	
far	from	‘the	best	way	of	working	with	governments	in	developing	countries’.133	
Yet	 it	 is	precisely	this	 ‘nagging	from	aid	dispensers	who	think	they	know	best’	as	
regards	 Narosurra	 which	 reveals	 the	 true	 nature	 of	 Betts’	 support	 for	 the	 Kenya	
government	during	these	early	years.134	For	it	shows	that	Betts,	and	later	Harper,	did	not	
blindly	follow	government	priorities	when	establishing	a	set	of	projects	in	the	country	or	
offer	 their	 support	 to	an	apparently	 ‘neutral’	 state,	as	argued	by	Ferguson	 for	 Lesotho.	
Rather,	 they	 wished	 to	 leverage	 their	 financial	 support	 in	 order	 to	 make	 government	
follow	 through	 on	 its	 development	 commitments.	 Importantly	 Oxfam	 schemes	 were	
located	 in	 underdeveloped	 regions	 cast	 adrift	 by	 the	 highly	 politicised	 developmental	
apparatus	 in	 Kenya:	 the	 region	 on	 which	 Oxfam	 concentrated	 its	 early	 efforts,	 the	
northern	 Rift	 Valley,	 was	 marginal	 in	 both	 a	 geographic	 and	 political	 sense.	 As	 Betts	
noted,	‘politically	it	does	not	carry	high	priority	with	the	Kenya	Government’	and	was	thus	
‘less	likely	to	be	the	beneficiary	of	the	major	sources	of	aid’	 in	normal	circumstances.135	
On	the	other	side	of	the	coin,	Oxfam’s	Field	Director	was	insistent	that	the	organisation	
would	not	work	in	Central	Province	which	lay	to	the	east	and	south	of	the	Rift	because	it	
was	home	to	a	vast	population	and	a	concentration	of	the	‘politically	clamant	peoples	of	
the	Kikuyu,	Embu	and	Meru	tribes,	who	formed	the	spearhead	of	the	Mau	Mau	protest’.	
These	facts	meant	that	Central	Province	was	looked	on	far	more	favourably	than	the	Rift	
Valley	 by	 the	 Kenyatta	 regime,	 which	 would	 request	 Oxfam	 partnership	 in	 large-scale	
projects	 such	 as	 a	 scheme	 to	 provide	 piped	water	 to	 Thika	 at	 a	 cost	 of	 £600,000	 (the	
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contribution	 asked	 from	 Oxfam	was	 £72,000).136	In	 such	 an	 instance,	 Oxfam	would,	 of	
course,	 have	 been	 a	 very	 junior	 partner	 (so	 as	 not	 to	 suggest	 that	 the	 state	 required	
significant	external	support	in	its	political	stronghold	–	a	message	that	would	potentially	
undermine	 its	 legitimacy);	nonetheless,	Oxfam’s	 resources	would	have	been	a	welcome	
contribution	 to	 the	 overall	 cost.	 To	 the	 west,	 Nyanza	 Province	 was	 equally	 politically	
fortunate,	 (at	 least	 for	 the	 time	 being)	 receiving	 as	 it	 did	 ‘the	 support	 of	 the	 Vice	
President	 who	 draws	 his	 political	 influence	 from	 [the]	 area’.	 Not	 coincidentally,	 it	 was	
‘also	receiving	the	benefit	of	major	agricultural	development’	and	would	not	be	a	priority	
area	for	Oxfam.	‘This	is	not	to	say’,	Betts	admitted,	that	‘needs	are	not	there	for	our	kind	
of	work,	but	[instead	that]	our	impact	would	be	lost’.137	The	Nairobi	office	thus	rejected	
any	applications	 from	government	 for	assistance	 in	Central	 (with	 the	exception	of	poor	
areas	of	Nairobi)	and	Nyanza,	because	they	were	‘well-endowed’	and	accordingly	areas	of	
low	priority	 for	 the	organisation,	 and	 focused	on	 the	Rift	Valley.138	Figure	1	 shows	 that	
from	1962/63	to	1978/79,	the	Rift	Valley	received	the	most	Oxfam	funding	in	each	year	
except	1969/70	and	1977/78.		
One	 exception	 to	 this	 rule	 was	 provided	 for	 Gatundu	 hospital,	 which	 received	
around	 £3,000	 from	 Oxfam	 in	 1967.139	Such	 a	 contribution	 was	 not,	 on	 the	 face	 of	 it,	
entirely	necessary.	 The	hospital	 sat	 in	Kenyatta’s	 constituency	and	 so	was	able	 to	 raise	
Ksh.	 45,000	 (around	£2,500)	 in	 cash	on	 the	morning	of	 its	opening,	 as	 the	government	
machinery	 moved	 to	 Gatundu	 and	 donations	 were	 forthcoming	 from	 the	 Cabinet	 and	
diplomatic	corps.140	Although	this	harambee	was	to	come	after	Oxfam’s	grant,	Betts	knew	
that	the	hospital	was	near	to	the	President’s	home	and	that	the	latter	had	‘taken	a	keen	
personal	 interest	 in	 the	 Hospital	 and	 given	 it	 much	 time	 and	 encouragement’;	 in	 all	
likelihood	he	also	knew	that	the	hospital	would	be	better	funded	than	others	in	the	area,	
let	alone	those	in	marginal	regions.141	However,	in	their	chapter	on	Kenyan	development,	
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Cowen	and	Shenton	suggest	that	contributions	to	Gatundu	hospital	were	key	for	foreign	
organisations	wishing	to	build	relations	with	the	Kenyatta	state.	These	contributions	were	
amassed	by	Kenyatta	and	then	used	to	fund	smaller	projects	and	inculcate	loyalty	to	the	
President	in	other	areas.142	While	there	is	no	direct	evidence	that	Oxfam	made	a	grant	in	
order	to	seek	favour	with	the	state,	it	is	scarcely	credible	that	the	organisation,	so	focused	
on	the	most	marginal	areas	of	Kenya,	would	consider	a	grant	to	the	Gatundu	hospital	for	
any	reason	other	than	to	secure	some	influence	with	the	state.		
Moreover,	 it	 is	 quite	 possible	 that	 the	 contribution	 to	Gatundu	was	 part	 of	 the	
effort	to	gain	influence	in	order	to	encourage	the	state	–	which	Oxfam	saw	as	the	prime	
mover	 of	 development	 in	 Kenya	 and	 Africa	 –	 to	 work	 in	 less	 ‘well-endowed’	 areas.147	
Indeed,	Betts	had	elaborated	on	the	tactic	of	‘shaming	[governments]	to	do	more’	in	an	
interview	 with	 the	 Daily	 Nation	 earlier	 in	 1967.	 Recalling	 his	 efforts	 to	 convince	 the	
governments	of	Bechuanaland	and	Swaziland	 to	accept	agricultural	 training	 in	 the	early	
1960s,	Betts	remarked	that	by	working	alongside	government	and	subsidising	its	efforts,	
he	was	 able	 to	 cajole	 each	 government	 into	 implementing	 his	 ideas	 even	 after	 Oxfam	
funds	had	been	spent:	 ‘in	 this	way’,	he	argued,	 ‘our	money	was	a	 lever	well	beyond	 its	
own	 actual	 value’. 148 	Leveraging	 Oxfam	 funds	 was,	 in	 fact,	 considered	 increasingly	
important	for	many	within	the	organisation	around	this	time	as	it	became	clear	that	the	
scale	 of	 poverty	 across	 the	 globe	 was	 too	 vast	 for	 small	 agencies	 to	 have	 any	 impact	
alone.	As	the	James	Report	acknowledged:	
	
the	 relief	 and	 development	 of	 peoples	 in	 all	 parts	 of	 the	 world	 cannot	 be	
accomplished	 by	 voluntary	 agencies	 alone.	 Massive	 effort	 by	 all	 governments	 is	
essential,	and	to	encourage	such	effort,	Oxfam	must	play	the	role	of	Socrates	and	be	
a	gadfly	to	sting	the	State	to	action.149	
	
The	Kenya	 government	would,	 of	 course,	 attempt	 to	work	Oxfam	 support	 to	 its	
own	benefit.	For	instance,	the	Rift	Valley	provincial	agricultural	board	complained	that	at	
Narosurra,	 the	 local	 Tugen	 people	 were	 left	 ‘empty	 handed	 while	 people	 from	 other	
districts	benefitted	from	the	training	on	their	land’.150	A	special	meeting	was	arranged	at	
Narosurra	 to	question	 the	owner	of	 the	 farm,	who	admitted	 that	most	of	 the	 students	
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came	 from	 Central	 Province	 and	 none	 came	 from	 Nakuru,	 Trans	 Nzoia,	 Uasin	 Gishu,	
Laikipia,	 Baringo	or	 Elgeyo/Marakwet.151	Although	 there	 is	 no	 conclusive	proof	 that	 the	
state	 actively	manipulated	 the	 selection	 at	 Narosurra	 to	 benefit	 students	 from	 Central	
Province,	the	bias	in	favour	of	Central	Province	matched	Kenyatta’s	political	priorities	at	
the	 time,	and	 it	 is	probable	 that	government	 involvement	ensured	applicants	 from	that	
region	were	treated	more	favourably	than	those	from	elsewhere.	
Narosurra	 and	 Gatundu	 thus	 shed	 some	 light	 on	 a	 country-specific	 ‘dance’	
between	Oxfam	and	the	state	in	Kenya	–	with	the	former	attempting	to	‘prime	the	pump’	
or	to	‘sting’	the	government	to	work	in	less-favoured	areas	and	the	latter	trying	to	work	
the	NGO’s	support	into	its	own	priorities	and	to	its	own	advantage.	Importantly,	the	fact	
that	the	Kenyan	state	was	not	‘neutral’	was	precisely	the	reason	Oxfam	wished	to	expand	
government	 horizons	 and	 encourage	 it	 to	 take	 responsibility	 for	marginalised	 areas.	 As	
mentioned	 above,	 this	 did	 run	 the	 risk	 of	 helping	 to	 extend	 state	 control	 over	 areas	
formerly	lightly	governed,	but	the	ends	justified	the	means:	Oxfam	had	faith	in	the	state	
(in	an	abstract	sense)	as	the	central	development	actor	and	was	convinced	that	 it	could	
cajole	the	state	 in	Kenya	away	from	ethnic	patrimonialism	and	towards	a	more	rational	
and	 bureaucratic	 approach	 to	 the	 development	 of	 marginalised	 areas.	 Oxfam	was	 not	
blind	 to	 the	 politics	 of	 development	 in	 Kenya;	 it	 hoped	 it	 could	 take	 advantage	 of	 the	
personalised	nature	of	politics	 in	Kenya	–	whereby	 ‘big	men’	were	 invested	 in	everyday	
disputes	 regarding	development	 resources	at	 the	 local	 level	 –	 in	order	 to	 influence	 the	
state	to	become	the	‘neutral’	development	actor	that	it	believed	all	states	should	be.	It	is	
unlikely	 that	 Betts	 believed	 Oxfam	 could	 fundamentally	 alter	 the	 basic	 nature	 of	 the	
Kenyan	 state,	 but	 any	 redirection	 of	 resources	 to	marginalised	 areas	would	 have	 been	
grounds	for	celebration.	
The	 history	 of	 other	 Oxfam	 schemes	 in	 Kenya	 supports	 such	 a	 conclusion.	 For	
example,	Betts	and	representatives	from	the	Range	Management	Department	had	agreed	
in	1966	that	the	limited	resources	then	available	from	the	state	(and	Oxfam)	meant	that	
for	 the	 time	 being	 experimental	 schemes	 should	 receive	 priority	 in	 Turkana.	 These	
schemes	 would,	 they	 hoped,	 convince	 the	 upper	 echelons	 of	 government	 ministries,	
which	had	to	date	‘sat	on	their	hands	[sic]’	in	Turkana,	to	enact	larger-scale	development	
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programmes	 in	 the	 region.152	The	 success	 of	 the	 pilot	 irrigation	 scheme	 at	 Lorengippe	
(which	 produced	 1,000	 lbs.	 of	 grass	 seed	 from	 30	 acres)	 did,	 according	 to	 the	
government,	‘[show]	the	way	to	development	in	Turkana	and	gives	hope	in	the	quest	to	
find	 a	 solution	 to	 a	 very	 difficult	 problem’.153	Encouraged	 by	 Lorengippe	 (or	 by	 the	
extension	of	government	control	that	resulted	from	it),	the	government	established	other	
projects	in	the	region,	including	an	irrigation	scheme	at	Lokichar	in	order	to	provide	5,000	
acres	 of	 drought-resistant	 fodder	 for	 livestock.154	Oxfam	 would	 support	 the	 project	 at	
Lokichar,	 providing	 £10,000	 in	 1967	 to	 help	 the	 government	 pay	 for	 the	 requisite	
machinery,	vehicles	and	salaries.155	Both	parties	were	eager	to	get	started	straight	away,	
and	were	 ‘anxious	not	to	 imitate’	the	previous	example	of	the	 ‘Agricultural	Department	
[which]	 promised	 the	 earth	 to	 the	 Turkana’	 but	 had	 not	 yet	 delivered.156	Meanwhile,	
Oxfam’s	 support	 for	 mission	 hospitals	 in	 marginal	 areas	 was	 also	 predicated	 on	 the	
government	 taking	 responsibility	 for	 them.	 When,	 in	 1968,	 no	 government	 grant	 was	
allocated	while	Ministers	discussed	the	relationship	between	the	state	and	such	hospitals,	
Betts	 and	 Harper	 held	 off	 from	 offering	 assistance:	 Harper	 wrote	 that	 the	 issue	 of	
government	 contributions	 ‘is	 a	 matter	 which	 Government	 must	 clearly	 resolve	 before	
further	 voluntary	 agency	 assistance	 at	 such	 hospitals	 will	 readily	 be	 offered’.157	Oxfam	
grants	 were,	 therefore,	 being	 used	 to	 entice	 and	 cajole	 the	 government	 to	 take	
responsibility	for	its	citizens	in	peripheral	areas.	
One	 of	 the	 larger	 projects	 with	which	 Oxfam	was	 involved	 in	 these	 early	 years	
attempted	 to	 do	 both.	 Starting	 in	 1967,	 the	 School	 Feeding	 Scheme	 –	 with	 the	
participation	of	the	KFFHC,	Catholic	Relief	Services	and	Oxfam	–	aimed	to	provide	lunch	at	
a	 heavily	 subsidised	 rate	 for	 schoolchildren	 in	 the	 poorest	 and	most	marginal	 areas	 of	
Kenya.	 Oxfam	 provided	 the	 funds	 for	 the	 initial	 survey	 into	 the	 possibility	 of	 such	 a	
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scheme,	which,	along	with	the	promise	of	£40,000	to	allow	the	scheme	to	run	from	1966	
to	1968	(while	it	grew	and	built	up	its	number	of	paying	students)	encouraged	the	Kenya	
National	Council	of	Social	Services	(KNCSS)	to	organise	a	comprehensive	programme	for	
the	scheme,	due	to	reach	50,000	students	in	its	first	year,	rising	to	150,000	by	the	end	of	
1968.158	A	 further	 £20,000	 was	 allocated	 by	 Oxfam	 as	 a	 loan	 for	 the	 construction	 of	
kitchens	 in	 Nairobi	 and	 Mombasa.159	The	 Africa	 Committee	 acknowledged	 that	 ‘the	
initiative	of	the	feeding	project	was	very	largely	due	to	Mr	Betts’,	whose	allocation	to	the	
scheme	of	around	a	quarter	of	his	funds	for	Kenya	for	1966-1968	demonstrated	his	belief	
in	 the	 project.160	As	 well	 as	 finance,	 Betts	 invested	 a	 significant	 amount	 of	 time	 and	
energy	in	the	establishment	of	the	scheme;	so	much	so,	in	fact,	that	the	School	Feeding	
Council	considered	him	somewhat	overbearing.	Their	complaints	found	their	way	to	the	
Africa	Committee,	which	asked	Betts	to	step	aside	from	involvement	in	the	scheme.	They	
noted	that	‘Betts	had	become	too	involved	in	the	management	of	the	project	rather	than	
limiting	himself	to	its	supervision’	and	that	he	had	even	appointed	the	national	organiser	
(Mrs	Haggie)	without	 reference	 to	Oxford	 or	 local	 representatives.	161	The	 behaviour	 of	
Mrs	Haggie	turned	out	to	be	particularly	damaging	for	Oxfam:	her	 letters	to	the	District	
Commissioner	 at	Machakos,	 venting	 frustration	 at	 the	 slow	movement	 of	 bureaucracy,	
were	considered	impertinent,	and	she	was	cautioned	that	
	
you	 jump	 to	 conclusions	and	pass	 judgement	with	alarming	alacrity…	 it	 is	 a	 sign	of	
the	times	that	none	shall	ride	roughshod	over	our	established	ways,	and	you	make	a	
false	start	by	taking	fright	so	early	in	the	day.162	
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She	was	told	by	Oxfam	to	resign,	and	Betts	was	advised	to	‘divest	himself	of	managerial	
responsibility	 and	 give	 every	 encouragement	 to	 the	 scheme’s	 take-over	 by	 [a	 local	
Council]’.163	
Internal	 wrangles	 were	 the	 least	 of	 Oxfam’s	 concerns	 regarding	 the	 feeding	
project,	however:	the	first	two	terms	of	1967	saw	feeding	start	at	only	59	schools,	with	
only	3,820	 children	paying	 for	 the	meals.164	With	 such	a	 low	 take-up	 (partly	due	 to	 the	
poverty	 of	 the	 areas	 in	which	 it	 operated),	 the	 scheme	was	 not	 sustainable	 even	with	
external	 funding,	 and	 so	 correspondence	 between	 Oxford	 and	 Nairobi	 questioned	
whether	 increasing	 the	 cost	 of	 the	 school	 meals	 –	 which	 would	 hurt	 the	 poorest	
participants	 but	 would	 ensure	 the	 survival	 of	 the	 scheme	 –	 was	 an	 option	 for	 Oxfam.	
Naturally,	Bernard	Llewellyn	was	scathing	 in	his	criticism	of	the	project,	which	–	despite	
its	expansion	to	reach	15,810	students	by	the	time	of	his	visit	to	Kenya	in	late	1968	–	he	
alleged	was	doing	next	to	nothing	for	the	neediest	Kenyan	school	children.	He	also	noted	
that	 whereas	 in	 normal	 circumstances	 organisations	 come	 to	 Oxfam	 with	 ideas	 for	
funding,	 in	 this	 case,	Oxfam	had	 assumed	 the	 responsibilities	 of	 initiating,	 encouraging	
and	 catalysing	 in	 order	 to	 ‘get	 something	 going	 which	 we	 are	 persuaded	 will	 be	 of	
benefit’.	 He	 considered	Oxfam	 unsuited	 for	 such	 a	 role,	 remarking	 that	 ‘our	messianic	
vision	 of	 the	 possibilities	 is	 otherwise	 interpreted	 by	 those	who	 know	 the	 details’	 and	
complaining	that	‘the	imaginations	of	the	original	promoters	ran	riot’.	‘Some’,	he	argued,		
	
will	 view	 the…	 project	 as	 a	 bold	 and	 imaginative	 piece	 of	 Oxfam	 planning	 which	
didn’t	 quite	 come	 off.	 Others	 –	 and	 I	 count	 myself	 among	 them	 –	 will	 see	 it	 as	
another	costly	attempt	to	fly	before	we	have	learnt	to	walk.	
	
Moreover,	 Llewellyn	suggested	 that	 the	only	 reason	Harper	continued	 in	his	 support	of	
the	project	after	Betts’	departure	was	that	‘the	administration	of	the	scheme	had	gained	
a	 certain	momentum	 [and]	Oxfam’s	 face	was	 very	much	 involved’.	 Finally,	 he	 criticised	
the	Field	Director	for	‘badgering	the	government’	to	commit	itself	to	the	continuance	of	
the	scheme.165	
	 In	fact,	the	two	issues	Llewellyn	raised	–	Harper’s	support	for	the	scheme	and	his	
‘badgering’	of	government	–	were	interrelated.	The	Field	Director	retorted	that	it	was	not	
																																																						
163	‘Minutes	of	the	Africa	Committee’,	11	May,	1967,	OxA,	MS.	Oxfam	PRG/1/3/2	Folder	1:	October	1966	–	
November	1967.	
164	T.	Betts,	‘Kenya	National	School	Feeding	Scheme:	Memorandum	on	Probable	Future	Costings’,	August,	
1967,	KNA,	National	School	Feeding,	TR/42/1.	
165	B.	Llewellyn,	‘Visit	to	Kenya	and	Tanzania’,	3	January,	1969,	OxA,	MS.	Oxfam	PRG/1/3/2	Folder	2:	January	
1968	–	November	1969.	
		 131	
for	the	sake	of	Oxfam’s	honour	that	the	School	Feeding	Scheme	retained	his	support,	but	
rather	 ‘because	I	 felt	that	the	 idea	behind	the	scheme	was	good’.	 It	was	for	this	reason	
that	he	attempted	to	link	government	into	the	scheme:	
	
If	 this	project	expands	as	planned,	surely	government	must	 take	 it	over?	 If	 they	do	
not,	then	either	it	must	close	down	or	it	must	never	expand	as	part	of	national	policy.	
If	it	does	not	finally	become	integrated	into	Government’s	education	plans	then	it	will	
never	cover	as	many	children	as	we	would	eventually	want	 it	 to.	Of	 that	 I	am	sure;	
and	 that	 is	 one	 of	 the	main	 reasons	why	 I	 believe	 that	 we	 should	 try	 to	 influence	
Government	here.	This	must	be	one	of	the	scheme’s	objectives.166	
	
A	major	reason	for	the	continued	support	given	to	the	project	was,	therefore,	to	allow	it	
to	 expand	 to	 reach	 such	 a	 size	 that	 would	 compel	 the	 government	 to	 assume	
responsibility	 for	 the	 scheme,	 and	 by	 extension	 for	 children	 in	 the	 least	 developed	
districts	of	Kenya.167	In	spite	of	–	or	rather	because	of	–	their	continued	commitment	to	
the	 scheme,	 Betts	 and	 Harper	would	 even	 use	 the	 threat	 of	 the	withdrawal	 of	 Oxfam	
funds	to	put	more	direct	pressure	on	the	government	to	get	involved:	following	Perham’s	
advice,	 the	 organisation	 resisted	 becoming	 a	 surrogate	 of	 the	 Kenyan	 state	 and	 hoped	
that	 the	 threat	of	withdrawal	would	 force	any	 interested	personalities	 (and	particularly	
Ronald	Ngala)	to	come	forward	in	support	of	the	scheme.	Accordingly,	Betts	wrote	to	the	
School	Feeding	Council	 in	early	1968	warning	that	his	support	for	the	scheme	would	be	
discontinued	unless	 ‘the	scheme	has	 the	 financial	backing	of	 [the]	government’.168	With	
the	support	of	Betts	and	Harper,	the	Africa	Committee	also	placed	strict	conditions	on	a	
new	grant	of	£39,088	for	1969:	these	 included	reaching	a	minimum	number	of	children	
(40,000	by	30	June,	1969;	75,000	by	31	December,	1969;	and	120,000	by	autumn	1970)	as	
well	as	obtaining	direct	support	from	the	Kenya	government.169	
	 By	the	middle	of	1969,	it	was	clear	that	these	conditions	had	not	been	met.170	As	
regards	the	number	of	children	reached	by	the	scheme,	this	was	unavoidable,	 for	there	
was	a	 shortage	of	beans	used	 to	 create	 the	 lunches,	which	meant	 the	 scheme	 reached	
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only	27,865	children	by	June	1969.171	Yet	as	the	Assistant	Director	(Overseas)	wrote	in	a	
letter	to	the	Kenyan	High	Commissioner	to	the	UK,	the	lack	of	government	commitment	
was	 particularly	 disappointing,	 since	 the	 organisation	 ‘was	 led	 to	 believe	 as	 a	 result	 of	
discussions	held	between	Government	 representatives	and	our	staff	 that	a	sympathetic	
hearing	 would	 be	 given	 to	 proposals	 for	 financial	 assistance	 from	 the	 Kenya	
Government’.172	In	 response	 to	 this	 letter,	 both	 the	Ministry	 of	 Foreign	Affairs	 and	 the	
Ministry	of	Co-operatives	and	Social	Services	urged	the	High	Commissioner	to	‘plead	with	
Oxfam	not	to	withdraw	its	financial	assistance’;	if	necessary	he	was	advised	to	approach	
Oxfam’s	 Director	 personally	 to	 persuade	 him	 to	 reconsider	 withdrawal.173	The	 Kenya	
government	wanted	the	benefit	of	the	scheme	without	taking	on	the	responsibility	for	it,	
however;	 as	 it	 stood,	 the	 scheme	got	 the	 state	off	 the	hook	as	 regards	one	potentially	
sizeable	 area	 of	 welfare	 expenditure,	 freeing	 up	 funding	 for	 its	 preferred	 ‘productive’	
expenditure.	The	High	Commissioner	would	eventually	meet	with	the	Director	of	Oxfam	
to	argue	on	behalf	of	the	government,	but	he	was	pessimistic	as	regards	his	chances	of	
success.	 He	 noted	 at	 the	 foot	 of	 his	 reply	 to	 the	Ministry	 of	 Co-operatives	 and	 Social	
Services	that,	
	
I’ve	 also	 spoken	 to	 them	 on	 [the]	 telephone	 and	 urged	 them	 to	 reconsider	 their	
decision.	It	seems	that	they	want	[the]	Kenya	Government	to	contribute	some	share	
to	the	scheme’s	cost.174	
	
Indeed,	 the	Africa	Committee	 resolved	 in	 July	 that	 only	 if	 the	 government	 gave	 a	 ‘firm	
undertaking	 to	 provide	 financial	 support’	would	Oxfam	 consider	 future	 assistance.175	In	
view	 of	 Oxfam	 benevolence,	 and	 in	 order	 to	 meet	 the	 condition	 for	 further	 funding,	
government	officials	suggested	a	token	contribution.176	For	a	time,	promises	of	assistance	
from	the	Ministry	of	Co-operatives	and	Social	Services	convinced	Oxfam	to	hold	off	from	
withdrawing	their	support.	Leslie	Kirkley	thus	wrote	to	Ngala	in	August	1969	to	say	‘how	
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encouraged	we	are	by	the	keen	interest	which	the	Kenya	Government	is	showing	in	the	
maintenance	and	development	of	the	programme’.	He	continued,	
	
As	I	know	you	will	appreciate,	it	has	always	been	our	hope,	whilst	giving	substantial	
assistance	during	the	pilot	period	of	the	scheme,	that	Government	would	feel	able	to	
accept	financial	obligations	at	a	later	date…	I	hope	that	you	will	take	this	letter	as	an	
expression	 of	 our	 thanks	 to	 you	 for	 your	 interest	 and	 desire	 to	 assist	 in	 the	
development	of	the	scheme.177	
	
	 Unfortunately	 for	 Oxfam,	 whether	 for	 reasons	 of	 financial	 hardship	 or	 simply	
because	it	was	uninterested	in	taking	over	responsibility	for	the	scheme,	the	government	
did	not	–	 in	spite	of	promises	made	 in	the	KANU	manifesto	–	provide	any	assistance.178	
Consequently,	 the	Africa	Committee	cancelled	Oxfam	support	 for	 the	project,	despite	 it	
having	 reached	 30,506	 children	 by	 November	 1969.179	The	 disappointment	 within	 the	
Committee	 was	 clear:	 a	 year	 later	 they	 noted	 the	 fact	 that	 £71,667	 had	 been	 wasted	
when	the	Kenya	government	refused	to	make	its	promised	contributions.180	CARE	would	
replace	Oxfam	as	 the	main	 donor	 to	 the	 scheme	 in	 1969,	 but	 also	withdrew	 after	 two	
years.	As	the	executive	officer	noted	in	1971,	
	
Oxfam	 termination	of	 support	 last	 year,	 and	CARE	 termination	of	 support	 this	 year	
resulted	 in	part	 from	a	 similar	 conviction	 that	 the	 school	 feeding	programme	must	
receive	direct	 subsidy	 from	Government	 to	 confirm	 recognition	of	 the	high	priority	
assigned	it	verbally	by	all	three	supporting	ministries	and	reconfirmed	specifically	in	
the	KANU	Manifesto	last	election.181	
	
	 Betts	and	Harper	had	wanted	the	School	Feeding	Scheme	to	have	both	a	tangible	
impact	on	the	ground	and	to	influence	the	state	to	take	responsibility	for	the	education	of	
children	in	Kenya’s	marginalised	periphery.	Unlike	the	agricultural	schemes	documented	
above,	 however,	 the	 School	 Feeding	 Scheme	 offered	 too	 little	 political	 or	 economic	
benefit	to	the	government	considering	its	cost.	(Indeed,	the	more	impact	the	scheme	had	
on	the	ground	by	aiding	the	poorest	in	society	in	the	manner	of	welfare	expenditure,	the	
less	likely	the	state	was	to	take	an	interest.	A	cheaper	scheme	–	focused	solely	on	those	
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who	could	afford	the	meals	–	would	have	been	more	 likely	to	attract	 the	government’s	
attention,	but	would	have	alienated	 the	Africa	Committee	 since	 the	poorest	would	not	
have	benefited.)	Yet	if	the	scheme	failed	to	achieve	its	goals,	it	nonetheless	demonstrates	
the	‘dance’	between	Oxfam	and	the	Kenyan	state	as	regards	development.	Moreover,	the	
scheme	 would	 encourage	 a	 debate	 between	 Nairobi	 and	 Oxford	 about	 the	 nature	 of	
Oxfam	priorities,	 a	 debate	which	would	 form	part	 of	 a	much	bigger	dialogue	 in	Oxford	
regarding	the	very	purpose	of	the	organisation	as	the	‘decade	of	development’	drew	to	a	
close.	
	
	
	
‘ I  DO NOT FANCY MYSELF PRIMARILY AS A FUND RAISER’ 
 
In	combination	with	Betts’	and	Harper’s	efforts	on	Narosurra,	the	School	Feeding	Scheme	
drew	 particular	 criticism	 from	 Bernard	 Llewellyn	 because	 of	 the	 efforts	 to	 ‘wring	 a	
declaration	of	 intent	from	[the]	government	to	continue	[an	Oxfam]	scheme’.	The	latter	
conceded	 that	 it	was	difficult	 for	Oxfam	 ‘not	 to	 see	 its	 role	 as	 a	 catalyst	 in	 stimulating	
Governments	to	do	things	which	[the]	agency	thinks	desirable’,	but	considered	that	 ‘we	
should	look	again	at	this	policy	of	demanding	a	Government	take-over	of	a	commitment’.	
He	asked	 the	Africa	Committee	 ‘how	much	pressure	 should	we	exert,	by	 reason	of	our	
financial	 involvement,	 on	 Governments	 other	 than	 our	 own?’	 His	 own	 answer	 was	
unambiguous:	 ‘When	 Governments	 do	 take	 over	 a	 project	 because	 of	 pressure’,	 he	
argued,	it	is	‘at	the	cost	of	some	other	part	of	their	development	programme’,	and	Oxfam	
does	 not	 ‘know	 better	 than	 such	 Governments	 how	 their	 scarce	 resources	 should	 be	
spent’.	 Llewellyn	 concluded	 that	 ‘it	 would	 be	 preferable	 to	 move	 away	 from	 this	
pressurising	of	Governments…	to	pick	up	particular	bills	which	the	continuance	of	Oxfam	
projects	will	incur’.182	Harper	disagreed	strongly,	writing	soon	after	that	Llewellyn	‘talks	of	
“how	their	[i.e.	government]	scarce	resources	should	be	spent”.	And	yet	he	must	know	as	
well	 as	any	of	us	how	much	 is	wasted	on	prestige	and	peripheral	 activities’.	Moreover,	
revealing	 his	 interest	 in	 using	 Oxfam	 finance	 to	 influence	 newly	 independent	
governments,	Harper	asked	whether	‘if	we	are	not	to	put	any	pressure	on	Governments	
overseas,	 perhaps	 we	 should	 withdraw	 entirely	 from	 supporting	 any	 Governmental	
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schemes?’183	For	 Betts,	 and	 now	 Harper,	 the	 whole	 point	 of	 working	 together	 with	
governments	 was	 to	 influence	 them	 –	 as	 the	 central	 development	 actor	 –	 to	 adopt	 a	
more	responsible	attitude	towards	their	citizens.	
The	disagreement	over	the	nature	of	Oxfam’s	programme	in	Kenya	mirrored	wider	
debates	 within	 Oxfam	 over	 its	 objectives	 and	 its	 rationale	 for	 continuing	 to	 exist.	 As	
discussed	in	chapter	one,	in	the	late	1960s	and	early	1970s	Oxfam	questioned	whether	it	
should	 retain	 a	 focus	 on	 small-scale,	 reactive	 aid	 and	 helping	 to	 ease	 suffering	 often	
caused	 by	 politics	 or	man-made	 disasters,	 or	 whether	 it	 should	 transform	 itself	 into	 a	
lobbying	group,	using	education	and	pilot	projects	 to	cajole	governments	 into	action	 to	
help	the	most	vulnerable	before	disaster	hit.	Betts	and	Harper	had,	in	fact,	been	doing	in	
Kenya	 what	 Nicholas	 Stacey	 would	 have	 wanted:	 by	moving	 away	 from	 relief	 towards	
development,	by	working	with	the	government	on	brave	pilot	projects	and	experimental	
schemes	that	the	state	could	take	over	and	by	concentrating	on	‘small	neglected	groups	
who	lack	political	pull’,	the	Kenya	programme	offered	Oxfam	the	chance	to	‘assist	in	the	
main	 stream	 of	 development’. 184 	Though	 Stacey	 was	 forced	 to	 resign	 from	 the	
organisation	 over	 this	 issue,	 Oxfam’s	 Field	 Directors	 in	 Africa	 gave	 their	 support	 to	 his	
position	 in	 a	 submission	 to	 the	Africa	Committee	 in	 early	 1969,	 noting	 that	 although	 it	
‘should	 not	 be	 a	 basic	 function	 of	 Field	 Directors’,	 it	 was	 ‘accepted	 that	 there	 were	
occasions	when	Oxfam	should	seek	to	influence	Governments’.185	Perhaps	swayed	by	this	
intervention,	 when	 the	 Africa	 Committee	 met	 with	 Llewellyn	 a	 month	 later	 they	
emphasised	 that	 aid	 to	 governments	 was	 justifiable	 and	 that	 ‘in	 such	 cases	 it	 was	
essential	 to	 seek	 assurances	 from	 governments	 as	 to	 their	 priorities	 and	 ultimate	
intentions,	in	relation	to	such	schemes’.	On	the	other	hand,	the	Committee	conceded	that	
it	 could	 be	 seen	 as	 inappropriate	 in	 the	 post-colonial	 era	 for	 Oxfam	 to	 pressure	 their	
hosts	 to	 support	 schemes	 that	 the	 organisation	 had	 chosen	 unilaterally.186	Thus	 Field	
Directors	were	 advised	not	 to	bounce	 governments	 into	 support	of	 schemes	 that	 they,	
but	 not	 the	 government,	 considered	 worthwhile.	 However,	 such	 a	 formulation	 left	
enough	room	for	manoeuvre	for	those	on	the	ground	to	pressure	government	to	support	
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Oxfam	 schemes	 in	 which	 the	 state	 had	 declared	 an	 interest.	 Harper	 and	 his	 successor	
Toby	Gooch	were,	therefore,	free	to	continue	working	alongside	the	Kenya	government	in	
the	early	1970s	as	described	above	for	 Isiolo	and	Garissa.	They	retained	a	 focus	on	 less	
fortunate	areas	of	 the	country,	but	resisted	the	temptation	to	become	a	 ‘surrogate’	 for	
the	 state	 in	 those	 areas,	 concentrating	 instead	 on	 using	 pilot	 projects	 to	 encourage	
government	to	operate	there.	
Rather	 like	a	doctor	who	prescribes	a	dose	of	virus	 in	order	 to	vaccinate	against	
disease,	 Oxfam	 prescribed	 state	 intervention	 as	 a	 solution	 to	 a	 problem	 (inequitable	
development)	 caused	 by	 that	 same	 state.	 Oxfam	 field	 staff,	 cognisant	 of	 the	 limits	 of	
finance	 and	manpower	 within	 which	 they	 worked	 and	 familiar	 with	 the	 consequences	
that	negligible	state	investment	had	on	marginal	areas	in	Kenya,	hoped	that	by	using	their	
limited	 financial	 leverage	 they	 could	 encourage	 the	 state	 to	 invest	 in	 its	 periphery.	 By	
encouraging	the	state	to	 integrate	these	areas	 into	a	nation-building	project	defined	by	
development	 discourse,	 Oxfam	 sought	 to	 protect	 those	 regions	 from	 a	 future	 of	
irrelevance	and	underdevelopment.	Oxfam’s	ideological	commitment	to	the	institution	of	
the	 state,	 combined	 with	 faith	 in	 its	 own	 ability	 to	 nudge	 the	 state	 in	 a	 responsible	
direction,	encouraged	it	to	be	pragmatic	about	the	precise	characteristics	of	that	state	in	
the	short-term.	Thus	the	organisation	could	work	as	intimately	with	the	state	in	Kenya	–	
to	 some	extent	 its	polar	opposite	 in	 terms	of	attitudes	 to	 the	poor	and	welfare	–	as	 in	
Tanzania,	 where	 the	 ideological	 foundations	 of	 the	 state	 matched	 Oxfam	 ideals	 more	
closely.	 The	 former	 merely	 required	 more	 cajoling	 to	 invest	 in	 schemes	 that	 matched	
Oxfam	concerns.	 If	 the	 state-centric	 ‘treatment’	 failed,	of	 course,	Oxfam	ran	 the	 risk	of	
acting	as	a	‘carrier’	for	the	‘virus’	of	a	self-interested	government	elite,	opening	up	these	
marginal	 areas	 to	 control	 and	exploitation.	 This	 risk	was	 something	 that	Oxfam	staff	 at	
the	 time	 did	 not	 appreciate	 fully	 before	 the	 mid-1970s,	 as	 even	 those	 who	 resented	
Oxfam	putting	pressure	on	governments	did	not	question	the	central	 importance	of	the	
state	 as	 a	 development	 actor	 or	 its	 ability	 to	 act	 in	 a	 ‘neutral’	 fashion	 if	 properly	
administered.	
The	 Lake	 Kenyatta	 Settlement	 Scheme	 provides	 a	 final	 example	 of	 the	 risks	
involved	 in	 such	 a	 strategy.	 First	 established	 in	 Lamu	 in	 1970	 as	 a	 project	 for	 growing	
5,000	 acres	 of	 cotton,	 the	 scheme	 was	 reimagined	 as	 a	 settlement	 scheme	 for	 1,000	
families	in	1973	because	Kenyatta	was	‘very	much	interested	in	settling	landless	people	in	
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the	 area’. 187 	Initially	 intended	 to	 provide	 settlement	 for	 local	 landless	 people,	 and	
specifically	those	displaced	by	the	Shifta	conflict,	the	scheme	in	fact	quickly	received	an	
influx	 of	 settlers	 from	 elsewhere.	 In	 particular,	 Kenyatta	 made	 sure	 to	 settle	 landless	
Kikuyu	as	part	of	 the	expansion	of	 the	Kikuyu	 ‘frontier’	 that	 took	place	 throughout	 the	
1960s	 and	 1970s. 188 	Such	 migration	 encouraged	 ethnic	 tensions	 to	 form	 between	
autochthonous	residents	and	incoming	‘foreigners’	–	tensions	released	in	a	brutal	fashion	
in	 the	 1990s	 and	 2000s	 as	 multiparty	 elections	 took	 on	 an	 ethnic	 hue.	 Inward	 Kikuyu	
migration	 to	 Lamu	 certainly	 caused	 mixed	 feelings	 in	 the	 Coast	 provincial	 agricultural	
board,	whose	members	were	concerned	about	the	reaction	of	people	born	at	the	Coast.	
The	chairman	of	the	board	emphasised,	however,	that	other	members	‘should	endeavour	
to	educate	their	people	to	change	with	the	new	Kenya	[by	addressing]	Barazas	on	matters	
pertaining	 to	 developments	 and	 building	 of	 the	 nation	 in	 general’. 189 	Oxfam	 began	
funding	medical	work	at	 the	Lake	Kenyatta	scheme	 in	1976,	and	 remarked	 that	by	 that	
time	 there	 were	 around	 15,000	 settlers,	 with	 a	 large	 Kikuyu	 contingent	 from	 the	
overcrowded	 highlands.190	After	 discussions	 with	 the	 Ministry	 of	 Health,	 Oxfam	 had	
agreed	to	provide	funds	for	a	mobile	clinic	and	its	associated	costs	for	transport,	housing,	
equipment,	 salaries	 and	 training	 for	 local	 health	 workers.	 The	 organisation	 allocated	
£39,325	for	this	purpose	between	1976	and	1982,	the	Africa	Committee	noting	positively	
just	before	Kenyatta’s	death	the	recent	‘efforts…	made	by	the	government	to	meet	their	
commitments’	in	the	area.	Indeed,	the	Committee	made	it	‘a	matter	of	deliberate	policy’	
that	 the	 clinic	 ‘works	 closely	with	 the	 local	Government	of	 Kenya	dispensary	 [in	 order]	
that	 its	work	will	 eventually	 be	 taken	 over	 by	 the	Government’.	 By	 February	 1989	 the	
organisation	had	donated	over	£133,000	to	the	scheme	 in	total,	but	 it	 remained	 just	as	
unlikely	that	the	government	(now	under	Moi)	would	dedicate	sufficient	investment	and	
	
																																																						
187	‘Handing	Over	Report,	Lake	Kenyatta	Development	Project	–	Lamu’,	9	July,	1973,	KNA,	Lake	Kenyatta	
Cotton	Scheme,	CE/2/6;	‘Letter	from	Mr.	Kaaria	to	the	Provincial	Water	Engineer,	Coast	Province’,	2	August,	
1973,	KNA,	Lake	Kenyatta	Cotton	Scheme,	CE/2/6;	‘Minutes	of	the	Provincial	Agricultural	Board,	Coast	
Province’,	10	July,	1973,	KNA,	Provincial	Agricultural	Board,	CE/2/12.	
188	The	results	of	the	expanded	Kikuyu	‘frontier’	were	most	notable	in	the	Rift	Valley:	by	1969	over	150,000	
residents	of	the	province	had	actually	been	born	in	Central	Province.	Inward	migration	to	the	Rift	soared	in	
the	1970s	as	Kenyatta	announced	new	settlement	schemes.	Branch	relates	that	Trans	Nzoia	district	
experienced	per	annum	population	growth	of	nearly	eight	per	cent	per	annum	between	1969	and	1979.	
Branch,	Kenya:	Between	Hope	and	Despair,	p.	97.	
189	‘Minutes	of	the	Provincial	Agricultural	Board,	Coast	Province’,	12	November,	1973,	KNA,	Provincial	
Agricultural	Board,	CE/2/12.	
190	Branch	estimates	that	there	were	around	3,600	Kikuyu	settled	at	the	scheme.	Branch,	Kenya:	Between	
Hope	and	Despair,	p.	97.	
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staff	 to	 this	 area. 192 	In	 their	 willingness	 to	 support	 a	 government-led	 scheme	 in	 a	
marginalised	 region	 of	 Kenya	 Oxfam	 had,	 once	 more,	 played	 a	 role	 –	 albeit	
unintentionally	–	 in	 the	 state’s	 attempt	 to	utilise	development	discourse	and	 resources	
politically.	In	this	case	the	organisation	aided	Kenyatta	in	his	attempt	to	cohere	his	ethnic	
support	 base	 by	 helping	 to	 finance	 a	 project	 that	 had	 been	 manipulated	 to	 placate	
frustrated	Kikuyu	with	land	traditionally	claimed	by	non-Kikuyu.	
	 Crucially,	 the	 Lake	 Kenyatta	 Settlement	 Scheme	 is	 something	 of	 an	 outlier	 as	
regards	 Oxfam’s	 work	 in	 the	 mid-1970s,	 for	 by	 this	 time	 the	 organisation	 had	 mostly	
wound	 down	 elements	 of	 its	 programme	 that	 involved	 partnership	 with	 the	 Kenya	
government.	Figure	2	demonstrates	that	Oxfam	spending	in	collaboration	with	the	state	
was	 steady	 or	 increasing	 throughout	 the	 1960s	 (with	 the	 exception	 of	 1965-66	 –	 a	
hangover	of	the	Charity	Commission	difficulties),	reaching	a	peak	in	1968-69.193	The	year	
after,	 spending	 in	partnership	with	 the	state	dropped	 from	£80,000	to	around	£23,000,	
and	 continued	 to	 decline	 haltingly	 to	 nothing	 in	 1974-75.	 As	 should	 be	 clear	 from	 the	
foregoing,	however,	the	decline	in	the	level	of	work	with	the	government	had	little	to	do	
with	 the	 concerns	 raised	 by	 Llewellyn,	 which	 were	 noted	 but	 dismissed	 by	 the	 Africa	
Committee.	 Rather,	 there	 were	 two	 reasons	 why	 Oxfam	 began	 to	 disengage	 with	 the	
Kenya	 government	 in	 the	 early-to-mid	 1970s,	 one	 practical	 and	 one	 ideological.	 These	
issues	would	become	interlinked	in	the	minds	of	those	involved	in	the	Kenya	programme	
in	 the	 later	 1960s	 and	 early	 1970s	 to	 suggest	 that	 some	 level	 of	 detachment	 from	 the	
state	was	necessary.	
	 The	 first	 reason	 for	 disengagement	 was	 simple:	 as	 the	 hopefulness	 around	
independence	began	to	fade	into	the	past	and	the	rose-tinted	spectacles	were	removed,	
staff	 became	 concerned	 that	 the	 Kenya	 government	 was	 ignoring	 Oxfam	 cajolery	 and	
fudging	 its	 commitments	 to	 the	organisation	 and	 to	 its	 people.	Whereas	 certain	delays	
and	 obfuscations	 had	 been	 expected	 and	 waived	 away	 in	 the	 optimism	 of	 the	 early	
independence	 period,	 by	 the	 later	 1960s	 it	 was	 difficult	 to	 ignore	 the	 fact	 that	 Oxfam	
efforts	 were	 hitting	 a	 brick	 wall	 of	 government	 indifference	 to	 the	 organisation’s	
blandishments.	 The	School	 Feeding	Scheme	was	only	 the	most	notable	example	of	 this	
																																																						
192	‘Lake	Kenyatta	Settlement	Scheme:	Mobile	Clinic	and	Community	Health	Workers’,	February,	1989,	OxA,	
MS.	Oxfam	COM/2/9/9	Folder	11;	‘Minutes	of	the	Africa	Committee’,	10	May,	1978,	OxA,	MS.	Oxfam	
PRG/1/3/5	Folder	2:	January	1978	–	January	1979;	‘Grants	Approved	by	Between	Committees	Procedure’,	
September	–	November,	1984,	OxA,	MS.	Oxfam	PRG/1/3/11	Folder	1:	January	1985	–	April	1985.	
193	The	peak	in	spending	with	non-governmental	or	‘intermediate’	partners	in	1968-69	was,	meanwhile,	due	
to	a	number	of	large,	one-off	grants	to	build	schools	and	homes	for	disabled	children.	
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issue.	Narosurra	 also	 faced	delays	 in	 funding	despite	 government	 support,	with	Harper	
complaining	that	letters	from	Bruce	McKenzie	and	Tom	Mboya	in	support	of	the	scheme	
were	 less	 than	 specific	 about	 future	 government	 commitments	 and	 that	 the	
government’s	failure	to	send	its	full	quota	of	students	was	a	bad	omen.194	Even	the	more	
promising	 schemes	 such	 as	 the	 irrigation	work	 in	 Turkana	 and	 the	 Fertiliser	 and	Maize	
projects	faced	delay	and	maladministration.	As	regards	the	former,	there	were	problems	
early	on	in	relation	to	inadequate	government	reporting	on	the	progress	of	the	project.	In	
fact,	the	lack	of	progress	reports	reflected	the	lack	of	progress:	no	suitable	engineer	was	
available	 during	 the	 first	 seven	 months	 and	 so	 no	 movement	 had	 been	 made	 on	 the	
ground. 195 	Belatedly,	 the	 project	 was	 successful	 at	 developing	 grass	 seed,	 and	 the	
government	made	a	 follow-up	application	 in	 late	1966	 for	Lokichar.196	On	this	occasion,	
Betts	was	 informed	by	Oxford	that	such	a	grant	was	unlikely	before	a	full	report	on	the	
final	stages	of	 the	original	scheme	was	presented	to	Oxfam.197	In	 the	end,	civil	 servants	
would	arrange	a	‘cooked	up	report’	on	the	balance	of	the	Oxfam	funds.	The	funds	had,	in	
reality,	 been	 used	 to	 support	 other	 schemes	 run	 by	 the	 state	 in	 the	 region. 198	
Nonetheless,	the	cooked	up	report	did	its	job,	and	Oxfam	granted	£10,000	to	Lokichar	in	
early	1967.199	
	 Upon	 investigation	 later	 in	the	year,	however,	Oxfam	representatives	discovered	
that	the	first	tranche	of	this	grant	(£5,000)	had	not	been	used	(at	least	in	the	way	that	it	
was	supposed	to	be	used)	and	that	a	site	for	the	scheme	had	not	even	been	selected.	The	
remainder	of	the	grant	was	frozen	as	a	result,	and	Betts	warned	the	government	that	the	
whole	 grant	 would	 likely	 be	 cancelled	 if	 officials	 did	 not	 fully	 apprise	 Oxfam	 of	 the	
																																																						
194	‘Letter	from	Mr.	Harper	to	Mr.	Bennett’,	2	March,	1969,	OxA,	MS.	Oxfam	PRG/1/3/2	Folder	2:	January	
1968	–	November	1969;	‘Nairobi	Office	–	Annual	Review’,	November	1969,	OxA,	MS.	Oxfam	PRG/1/3/2	
Folder	2:	January	1968	–	November	1969.	
195	‘Letter	from	Mr.	Hilton	to	Mr.	Mettrick’,	24	March,	1964,	KNA,	Project	–	Turkana	Rehabilitation,	
BV/104/103;	‘Letter	from	Mr.	Mettrick	to	Mr.	Hilton’,	3	April,	1964,	KNA,	Project	–	Turkana	Rehabilitation,	
BV/104/103;	G.	Classen,	‘African	Land	Development:	Turkana	Rehabilitation	–	Irrigation	Development’,	13	
May,	1964,	KNA,	Rehabilitation	and	Development,	Turkana	District,	DC/LDR/1/1/104;	‘Letter	from	Mr.	
Mettrick	to	the	Assistant	Director	of	Agriculture’,	5	October,	1964,	KNA,	Project	–	Turkana	Rehabilitation,	
BV/104/103;	‘Letter	from	Mr.	Betts	to	Mr.	Mettrick’,	26	October,	1964,	KNA,	Project	–	Turkana	
Rehabilitation,	BV/104/103;	J.	Newbould,	‘Water	Spreading	in	Turkana’,	14	October,	1965,	KNA,	Project	–	
Turkana	Rehabilitation,	BV/104/104.	
196	‘Application	for	Oxfam	Grant’,	6	September,	1966,	KNA,	Project	–	Turkana	Water	Spreading,	
BV/104/108;	‘Turkana	Water	Spreading	Scheme’,	8	March,	1967,	OxA,	MS.	Oxfam	COM/2/9/9	Folder	11.	
197	‘Letter	from	Mr.	Betts	to	Mr.	Cole’,	11	November,	1966,	KNA,	Project	–	Turkana	Water	Spreading,	
BV/104/108.	
198	‘Letter	from	Mr.	Chester	to	the	Assistant	Director	of	Agriculture’,	30	November,	1966,	KNA,	Project	–	
Turkana	Water	Spreading,	BV/104/108.	
199	‘List	of	Recommended	Grants’,	5	January,	1967,	OxA,	MS.	Oxfam	PRG/1/3/2	Folder	1:	October	1966	–	
November	1967.	
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situation.200	In	 response,	 the	 government	 admitted	 that	 none	 of	 the	 grant	money	 had	
been	 utilised	 because	 rains	 had	made	 the	 scheme	 inaccessible,	 but	 scolded	Oxfam	 for	
showing	 ‘undue	 impatience	with	 the	providence	 that	has	provided	Turkana	with	a	near	
record	rainfall	year’.	The	official	added	that	‘I	would	much	prefer	to	implement	this	joint	
project	in	an	atmosphere	of	cooperation	and	trust	than	through	the	medium	of	ultimata	
[sic]	 and	 acrimonious	 correspondence’.201	This	was	 not	 to	 be:	 in	 early	 1968	 the	Oxfam	
representative	 who	 investigated	 the	 scheme,	 Richard	 Frost,	 revealed	 that	 the	
government	had	transferred	equipment	and	funds	from	the	Oxfam	schemes	in	Turkana	to	
their	own	prestige	scheme	 in	 the	region	 (with	acreage	reserved	 for	MPs);	 indeed,	Frost	
noted	that	‘all	the	machinery	from	Lorengippe	is	[at	the	government	scheme]’.	Moreover,	
he	concluded	that	this	machinery	must	have	been	purchased	using	Oxfam	funds	because	
the	entire	Oxfam	grant	had	been	used	whereas	the	government	had	only	spent	£1,743	of	
its	£7,200	commitment.202	Frost	estimated	that	the	government	had	misappropriated	at	
least	half	of	Oxfam’s	donation	for	the	Lorengippe	scheme.203	
	 Harper	wrote	 to	Betts	 to	outline	his	 anger	 and	 to	make	 it	 clear	 that	 ‘the	Kenya	
Government	had	no	right	to	transfer	equipment	and/or	funds’	from	an	Oxfam	scheme	to	
a	government	scheme	without	reference	to	the	organisation.	The	transfer	had	also,	they	
now	realised,	impacted	negatively	on	the	Oxfam	schemes	since	the	requisite	equipment	
was	unavailable	to	complete	the	irrigation	work.204	Betts	wrote	to	the	head	of	the	range	
management	 division	 to	 convey	 his	 dismay	 at	 the	 findings,	 and	 to	 demand	 answers	 to	
these	 allegations. 205 	Internally,	 the	 government	 defended	 its	 actions	 as	 utilising	
equipment	 where	 it	 was	 needed	 most,	 but	 officials	 had	 no	 satisfactory	 answer	 for	
Oxfam.206		 The	 issue	was	 felt	 to	 be	 ‘an	 unhealed	 sore	 in	 the	 side	 of	 our	 relations	with	
Oxfam	which	are	not	of	the	best	at	the	moment’	and	officials	feared	that	‘it	is	at	present	
																																																						
200	‘Letter	from	Mr.	Harper	to	Mr.	Betts’,	1	November,	1967,	KNA,	Project	–	Turkana	Water	Spreading,	
BV/104/108;	‘Letter	from	Mr.	Betts	to	Mr.	Pratt’,	8	November,	1967,	KNA,	Project	–	Turkana	Water	
Spreading,	BV/104/108.	
201	‘Letter	from	Mr.	Pratt	to	Mr.	Betts’,	13	November,	1967,	KNA,	Project	–	Turkana	Water	Spreading,	
BV/104/108.	
202	‘Abstract	from	Mr.	Frost’s	Report	on	Turkana	Water	Spreading’,	February,	1968,	KNA,	Project	–	Turkana	
Water	Spreading,	BV/104/108.	
203	‘Visit	to	Turkana	by	Richard	Frost’,	February,	1968,	OxA,	MS.	Oxfam	PRG/3/5/8	Folder	2:	Jamaica	–	
Kenya.	
204	‘Letter	from	Mr.	Harper	to	Mr.	Betts’,	27	March,	1968,	KNA,	Project	–	Turkana	Water	Spreading,	
BV/104/108.	
205	‘Letter	from	Mr.	Betts	to	Mr.	Meadows’,	15	April,	1968,	KNA,	Project	–	Turkana	Water	Spreading,	
BV/104/108.	
206	‘Letter	from	Mr.	Birir	to	Mr.	M’Rabu’,	16	May,	1968,	KNA,	Project	–	Turkana	Water	Spreading,	
BV/104/108.	
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jeapardizing	 [sic]	our	current	approaches	 for	 funds’.207	In	early	1969,	with	 the	 issue	still	
not	 resolved	to	Oxfam’s	satisfaction,	Harper	wrote	 to	 the	Ministry	of	Agriculture	asking	
for	clarification	and	noted	that	‘Mr	Meadows…	spoke	of	his	desire	for	a	spirit	of	mutual	
cooperation	 between	Oxfam	 and	 his	 Department.	 This	 can	 only	 succeed’,	 he	wrote,	 ‘if	
both	 sides	 act	 fairly	 towards	 each	 other’.	 He	 also	 pointed	 out	 that	 ‘there	 can	 be	 no	
chance	 of	 our	 remitting	 the	 £5,000	 [for	 Lokichar]	 until	 [Oxfam	 funds]	 had	 been	 fully	
accounted	 for’,	 since,	 as	 ‘trustees	 of	 public	 donations’	 Oxfam	 was	 accountable	 to	 its	
supporters	 for	 the	 use	 of	 its	 funds. 208 	Finally,	 Harper	 warned	 officials	 that	 ‘I	 am	
considerably	tougher	in	chasing	reports	and	accounts	than	was	Mr	Betts’,	who	was	known	
on	 all	 sides	 to	 be	 sympathetic	 towards	 the	 Kenya	 government.209	Even	 so,	 it	 was	 only	
after	more	than	six	months	of	government	silence	as	regards	the	Oxfam	grant	that	Harper	
wrote	 ‘to	 forewarn	 [the	 government]	 that	 the	 patience	 of	 my	 Committee	 is	 being	
extended	 to	 the	 extreme	 by	 your	 failure’	 and	 that	 the	 Lokichar	 scheme	 would	 be	
cancelled	unless	the	situation	was	resolved	within	a	matter	of	weeks.210	In	the	event,	the	
situation	was	resolved	when	Nicholas	Stacey	visited	Turkana	in	early	1970,	as	he	agreed	
‘off	the	record’	to	ignore	a	discrepancy	of	£1,500	in	the	use	of	Oxfam	funds	as	long	as	the	
government	guaranteed	that	it	would	provide	the	same	amount	to	the	Oxfam	schemes	in	
Turkana.	When	this	was	done,	Oxfam	released	the	remaining	£5,000	for	Lokichar.211	
	 Meanwhile,	just	as	the	dispute	over	the	Turkana	schemes	was	threatening	to	boil	
over,	the	fertiliser	and	maize	schemes	faced	serious	setbacks.	The	former	faced	issues	of	
late	or	non-delivery	of	the	fertiliser	and	suffered	in	poor	rains.212	Though	the	government	
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considered	the	demonstration	plots	a	success,213	Betts	was	chastised	by	Oxford	because	
‘there	is	no	measure	by	which	to	judge	[said]	success’,	and	the	scheme	itself	was	criticised	
for	avoidable	mistakes	such	as	late	planting	and	the	failure	to	use	insecticide.214	Officials	
defended	 the	 scheme,	highlighting	 that	 the	demonstration	plots	had	higher	 yields	 than	
neighbouring	areas	and	that	there	was	a	‘great	increase’	in	the	use	of	fertilisers	and	other	
improved	methods	of	husbandry	nearby.	They	also	attempted	to	shift	the	blame	for	the	
poor	delivery	of	supplies	onto	the	private	sector.215	As	regards	the	maize	scheme,	Betts	
discovered	in	mid-1966	that	Oxfam’s	grant	had	been	sat	idle	for	nearly	a	year	due	to	the	
mismanagement	of	the	grant	timetable,	which	had	meant	that	seed	was	not	available	at	
the	required	time.216	Government	officials	feared	that	Oxfam	would	withdraw	the	grant,	
since	by	their	 inaction	they	had	deprived	‘other	needy	causes	of	assistance’.217	Yet	even	
after	the	Oxfam	funds	were	spent,	there	were	difficulties	concerning	the	delivery	of	the	
seed:	in	Machakos,	for	instance,	only	enough	seed	for	4,800	acres	was	delivered	despite	
immediate	demand	for	10,000	acres’	worth	of	seed	and	the	potential	for	30,000	acres	to	
be	planted.	In	Kitui,	there	was	immediate	demand	for	seed	to	cover	5,000	acres,	but	only	
1,000	acres’	worth	of	seed	was	delivered.218	By	the	time	more	seed	arrived,	many	farmers	
had	 planted	 their	 farms	with	 any	 seed	 they	 could	 get	 their	 hands	 on.219	Disappointed,	
Betts	 wrote	 to	 Oxford	 in	 early	 1967	 that	 although	 over	 half	 the	 Oxfam	 grant	 was	 still	
unspent,	 officials	 involved	 with	 the	 scheme	 were	 talking	 ‘somewhat	 glibly’	 of	 Oxfam	
contributing	£5,000	per	year,	and	he	promised	 to	assess	 the	 scheme	afresh	 in	order	 to	
recommend	 to	 Oxford	 whether	 to	 repatriate	 the	 grant.220	The	 scheme	 was,	 therefore,	
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allowed	 to	 continue	 into	early	1968,	but	Betts	 cautioned	 the	government	 that	 this	 and	
other	failures	 ‘on	the	part	of	the	various	departments	of	the	Ministry	of	Agriculture	are	
causing	me	serious	embarrassment	with	my	Head	Office’,	and	that	he	would	cancel	 the	
maize	grant	if	information	on	the	state	of	the	scheme	was	not	forthcoming	soon.	Such	an	
eventuality,	he	noted,	would	doubtless	‘prejudice	the	attitude	of	my	Committee	to	future	
grants’	to	the	Kenya	government.221	
	 In	 response,	 the	Ministry	of	Agriculture	circulated	a	memorandum	reminding	 its	
officials	that	if	this	occurred	it	would	‘do	a	very	great	deal	of	harm	to	Kenya’s	reputation	
with	 non-Governmental	 Agencies	 and	 above	 all	 with	 Oxfam’.	 ‘They	 will’,	 an	 official	
suggested,	 ‘immediately	 conclude	 (perhaps	with	 some	 justification)	 that	 this	Ministry	 is	
incapable	 of	 handling	 their	 grants	 and	 will	 be	 most	 reluctant	 to	 offer	 support	 in	 the	
future’.	The	official	placed	the	maize	scheme	in	its	wider	context,	noting	that	
	
the	 lack	 of	 attention	 given	 to	 the	 successful	 completion	 of	 these	 smaller	 Oxfam…	
projects	 is	 not	 confined	 to	 the	 [maize]	 scheme.	 You	 will	 recall	 that	 [I]	 drew	 your	
attention	 to	 both	 [Narosurra]	 and	 the	 [Fertiliser	 Demonstration	 Scheme]	 also.	
Neither	of	these	schemes	has	had	a	particular	[sic]	successful	history,	and	both	have	
suffered	from	considerable	periods	of	inattention	by	the	Department	of	Agriculture…	
What	makes	matters	worse	is	that	these	projects	are	completely	financed	by	or	have	
considerable	 Oxfam	 participation.	 If	 we	 do	 not	 pay	 some	 attention	 to	 either,	 we	
cannot	expect	Oxfam	to	pay	attention	to	our	future	requests.222	
	
He	advised	that	these	schemes	be	given	priority	within	the	Department	in	order	that	they	
could	 be	 brought	 to	 a	 constructive	 conclusion.223	In	 the	 event,	 while	 the	 grants	 for	
Narosurra	 and	 the	 fertiliser	 scheme	were	 allowed	 to	 remain	with	 the	 government,	 the	
balance	 of	 Oxfam’s	 grant	 for	 the	 maize	 scheme	 was	 refunded	 at	 Betts’	 insistence	 in	
September	1968.224	‘Oxfam	may	well	be	a	charitable	organisation’,	one	official	noted,	‘but	
its	 executives	 are	 hard	 headed	 pragmatists	 who	 demand	 results	 almost	 immediately	
money	is	voted’.225	
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	 For	 as	 long	 as	 he	 remained	 in	 Kenya,	 Betts	was	 committed	 to	working	 through	
these	issues	with	the	government,	referring	to	the	‘battle	with	my	Committee’	in	terms	of	
‘us’	(meaning	Betts	and	the	government)	versus	‘them’	(Oxford).226	Harper	also	remained	
dedicated	to	working	with	the	government,	despite	his	more	tenacious	attitude;	though	
by	1969	his	 frustration	was	beginning	 to	show:	 ‘Rash	promises	by	 the	politicians	are	all	
too	common’,	he	wrote,	‘No	wonder	people	prefer	to	turn	to	Oxfam!’.227	Yet	by	the	time	
he	was	replaced	by	Toby	Gooch	 in	1971,	relations	between	Oxfam	and	the	government	
had	 cooled	 considerably,	 partly	 as	 a	 result	 of	 the	 afore-mentioned	 failures	 in	 the	
administration	 of	 Oxfam	 grants.	 ‘In	 general’,	 Gooch	 remarked,	 ‘co-operation	 with	
Government	has	not	been	too	good’.	These	failures	and	particularly	the	inattention	with	
which	Oxfam	grants	were	treated	had	highlighted	the	limit	to	Oxfam’s	influence	in	Kenya.	
Moreover,	 Gooch	 noted	 that	 Kenya	 was	 making	 rapid	 economic	 progress	 and	
recommended	 on	 both	 counts	 that	 Oxfam	 should	 make	 a	 steady	 reduction	 in	 its	
assistance	 to	 the	 country.228	Accordingly,	 the	Africa	 Committee	 reduced	 the	 size	 of	 the	
Kenya	 programme	 from	 1970.229	Given	 the	 decline	 in	 relations	 with	 the	 government,	
Oxford	also	decided	to	move	the	local	headquarters	to	Addis	Ababa	in	1973.230	The	effect	
of	this	shift	is	visible	in	Figures	2,	3,	4	and	5.	Figure	2	demonstrates	that	each	constituent	
part	of	the	programme	was	reduced	markedly	in	scale	between	the	late	1960s	and	early	
1970s.	This	was	reflected	in	the	number	and	cost	of	the	projects	undertaken	thereafter.	
During	1974	the	Oxfam	programme	in	Kenya	was	restricted	for	a	time	to	11	projects,	and	
stabilised	 at	 15	 projects	 until	 1976,	 as	 shown	 by	 Figure	 3.	 This	 was	 around	 half	 the	
average	 number	 of	 projects	 Oxfam	worked	with	 in	 the	 1960s.	Meanwhile,	 as	 Figure	 4	
demonstrates,	 budget	 allocations	 were	 reduced	 to	 around	 £50,000	 per	 year,	 a	 far	 cry	
from	the	£100,000-plus	budgets	of	the	mid-to-late	1960s.	The	fall	in	expenditure	is	even	
more	 noticeable	 in	 real	 terms,	 as	 illustrated	 by	 Figure	 5.	 Spending	 in	 the	 mid-1970s	
dropped	to	around	one	sixth	of	 its	 real-terms	 level	 in	 the	peak	years	of	 the	 later	1960s	
and	spending	across	the	decade	averaged	around	one	third	of	the	average	spend	during	
the	1960s	as	a	whole.	
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	 When	Oxfam	returned	to	Nairobi	–	which	was,	 it	admitted,	 ‘the	communications	
hub	of	East	Africa’	–	in	1976,	Tim	Brierly,	who	had	replaced	Toby	Gooch	in	1975,	advised	
that	 although	 Oxfam	 ‘must	 main	 a	 respectable	 programme’	 in	 Kenya	 due	 to	 the	 tax	
privileges	 and	 customs	 agreements	 negotiated	 with	 the	 government,	 the	 organisation	
should	 keep	 ‘a	 fairly	 low	 profile’.	 Furthermore,	 Oxfam	would,	 he	 argued,	 ‘probably	 do	
better	not	to	fund	governmental	projects	in	the	future’,	especially	since	the	government	
‘receives	so	much	aid	from	the	World	Bank,	ODM	[Overseas	Development	Ministry],	etc.’.	
Brierly	was	cognisant	that	the	chance	of	finance	on	the	scale	at	which	Oxfam	could	offer	it	
having	any	impact	on	the	government	was	limited	in	the	extreme.	While	a	higher	budget	
was	provided	for	Kenya	in	1976-77,	therefore,	it	was	mostly	the	result	of	two	large,	and	
somewhat	anomalous,	grants	to	other	NGOs	(and	 in	particular	to	the	American	Medical	
and	 Research	 Foundation	 –	 AMRF	 or	 AMREF	 –	 for	 research	 into	 hydatid	 disease)	 in	
addition	 to	 the	 Lake	 Kenyatta	 Project,	 and	 it	 was	 reduced	 for	 the	 following	 year.232	
Crucially,	 disengagement	 from	 the	 state	 had	 an	 impact	 on	 the	 shape	 of	 Oxfam’s	
programme	as	well	as	its	scale:	Figure	2	highlights	the	crossover	between	support	to	the	
state	 and	other	 ‘intermediate’	 organisations	 around	1974	 and	 the	peak	 in	 engagement	
with	the	latter	in	1976-77.	The	orientation	of	the	Oxfam	programme	shifted	at	the	same	
time,	with	Oxfam	 soon	 spending	 four	 times	more	on	medical	 projects	 than	agricultural	
projects	 because,	 as	 Brierly	 lamented,	 ‘whereas	 there	 are	 many	 excellent	 voluntary	
agencies	 like	AMRF	and	 church	hospitals…	 in	 the	medical	 field,	 there	are	 relatively	 few	
non-governmental	 agricultural	 activities…’.233	The	 transition	 between	 agricultural	 and	
medical	projects	occurred	around	1974,	as	shown	by	Figure	6,	which	also	illustrates	that	
such	a	shift	had	happened	once	before	–	between	1968	and	1970	–	as	Oxfam	spending	
alongside	the	state	in	agricultural	development	projects	started	to	collapse	while	medical	
spending	(boosted	by	three	grants	to	AMRF)	remained	high.	(Note,	meanwhile,	that	the	
spike	 in	 welfare	 spending	 in	 1968/69	 was	 a	 result	 of	 Oxfam	 categorising	 the	 School	
Feeding	Scheme	as	welfare	spending.)	
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	 The	decline	in	support	within	Oxfam	for	working	alongside	the	Kenya	government	
was	not	solely	due	to	the	practical	issues	discussed	above,	however.	In	fact,	Brierly	made	
it	 clear	 that	 Kenya	 remained	 ‘the	 easiest	 country	 for	 Oxfam	 to	 work	 in	 because	 the	
Government	 favours	 voluntary	 agencies’.	 The	 other	 reason	 for	Oxfam’s	 disengagement	
from	 the	 state	 was	 that	 the	 organisation	 underwent	 something	 of	 an	 ideological	
revolution,	which	meant	 it	could	no	 longer	 ignore	 the	 fact	 that	Kenya	had	 ‘an	elite	and	
corrupt	political	system	that	is	less	in	tune	with	Oxfam	ideas	than	the	socialist	and	earnest	
system	 of	 Somalia…	 while	 Sudan,	 Rwanda	 and	 Burundi	 strike	 a	 happy	 medium’.	 For	
Brierly,	 it	 was	 in	 these	 countries	 that	 Oxfam	 ‘should	 try	 and	 concentrate	more	 of	 our	
assistance	in	the	future’.235	In	a	politically-charged	critique	of	the	Kenya	government,	he	
wrote	that:	
	
The	high	and	healthy	island	of	fertility	rising	to	the	north	of	the	booming	capital	city	
of	Nairobi	 is	 surrounded	 by	 scrubby	wastes	 that	 are	 rapidly	 turning	 to	 desert.	 The	
country	continues	to	be	run	by	a	Government	that	has	been	described	as	a	“family	of	
business-men	 politicians	 of	 whom	 Kenyatta	 is	 God	 the	 Father.”	 Members	 of	
Kenyatta’s	own	 family	have	been	 implicated	 in	 the	widespread	poaching	of	game…	
and	 destruction	 of	 trees…	 that	 threaten	 respectively	 the	 future	 of	 Kenya’s	 main	
revenue	source	(tourism)	and	the	ecology	and	rainfall	of	the	country.	Civil	servants,	
including	the	once	impartial	District	Commissioners,	have	since	1970	been	allowed	to	
take	part	 in	business	and	thus	have	a	vested	 interest	 in	the	continuance	of	Kenya’s	
capitalist	type	of	society.	“Fat	cats”	in	big	Mercedes	buy	up	land	from	poor	peasants	
and	 property	 from	 the	 dwindling	 Indians	 for	 letting	 at	 exorbitant	 prices	 to	 foreign	
diplomats	 and	 firms…	 The	 “elitist	 and	 corrupt”	 system	 in	 Kenya	 [means	 that]	
development	[is	also]	mainly	concentrated	on	the	economically	viable	areas	on	either	
side	of	the	Rift	Valley…236	
	
	 Kenyatta’s	policy	of	full-blooded	capitalism	did,	of	course,	split	KANU	in	the	later	
1960s,	 while	 the	 government’s	 failure	 to	 improve	 the	 lot	 of	 the	 majority	 of	 Kenyan	
citizens	 was	 reflected	 in	 the	 popularity	 of	 J.M.	 Kariuki	 and	 in	 the	 results	 of	 the	 1974	
election	–	 in	which	nearly	50	per	cent	of	sitting	MPs	were	defeated.	Kenyans	were	thus	
equally	 concerned	with	 the	 Kenyatta	 government’s	 turn	 towards	 authoritarianism,	 and	
individuals	 such	 as	 Ngũgĩ	wa	 Thiong’o	 risked	 their	 freedom	 to	 express	 their	 anxiety	 as	
regards	 inequality	 and	 corruption.237	Yet	 despite	 the	 fact	 that	 Kenya	 was	 ‘the	 most	
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unevenly	 developed	 country	 in	 the	 area’,	 with	 ‘extremes	 of	 wealth	 and	 poverty	 and	
growing	corruption’	as	its	most	salient	features,	Brierly	feared	that	
	
such	is	the	prestige	and	personality	of	the	“Old	Man”	(Mzee)	that	Kenyatta	is	unlikely	
to	 be	 toppled	 in	 whatever	 remains	 of	 his	 lifetime…	 The	 tribal	 dominance	 of	 the	
Kikuyu	 in	 Kenya	 politics	 could	 also	 cause	 trouble,	 although	 so	 far	 the	 Kikuyu	 have	
proved	 too	numerous	 and	 too	 adept	 to	be	 seriously	 challenged	by	 the	other	 tribal	
groups	who	are	by	no	means	united	among	themselves.238	
	
Importantly,	in	contrast	to	Betts	and	Harper,	Brierly	was	pessimistic	about	the	future	and	
doubtful	of	the	potential	for	Oxfam	to	influence	the	government:	
	
Kenya	 is	 an	 ideologically	 isolated	mountain	 of	 [capitalism]…	more	 democratic	 than	
most	 other	 African	 countries,	 but	 [where]	 no	 real	 opposition	 is	 tolerated…	 The	
Kenyatta	 “royal	 family”	 still	 rules…	 with	 pictures	 on	 the	 front	 pages	 of	 the	
newspapers	everyday	of	Mzee	being	entertained	by	traditional	dancers	to	prove	that	
he	is	still	very	much	alive.239	
	
He	expected	nothing	 less	 than	 that	 ‘the	 ruling	KANU	[would]	 try	and	maintain	a	 similar	
system	after	Nzee	[sic]	Kenyatta	dies’.240	
	 The	distaste	with	which	the	Field	Director	discussed	the	Kenya	government	differs	
markedly	 from	 the	 early	 optimism	 shown	by	Betts,	Harper	 and	 Fletcher	 among	others,	
which	was	based	on	their	ideological	faith	in	the	newly	independent	state	and	in	Oxfam’s	
ability	 to	 influence	 its	 developmental	 orientation.	 Such	 a	 faith	 had	 encouraged	 a	
pragmatic	 attitude	 as	 to	 the	 Kenya	 state’s	 own	 capitalist	 ideology,	 its	 increasing	
authoritarian	tendencies	and	the	limited	success	of	Oxfam’s	efforts	to	influence	the	state	
to	 become	 a	more	 ‘neutral’	 development	 actor.	 Just	 as	 these	 difficulties	 became	more	
obvious,	 however,	Oxfam	 itself	 underwent	 a	 shift	 in	 its	 attitude	 towards	 the	 state	 and	
state-led	 development,	 a	 shift	 that	 meant	 these	 problems	 could	 no	 longer	 be	 swept	
under	the	carpet.	As	discussed	in	chapter	one,	the	early	1970s	saw	Oxfam	–	influenced	by	
Paulo	Freire	–	starting	to	talk	of	empowerment	as	the	key	to	development.	Indeed,	by	the	
middle	 of	 the	 decade	 Oxfam	 had	 adopted	 much	 of	 the	 concientizacao	 or	
																																																																																																																																																																			
Thiong’o	attacks	‘the	warped	logic	of	modernity’,	which	dislocates	people	from	nature	and	fatally	weakens	
marginal	areas.	Thiong’o	was	arrested	for	his	outspokenness	in	the	same	year,	and	remained	in	prison	until	
December	1978.	N.	wa	Thiong’o,	Petals	of	Blood	(London,	Heinemann,	1977);	S.	Gikandi,	Ngugi	wa	Thiong’o	
(Cambridge,	Cambridge	University	Press,	2000),	pp.	128-160.	
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‘conscientisation’	 methodology	 and	 expressed	 its	 support	 for	 liberation	 theology	 as	
unleashed	by	Vatican	II.	Oxfam’s	Director,	Brian	Walker,	outlined	in	1978	that	
	
Development	 work	 overseas	 is	 essentially	 about	 people	 and	 not	 so	 much	 about	
economic	 systems	and	putting	 in	 large	amounts	of	 capital…	 It	 is	 essentially	 to	help	
people	 to	 grow	 within	 themselves.	 The	 cardinal	 sin	 in	 our	 work	 is	 to	 make	 such	
people	dependent	on	us.	Cultural	imperialism	is	something	we	try	very	hard	to	avoid.	
	
Instead,	 ‘the	Oxfam	approach	 is	 to	 help	 people	 to	 identify	 the	 elements	which	 help	 to	
make	them	poor	and	to	explore	ways	to	tackle	those	elements’.241	
	 Hence,	Oxfam’s	handbook	for	Field	Directors	–	first	published	in	the	mid-1970s	as	
part	 of	 the	 conscientisation	 of	 Oxfam	 itself	 –	 asked	 how	 Oxfam	 could	 champion	 the	
‘wretched	 of	 the	 earth’	 rather	 than	 simply	 ‘reinterpreting	 the	 white	 man’s	 burden	 to	
coincide	 with	 British	 charitable	 impulses.242	It	 concluded	 that	 the	 organisation	 should	
codify	 its	 commitment	 to	 a	 process	 of	 conscientisation	 ‘which	 encourages	 people	 to	
recognise	and	develop	their	potential	and	to	decide	their	own	values	and	priorities’.	The	
handbook	 criticised	 ‘capitalistic	 societies	 and	 others	 with	 elitist	 elements’	 –	 of	 which	
Kenya	 was	 certainly	 one	 –	 for	 the	 restriction	 of	 opportunity	 and	 the	 polarisation	 of	
wealth.	It	cautioned	that	the	‘bias	against	the	poor’	in	the	development	process	could	not	
be	challenged	through	 ‘orthodox	development	programmes	designed	by	governments…	
for	the	downward	movement	of	technological	and	material	stimulus’.	Moreover,	though	
‘offense	to	those	 in	power’	was	to	be	avoided,	the	handbook	warned	that	 ‘the	unequal	
and	unacceptable	effects	of	 just	such	programmes	[were	precisely	what]	Oxfam	may	be	
faced	with	countering’.	Modernisation	programmes	akin	to	those	Betts	had	supported	in	
Kenya	were	 now	 seen	 to	 have	 extended	 a	 system	 of	 domination	 by	 governments	 and	
international	 financial	 institutions	 by	 encouraging	 the	 quiescence	 of	 development	
‘subjects’	 without	 the	 means	 to	 counter	 ‘scientific’	 modernising	 schemes.	 The	
organisation	 should,	 therefore,	 try	 to	 ‘work	 with	 voluntary	 groups	 rather	 than	
governments’,	 making	 sure	 that	 projects	 contained	 a	 ‘social’	 as	 well	 as	 a	 ‘technical’	
aspect.	 Improving	 people’s	material	 situation	was	 no	 longer	 enough:	 Oxfam	wished	 to	
make	them	‘less	accepting	in	outlook	[and]	more	aware	of	what	they	can	do	to	effect	an	
improvement	 in	 their	 circumstances’.	 The	 section	 on	 pastoralism	 perhaps	 best	
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illuminated	 the	 shift	 in	 ideology,	 conceding	 that	 development	 no	 longer	 implied	
settlement,	but	transhumance.243	
As	 regards	 Kenya,	 the	 Field	 Director	 and	 Africa	 Committee	 agreed	 in	 1977	 that	
Oxfam	should	‘try	to	find	more	grass-roots,	village-level	schemes	to	support	rather	than…	
paternalist	 projects’	 which	 had	 characterised	 earlier	 efforts	 in	 the	 country.	 A	 new	
partnership	was	 suggested	with	 the	Catholic	 churches,	which,	 as	Brierly	 acknowledged,	
‘are	very	aware	of	the	need	for	greater	human	involvement	from	below’.244	The	contrast	
between	 the	 anti-institutionalism	 of	 such	 an	 approach	 and	 the	 methods	 that	 the	
organisation	had	used	in	Kenya	in	the	1960s	could	not	be	clearer.	In	terms	of	ideology,	as	
the	Kenya	government	moved	right,	Oxfam	moved	left,	and	this	widening	ideological	gap	
served	 to	 illuminate	 and	 magnify	 the	 practical	 difficulties	 Oxfam	 was	 experiencing.	
Together,	these	concerns	encouraged	Oxfam	to	by-pass	the	state	towards	the	end	of	the	
Kenyatta	era	instead	of	working	through	its	institutions	to	encourage	state	responsibility.	
Such	a	trend	is	shown	in	Figure	2,	as	the	share	of	Oxfam	funds	that	went	to	government	
fell	 below	 the	 increasingly	 numerous	 small	 grants	 to	 intermediate	 organisations	 (local	
NGOs),	 church	bodies	 and	 community	 groups	 for	 inter-church	agricultural	 schemes	and	
community-built	 dams,	 for	 example.	 (These	 are	 discussed	 in	 greater	 detail	 in	 the	
following	 chapter.)	 No	 longer	 was	 there	 an	 attempt	 to	 influence	 government	 directly,	
since	 ‘compared	 to	 the	 World	 Bank…	 or	 the	 British	 Overseas	 Development	 Ministry…	
Oxfam	 is	very	 small	 fry	 indeed’.	Oxfam’s	 influence	was	 instead	 to	be	 found	 ‘among	 the	
local	voluntary	agencies’	and	better	development	opportunities	were	seen	to	lie	outside	
the	state	(and	outside	of	Kenya).245	
	 Oxfam	had,	therefore,	distanced	itself	from	the	Kenya	government	before	the	Moi	
era,	 which	 is	 commonly	 seen	 as	 representing	 the	 nadir	 of	 government-civil	 society	
relations	in	Kenya.	The	organisation,	and	particularly	those	on	the	ground	in	Nairobi,	had	
always	known	that	the	state	was	inefficient,	corrupt	and	pushed	an	elite	capitalist	project	
that	was	exclusive	and	exploitative	of	the	very	regions	that	Oxfam	most	wished	to	help.	
But	 they	 had	 faith	 in	 the	 institution	 of	 the	 state	 and	 in	 their	 own	 ability	 to	 nudge	 the	
Kenya	 government	 away	 from	 ethnic	 patrimonialism	 and	 towards	 a	 more	 socially	
responsible	position.	Never	fully	co-opted	into	the	‘anti-politics	machine’	in	Kenya	due	to	
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their	refusal	to	work	in	politically	favoured	regions,	the	organisation’s	actions	did	in	some	
cases	aid	 the	expansion	of	 the	 ‘bureaucratic-executive’	Kenyatta	 state	 into	areas	as	yet	
lightly	governed.	Yet	Oxfam	hoped	that	forcing	the	state	to	engage	with	its	citizens	would	
inculcate	 a	 less	 political	 approach	 to	 development.	 Following	 Lorgen’s	 theorisation,	
changing	 Oxfam	 values	 meant	 that	 whereas	 Betts	 and	 Harper	 had	 hoped	 that	 the	
government	 could	 be	 encouraged	 through	 pilot	 projects	 and	 financial	 incentives	 to	
expand	its	reach	to	areas	of	the	periphery	–	and	were	thus	pragmatic	about	 its	political	
orientation	–	by	 the	early	 1970s	Oxfam	was	 ready	 to	move	away	 from	 its	 engagement	
with	a	state	ideologically	isolated	and	insulated	from	its	citizens	by	the	de	facto	one-party	
system	and	by	large-scale	support	from	the	West.246	
	 It	 is	 important	 to	 note,	 though,	 that	 Oxfam	 actually	 saw	 conscientisation	 as	
another	 method	 for	 making	 the	 state	 responsible	 for	 its	 citizens.	 On	 War,	 Carl	 von	
Clausewitz’s	 1873	 treatise	 on	 conflict,	 offers	 an	 insight	 into	 the	 distinction	 between	
strategy	 and	 tactics	 used	 implicitly	 by	Oxfam.	 In	war,	 he	writes,	 not	 everything	 can	 be	
foreseen;	 responses	 to	 shifting	 context	 have	 to	 be	 based	 either	 on	 strategic	 and	 long-
term	planning	or	discriminating	judgement	based	on	short-term	imperatives.247	In	1960s	
Kenya,	while	armed	conflict	was	limited	to	the	north-east,	political	and	ideological	conflict	
over	development	created	its	own	‘fog	of	war’.	For	a	time	there	was	coincidence	between	
Oxfam’s	 long-term	 strategy	 (to	 build	 a	 responsible	 state)	 and	 its	 short-term	 tactics	 (to	
work	with	the	state	to	encourage	such	an	approach).	Once	top-down	tactics	were	shown	
to	 be	 ineffective,	 however,	 those	 on	 the	 ground	 embraced	 the	 new	 tactics	 of	
empowerment	and	conscientisation;	yet	the	long-term	strategy	–	to	create	a	responsible	
state	–	 remained	constant.	Thus	 instead	of	 the	 top-down	or	 ‘supply	 side’	 reform	which	
Betts	 had	 hoped	 to	 achieve	 in	 the	 1960s,	Oxfam	 adopted	 bottom-up	 or	 ‘demand	 side’	
reform	 in	 the	 later	 1970s:	 where	 Oxfam	 had	 failed	 to	 cajole	 the	 state	 to	 take	 on	
responsibility	 for	 the	whole	 country	 as	 opposed	 to	merely	 politically	 and	 economically	
significant	 areas,	 it	 hoped	 that	 Kenyan	 citizens	 would	 have	 more	 success.	 The	
organisation	was	 given	 some	 hope	 by	 the	 ‘Kenya	we	Want’	 conference	 –	 attended	 by	
national	 leaders	 including	 Moi	 –	 which	 resolved	 that	 development	 plans	 ‘should	 be	
deliberately	 and	 consciously	 geared	 to	 enhancing	 a	 faster	 pace	 of	 growth	 and	
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development	in	the	marginal	areas	and	among	underprivileged	members	of	society’.248	Of	
course,	such	rhetoric	only	briefly	disguised	Moi’s	ruthlessly	political	redistribution	of	the	
spoils	 in	 Kenya	 and	 his	 desire	 to	 control	 and	 dominate	 the	 development	 space	 to	 an	
extent	that	Kenyans	had	not	yet	experienced.	The	following	chapter	describes	how	Oxfam	
struggled	 to	 find	 room	 to	 operate	 under	Moi’s	 increasingly	 paranoid	 and	 authoritarian	
regime.	
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Chapter Three 
	
‘THE	WAR	IS	NOT	BEING	WON…	MORE	PEOPLE	ARE	POOR’	–	OXFAM	IN	
KENYA,	1978-1991	
	
	
	
	
	
	
Development	 questions…	 cannot	 be	 discussed	 outside	 the	 existing	 modes	 of	
production	and	the	social	structures	emanating	from	those	modes	during	a	definite	
historical	 period…	 Questions	 of	 development	 cannot	 be	 ideologically	 neutral…	 To	
many	of	 the	Third	World	countries	development	 issues	also	entail	 liberation…	from	
fear	 of	 natural	 phenomena,	 superstition,	 ignorance	 and	 poverty.	 It	 also	means	 the	
extent	 to	 which	 that	 individual	 is	 capable	 of	 understanding	 the	 national	 and	
international	forces	that	are	militating	against	his	freedom	and	his	liberty…	It	means	
making	people	the	subject	and	not	the	objects	of	development.	
Odhiambo	Anacleti,	Assistant	Field	Director	for	Oxfam	in	East	Africa,	writing	in	1984.1	
	
	
In	 contrast	with	 the	previous	 chapter,	 the	 following	 concentrates	 less	 on	examining	 the	
nature	of	the	projects	with	which	Oxfam	was	involved	in	Kenya	and	more	on	the	debates	
within	 the	 organisation	 –	 both	 at	 Oxford	 and	 between	 Oxford	 and	 Nairobi	 –	 over	 the	
future	of	 its	operations	 in	Kenya	and	across	Africa.	The	previous	chapter	concluded	with	
Oxfam	starting	to	work	around	the	state	in	Kenya,	tapping	into	the	conscientisation	and	
empowerment	ideologies.	This	chapter	shows	how	such	an	approach	ran	into	difficulties	in	
Kenya	 due	 to	 a	 paranoid	 government	 and	 a	 Field	 Director	 unconvinced	 of	 its	 merits.	
Instead,	 flush	with	 cash	 from	high-profile	 relief	 campaigns	 in	 the	 early	 1980s,	 the	 Field	
Director	 shifted	Oxfam	 towards	 ‘operationality’	 in	 Kenya.	 Yet	many	 in	 Oxford	 regarded	
such	a	move	as	 inconsistent	with	 the	organisation’s	 history	and	 values,	 and	 the	debate	
over	 whether	 Oxfam	 should	 be	 an	 ‘operational’	 or	 ‘facilitative’	 agency	 at	 a	 time	 of	
increasing	 income	 helped	 to	 define	 the	 future	 direction	 of	 the	 organisation.	 Thereafter,	
the	attempt	of	a	new	Field	Director	to	accommodate	the	demands	from	Oxford	with	the	
realities	on	the	ground	in	Kenya	–	as	the	government	became	ever	more	hostile	to	NGOs	
and	civil	society	in	general	–	demonstrates	clearly	the	relative	importance	of	‘values’	and	
‘pragmatism’	in	determining	the	direction	and	methods	of	an	NGO	such	as	Oxfam.	Above	
all,	 the	 innovative	 and	 flexible	 response	 of	 the	 organisation	 to	 changing	 circumstances,	
both	 global	 and	 local,	 helps	 to	 counter	 narratives	 that	 NGOs	 adopt	 ‘one	 size	 fits	 all’	
approaches.	
	
With	the	benefit	of	hindsight,	Oxfam’s	optimism	as	regards	a	potential	Moi	government	
may	 seem	 naïve.	 But	 at	 the	 time	much	 of	 Kenyan	 civil	 society	 was	 willing	 to	 suspend	
disbelief	 as	 Moi	 freed	 political	 prisoners,	 worked	 to	 build	 good	 relations	 with	 Nairobi	
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University	 and	 initiated	 a	 hugely	 popular	 anti-corruption	 drive.	 Even	 prominent	
backbench	critics	of	Kenyatta’s	government	declared	themselves	satisfied	with	the	path	
Moi	was	 following.	 The	 President	was,	 however,	 rather	more	 interested	 in	 the	 corrupt	
dealings	 of	 those	 who	 had	 opposed	 his	 bid	 for	 the	 presidency	 than	 in	 the	 illegalities	
perpetrated	by	his	allies.2	Anger	at	the	‘Kikuyuisation’	of	the	government	under	Kenyatta	
also	 lent	 weight	 to	 the	 second	 President’s	 calls	 for	 redistribution,	 which	 would,	
conveniently,	 dismantle	 the	 ethno-regional	 base	 of	 the	 previous	 regime.	 As	 shown	 in	
chapter	one,	with	the	economy	stagnating	soon	after	Moi’s	accession,	the	redistribution	
of	employment	and	investment	towards	his	ethno-regional	strongholds	in	the	Rift	Valley	
came	at	the	cost	of	Moi’s	Kikuyu	opponents.		
	 Although	 the	 Rift	 Valley	 contained	 a	 large	 number	 of	 severely	 impoverished	
people	that	Oxfam	wished	to	see	helped	by	the	government,	the	organisation	surmised	
fairly	quickly	that	the	zero-sum	nature	of	Moi’s	political	and	economic	calculations	meant	
that	even	in	the	Rift	‘under-privileged	sections	of	the	population’	such	as	herdsmen,	small	
farmers,	agricultural	workers	and	the	urban	poor	would	be	left	to	struggle	for	existence.3	
The	organisation	condemned	the	government’s	attitude	towards	development	as	‘capital	
intensive,	 mainly	 infrastructural	 [and]	 favouring	 the	 better	 off	 rather	 than	 the	 really	
poor’.	 ‘To	some	extent’,	 the	report	continued,	 ‘it	 is	also	politically	motivated.	There	has	
for	 instance	been	considerable	road	 improvement	and	other	development	 in	 the	Tugen	
area	–	Moi	country!’4	Meanwhile,	the	Arid	and	Semi-Arid	Lands	Programme,	launched	by	
the	government	in	1979,	focused	its	efforts	on	Moi’s	ethno-regional	support	base	in	the	
Rift	 Valley	 and	 priority	 status	 was	 given	 to	 districts	 most	 closely	 associated	 with	 the	
President.5	Combined	 with	 ‘corruption	 in	 government	 circles’	 and	 ‘exploitation	 [of	 the	
poor]	by	people	in	authority’,	the	government’s	approach	to	development	–	which	more	
or	 less	 picked	 up	 from	where	 Kenyatta	 left	 off,	 albeit	 in	 different	 locations	 –	 made	 it	
impossible	 for	 Oxfam	 staff	 newly	 versed	 in	 conscientisation	 to	 consider	 direct	
participation	in	government	development	projects.6	A	report	to	Oxford	in	the	early	years	
of	 the	Moi	regime	admitted,	 therefore,	 that	no	mention	was	made	of	working	with	the	
government	 because	 there	 was	 ‘little	 likelihood	 of	 Oxfam	 participating	 in	 government	
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devised	and/or	 implemented	programmes’.7	For	Oxfam’s	Field	Director	 in	Nairobi	 (from	
1981),	David	Campbell,	‘long	term	solutions	to	the	country’s	difficulties	are	unlikely	to	be	
found	in	the	acquisitive,	capitalist	ideology	of	Kenya’s	present	ruling	elite,	which	the	west	
is	now	going	to	such	lengths	to	support’.8	
	
	
Map	2:	Oxfam	projects	1978-1991.	1	=	Various	empowerment	work	with	churches	in	Meru,	Kitui,	Machakos	
(late	1970s);	2	=	Pilot	restocking	schemes	in	Isiolo	and	Kalabata	(1983/84);	3	=	Emergency	restocking	work	
in	 Turkana	 (1984);	 4	 =	 Emergency	 restocking	 work	 in	 Samburu	 (1984);	 5	 =	 Turkana	 water	 harvesting	
scheme/Lokitaung	 pastoral	 development	 project	 (1984/1989);	 6	 =	 Wagalla	 relief	 (1984);	 7	 =	 Kakuma	
pastoral	development	project	(1989).	
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	 Instead	of	a	traditional	‘philanthropic	approach’	in	collaboration	with	government,	
Oxfam	 continued	 to	 seek	out	 grassroots	 and	 village-level	 schemes	with	which	 to	 act	 in	
partnership.	 Odhiambo	 Anacleti,	 Assistant	 Field	 Director	 for	 Eastern	 Africa,	 noted	 that	
whereas	 the	 ‘philanthropic	 approach’	 meant	 grants	 and	 aids	 were	 often	 irrelevant	 to	
people’s	needs	or	even	‘inimical	to	the	healthy	development	of	the	productive	forces	of	
the	community’,	the	new	‘development	philosophy’	of	working	in	partnership	with	groups	
at	the	village	level	to	help	people	identify	and	find	solutions	to	their	own	problems	meant		
	
see[ing]	 ourselves	 as	 participants	 in	 the	 process	 of	 development	 to	which	we	 only	
offer	 a	 contribution,	 leaving	 the	main	 cause	 of	 development	 to	 be	 decided	 by	 the	
people	who	are	developing	themselves.9	
	
Michael	Behr,	one	of	Oxfam’s	most	senior	staff	in	Africa,	concurred,	writing	in	1979	that	
‘technical	 solutions	 to	 poverty…	 should	 not	 take	 on	 higher	 importance	 than	 social	
change’.10	Accordingly,	the	Nairobi	office	set	out	to	build	strong	links	with	church-related	
agencies	in	Meru,	Kitui	and	Machakos	(see	Map	2);	these	were	the	first	in	the	country	to	
adopt	 the	 psycho-social	 approach	 to	 development	 adapted	 from	 Freire.	 Oxfam	 also	
offered	 financial	 support	 to	 the	 co-ordinating	 body	 of	 such	 agencies,	 the	 Christian	
Development	 Education	 Service	 (CDES),	 which	 sought	 to	 encourage	 the	 ‘progressive	
ideology’	 of	 many	 Catholic	 dioceses	 in	 Kenya.11	Equally	 notable	 was	 the	 movement	 of	
‘radical’	 members	 of	 the	 ‘Catholic	 Mafia’	 into	 Oxfam	 over	 the	 next	 ten	 years.12	Yet	
although	 Oxfam’s	 tactical	 focus	 was	 now	 trained	 at	 a	 local	 level	 in	 Kenya,	 the	 state	
remained	 the	 ultimate	 strategic	 target	 of	 its	 efforts:	 as	 Behr	 admitted,	 ‘until	
governments…	take	action	themselves	then	little	positive	[outcome]	will	result’.	While	the	
organisation’s	 own	 attempts	 to	 encourage	 the	 government	 to	 take	 responsibility	 for	
																																																						
9	O.	Anacleti,	‘New	Initiative	in	Development:	Development	and	Developers	in	the	Third	World’,	4	
September,	1984,	OxA,	MS.	Oxfam	PRG/2/3/1/7	African	Field	Directors’	Conference,	1984.	
10	Behr	would	soon	take	this	approach	to	Zimbabwe,	where	he	helped	to	create	the	Organisation	of	Rural	
Associations	for	Progress	(ORAP).	M.	Behr,	‘Oxfam	in	Africa’,	July,	1979,	OxA,	MS.	Oxfam	PRG/1/3/6	Folder	
1:	May	1979	–	November	1979.	
11	‘Report	on	Eastern	Africa’,	March,	1981,	OxA,	MS.	Oxfam	PRG/1/3/7	Folder	1:	January	1981	–	July	1981.	
12	Phrase	used	by	former	Oxfam	staff	member	in	interview	with	author	no.	XII,	5	December,	2014.	See	also	
‘Kenya	Biannual	Report’,	10-11	January,	1991,	OxA,	MS.	Oxfam	PRG/3/4/12	Folder	6:	Kenya	Biannual	
Report,	November	1989	–	October	1990.	Kenyan	churches	played	a	vital	role	in	challenging	the	Moi	
regime’s	authoritarianism.	Yet	despite	it	being	well	understood	that	churches	were	the	drivers	of	critique	in	
Moi-era	Kenya,	the	collaboration	between	internal	and	external	civil	society	actors	requires	more	research.	
Because	of	its	partnership	with	radical	churches	Oxfam	would	provide	a	good	window	into	this	moment	of	
possibility;	unfortunately,	for	Oxfam,	such	research	is	not	feasible	until	project	reports	are	catalogued	in	
2017.	See	J-F.	Bayart,	‘Civil	Society	in	Africa’,	in	P.	Chabal	(ed.),	Political	Domination	in	Africa	(New	York,	
Cambridge	University	Press,	1986),	pp.	112-119;	M.	Bratton,	‘Civil	Society	and	Political	Transitions	in	Africa’,	
in	J.	Harbeson,	D.	Rothchild	and	N.	Chazan	(eds.),	Civil	Society	and	the	State	in	Africa	(Boulder,	Colo.,	Lynne	
Rienner,	1994),	pp.	52-76.	
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politically	and	economically	marginal	areas	had	failed,	it	hoped	that	‘more	notice	will	be	
taken	 if	 the	 pressure	 comes	 from	 the	 Third	 World	 itself’	 and	 that	 by	 mobilising	 local	
communities	to	challenge	the	government	it	could	force	the	latter	‘to	recognise	and	face	
up	to	their	role	and	responsibilities	in	the	development	process’.13		
Oxfam	was,	therefore,	hopeful	about	the	potential	for	work	from	the	bottom	up;	
however,	 it	 did	 not	 lionise	 the	 ‘local’	 in	 Kenya	 in	 the	 manner	 of	 later	 development	
theorists	who,	 in	 their	determination	to	condemn	the	totalising	 logic	of	 the	big	project,	
valorise	 the	 small-scale	 initiative	 in	 a	 rather	 broad-brush	 and	 uncritical	 manner. 14	
Campbell	 understood	 that	 Kenyan	 civil	 society	 was	 fragmented	 along	 ethnic	 lines	 and	
lacked	 the	 ‘spirit	 of	 altruism,	 of	 national	 consciousness	 and	 responsibility’	 present	 in	
places	 such	 as	 India:	 ‘attitudes	 towards	 development,	 indeed	 towards	 survival’,	 noted	
one	 report,	 ‘are	 much	 more	 tribally	 based’.15	Aside	 from	 displaying	 ethnic	 preference,	
many	 local	 organisations	 in	 Kenya	were	 also	 used	 as	 vehicles	 for	 elite	 accumulation.	 A	
bureaucratic	 bourgeoisie,	 finding	 itself	 under	 pressure	 as	 the	 state	 withered	 under	
structural	 adjustment,	 established	 or	 took	 control	 over	 many	 local	 NGOs	 to	 enable	 ‘a	
needed	 diversification	 of	 patronage	 resources’.16	For	 this	 reason	 Oxfam	 seconded	 Rob	
Rees	as	an	agricultural	adviser	 to	the	Catholic	diocese	of	Meru	to	help	the	organisation	
find	true	harambee	projects	as	opposed	to	the	‘help	yourself’	variant	that	was	becoming	
increasingly	 common.17	Although	 there	 was	 little	 quantifiable	 evidence	 of	 success	 –	 a	
particular	difficulty	with	empowerment	approaches	to	development	–	by	the	early	1980s	
Oxfam	was	 confident	 that	 Rees’	 efforts	 to	 encourage	 farmers	 to	 ‘form	 groups,	 identify	
problems	and	seek	solutions’	was	having	an	impact	on	the	attitudes	and	actions	of	groups	
with	whom	he	worked.	Reports	documented	 that	 farmers	were	 ‘questioning	 the	 status	
quo	 and	 putting	 pressure	 on	 local	 government	 structures’	 for	 the	 first	 time.18	A	 later	
review	 of	 Rees’	 work	with	 the	 Kamujine	 Farmers’	 Centre	 and	Women’s	 Programme	 at	
																																																						
13	M.	Behr,	‘Oxfam	in	Africa’,	July,	1979,	OxA,	MS.	Oxfam	PRG/1/3/6	Folder	1:	May	1979	–	November	1979;	
‘Report	on	Eastern	Africa’,	March,	1981,	OxA,	MS.	Oxfam	PRG/1/3/7	Folder	1:	January	1981	–	July	1981.	
14	J.	Scott,	Seeing	Like	a	State:	How	Certain	Schemes	to	Improve	the	Human	Condition	Have	Failed,	(Yale	
University	Press,	1998);	cf.	Crewe	and	Harrison,	Whose	Development?,	p.	171.	
15	‘Annual	Report,	Kenya	and	South	Sudan’,	26	August,	1983,	OxA,	MS.	Oxfam	PRG/1/3/9	Folder	2:	July	1983	
–	October	1983.	
16	Julie	Hearn	quotes	one	donor	who	explained	that	‘there	are	basically	four	ways	of	making	money	in	
Kenya	–	coffee,	tea,	tourism	and	aid	–	and	since	the	first	three	are	spoken	for,	the	last	remains	the	only	
option’.	Hearn,	‘African	NGOs:	The	New	Compradors?’,	p.	1103.	See	also	I.	Gary,	‘Confrontation,	Co-
operation	or	Co-optation:	NGOs	and	the	Ghanaian	State	during	Structural	Adjustment’,	Review	of	African	
Political	Economy,	Vol.	68	(1996),	p.	163;	Dicklitch,	The	Elusive	Promise	of	NGOs	in	Africa,	p.	18.	
17	‘Report	on	Eastern	Africa’,	May,	1978,	OxA,	MS.	Oxfam	PRG/1/3/5	Folder	2:	January	1978	–	January	1979.	
18	‘Report	on	Eastern	Africa’,	March,	1981,	OxA,	MS.	Oxfam	PRG/1/3/7	Folder	1:	January	1981	–	July	1981.	
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Meru	noted	that	the	group	had	successfully	pressed	local	government	staff	into	enforcing	
agricultural	regulations	for	the	benefit	of	small	farmers.19	
	 Yet	 just	 as	 empowerment	 work	 was	 gaining	 ground	 in	 many	 radical	 dioceses	
across	 Kenya,	 the	 authoritarian	Moi	 regime	 clamped	 down	 on	 civil	 society	 activity	 and	
sought	to	entrench	state	control	over	Kenyan	development.	As	described	in	chapter	one,	
Moi	 used	 the	 failed	 coup	 attempt	 of	 1982	 to	 justify	 dismantling	 opposition	 to	 his	
government,	 and	 thus	 civil	 society	 actors	 who	 promoted	 ‘foreign	 ideologies’	 like	
empowerment	 faced	 the	 threat	 of	 torture	 and	 imprisonment. 20 	Indeed,	 Campbell	
reported	 in	1983	that	at	 least	one	Oxfam	partner	was	arrested	at	the	time	of	the	coup,	
taken	 to	 a	 provincial	 jail	 and	 tortured	 using	 electric	 shocks.21	However,	 perhaps	 more	
concerning	 for	Moi	 than	 ‘evil’	 ideologies	was	 the	 fact	 that	members	of	NGOs	and	 local	
organisations	 were	 primed	 to	 shed	 light	 on	 his	 attempt	 to	 reorient	 the	 development	
priorities	 of	 the	 Kenyan	 state	 towards	 his	 ethno-regional	 support	 base.	 At	 a	 time	 of	
structural	 adjustment	 and	 reduced	 levels	 of	 patronage,	 revelations	 concerning	 the	
skewed	 nature	 of	 Kenyan	 development	 would	 have	 posed	 a	 threat	 to	 Moi’s	 hitherto	
unchallenged	ability	to	direct	state	resources.	Hence	the	President	attempted	to	silence	
criticism	of	his	development	agenda	through	intimidation.	Meanwhile,	numerous	donor-
led	 drives	 to	 document	 district-level	 government	 spending	 or	 to	 chart	 the	 status	 and	
location	 of	 all	 public	 infrastructure	 projects	 –	 both	 of	 which	 made	 transparent	 the	
informal	 and	murky	 budgetary	 allocation	 process	 and	 the	 relationship	 between	 ethnic	
interests	 and	public	 sector	 investment	 –	were	mothballed	 in	 the	 1980s	under	 pressure	
from	the	Ministry	of	Finance	and	the	Ministry	of	Planning	and	Economic	Development.22		
	 At	the	same	time,	 local	and	international	NGOs	posed	a	more	latent,	but	no	less	
dangerous,	 threat	 to	 the	 legitimacy	 of	 the	 state	 itself.	 Chapter	 two	 demonstrated	 that	
during	 the	 Kenyatta	 era	 of	 stable	 economic	 growth	 and	 increasing	 bilateral	 aid	 flows,	
NGOs	were	regarded	as	a	complement	to	the	developmental	state.	In	contrast,	during	the	
early	 1980s	 Kenyan	 growth	 stalled,	 structural	 adjustment	 conditionalities	 pared	 away	
parts	of	 the	state,	and	donors	became	 increasingly	convinced	that	routing	their	 funding	
through	NGOs	was	an	 improvement	on	bilateral	 agreements	with	 corrupt	 governments	
																																																						
19	‘Kamujene	Farmers’	Centre	and	Women’s	Programme	–	Meru	District’,	July,	1987,	OxA,	MS.	Oxfam	
COM/2/9/9	Folder	11.	
20	‘Annual	Report,	Kenya	and	South	Sudan’,	26	August,	1983,	OxA,	MS.	Oxfam	PRG/1/3/9	Folder	2:	July	1983	
–	October	1983.	
21	‘Annual	Report,	Kenya	and	South	Sudan’,	26	August,	1983,	OxA,	MS.	Oxfam	PRG/1/3/9	Folder	2:	July	1983	
–	October	1983.	
22	Cohen,	Ethnicity,	Foreign	Aid,	and	Economic	Growth,	pp.	18-19.	
		 163	
unable	 to	 fulfil	 basic	 tasks.23	As	 a	 consequence,	 while	 NGOs	 flourished,	 the	 Kenyan	
government	was	struggling	to	fulfil	rising	expectations.	In	a	nation	whose	legitimacy	was	
bound	 tightly	 with	 the	 ability	 of	 the	 state	 to	 deliver	 development	 and	 services	 to	 the	
wananchi,	this	was	politically	dangerous	for	the	ruling	elite.	Government	sensitivity	was,	
no	 doubt,	 piqued	 further	 by	 the	 fact	 that	 NGOs	 like	 Oxfam	 still	 relied	 heavily	 on	
expatriate	 staff.24	As	 the	 decade	 wore	 on,	 the	 development	 space	 in	 Kenya	 became	
increasingly	politicised.25	A	confidential	letter	from	the	Chief	Secretary	at	the	Office	of	the	
President	 reveals	 one	 attempt	 to	 maintain	 control	 over	 the	 rhetoric	 surrounding	
development	 interventions.	 Written	 to	 all	 Permanent	 Secretaries	 and	 Provincial	
Commissioners,	 the	 letter	 sought	 to	 ‘draw	 your	 attention	 to	 an	 undesirable	 practice…	
which	must	be	stopped	for	the	sake	of	good	image	of	the	Government	[sic]’.	The	author	
urged	government	officers	to	stop	embarrassing	the	government	by	referring	to	foreign	
aid	 in	 a	 manner	 that	 suggested	 that	 the	 funds	 or	 materials	 donated	 belonged	 to	 the	
donors	and	not	the	government.	‘The	credit	given	to	the	donors’,	the	letter	fulminated,	‘is	
superfluous	 and	 unjustified.	 It	 should	 be	 understood	 that	 funds	 and	 equipment,	 once	
borrowed	 or	 donated,	 belong	 to	 the	Government’.	 The	 author	 advised	 that	 individuals	
who	initiate	projects	using	a	bank	loan	do	not	credit	the	bank	if	the	project	turns	out	to	
be	a	success:	‘the	credit	for	success…	goes	to	the	borrower	and	not	to	the	bank’.	In	such	a	
way,	 he	 reasoned,	 credit	 for	 projects	 funded	 by	 donors	 should	 always	 go	 to	 the	
government.26	
	 As	 well	 as	 attempting	 to	 control	 the	 rhetoric	 surrounding	 foreign	 aid,	 the	
government	 looked	to	establish	more	concrete	ways	of	controlling	NGO	 inputs.	 In	1983	
the	 state	 forced	NGOs	 to	 re-register	 their	 operations	 in	what	 one	 interviewee	 called	 a	
‘clumsy	effort	to	get	a	grip	of	NGOs’.27	The	District	Focus	for	Rural	Development	(DFRD)	
																																																						
23	Structural	adjustment	programmes,	of	course,	undermined	the	ability	of	the	state	to	deliver	its	basic	
functions.	
24	Oxfam’s	first	Kenyan	Assistant	Field	Director	was	hired	only	in	1983,	and	soon	left	under	acrimonious	
circumstances.	There	was	no	Kenyan	Field	Director	(or	Country	Representative	as	it	was	then	known)	until	
1999.	The	lack	of	Kenyan	staff	contrasts	markedly	with	the	situation	in	Tanzania,	where	locals	were	much	
more	heavily	involved	in	the	management	of	the	NGO	by	the	mid-1980s.	According	to	one	interviewee,	this	
helps	to	explain	the	level	of	tension	between	Oxfam	and	the	Kenya	government	during	this	period.	
Interview	with	author	no.	V,	12	January,	2015;	Interview	with	author	no.	XI,	4	December,	2014;	Interview	
with	author	no.	VIII,	6	November,	2014;	‘From	Ideas	to	Reality:	The	Work	of	Oxfam’s	Programme	Officers	in	
Kenya’,	January	1990,	OxA,	MS.	Oxfam	COM/2/9/9	Folder	11.	
25	Kanyinga,	‘The	Politics	of	Development	Space	in	Kenya’,	in	Semboja	and	Therkildsen	(eds.),	Service	
Provision	under	Stress,	p.	70.	
26	‘Statements	on	Foreign	Aid	by	Government	Officers’,	21	January,	1983,	KNA,	Development	General,	
BB/13/33.	
27	Interview	with	author	no.	V,	12	January,	2015.	
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initiative	also	sought	to	integrate	NGO	activities	into	development	frameworks	created	by	
government	 officials	 in	 District	 Development	 Committees	 (DDCs).	 Under	 DFRD,	 NGOs	
were	required	to	attend	DDCs	and	subordinate	committees	and	NGO	activities	required	
DDC	 approval.28	A	 government	 seminar	 on	 DFRD	 spoke	 of	 the	 need	 for	 DDCs	 to	 ‘be	
conversant	with	and	monitor	 the	progress	of	all	 the	projects	 that	are	 foreign	funded	or	
aided’,	 and	 reminded	 officials	 that	 ‘money	 for	 foreign	 projects	 should	 be	 channelled	
through	the	district	treasuries…’.29	Many	NGOs	saw	this	not	only	as	a	blatant	power	grab	
by	 the	 government,	 but	 also	 as	 an	 attempt	 to	 interfere	with	 development	 activities	 to	
neutralise	 their	 emancipatory	 content	 while	 redirecting	 them	 towards	 politically	
important	 regions	 and	 constituencies.30	In	 the	 prevailing	 atmosphere,	 however,	 Oxfam	
and	its	development	partners	were	careful	to	use	only	a	‘mild	version	of	Freirian	dialogue	
and	 to	 not	 take	 too	 ‘political’	 an	 approach	 ‘for	 fear	 of	 antagonising	 the	 increasingly	
sensitive	 government’.31	Nonetheless,	 the	 CDES	 –	 Oxfam’s	 partner	 as	 regards	 Catholic	
development	 interventions	 –	 was	 forced	 to	 disband	 in	 1983	 following	 government	
‘investigations’	 into	 its	 activities	 during	 the	 coup	 attempt.	 Alan	 Fowler	 argues	 that	 the	
success	of	the	CDES	in	changing	the	attitudes	of	Kenyans	and	highlighting	the	injustices	of	
the	development	system	using	Freirian	methods	simply	posed	too	much	of	a	threat	to	the	
state.32	The	government	clampdown	on	Catholic	priests	and	increased	state	surveillance	
necessarily	 ‘put	a	brake	on’	Oxfam’s	 ‘radical’	work	with	 the	churches.	According	 to	one	
interviewee,	 very	 few	 agencies	 were	 properly	 subversive,	 but	 they	 were	 seen	 as	
threatening	 by	 a	 government	 racked	 with	 paranoia.33	It	 was,	 therefore,	 pragmatic	 for	
Oxfam	not	to	be	too	closely	associated	with	such	‘dangerous’	elements.	
If	empowerment	work	was	becoming	increasingly	treacherous	 in	Kenya,	this	was	
not	 necessarily	 an	 occasion	 for	 regret	 for	 Oxfam’s	 Field	 Director,	 who	 was	 less	 than	
enamoured	 with	 the	 idea	 as	 expressed	 by	 ‘intellectuals’	 from	 Oxford	 with	 little	
understanding	 of	 work	 in	 the	 field.	 Indeed,	 soon	 after	 his	 arrival	 in	 Africa,	 Campbell	
criticised	 Oxfam’s	 tactical	 approach	 to	 Kenya	 as	 misconceived	 and	 based	 on	 a	 faulty	
																																																						
28	Kanyinga,	‘The	Politics	of	Development	Space	in	Kenya’,	in	Semboja	and	Therkildsen	(eds.),	Service	
Provision	under	Stress,	pp.	76-77.	
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May,	1984,	KNA,	Development	General,	BB/13/33.	
30	Kanyinga,	‘The	Politics	of	Development	Space	in	Kenya’,	in	Semboja	and	Therkildsen	(eds.),	Service	
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31	‘Annual	Report,	Kenya	and	South	Sudan	1982-83’,	26	August,	1983,	OxA,	MS.	Oxfam	PRG/1/3/9	Folder	2:	
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optimism,	present	from	the	start	of	its	work	in	Kenya,	that	Oxfam	could	be	a	‘catalyst’	in	
the	process	of	social	change.34	In	contrast	to	Behr	and	Anacleti,	Campbell	felt	that	‘there	
are	many	groups	who	want	advice	from	really	experienced	agriculturalists	and	who	would	
benefit	from	small	inputs	we	could	provide,	rather	than	the	less	specific	approach,	based	
on	Freirian	dialogue,’	pursued	by	Rob	Rees	in	Meru.35	Seeking	to	provide	an	antidote	‘to	
the	 epidemics	 of	 megalomania	 and	 naïveté	 which	 from	 time	 to	 time	 sweep	 through	
Banbury	Road	and	our	Field	Offices’,	he	reminded	his	colleagues	that	Oxfam	was	a	small	
agency	 in	 a	 part	 of	 the	 world	 where	 size	 was	 a	 crucial	 factor.	 Moreover,	 since	 Field	
Directors	still	 retained	a	great	deal	of	 influence	 in	their	respective	geographical	spheres	
(both	because	they	had	their	feet	on	the	ground	and	because	control	was	more	difficult	in	
an	 age	 of	 telex	 and	 infrequent	 telephone	 conversation),	 Campbell	 had	 the	 freedom	 to	
shape	 the	 Kenya	 programme	 in	 a	 more	 ‘technical’	 direction.	 An	 unfolding	 drought	
situation	in	Turkana	provided	the	opportunity	to	do	so,	and	strengthened	the	position	of	
those	who	 advocated	 technical	 inputs	 ahead	 of	 conscientisation.	 As	 two	 of	 Campbell’s	
contemporaries	observed,	although	conscientisation	and	empowerment	were	important,	
Oxfam	could	not	turn	its	back	on	immediate	need	‘as	some	in	the	organisation	seemed	to	
think’:	empowerment	‘to	be	able	to	watch	livestock	die	because	there	are	no	functioning	
vet	services’	was	not	really	empowerment	at	all.36		
	
	
	
‘ANIMALS OF STRANGERS’ 
 
In	the	1983-84	drought,	over	80	per	cent	of	cattle	and	small	stock	(goats	and	sheep)	and	
40	 per	 cent	 of	 camels	 died	 in	 Turkana,	 forcing	 80,000	 pastoralists	 –	 around	 half	 the	
population	 –	 to	 head	 for	 famine	 camps.37	Yet	 if	 Campbell	was	 to	 put	 a	more	 technical	
approach	 into	action	 in	 response	 to	 this	 crisis,	 he	 faced	a	 significant	problem:	with	 the	
exception	of	 religious	groups	 (who	often	attempted	to	proselytise	using	offers	of	stock)	
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1:	March	1982	–	July	1982.	
35	‘Annual	Report	for	Kenya,	Sudan	and	Uganda,	1981/82’,	22	July,	1982,	OxA,	MS.	Oxfam	PRG/1/3/8	Folder	
1:	March	1982	–	July	1982.	
36	Interview	with	author	no.	V,	12	January,	2015;	Interview	with	author	no.	VI,	1	September,	2014.	
37	R.	Hogg,	‘The	New	Pastoralism:	Poverty	and	Dependency	in	Northern	Kenya’,	Africa:	Journal	of	the	
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there	were	no	established	 local	 groups	 through	whom	Oxfam	could	work	 in	 Turkana.38	
Direct	 collaboration	 with	 the	 authoritarian	 Moi	 state	 was,	 predictably,	 considered	
inappropriate,	 particularly	 since	 the	 government	was	more	 concerned	with	 securing	 its	
own	 position	 than	 with	 providing	 relief	 during	 drought	 to	 bothersome	 pastoralists.39	
Furthermore,	Campbell	was	sceptical	of	the	value	of	previous	Oxfam	efforts	alongside	the	
state	in	Turkana	and	hired	external	consultants	to	advise	on	the	best	way	forward	for	the	
organisation	in	the	region.	These	consultants	helped	to	convince	Campbell	(and	Oxfam	as	
a	whole)	that	its	work	in	Turkana,	centred	as	it	was	on	settlement	and	irrigation,	had	in	
fact	 contributed	 to	 the	 destruction	 of	 pastoral	 systems.	 As	 Brian	 Hartley	 outlined	 at	 a	
Field	 Directors’	 meeting	 in	 late	 1982,	 the	 continued	 marginalisation	 and	
underdevelopment	of	pastoral	regions	could	be	traced	back	to	
	
prejudices	against	nomads	and	the	nomadic	way	of	life	through	the	misguided	belief	
that	sedentary	livestock	operations	are	preferable,	and	the	desire	of	Government	to	
control	 the	 people	 and	 offer	 them	 social	 services…	 backed	 by	 outside	 influences…	
such	as	Non-Governmental	Organizations.40	
	
The	meeting	criticised	the	‘fallacy	of	the	“settle	the	nomad”	policy’	(when	survival	in	the	
region	depended	on	mobility),	the	adverse	effect	of	government	sponsored	development	
projects	 to	 create	 irrigation	 schemes	 (which	 ‘destroy	 strategic	 dry	 season	 grazing	
reserves’),	 the	 ‘negative	 attitude	 of	 Government	 officials	 to	 the	 needs	 of	 nomadic	 and	
semi-nomadic	 groups’,	 and	 the	 introduction	 of	 new	 water	 points	 (which	 attracted	
sedentary	populations	and	destroyed	rangeland).41	The	meeting	concluded	that	Turkana	
had	been	‘messed	up	by	earlier	aid	policies’,	and	that	Oxfam	had	helped	cause	disarray	in	
the	 region.42	As	 Campbell	wrote	 later,	 ‘archaic	 and	 troublesome	 relics	 as	 they	 seem	 to	
many	 modern	 Kenyans,	 [pastoralists]	 are	 in	 many	 ways	 the	 best	 equipped	 to	 exploit	
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[northern	 Kenya]’. 43 	The	 Kenya	 government’s	 continued	 commitment	 to	 ‘disastrous’	
irrigation	schemes	and	settlement	–	the	theme	of	Wajir’s	agricultural	show	opened	by	the	
Provincial	 Commissioner	 in	 1984	 was	 ‘discouraging	 nomadism’	 –	 thus	 provided	 yet	
another	 reason	 for	 Oxfam	 to	 avoid	 direct	 partnership	 with	 the	 state.44	The	 impact	 of	
conscientisation	ideology	on	Oxfam	also	ensured	that	its	staff	understood	more	clearly	by	
this	 point	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 state	 had	 a	 vested	 interest	 in	 stigmatising	 pastoralists	 as	
backward	 in	order	to	 justify	 intervention	‘in	the	name	of	“development”’,	whereas	they	
actually	‘aimed	at	controlling	or	changing	or	destroying	them’.45	In	truth,	Campbell	wrote,	
while	 the	government’s	Arid	and	Semi-Arid	Lands	paper	of	1979	 focused	on	settlement	
and	 alternatives	 to	 pastoralism,	 ‘lurking	 in	 the	 minds	 of	 the	 policy	 makers	 and	 other	
powerful	people	is	often	the	intention	to	take	eventually	the	land	[sic]	out	of	the	hands	of	
the	pastoralists	altogether	and	for	it	to	be	ranched	by	others’.46	
Consequently,	 the	Field	Director	concluded	that	 if	Oxfam	wanted	to	support	 the	
pastoral	 sector	 as	 the	most	 appropriate	 way	 of	 life	 in	 the	 region,	 it	 had	 to	 undertake	
intervention	 alone	 and	 become	operational.	 In	 the	 context	 of	 drought	 and	widespread	
livestock	 deaths,	 the	 first	 major	 intervention	 that	 Oxfam	 initiated	 aimed	 to	 restock	
destitute	pastoralists	 to	enable	 them	to	return	 to	 the	pastoral	 sector.	Campbell	did	not	
consider	 that	Oxfam	could	act	as	 the	saviour	of	pastoralism,	however;	 rather,	 following	
the	thread	which	runs	through	all	of	Oxfam’s	work	 in	Kenya	to	this	point,	he	wished	to	
provide	an	example	that	the	government	could	follow.	Indeed,	he	outlined	clearly	that	if	
successful	 in	 this	 ‘radical	departure	 from	most	hitherto	 tried	and	 implemented	pastoral	
development	programmes’	 –	which	had	made	pastoralists	 ‘more	not	 less	 vulnerable	 to	
drought’	–	Oxfam	would	‘try	to	persuade	the	government…	that	it	should	be	adopted	on	a	
wider	 scale’.47	Thus	 although	 no	 longer	 working	 directly	 with	 the	 state,	 Oxfam	 and	 its	
staff	 retained	 hope	 that	 its	 restocking	 effort	 would	 influence	 the	 state	 as	 the	 central	
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stakeholder	 for	 development	 in	 the	 country:	 tactical	 change	 only	 partially	 disguised	
strategic	continuity,	therefore.	
Pastoralists	 do,	 of	 course,	 maintain	 their	 own	 ‘traditional’	 restocking	 networks.	
Unfortunately,	these	are	less	efficient	in	severe	drought	or	famine	situations	when	stock	
levels	drop	precipitously	and	obligations	to	fellow	pastoralists	are	relaxed.	Moreover,	as	
commercialisation	and	settlement	 took	 root	 in	 this	period	 (inspired	by	government	and	
development	 agency	 interventions),	 a	 divergence	 between	 rich	 and	 poor	 pastoralists	
became	 increasingly	 marked.	 This	 stratification	 helped	 to	 undermine	 traditional	
restocking	networks,	as	wealthier	pastoralists	were	much	better	 insulated	from	disaster	
and	more	 capable	 of	 ignoring	 calls	 to	 help	 fellow	 pastoralists	 (which	were	 always	 to	 a	
certain	extent	based	on	reciprocity).48	As	Richard	Hogg	–	an	anthropologist	affiliated	with	
the	Overseas	 Development	 Institute	 –	 reported	 to	Oxfam	 in	 1980,	 Boran	 in	 Isiolo	with	
over	1,000	stock	did	not	look	to	help	friends	or	relatives	as	earlier	traditions	of	reciprocity	
and	 the	 collective	 pooling	 of	 risk	 had	 corroded.49	Following	 Hogg’s	 advice,	 therefore,	
Oxfam	established	a	pilot	restocking	project	in	Isiolo	in	September	1983.	The	programme	
aimed	 to	 encourage	 70	 families	 to	move	 out	 from	 the	Malka	Dakaa	 irrigation	 scheme,	
where	overstocking	and	an	acute	dependence	on	subsidies	had	become	prevalent	after	
the	 FAO	 and	 UNDP	 withdrew	 in	 1980.50 	The	 organisation	 noted	 that	 the	 irrigation	
schemes	had	 failed	without	 traditional	 restocking	 taking	 their	place	and	 recognised	 the	
importance	of	supporting	traditional	mechanisms	of	stock	redistribution.	Thus	each	of	the	
70	families	chosen	for	restocking	by	the	project	leader	received	50	small	stock	as	a	gift.	In	
such	 a	 way	 Oxfam	 hoped	 to	 repair	 at	 least	 some	 of	 the	 ‘harm	 done	 by...	 expensive	
blunders’	in	the	region.51	The	scheme	would	cost	on	average	around	£800	per	family,	or	
one-fifteenth	 of	 the	 cost	 of	 irrigation	 schemes. 52 	Families	 were	 also	 given	 maize	
(contributed	by	WFP)	 to	hold	off	 stock	sales	by	meeting	 food	needs	 for	 long	enough	to	
allow	each	flock	the	time	to	increase	in	number.	In	May	1984	(likely	before	it	was	possible	
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to	 fully	evaluate	 the	success	of	 the	pilot	 scheme),	 the	 Isiolo	 restocking	programme	was	
replicated	in	Kalabata,	Turkana:	there,	ten	families	received	70	small	stock	each.53	
To	 put	 these	 efforts	 in	 perspective,	 however,	 over	 11,000	 families	 were	 still	
registered	at	government	food-for-work	sites	in	Turkana	alone.	Accordingly,	the	tentative	
evidence	 coming	 out	 from	 Isiolo	 that	 restocked	 families	 had	 severed	 ‘their	 long	
dependence	 on	 food	 aid’	 and	 moved	 back	 into	 the	 pastoral	 sector	 was	 enough	 to	
convince	the	Field	Director	and	his	external	consultants	that	a	more	ambitious	restocking	
programme	could,	and	should,	be	undertaken	in	Turkana.	The	programme	drawn	up	for	
acceptance	by	Oxford	in	July	1984	was	on	a	much	larger	scale	than	the	pilot	schemes:	it	
aimed	to	restock	500	families	over	two	years	with	flocks	of	50	small	stock.	The	restocked	
families	were	encouraged	not	to	sell	or	gift	stock	to	other	pastoralists,	but	to	use	them	
only	 to	 re-establish	 themselves	 in	 the	 pastoral	 sector.	 The	 cost	 of	 the	 programme,	
£124,750,	 was	 much	 greater	 than	 any	 previous	 Oxfam	 intervention	 in	 Kenya	 and	 was	
particularly	significant	since	the	government,	‘deprived	of	funds	in	the	public	sector,	[was]	
able	to	do	very	little’	in	the	region.54	Though	small	in	scale	when	looked	at	from	a	broader	
national	development	perspective,	Oxfam	 thus	had	a	 considerable	presence	 in	pastoral	
areas	like	Turkana,	where	its	finances,	organisational	capacity,	skills	and	knowledge	(built	
up	 as	 one	 of	 very	 few	 agencies	 present	 there	 over	 the	 longer-term)	 were	 in	 great	
demand.	 Moreover,	 along	 with	 other	 operational	 programmes	 (discussed	 below)	 the	
scheme	 helped	 to	 push	 Oxfam	 spending	 in	 Kenya	 to	 over	 £500,000	 for	 the	 year.	 This	
marked	a	significant	departure	for	the	organisation	in	scale	and	operationality,	but	given	
the	 emergency	 circumstances,	 the	 Africa	 Committee	 approved	 the	 application	 without	
much	comment.55	
Yet	as	the	programme	got	underway,	the	difficulty	of	restocking	even	500	of	the	
11,000	destitute	Turkana	families	became	apparent,	and	a	year	into	the	effort	Campbell	
admitted	 that	 200	 was	 a	 more	 realistic	 target.	 Even	 to	 reach	 this	 smaller	 target	 the	
scheme	 required	 a	 cash	 injection	 of	 over	 £50,000,	 taking	 the	 overall	 cost	 to	 £176,975.	
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This	more	than	tripled	the	cost	per	family	from	just	under	£250	to	over	£880.	The	Africa	
Committee	 accepted,	 with	 some	 reluctance,	 the	 high	 per	 capita	 cost	 (which,	 in	 fact,	
worked	out	about	the	same	as	the	 Isiolo	project),	but	noted	that	this	 leniency	was	only	
because	 the	 scheme	 was	 regarded	 as	 an	 essential	 pilot	 initiative.56	The	 target	 of	 200	
families	was	 finally	 reached	 in	April	 1986.57	Nonetheless,	 compared	with	 Isiolo	–	where	
the	beneficiaries	were	 fairly	easy	 to	select	due	 to	 the	 failure	of	 the	 irrigation	scheme	–	
selection	of	beneficiaries	 in	Turkana	had	proved	much	more	difficult	due	to	the	scale	of	
the	district	and	the	scale	of	the	problem.	Furthermore,	although	the	animals	were	given	
directly	 to	 pastoralists	 by	 Oxfam	 and	 were	 called	 ‘Ngiberen	 Ngimoi’	 (‘animals	 of	
strangers’),	 local	 stock	were	 identifiable	 and	 came	with	 a	 history,	meaning	 there	were	
numerous	 claims	 and	 counter-claims	 against	 restocked	 animals.	Often,	 questions	 arose	
over	whether	 there	 remained	 any	 obligation	 (either	 in	 stock	 or	 in	 other	 resources)	 on	
behalf	of	the	restocked	pastoralist	towards	the	person	who	had	sold	their	stock	to	Oxfam.	
As	the	project	expanded	these	problems	became	more	acute:	chiefs,	local	Councillors	and	
MPs	 all	 became	 involved	 in	 selection,	 and	 there	 were	 frequent	 allegations	 that	 the	
recipients	of	stock	were	not	sufficiently	destitute	to	require	restocking.	The	involvement	
of	 these	 interested	parties	helped	 to	 confuse	 issues	of	ownership	and	 control	over	 the	
stock	even	further,	and	uncertainty	over	the	way	the	progeny	of	restocked	animals	could	
be	used	restricted	attempts	to	reconstruct	reciprocal	relations	with	wealthier	households.	
Finally,	 Oxfam’s	 inbuilt	 ideological	 bias	 to	 ‘bet	 on	 the	 weak’	 (by	 discouraging	 those	
restocked	 from	 selling	 or	 gifting	 their	 stock	 to	 others)	 also	meant	 that	 the	 constraints	
placed	on	pastoralists	were	 far	 from	 ‘traditional’.	 Consequently,	 even	a	 few	years	 later	
only	 a	 small	 number	 of	 the	 original	 ‘restockees’	 were	 able	 to	 fully	 sustain	 themselves	
using	restocked	herds	alone:	most	 relied	on	 food	aid	as	a	supplement	to	pastoralism;	a	
quarter	returned	to	the	settlement	areas.58	
Regardless	of	these	setbacks	and	disappointments,	the	realisation	that	pastoralists	
had	descended	from	‘conjunctural’	to	‘structural’	poverty	–	a	decline	earlier	development	
efforts	 had	 helped	 to	 encourage	 –	 ensured	 that	 Oxfam	 considered	 the	 schemes	 a	
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worthwhile	 effort.59	Hence,	 the	organisation	 started	 another	 operational	 programme	 in	
Samburu	 in	 July	 1984.	 On	 this	 occasion,	 rather	 than	 attempting	 to	 reintegrate	 the	
destitute	into	pastoralism,	Oxfam	first	concentrated	on	emergency	destocking	to	enable	
pastoralists	 to	 exchange	 their	 dying	 stock	 for	 food.	 The	 animals	were	 then	 slaughtered	
and	the	meat	distributed	locally,	with	the	hides	and	skins	sold	in	Nairobi	to	help	support	
the	 scheme.	 These	 sales	 helped	 restrict	 the	 overall	 cost	 of	 the	 destocking	 effort	 to	
£27,765.	 As	 the	 rains	 improved	 in	 late	 1984,	 destocking	 was	 no	 longer	 considered	
appropriate,	and	so	Oxfam	shifted	to	restocking	pastoralists	using	an	emergency	grant	of	
£51,680.	 The	 organisation	 distributed	 surplus	 animals	 (exchanged	 for	 maize)	 to	 those	
without	stock,	but	the	arrangement	took	the	form	of	a	loan	from	Oxfam	to	the	pastoralist	
in	order	to	stop	the	latter	killing	or	redistributing	animals	as	soon	as	they	were	received.	
The	 ‘loan’	was	 to	be	 repaid	after	 two	and	a	half	 years	and	 the	 repayments	were	 to	be	
used	to	restock	other	families.60	In	correspondence	with	Oxford,	Campbell	noted	that	the	
programme	was	the	only	substantial	NGO	intervention	in	the	district	at	the	time,	and	he	
soon	 requested	over	 £200,000	 in	 additional	 funding	 in	 order	 to	meet	 the	needs	of	 the	
region.	On	this	occasion,	the	Africa	Committee	was	disinclined	to	provide	the	requested	
grant	in	full.	Indeed,	some	members	felt	the	emergency	grants	procedure	had	been	used	
to	 try	 to	 pre-empt	 the	 Committee’s	 decision	 on	 further	 support,	 since	 without	 such	
support,	the	original	emergency	grant	would	have	been	wasted.61	Additional	funding	for	
Samburu	restocking	was,	therefore,	restricted	to	£131,384	and	delayed	until	early	1986.62	
By	 late	 1987,	 186	 pastoralist	 families	 had	 been	 successfully	 restocked.63	Nevertheless,	
later	 reviews	 of	 the	 Samburu	 restocking	 effort	 would	 record	 that	 only	 20	 per	 cent	 of	
those	restocked	returned	all	the	loaned	animals	and	only	one	third	of	animals	had	been	
returned	overall,	which	limited	the	second	round	of	restocking.64	
Notwithstanding	the	determination	to	make	a	success	of	the	restocking	projects,	
Oxfam	did	not	focus	exclusively	on	facilitating	the	exchange	of	stock	during	this	period.	In	
Turkana	a	two-year	project	to	demonstrate	rainwater	harvesting	for	sorghum	cultivation	
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was	established	alongside	the	restocking	effort	in	1984.	The	project,	which	cost	£45,640,	
aimed	to	build	on	Turkana	knowledge	of	sorghum	cultivation	in	‘gardens’	(located	in	wet	
season	 grazing	 grounds)	 to	 supplement	 pastoral	 income.	 Oxfam	 hoped	 that	 the	
cultivation	of	sorghum,	a	traditional	Turkana	activity,	would	help	the	poorest	pastoralists	
avoid	the	vicious	circle	during	drought	whereby:	stock	are	sold	for	food,	the	value	of	stock	
plummets	 as	 more	 and	more	 animals	 flood	 the	 market,	 pastoralists	 are	 forced	 to	 sell	
more	 animals	 to	 survive,	 and	 eventually	 they	 become	 stockless	 and	 destitute.	 The	
Turkana	 traditionally	planted	 the	 sorghum	crop	after	 the	 first	 substantial	 rainfall	of	 the	
year	 and	 then	 (because	 it	 was	 fast-maturing)	 harvested	 before	 the	 pastoralists	moved	
away	 from	 the	 area. 65 	Rainwater	 harvesting	 would,	 Oxfam	 believed,	 improve	 the	
reliability	 of	 sorghum	 cropping.66	However,	 the	 project	 had	 limited	 impact:	 only	 100	
hectares	of	land	received	any	benefit,	while	yields	varied	hugely	depending	on	rainfall.67	
Indeed,	 despite	 Oxfam’s	 best	 efforts,	 its	 projects	 and	 programmes	 in	 pastoral	
areas	were	on	such	a	small	scale	relative	to	the	problems	of	pastoralism	that	their	direct	
impact	was	always	likely	to	be	minimal:	‘perhaps’,	as	one	interviewee	concluded,	‘it	was	
unrealistic	 to	wish	 to	 re-establish	pastoralists’	old	way	of	 life’.68	Oxfam	staff	were	more	
disappointed	 by	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 schemes	 seemed	 to	 have	 little	 impact	 on	 the	
government’s	 attitude	 to	 pastoralists:	 they	 recalled	 that	 the	 government’s	
embarrassment	 about	 these	 ‘primitives’	 continued	 to	 grow	 during	 this	 period,	 and	
government	 officials	 still	 articulated	 openly	 their	 desire	 to	 see	 pastoralists	 settled	 and	
modernised.	These	officials	were,	though,	content	for	Oxfam	to	continue	to	work	towards	
rehabilitating	a	small	number	of	pastoralists,	since	although	Oxfam’s	 interventions	were	
not	on	a	scale	to	pose	any	real	challenge	to	state	legitimacy	they	helped	to	cover	for	the	
government’s	 lacklustre	 response	 to	 the	 crisis.69	The	 government’s	 own	 project	 in	 the	
region,	 the	 Turkana	 Rehabilitation	 Project,	 consisted	 largely	 of	 a	 quick-fix	 food	
distribution	and	was	manipulated	by	government	officers	for	personal	and	political	gain.70	
Its	 funding	 from	 the	 European	 Community	 was	 withdrawn	 in	 the	 late	 1980s	 after	
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revelations	of	gross	mismanagement	and	fraud.71	Similarly,	 the	Oxfam	schemes	brought	
in	resources,	which	chiefs	and	MPs	hoped	to	appropriate	either	physically	or	rhetorically	
(by	 claiming	 credit	 for	 Oxfam’s	 work)	 for	 use	 in	 consolidating	 their	 political	 support-
base.72	Thus	 Oxfam’s	 Turkana	 restocking	 project	 for	 a	 time	 garnered	 a	 ‘high	 political	
profile’	as	MPs	tried	(without	success)	to	force	the	expulsion	of	expatriate	consultants	in	
an	attempt	to	control	the	distribution	effort.73	
	
	
	
‘OUR VOICE DOES NOT EVEN AMOUNT TO A WHISPER’ 
 
Although	Oxfam’s	operational	 projects	 in	Kenya	were	 small	 in	 relation	 to	 the	problems	
facing	 pastoralism,	 they	 were,	 nonetheless,	 large	 enough	 to	 present	 something	 of	 a	
departure	from	the	normal	mode	of	operations	for	the	organisation.	As	shown	in	Figure	
7,	Oxfam	 spending	 in	 Kenya	 increased	markedly	 in	 nominal	 terms,	more	 than	doubling	
from	around	£225,000	in	1983-84	to	over	£500,000	in	1984-85.	Deflated	to	1974	values	in	
order	to	compare	with	Oxfam’s	earlier	efforts,	the	jump	is	no	less	dramatic,	and	though	it	
reveals	 that	 the	 scale	 of	 the	 spending	 did	 not	match	 the	 peaks	 in	 the	 optimism	of	 the	
1960s,	it	demonstrates	that	Oxfam	was	still	spending	more	in	relative	terms	than	at	any	
point	since	1968-69.	Moreover,	as	Figure	8	reveals,	a	higher	proportion	of	this	increased	
spending	 was	 coming	 from	Oxfam	 operational	 projects.	Whereas	 the	 organisation	 had	
spent	nothing	on	operating	alone	 in	Kenya	before	1980-81,74	and	then	dedicated	only	a	
minimal	amount	–	around	two	per	cent	of	its	overall	outlay	–	to	operational	work	before	
1983-84,	 in	 1984-85	Oxfam	operational	 spending	 accounted	 for	 over	 50	per	 cent	 of	 its	
budget	 in	 Kenya.	Operational	work	 continued	 to	 receive	more	 than	 45	 per	 cent	 of	 the	
organisation’s	 total	 spend	 for	 the	 next	 two	 years.	 In	 fact,	 fluctuations	 in	 Oxfam’s	
operational	work	(since	operational	expenditure	was	phased	over	time)	helped	to	dictate	
the	overall	trend	of	its	spending	in	Kenya.	Oxfam	was,	therefore,	not	only	spending	much	
																																																						
71	‘A	Review	of	Oxfam’s	Approach	to	Relief	Food	Distribution	in	Samburu	and	Turkana,	1992/3’,	October,	
1993,	OxA,	MS.	Oxfam	PRG/5/5/8	Folder	2:	Kenya,	1992-1993.	
72	Interviews	confirmed	that	the	latter	was	a	much	more	common	occurrence,	as	it	was	harder	to	trace	and	
counter.	Interview	with	author	no.	V,	12	January,	2015;	Interview	with	author	no.	XI,	4	December,	2014.	
73	Ironically,	as	chapter	four	illustrates,	the	replacement	of	expatriate	experts	with	Oxfam	staff	employed	
from	the	local	area	would	soon	place	the	position	of	these	MPs	under	much	greater	threat.	‘Annual	Report	
for	Kenya,	December	1985	–	November	1986’,	21	January,	1987,	OxA,	MS.	Oxfam	PRG/1/3/13	Folder	2:	
January	1987.	
74	The	small	spike	in	Oxfam	operational	spending	at	this	time	is	due	to	the	purchase	of	equipment	and	
payment	of	salaries	for	emergency	work	during	the	1979/80	drought.	
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more	 in	 Kenya	 than	 a	 few	 years	 previously,	 but	 was	 doing	 so	 because	 it	 had,	 for	 this	
period	at	least,	altered	its	modus	operandi	to	become	an	operational	NGO.	
As	discussed	above,	the	move	towards	‘operationality’	in	Kenya	was	a	tactical	shift	
that	reflected	the	situation	on	the	ground	(drought	and	the	 lack	of	viable	partners)	and	
also	 the	 favourable	attitude	of	 the	Field	Director	 towards	more	 technical	 interventions.	
But	such	a	move	was	only	possible	in	a	period	of	increased	income	for	the	organisation	as	
a	 whole,	 and	 this	 came	 about	 partly	 as	 a	 result	 of	 the	 surge	 in	 donations	 following	
Oxfam’s	high-profile	role	 in	the	relief	effort	as	regards	the	Ethiopian	famine:	during	the	
early-to-mid-1980s	 Oxfam	 income	would	 increase	 at	 a	 rate	 of	 around	 20	 per	 cent	 per	
annum.	 In	 Oxford,	 the	 Africa	 Committee	 debated	 the	 implications	 of	 this	 newfound	
wealth	during	1985	and	1986.	Peter	Wiles,	the	area	co-ordinator	for	Africa,	noted	in	late	
1985	 the	 ‘pressures	 on	 Oxfam	 to	 gear	 up	 our	 work	 and	 to	 embark	 on	 larger	 projects	
because	 of	 the	 fashionable	 support	 for	 NGOs	 in	 international	 circles’.	 He	 warned	 that	
‘these	 pressures	 need	 to	 be	 handled	 carefully,	 and	 it	 seems	 to	 me	 that	 we	 should	
continue	 to	 campaign	 and	press	 for	 the	 large	bi-	 and	multi-lateral	 agencies	 to	 improve	
their	 own	 work,	 rather	 than	 take	 on	 work	 which	 they	 themselves	 should	 be	 doing’.	
Nonetheless,	he	also	cautioned	that	Oxfam	should	
	
avoid	the	‘head-in-the-small-project	syndrome’	and	look	to	where	our	work	is	going	
in	 broader	 terms…	 [since]	 we	 now	 have	 the	 opportunity	 provided	 by	 the	 amazing	
successes	of	our	fundraisers	to	think	more	widely	and	look	for	opportunities	which	a	
few	years	ago	would	have	been	unthinkable	for	Oxfam.75	
	
	 The	 debate	 over	 the	 future	 direction	 of	 Oxfam’s	 work	 began	 in	 earnest	 a	 few	
months	later	in	response	to	a	paper	written	by	Jeremy	Swift.	Swift	was	a	member	of	the	
Africa	South	Sub-Committee	and	was	thus	closely	involved	with	Oxfam’s	work	in	Kenya	–	
particularly	in	the	pastoral	regions;	indeed,	the	Kenya	programme	would	be	an	important	
marker	in	the	debate	as	its	contemporary	form	pointed	to	one	possible	tactic	for	Oxfam	
in	these	circumstances:	to	scale	up	its	operations	and	become	an	implementing	agency.	
Swift’s	paper	opened	by	outlining	his	concern	that	 ‘conditions	 in	Africa	and	the	scale	of	
Oxfam’s	 resources	 are	 changing	 so	 rapidly	 that	 what	 has	 been	 right	 hitherto	may	 not	
automatically	be	so	in	the	future’.	He	argued	that	the	failure	of	development	in	the	1980s	
–	which	had	left	people	in	marginalised	places	such	as	Turkana	worse	off	than	in	1960	–	
together	with	 the	collapse	of	many	African	 states	under	external	pressure,	would	 likely	
																																																						
75	‘Area	Co-ordinator	for	Africa	–	Annual	Report,	October	1984	–	September	1985’,	18	September,	1985,	
OxA,	MS.	Oxfam	PRG/1/3/11	Folder	2:	July	1985	–	October	1985.	
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encourage	 a	 continuation	 in	 the	 upward	 trajectory	 of	 NGO	 funding.	 How	 Oxfam	
responded	 to	 that	 funding,	 he	 believed,	 would	 define	 the	 organisation	 for	 good	 or	 ill.	
Noting	the	small	scale	of	NGO	projects	in	comparison	to	those	initiated	by	governmental	
agencies	 and	 IFIs,	 Swift	 lamented	 that	 ‘even	 a	 long	 record	 of	 NGO	 successes	 does	 not	
ensure	 that	 things	 improve	 for	 people	 other	 than	 the	 small	 group	 of	 primary	
beneficiaries’.	Given	 the	 scale	of	problems	he	witnessed	 in	Africa,	 and	especially	 in	 the	
pastoral	 areas	 of	 Kenya	 and	 other	 sub-Saharan	 countries,	 ‘a	 few	 small,	 sensitive	 and	
largely	 successful	 projects	 may	 not	 make	 much	 of	 a	 dent	 in	 the	 overall	 crisis’.	
Consequently,	 Oxfam	 faced	 a	 choice	 between	 three	 possibilities:	 first,	 the	 organisation	
could	 continue	 to	work	on	 small	projects,	 such	as	 teaching	Turkana	pastoralists	 to	 fish,	
but	 do	more	 of	 them;	 second,	 they	 could	 scale	 up	 operations	 into	 the	middle	 ground,	
replicating	the	approach	taken	to	restocking	in	Kenya	(albeit	with	more	beneficiaries)	‘in	
an	attempt	to	operate	on	a	scale	that	could	conceivably	make	an	impact	on	the	African	
crisis’;	 third,	 Oxfam	 could	 seek	 out	 partnerships	 with	 larger	 organisations	 such	 as	 the	
World	 Bank	 and	 International	 Monetary	 fund	 to	 operate	 on	 large	 scale	 projects	 with	
budgets	 in	 the	 tens	 of	millions	 of	 dollars.	 From	 his	 experience	 in	 pastoral	 areas,	 Swift	
considered	the	first	option	unsatisfactory,	if	not	wasteful.	Instead,	he	recommended	that	
Oxfam	should	work	towards	middle	ground,	integrated	programmes	in	defined	areas,	and	
pointed	 to	 the	 work	 done	 in	 Turkana	 as	 an	 example	 of	 what	 Oxfam	 should	 be	 doing	
across	Africa.	Furthermore,	Swift	believed	that	Oxfam	ought	to	make	use	of	its	increased	
visibility	 to	 force	 its	way	 into	the	formation	of	development	policy	by	governments	and	
IFIs	in	order	to	ensure	that	its	constituents	were	not	ignored	under	pressure	for	‘mindless	
market	 liberalisation’.	 In	 such	 a	 manner,	 Swift	 hoped	 that	 Oxfam	 would	 replicate	 the	
approach	 taken	 in	 Kenya,	 bypassing	 ‘increasingly	 inefficient	 central	 governments’	 with	
midi-sized	 implementation	 projects,	 but	 using	 these	 projects	 to	 justify	 its	 involvement	
with	 policy	 advocacy.76	For	 Swift,	 the	 state	 remained	 at	 the	 heart	 of	 the	 development	
endeavour,	but	rather	than	working	as	a	gadfly	to	gently	sting	the	state	so	that	it	would	
heed	Oxfam’s	 ideas,	he	argued	 that	Oxfam	should	use	 its	newfound	wealth	 to	 scale	up	
into	something	much	more	forceful	in	order	to	compel	the	state	to	come	to	the	table	and	
(re)consider	its	methods.	
	 Swift’s	 paper	was	discussed	briefly	 at	 the	April	 1986	Africa	Committee	meeting,	
and	 participants	 agreed	 that	 it	 raised	 fundamental	 questions	 about	 models	 of	
																																																						
76	J.	Swift,	‘Oxfam’s	Future	Work	in	Africa’,	tabled	at	Africa	Committee	Meeting	on	23	April,	1986	(but	
widely	circulated	beforehand),	OxA,	MS.	Oxfam	PRG/1/3/12	Folder	1:	January	1986	–	April	1986.	
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development	‘in	the	context	of	widespread	failure	and	the	absence	of	coherent	theory’.	
The	latter	was	a	global	malaise:	the	‘Washington	consensus’	was	far	from	consensual	as	
many	development	organisations,	 including	Oxfam,	challenged	the	market-led	approach	
of	structural	adjustment.	At	the	same	time,	the	empowerment	philosophy	as	articulated	
by	 Anacleti	 and	 others	 was	 placed	 under	 severe	 strain	 by	 the	 scale	 of	 the	 crises	
enveloping	 Africa	 and	 the	 decisions	 of	 those	 on	 the	 ground	 to	 implement	 emergency	
operational	 programmes	 such	 as	 the	 one	 found	 in	 Kenya.	 Involved	 in	 the	meeting	was	
Frank	 Judd,	 a	 former	 labour	 MP	 and	 Minister	 for	 Overseas	 Development,	 who	 had	
recently	been	appointed	as	Oxfam	Director.	He	 concurred	with	 Swift	 that	 although	 the	
organisation’s	 reputation	 ‘rested	 on	 its	 experience	 at	 the	 micro-level’,	 and	 in	 spite	 of	
evidence	of	success	in	individual	projects,	‘the	war	is	not	being	won	and	more	people	are	
poor’.	He	thus	bemoaned	the	fact	that	whenever	Oxfam	was	challenged	to	do	more	‘we	
tend	to	become	defensive	and	worried	that	we	will	be	spoiled’.	Predictably,	Judd	would	
later	advocate	a	much	bigger,	and	much	more	political,	role	for	Oxfam	in	the	international	
arena.77	The	Committee	would	accept	Swift	and	Judd’s	argument	that	‘there	is	a	crisis	for	
NGOs	in	Africa	because	we	are	losing	out	to	the	dominant	political	and	economic	powers	
dominating	[the	continent]’;	but,	unlike	Swift,	it	did	not	make	any	recommendations	as	to	
how	Oxfam	 should	 resolve	 this	 situation.	 Instead,	 it	 resolved	 that	 the	 next	 Committee	
meeting	 would	 debate	 the	 issue,	 and	 asked	 members	 of	 the	 Committee	 to	 prepare	
papers	on	their	own	position.78	
	 One	Committee	member	firmly	supportive	of	Swift	was	Ingrid	Palmer,	who	wrote	
that	 the	 emergence	 of	 a	 general	 crisis	 in	 Africa	 combined	 with	 the	 recent	 increase	 in	
Oxfam’s	resources	raised	questions	about	the	impact	the	organisation	was	having	on	the	
major	problems	confronting	 the	continent.	Africa,	 she	contended,	 required	a	wholesale	
change	 ‘rather	 than	 numerous	 disassociated	 projects’.	 Instead	 of	 Oxfam	 continuing	 to	
‘delve	away	separately	on	projects	which	try	to	retain	a	“pure”	basis’,	Palmer	argued	that	
the	 bulk	 of	 its	 resources	 should	 go	 towards	 working	 alongside	 official	 development	
agencies	 or	 towards	 participation	 in	 ‘sectoral’	 programmes,	 and	 she	 foresaw	 Oxfam	
sharing	‘in	mainstream	economic	and	social	development	with	the	very	large	funders’.	At	
the	same	time,	a	scaled-up	Oxfam	could	‘help	governments	to	stand	up	to	the	IMF/World	
Bank’	 if	 the	 latter	were	too	draconian	 in	their	 implementation	of	structural	adjustment.	
																																																						
77	Black,	A	Cause	for	Our	Times,	pp.	266-267.	
78	‘Minutes	of	the	Africa	Committee’,	23	April,	1986,	OxA,	MS.	Oxfam	PRG/1/3/12	Folder	1:	January	1986	–	
April	1986.	
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As	 regards	 ‘operationality’,	Palmer	was	agnostic:	 ‘if	a	new	opportunity	 for	 influencing	a	
district-level	 development	 programme	 requires	 Oxfam	 to	 be	 operational,	 does	 it	make	
sense	to	forego	this	because	in	the	first	years	expatriates	have	to	be	fielded?’,	she	asked.	
It	would,	 she	 concluded,	 ‘be	better	 to	 see	 international	NGOs	go	operational	 than	 that	
the	 lack	 of	 local	 NGO	 personnel	 and	 mobilised	 people	 leaves	 a	 vacuum	 under	 the	
international	experts’.79	
	 Others	 on	 the	 Committee	 were	 less	 sympathetic	 towards	 Swift’s	 argument,	
however.	Brian	Pratt,	a	member	of	Oxfam’s	research	and	evaluation	unit,	remarked	that	
though	Oxfam	was	in	the	fortunate	position	of	being	able	to	meet	the	needs	of	the	poor	
with	 increasing	 resources	–	 something	 that	would	challenge	many	of	 the	organisation’s	
post	hoc	rationalisations	for	small	scale	work	in	fact	‘moulded’	by	an	‘ever	permanent	lack	
of	 money’	 –	 there	 remained	 cases	 where	 ‘small	 really	 is	 beautiful’.	 Thus	 while	 Pratt	
accepted	Swift’s	argument	in	favour	of	working	to	influence	policy	decisions	–	since	these	
were	too	often	made	‘on	the	basis	of	ignorance,	theory	divorced	from	practice	and	vested	
interests’	 –	 he	 was	 steadfast	 in	 his	 refusal	 to	 countenance	 middle-ground	 operational	
work	as	 the	way	 forward,	and	warned	against	 ‘the	 tendency	 in	a	period	of	growth…	 to	
look	 to	 operational	 programmes	 as	 an	 easy	 means	 of	 absorbing	 cash	 surpluses…	
Operational	 work’,	 he	 argued,	 ‘is	 still	 too	 tied	 to	 the	 “quick	 technical	 fix”	 approach	 to	
development’.	 Instead,	 ‘the	 effort	 should	 always	 be	 made	 first	 to	 identify	 local	
structures…	It	should	always	be	Oxfam’s	aim	not	to	replace	local	groups	but	to	strengthen	
them’	 via	 generous	 allocations	 to	 smaller	 projects	 over	 longer	 periods	 of	 time.80	Paul	
Shears,	a	member	of	the	Africa	North	Sub-Committee,	seconded	Pratt’s	argument,	noting	
that	the	large-scale	programmes	advocated	by	Swift	based	on	his	experience	of	Turkana	
and	other	pastoral	regions	would	miss	the	minutiae	of	 local	power	relationships	 in	non-
pastoral	 societies,	 and	would	only	 help	 landlords	or	 power	holders	 to	 get	 richer	 at	 the	
expense	of	the	poor.81	
	 A	 more	 ideologically-charged	 argument	 against	 scaling	 up	 was	 made	 by	 Ian	
Leggett,	 a	 member	 of	 Oxfam’s	 Africa	 Desk	 who	 had	 worked	 extensively	 in	 Tanzania.	
Conscious	of	the	need	for	consistency	with	Oxfam’s	‘history,	principles	and	ideas’	–	which	
																																																						
79	I.	Palmer,	‘Oxfam’s	Future	Work	in	Africa’,	tabled	at	Africa	Committee	Meeting	on	21-22	October,	1986,	
OxA,	MS.	Oxfam	PRG/1/3/13	Folder	1:	October	1986.	
80	B.	Pratt,	‘Discussion	Paper:	Areas	of	Expansion	for	Oxfam’s	Overseas	Programme’,	14	March,	1986,	OxA,	
MS.	Oxfam	PRG/1/3/13	Folder	1:	October	1986.	
81	P.	Shears,	‘Oxfam’s	Future	Work	in	Africa:	Some	Short	Comments	on	Jeremy	Swift’s	Paper’,	no	date,	OxA,	
MS.	Oxfam	PRG/1/3/13	Folder	1:	October	1986.	
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were,	 he	 thought,	 better	 reflected	 in	 the	 Tanzania	 programme	 than	 the	 Kenya	
programme	 now	 that	 Oxford	 had	 adopted	 the	 conscientisation	 methodology	 –	 he	
rejected	the	urge	to	increase	the	scale	of	Oxfam’s	work,	to	‘go	operational’	and	to	form	
closer	 alliances	 with	 larger	 funding	 agencies.	 He	 criticised	 Swift	 and	 Palmer	 for	
perpetuating	 the	 ‘myth’	 that	 development	 in	 Africa	 would	 be	 achieved	 by	 supporting	
bigger	 projects,	 noting	 that	 despite	 their	 admission	 that	 development	 had	 failed,	 both	
papers	advocated	‘more	of	the	same’	except	in	larger	and	stronger	doses	as	advocated	by	
the	 IMF.	 Moreover,	 like	 the	 IMF,	 which	 ‘puts	 its	 own	 man…	 [into]	 key	 institutions	 of	
debtor	 governments	 so	 as	 to	ensure	 that	 the	 required	policies	 are	 followed,	 so	we	are	
talking	 about	 “going	 operational”	 to	 make	 sure	 that	 the	 projects	 we	 support	 are	 “a	
success”’.	Leggett	proceeded	to	question	whether	bilateral	and	multilateral	agencies	had	
any	 identity	 of	 interest	 with	 Oxfam	 or	 worked	 for	 the	 poor	 and	 oppressed.	 He	 cited	
Tanzania	as	an	example	of	a	country	with	‘a	government	that	has	long	been	recognised	by	
Oxfam	 as	 actively	 supporting	 its	 own	 ideals’,	 but	which	 had	 ‘been	 slowly	 and	 painfully	
throttled	by	the	concerted	efforts	of	multilateral	 financial	 institutions’.	The	organisation	
should	 not,	 he	 averred,	 ‘cast	 in	 our	 lot’	with	 these	 organisations;	 nor	 should	 it	 bypass	
elected	 governments	 in	 a	neo-colonial	 fashion	by	working	operationally.	 Indeed,	 rather	
than	 staff	 asking	 ‘Where	 was	 Oxfam?’	 in	 this	 scenario,	 Leggett	 believed	 they	 should	
recognise	‘the	fact	that	we	count	for	very	little	on	the	big	stage’.	
	
Oxfam	has	played,	and	will	continue	to	play,	only	an	 insignificant	role	 in	promoting	
social	 change	 in	 the	 countries	 in	 which	 we	 work	 abroad…	 we	 should	 not	 deceive	
ourselves	 into	thinking	that	we	can	have	anything	but	a	minor	 impact	on	the	issues	
that	concern	us…	It	is	ironical,	therefore,	to	note	the	suggestion	“that	NGOs	can	help	
governments	to	stand	up	to	the	IMF/World	Bank”	when	the	evidence	suggests	that	
our	voice	does	not	even	amount	to	a	whisper.82	
	
	 Leggett	was	equally	sceptical	as	 regards	 the	suggestion	that	Oxfam	could	use	 its	
operational	 visibility	 to	 influence	 government	 development	 policies.	 Indeed,	 since	 the	
state	 was	 (with	 the	 exception	 of	 Tanzania,	 perhaps)	 ‘the	 principal	 protagonist	 in	 the	
process	 of	 exploitation	 of	 the	 peasants	 and	 workers’,	 any	 form	 of	 relationship	 with	
governments	threatened	to	involve	Oxfam	‘in	the	structures	which	express	domination’.	
Leggett	referred	scathingly	to	the	situation	in	Kenya	where	parastatals	were	increasing	in	
number	 –	 despite	 the	 country’s	 capitalist	 orientation	 –	 as	 part	 of	 a	 ‘mechanism	 of	
accumulation	 and	 extraction’	 under	 Moi.	 Oxfam	 had	 to	 beware,	 therefore,	 being	
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‘seduced’	 by	 powerful	 institutions	 (both	 national	 and	 international)	 responsible	 for	
‘policies	and	practices	which	have	caused	untold	suffering,	harm	and	destruction’	around	
the	 world.	 Leggett	 warned	 that	 such	 institutions	 would	 not	 respond	 to	 the	 logic	 or	
morality	of	Oxfam	arguments	over	their	own	vested	interests;	thus	‘to	cast	in	our	lot	with	
these	 organisations	 and	 institutions	 would	 be	 tantamount	 to	 changing	 sides…	 to	 join	
forces	 with	 those	 responsible	 for	 the	 wider	 predicament’	 in	 Africa.	 Instead,	 drawing	 a	
connection	 between	 Oxfam	 principles	 and	 history	 and	 the	 politics	 of	 identity	 and	
empowerment	prevalent	on	the	left	during	the	1980s,	Leggett	argued	that	Oxfam	‘should	
stand	united	with	those	whose	interests	we	claim	to	represent’.83	Of	course,	since	charity	
legislation	prevented	the	organisation	from	challenging	global	structures	outright	with	a	
political	message,	Leggett	recommended	that	Oxfam	should	see	 its	role	as	a	 ‘defensive’	
one:	this	meant	neither	bypassing	governments	in	a	neo-colonial	fashion	nor	working	too	
closely	 with	 them.	 Rather,	 Oxfam	 was	 advised	 to	 focus	 its	 energy	 on	 exposing	 the	
negative	 consequences	of	 official	 development	 interventions	 and	 corrupt	or	 oppressive	
governance,	 and	 on	 conscientising	 communities	 to	 resist	 ‘large	 dollops	 of	 international	
interference’	 (in	 the	 manner	 of	 the	 Tanzania	 programme)	 and	 to	 demand	 that	 their	
governments	fulfil	their	responsibilities.84		
	 Field	staff	from	across	Africa	were,	somewhat	 inevitably,	as	divided	as	the	Africa	
Committee	 over	 collaboration	 with	 multilateral	 organisations	 and/or	 government	
institutions.	 Many	 were,	 like	 Leggett,	 concerned	 that	 donors	 and	 governments	 would	
take	 advantage	 of	 NGO	 willingness	 to	 engage,	 since	 including	 NGOs	 as	 a	 token	 of	
consultation	on	large	schemes	was	a	shortcut	to	‘popular’	participation.	‘By	co-opting	an	
NGO’,	argued	one	respondent,	‘the	large	donors	are	“buying	in”	the	people	but	without	
taking	any	other	steps	to	change	their	style	of	operations	or	objectives’.	More	worryingly,	
‘co-operation	 will	 have	 been	 purchased	 at	 the	 price	 of	 not	 properly	 criticising	 the	
operations	or	activities	of	 large	agencies’,	and	would	jeopardise	Oxfam’s	credibility	with	
its	existing	partners.	Conversely,	other	staff	noted	that	‘no	end	of	micro-projects	will	ever	
																																																						
83	The	1980s	saw	both	right	and	left	turn	against	the	modernising	national	state,	which	was	seen	as	despotic	
and	overbearing,	in	favour	of	‘the	local’.	On	the	left,	the	task	was	to	protect	this	space	for	indigeneity	and	
minority	identities	through	consciousness-raising	and	empowerment.	Operational	work	threatened	to	act	in	
a	similar	manner	to	the	state	by	stifling	the	emergence	of	‘the	local’.	See	R.	Brubaker	and	F.	Cooper,	
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solve	 the	 problem	 of	 poverty’,	 and	 if	 large-scale	 projects	 were	 going	 to	 take	 place	
anyway,	 it	might	be	better	to	 influence	their	direction.	Furthermore,	not	all	participants	
were	convinced	that	 large	agencies	or	governments	were	as	 ‘monolithic’	as	Leggett	and	
others	portrayed	 them.	Those	with	a	more	nuanced	view	suggested	 that	Oxfam	should	
enter	into	dialogue	with	larger	development	bodies	to	modify	their	activities,	acting	as	a	
catalyst	for	change	rather	than	adopting	what	they	considered	to	be	Leggett’s	‘holier	than	
thou’	 approach.85	Fears	 that	 NGOs	were	 being	 courted	 in	 order	 to	 contain	 criticism	 of	
structural	adjustment	were,	therefore,	balanced	by	hopes	that	Oxfam	had	the	necessary	
leverage	–	due	to	their	grassroots	and	operational	work	–	with	which	to	pressure	for	‘pro-
poor’	policies.86	
	 Hence,	when	the	Africa	Committee	meeting	finally	came	around	in	October	1986,	
members	 were	 primed	 for	 a	 testing	 debate.	 The	 tone	 of	 the	 meeting	 was	 set	 early,	
however,	as	Swift	was	forced	to	defend	his	paper	from	accusations	that	he	had	suggested	
Oxfam	 should	 ‘throw	 in	 its	 lot	with	 the	World	 Bank’.	 He	 countered	 that	 his	 paper	was	
meant	to	emphasise	that	 the	organisation	should	seek	areas	of	cooperation	with	donor	
agencies	 in	 ways	 that	 would	 not	 preclude	 Oxfam	 from	 retaining	 its	 focus	 on	 poverty.	
Nonetheless,	much	of	the	air	had	been	taken	out	of	Swift’s	argument	in	favour	of	scaling	
up	by	the	fact	that	the	increase	in	Oxfam	income	had	recently	slowed	in	a	‘post-Ethiopia	
depression’:	 indeed,	 the	organisation	expected	a	£3	million	budget	deficit	 for	 the	 year.	
Thus	 while	 many	 participants	 admitted	 that	 the	 increase	 in	 funding	 had	 ‘cracked	 the	
mould’	 of	Oxfam’s	 approach	 to	 the	 continent	 and	 questioned	what	 exactly	Oxfam	had	
achieved	 in	 Africa	 through	 small-scale	 projects,	 the	 drop	 in	 donations	 reduced	 the	
possibility	 that	 Oxfam	 could	 scale	 up	 to	 a	 size	 that	 would	 enable	 a	 greater	 degree	 of	
influence	over	official	institutions	and	governments.	At	the	same	time,	on	an	ideological	
level	many	were	 nervous	 that	Oxfam	would	 be	 acting	 in	 a	 neo-colonial	 fashion	 if	 they	
chose	 to	 become	 operational	 across	 the	 continent	 on	 the	 scale	 witnessed	 in	 Kenya.	
Members	referred	to	Shears’	submission	to	the	Committee,	which	condemned	the	‘neo-
colonialism’	 of	 Oxfam	 in	 Turkana	 –	 with	 its	 fully	 fuelled	 and	 adequately	 maintained	
landrovers	 and	 staff	 –	 ‘taking	 areas	 over’,	 ‘replacing	 government’	 and	 threatening	 to	
permanently	 erode	 any	 local	 capacity	 and	 state	 involvement.	 This	 was	 considered	
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particularly	 problematic	 because	 regardless	 of	 its	 present	maladies	 the	 Committee	 felt	
that	the	state	in	Africa	remained	a	vital	development	actor	(albeit	impaired	by	structural	
adjustment).	Moreover,	 in	 addition	 to	 undermining	 state	 capacity,	 bypassing	 the	 state	
threatened	 to	 perpetuate	 the	 ease	with	which	 the	 state	was	 used	 as	 a	 ‘mechanism	 of	
accumulation	 and	 extraction’.	 For	 if	 operational	 work	 provided	 palliatives,	 kleptocratic	
state	elites	would	be	free	to	avoid	their	responsibilities	to	the	poorest	or	to	continue	to	
impose	 unsuitable	 and	 dangerous	 development	 programmes	 on	 unwilling	 populations.	
Somewhat	 counter-intuitively,	 therefore,	 while	 working	 alongside	 an	 authoritarian	 or	
kleptocratic	 government	 was	 not	 considered	 an	 appropriate	 response	 to	 the	 crisis	 in	
Africa,	neither	was	bypassing	the	state,	which	would	let	the	latter	off	the	hook	as	regards	
its	 fundamental	 duties	 to	 its	 citizenry.87	Unsurprisingly,	 minutes	 of	 the	 meeting	 would	
record	‘caution’	about	Swift’s	paper	and	‘strong	support’	for	Leggett’s.88	
	 Taking	 the	 temperature	 of	 the	 Committee,	 Brendan	Gormley,	 a	member	 of	 the	
Africa	North	Desk	and	soon	to	be	Africa	Director,	concluded	that	the	increase	in	Oxfam’s	
income	had	brought	about	profound	psychological	changes	in	Oxfam	as	the	organisation	
shook	 off	 both	 imagined	 and	 real	 constraints	 on	 the	 range	 of	 its	 activities	 and	 asked	
questions	 that	 went	 ‘to	 the	 very	 heart	 of	 Oxfam’s	 role	 as	 a	 development	 agency’.	
Meanwhile,	 the	 size	 of	 the	 crisis	 in	 Africa	 had	 provoked	 in	 countries	 like	 Kenya	 ‘a	
response	 built	 around	 quantity’:	 for	 the	 first	 time,	 Oxfam	 was	 ‘taking	 initiatives	 and	
responsibility	where	before	we	 looked	 for	 intermediaries	 that	 could	do	 this	 for	us’.	 Yet	
Swift	and	his	supporters	had,	Gormley	felt,	 ‘cast	[Oxfam]	in	the	role	of	the	orchestra	on	
the	Titanic	–	nice	but	ineffective,	whereas	we	see	ourselves	as	part	foghorn,	part	life-raft!’	
Indeed,	 the	 crisis	 had	 convinced	 many	 within	 the	 organisation	 that	 Oxfam	 needed	 ‘a	
clearer	 restatement	 of	 our	 focus	 on	 the	 poor	 and	 their	 participation	 in	 a	 process	 of	
development’;	 rather	 than	 working	 with	 large	 donor	 agencies	 and	 governments,	 they	
believed	that	the	organisation	ought	to	‘stand	by	the	people…	in	conflict	with	the	agendas	
of	those	[agencies]	with	whom	we	are	considering	working’.	The	tension	between	Oxfam	
‘values’	 of	 solidarity	 and	 empowerment	 and	 the	 practical	 urge	 to	 do	 more	 in	 the	
immediate	crisis	was	acute:	on	one	side	were	those	who	believed	first	and	foremost	that	
Oxfam	must	respond	to	need;	if	this	meant	Oxfam	had	to	do	more	itself	–	as	in	Turkana	–	
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then	 so	be	 it.	On	 the	other	were	more	 ideologically	minded	 individuals	who	 felt	 it	was	
important	 to	 consider	 how	 Oxfam	 responded.	 Doing	 so	 in	 a	 top-down	 manner	 was	
compared	with	neo-colonialism	and	was,	 in	any	case,	felt	to	be	damaging	 in	the	 longer-
term,	since	it	would	crush	people’s	initiative	and	their	chances	of	empowerment	while	at	
the	 same	 time	 excusing	 the	 state	 from	 its	 responsibilities.89	The	 organisation	 faced	 a	
choice,	 therefore,	between	a	 ‘materialist	approach,	which	regards	Oxfam	as	a	doer	and	
deliverer,	“responding	to	need”	and	having	to	get	bigger	and	bigger	in	order	to	respond	
to	ever	increasing	need’	and	a	‘human	scale,	third	system	approach’,	in	which	Oxfam	was	
a	facilitator	for	people	to	solve	their	own	problems.	90	
	 Personally,	Gormley	believed	that	 ‘we	can	continue	to	put	considerable	store	on	
the	 links	 between	 people,	 individuals	 and	 local	 communities,	 even	 if	 we	 cannot	
demonstrate	 their	 links	 with	 wider	 development	 processes,	 and	 [should]	 accept	 that	
Oxfam	will	 at	 best	 play	 a	modest	 role	 in	most	 situations’.91	Yet	 he	was	 not	 doctrinaire	
about	this	approach,	acknowledging	that	different	opinions	as	to	scaling	up,	operational	
work	 and	 working	 alongside	 multilateral	 aid	 agencies	 reflected	 the	 input	 of	 staff	 who	
faced	markedly	‘different	situations,	development	needs	and	government	characteristics	
in	 the	 countries	 where	 we	 work’.	 The	 nature	 of	 the	 host	 government	 was	 especially	
important,	since	scaling	up	often	meant	focusing	on	an	‘inputs’	approach,	which,	as	the	
Committee	 had	 noted,	 would	 potentially	 strengthen	 the	 status	 quo.92	Hence,	 Gormley	
recommended	 that	 the	 debate	 proceed	with	 ‘a	 country-specific	 focus’,	 and	 John	 Clark,	
campaigns	 manager,	 was	 tasked	 with	 canvassing	 country	 offices	 on	 the	 issues	 raised	
during	 the	 meeting.93	A	 year	 later,	 Clark	 concluded	 that	 there	 were	 nearly	 as	 many	
opinions	on	these	issues	as	there	were	country	offices.	The	‘idiosyncrasy’,	he	suggested,	
was	 a	 result	 of	 the	 fact	 that	 Oxfam	 had	 neither	 a	 well-defined	 policy	 on	 the	 macro-
economics	 and	 politics	 of	 development,	 nor	 an	 overall	 development	 philosophy	 with	
which	to	guide	its	country	offices.94	In	response,	Gormley	would	reiterate	his	own	take	on	
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Oxfam’s	 development	 philosophy,	 quoting	 at	 length	 from	Marc	 Nerfin’s	 article	 on	 the	
‘third	 system’	 approach	 to	 development	 (based	 on	 empowering	 people	 to	 make	
structural	transformations	in	their	own	countries)	in	a	paper	tabled	at	the	October	Africa	
Committee	meeting.	Crucially,	however,	he	accepted	that	Oxfam	should	remain	flexible,	
acting	 as	 a	 local	 partner,	 implementing	 agency,	 crusader	 (active	 in	 policy	 formulation)	
and/or	teacher	depending	on	the	circumstances	in	which	it	worked.95	
	 Thus	by	1986/87	Oxford	had	set,	in	a	broad	fashion,	the	direction	of	travel	for	the	
organisation	 towards	 a	 focus	 on	 the	 denial	 of	 rights	 faced	 by	 marginalised	 people	 (as	
opposed	to	intervention	on	a	larger	scale).96	As	Figure	8	demonstrates,	Oxfam	operational	
spending	 in	Kenya	would	decline	as	a	proportion	of	 its	grants	budget	around	 this	 time.	
From	 45	 per	 cent	 of	 Oxfam’s	 overall	 spend	 in	 Kenya	 in	 1986/87,	 operational	 spending	
would	fall	to	39	per	cent	in	1987/88	and	to	just	six	per	cent	in	1988/89.	Though	it	would	
rise	 in	 the	 following	 two	 years,	 this	 was	 mostly	 due	 to	 spending	 on	 networking	 and	
facilitating	 local	 groups	 rather	 than	 large-scale	 interventions.97	By	 1991/92,	 operational	
spending	had	settled	at	around	one	fifth	of	Oxfam’s	grants	budget	in	Kenya.	Importantly,	
while	 operational	 expenditure	 was	 mostly	 static	 or	 falling	 in	 Kenya,	 Oxfam’s	 overall	
expenditure	in	the	country	was	following	an	upward	trajectory;	this	shows	that	the	nature	
of	 Oxfam	 spending	 was	 changing	 rather	 than	 merely	 the	 extent.	 Yet,	 as	 Gormley	
acknowledged,	decisions	in	Oxford	only	formed	part	of	the	equation	for	Field	Offices.	In	
Kenya,	 the	 decline	 in	 operational	 spending	 began	 around	 1985,	 before	 the	 Africa	
Committee	offered	its	recommendations	on	the	nature	of	Oxfam’s	work	in	Africa.	Indeed,	
the	shift	away	from	‘operationality’	in	Kenya	reflected	the	approach	of	a	newly	appointed	
Field	 Director,	 Nicky	 May,	 who	 came	 to	 Kenya	 in	 October	 1985	 with	 a	 more	 radical	
background	than	her	predecessor.	At	the	same	time,	however,	May’s	approach	was	just	
as	much	based	on	her	 reading	 of	 changing	 political	 circumstances	 in	 Kenya,	where	 the	
government	 was	 becoming	 increasingly	 hostile	 towards	 NGOs,	 and	 towards	 Oxfam	 in	
particular.	
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‘AFTER BURNING THEM THEY SCRAPED THEM UP WITH BULLDOZERS’ 
 
Government	 antagonism	 towards	 Oxfam	 was	 ensured	 by	 the	 organisation’s	 tireless	
efforts	 to	provide	relief	and	raise	awareness	after	 the	 torture	and	massacre	of	Degodia	
pastoralists	 by	 Kenyan	 security	 forces	 at	 Wagalla	 airstrip	 in	 Wajir	 around	 9	 February,	
1984.	 The	 massacre	 itself	 was,	 according	 to	 Campbell,	 a	 devastating	 instance	 of	
government	‘hostility	towards	nomadic	people	as	a	whole	and	[its]	tendency	to	use	brutal	
methods	 to	 maintain	 stability	 rather	 than	 reconciliation	 and	 good	 development	
policies’.98	As	David	Anderson	has	discussed	more	recently,	Moi	frequently	used	collective	
punishment	to	‘discipline’	the	north,	and	government	officials	there	acted	with	impunity	
during	 his	 presidency.	 In	 November	 1980,	 for	 instance,	 the	 ambush	 and	 murder	 of	 a	
government	officer	near	Garissa	prompted	the	Provincial	Commissioner,	Benson	Kaaria,	
to	 threaten	 that	 the	 entire	 Somali	 population	 of	 the	 district	 ‘will	 be	 eliminated	 and	
Kenyans	will	be	 left	 living	 in	peace’.	A	 few	days	 later,	all	men	 in	 the	Bulla	Karatasi	area	
were	rounded	up	for	‘screening’	nearby.	Meanwhile,	the	military	rampaged	through	the	
settlement,	raping,	 looting	and	burning	homesteads.	Hundreds	of	 innocent	people	were	
killed,	with	many	half-dead	 thrown	 callously	 into	 the	 Tana	River.99	Such	 aggressive	 and	
murderous	behaviour	became	almost	routine	in	the	north	of	the	country	by	the	time	of	
the	 failed	 coup	 attempt	 in	 1982,	 and	 would	 only	 intensify	 thereafter	 as	 the	 President	
sought	 to	 stamp	 his	 authority	 across	 the	 country.	 Moreover,	 by	 appointing	 trusted	
members	of	the	Ogaden	clan	into	his	Cabinet	and	armed	forces,	Moi	ensured	that	intra-
ethnic	 conflict	 escalated,	 providing	 officials	 with	 the	 perfect	 opportunity	 to	 blame	 and	
punish	the	Degodia	clan,	who	sought	to	challenge	the	President’s	allies.	
Indeed,	on	9	February,	1984,	a	Degodia	attack	against	their	ethnic	rivals	provided	
an	 opportunity	 for	 the	 District	 Security	 Committee	 to	 initiate	 a	 brutal	 collective	
punishment	operation	against	this	 ‘troublesome’	group.	Almost	 immediately,	the	armed	
forces	started	rounding	up	Degodia	at	Wagalla	airstrip,	and	by	11	February	around	5,000	
Degodia	 were	 held	 captive.	Many	 would	 be	 violently	 interrogated	 by	 their	 captors:	 as	
Anderson	relates,	one	detainee	recalled	that	the	armed	forces	 ‘were	constantly	beating	
us…	 the	 whole	 day	 they	 were	 beating	 us’.	 Left	 in	 the	 hands	 junior	 army	 officers,	 the	
treatment	of	detainees	would	get	progressively	worse,	and	they	were	soon	forced	to	strip	
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before	being	subjected	to	torture.100	At	its	most	extreme,	this	included	burning	detainees	
alive.	 (Oxfam	 would	 later	 receive	 photographic	 evidence	 of	 these	 crimes	 from	 local	
contacts,	who	alleged	that	at	least	60,	and	as	many	as	80,	Degodia	were	immolated	in	the	
presence	 of	 high-ranking	 government	 officials,	 their	 bodies	 then	 ‘scraped	 up’	 with	
bulldozers.)	 When	 the	 detainees	 rioted	 in	 desperation	 at	 their	 treatment,	 the	 army	
panicked	and	fired	automatic	rifles	blindly	across	the	airstrip.	Oxfam’s	Africa	Committee	
was	 confident	 based	 on	 eyewitness	 reports	 that	 at	 least	 400	 men	 died	 in	 this	 one	
incident,	though	they	feared	that	the	number	could	have	been	as	high	as	1,400.101	Alone,	
this	murderous	act	left	upwards	of	10,000	women,	children	and	elderly	people	destitute;	
but	to	compound	the	punishment,	the	government	and	its	marauding	armed	forces	also	
impounded	cattle	and	destroyed	wells	to	prevent	local	people	being	able	to	eat	or	drink.	
Moreover,	 nearby	 hospitals	 were	 ordered	 to	 discharge	 Degodia	 patients	 without	
treatment,	 or	were	 closed	outright	 in	order	 to	 stop	detainees	who	managed	 to	escape	
custody	 from	 receiving	 treatment	 for	 their	wounds.	 Soldiers	were	 even	 heard	 to	 boast	
about	how	they	crucified	with	four-inch	nails	any	Kenyan	Somalis	who	had	escaped.102	
As	word	 of	 these	 atrocities	 began	 to	 leak	 out	 of	Wajir,	 aid	 agencies	 like	Oxfam	
rushed	 to	 try	 to	 help	 those	 in	 need.	 The	 government	 was,	 however,	 much	 more	
concerned	with	covering	up	the	massacre	than	with	helping	those	in	need,	and	so	denied	
relief	 agencies	 permission	 to	 enter	 the	 region	 and	 refused	 all	 requests	 for	 emergency	
supplies.103	The	 government	 line	 was	 that	 ‘inter-tribal	 feuds’	 were	 to	 blame	 for	 the	
violence	 reported	 in	 the	 region	 and	 that	 the	 security	 forces	 deserved	 praise	 for	 their	
efforts	 to	 restore	 peace	 and	 order.	Meanwhile,	 a	 friendly	 editorial	 in	 the	Kenya	 Times	
regretted	 ‘that	some	 local	 leaders	and	the	foreign	press	have	set	 it	upon	themselves	to	
distort	the	truth	about	the	situation	in	Wajir…	deliberately	exaggerat[ing]	the	magnitude	
of	 the	conflicts	 [in]	 false	claims’.	Thus	 the	allegation	 that	5,000	 locals	were	rounded	up	
and	 tortured	was	purported	 to	have	originated	with	 ‘a	 small	 group	of	 Kenyan	enemies	
based	in	London’	who	were	using	the	British	media,	and	the	BBC	in	particular,	to	feed	the	
world	 on	 ‘false	 and	 negative	 information’.	 In	 defence	 of	 the	 government,	 the	 paper	
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argued	that	famine	relief	had	been	distributed	in	the	region	for	many	years	and	that	the	
area	had	been	 ‘honoured	with	personal	visits	 from	the	President	himself’.	Local	 leaders	
were	 enjoined	 to	 ‘set	 a	 good	 example	 by	 telling	 the	 truth	 and	 joining	 hands	 with	 the	
government	in	bringing	about	harmony’	in	their	area.104		
Disregarding	 this	 warning,	 on	 21	 March	 the	 MP	 for	 Wajir	 West	 alleged	 in	
Parliament	 that	 security	 forces	 ‘arrested	 more	 than	 5,000	 men	 and	 put	 them	 into	
concentration	camps…	in	the	real	sense	of	the	word…	[since]	all	the	people	were	stripped	
naked	and	kept	there	for	five	consecutive	days	being	persistently	denied	water	and	food’	
while	 others	 were	 ‘killed	 through	 beating,	 shooting,	 and	 some	 of	 them	 were	 burned	
alive’.	Moreover,	those	who	remained	alive	after	five	days	‘were	collected	in	military	and	
police	 vehicles	 and	 dumped	 far	 away	 from	 the	 town	 where	 they	 could	 not	 get	 any	
medical	treatment’.	Noting	that	the	Provincial	Commissioner	had	‘sworn	that	he	is	going	
to	 wipe	 out	 the	 entire	 population	 of	 Somalis	 in	 the	 North-Eastern	 Province’,	 the	 MP	
alleged	that	 ‘there	 is	genocide	going	on	 in	my	district’.105	In	 response,	on	27	March	 the	
Minister	of	State	for	the	Office	of	the	President	responsible	for	security	(Justus	ole	Tipis)	
made	a	statement	acknowledging	that	57	men	had	died	 in	a	peace-keeping	 ‘operation’.	
The	 operation	 was,	 he	 said,	 necessary	 because	 ethnic	 leaders	 who	 ‘specialised	 in	
perpetrating	clanism	[sic]	for	their	own	selfish	ends…	[had]	encourage[d]	and	equip[ped]	
bandits	to	attack	other	clans	for	political	reasons’.	He	concluded	that	‘the	government’s	
commitment	 to	 law	and	order	 is	 firm.	 It	will,	 therefore,	 not	 help	 anybody	 to	 challenge	
that	 commitment	 for	disruptive	ends’.106	Bravely	 ignoring	 this	 veiled	 threat,	 the	MP	 for	
Wajir	East	 shouted	 that	 the	ministerial	 statement	 ‘was	written	by	murderers’.107	At	 this	
point,	any	further	debate	on	the	issue	was	shut	down.108	
As	time	wore	on,	the	government	found	that	 it	could	no	 longer	simply	refuse	all	
offers	 of	 external	 help,	 since	 that	made	 it	 look	 suspiciously	 negligent.	 Instead,	 officials	
played	for	time:	thus	while	Tipis	gave	assurances	that	Oxfam	would	be	allowed	into	the	
area	 at	 the	 end	 of	March,	 meetings	 in	 the	 Office	 of	 the	 President	 with	 regard	 to	 the	
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105	Kenya	Hansard,	21	April,	1984,	pp.	45-49;	Kenya	Hansard,	27	March,	1984,	pp.	136-138.	
106	Kenya	Hansard,	27	March,	1984,	pp.	146-148.	
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108	Ole	Tipis	would	make	a	final	statement	on	12	April,	admitting	that	381	men	had	been	taken	to	Wagalla	
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victims	were,	he	argued,	killed	when	they	resisted	the	armed	forces.	Kenya	Hansard,	12	April,	1984,	pp.	
817-820.	
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necessary	 documentation	 descended	 into	 obstruction	 and	 obfuscation.109	Throughout	
April	there	followed	numerous	reports	of	women	and	children	only	now	coming	in	from	
the	wilderness	to	try	to	find	food,	but	any	proper	assessment	of	the	situation	remained	
impossible	 as	 access	 to	 the	 area	 continued	 to	 be	 cut	 off.	 Reaching	 the	 limits	 of	 his	
patience,	David	Campbell	thought	about	flying	to	Wajir	without	permission,	but	just	as	he	
began	 to	 prepare	 for	 the	 trip	 his	 contacts	 in	 the	 area	were	 interrogated,	 followed	 and	
then	 thrown	 out	 of	 the	 district	 and	 ordered	 to	 return	 to	 Nairobi	 by	 the	 District	
Commissioner.	Soon	after,	Oxfam’s	proposals	for	a	relief	programme	were	turned	down:	
in	 fact,	 the	 DC	 ordered	 that	 all	 non-governmental	 feeding	 efforts	 should	 cease	
immediately	 and	 that	 their	 resources	 should	 be	 handed	 over	 to	 the	 government.110	
Fortunately,	 Oxfam	 was	 able	 to	 transfer	 around	 £3,000	 to	 a	 local	 missionary,	 Sister	
Annalena,	 for	 rehousing	 the	destitute,	but	 to	do	any	more	was	 impossible	 for	 the	 time	
being.	Even	conversations	on	the	telephone	were	considered	risky	as	Campbell	sought	to	
bide	 his	 time	 and	 avoid	 being	 thrown	 out	 of	 Kenya.111	Nonetheless,	 behind	 the	 scenes	
Oxfam	 briefed	 Ambassadors	 and	 High	 Commissioners	 as	well	 as	 the	 BBC	 and	 Amnesty	
International	on	the	arrests,	torture	and	killings	to	try	to	‘stir	things	up’	and	galvanise	the	
diplomatic	community	into	action.112		
Frustrated	 with	 the	 inability	 to	 act,	 however,	 in	 early	 May	 Campbell	 spoke	 to	
Michael	Harris,	who	gave	the	Field	Director	permission	to	travel	to	Wajir	regardless	of	the	
consequences	for	Oxfam.113	Relieved	to	finally	be	able	to	do	something,	Campbell	loaded	
up	a	landrover	and	drove	for	over	300	miles,	but	was	stopped	by	police	at	Habeswain	on	
the	border	of	Wajir	district.	There,	Campbell	and	his	cargo	were	held	overnight	without	
explanation.	 The	 following	 day,	 the	 police	 received	 instructions	 from	 Nairobi	 that	
Campbell	was	to	be	turned	around;	to	make	sure	he	did	not	attempt	to	return,	they	were	
ordered	 to	 escort	 the	 Oxfam	 Field	 Director	 until	 he	 reached	 Isiolo.	 On	 his	 arrival	 in	
Nairobi,	Campbell	 reported	 to	Oxford	 that	 the	military	operation	was	 still	on-going	and	
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Cause	for	Our	Times,	p.	192.	
		 190	
that	 a	 European	 presence	 worried	 the	 government	 more	 than	 anything	 else. 114	
Accordingly,	Oxfam	–	along	with	AMREF	–	continued	to	press	for	diplomatic	action.	The	
government	would	hold	out	against	 the	 lobbying	and	 international	broadcasts	until	 the	
‘operation’	was	concluded	later	in	the	month.	Soon	after,	Kaaria	was	replaced	in	an	effort	
to	appease	domestic	and	international	criticism	and	Oxfam	was	finally	allowed	to	visit	the	
area	to	start	an	emergency-feeding	programme.	
	 Unfortunately,	 it	 quickly	 became	 clear	 that	 little	 had	 changed	 in	 the	 district.	
Security	personnel	were	 still	 told	 to	 shoot	armed	pastoralists	on	 sight,	 and	 the	DC	was	
particularly	 interested	 in	 being	 involved	 in	 the	 selection	 of	 ‘needy’	 families	 to	 benefit	
from	Oxfam	relief.115	Nevertheless,	Campbell	felt	it	necessary	to	work	with	him	until	the	
latter	trusted	Oxfam	enough	that	they	would	be	able	to	operate	freely.116	Predictably,	this	
meant	that	early	efforts	at	food	distribution	were	spasmodic	and	only	effective	within	a	
30-mile	radius	from	Wajir.	117	Only	after	continued	pressure	by	Oxfam	and	other	donors	
through	 embassies,	 the	 press	 and	 the	 radio	 did	 the	 government	 consent	 to	 Oxfam	
starting	a	larger,	operational,	restocking	project	in	Wajir.	In	July,	Oxfam	allocated	£51,000	
to	 re-house,	 feed	 and	 restock	 widows	 of	 the	 Wagalla	 massacre,	 a	 relief	 effort	 that	
contrasted	with	government	efforts	to	settle	victims	of	state	violence;	yet	even	this	was	
of	limited	impact,	reaching	only	30	widows.118	All	of	the	recipients	would,	however,	make	
a	successful	return	to	pastoralism.119	
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‘BEWARE OF SUSPICIOUS FOREIGNERS’ 
 
Inevitably,	relations	with	the	government	were	strained	by	the	episode:	Campbell	noted	
in	 his	 last	 annual	 report	 that	 Oxfam’s	 involvement	 in	 Wajir	 had	 ‘earned	 us	 the	
considerable	displeasure	of	the	President’s	Office’	at	a	time	when	Moi	was	attempting	to	
consolidate	 his	 power	 through	 KANU	 and	 was	 removing	 potential	 challengers	 to	 his	
rule.120	Thus	 when	 Nicky	 May	 took	 over	 from	 Campbell	 in	 October	 1985	 she	 faced	
immediate	government	obstructiveness	as	regards	work	permits	for	Oxfam	expatriates.121	
Around	the	same	time	the	NGO	sector	and	Kenyan	churches	were	becoming	increasingly	
vocal	in	opposition	to	the	President’s	effort	to	subvert	democracy	by	replacing	the	secret	
ballot	with	the	queue	voting	system.	This	earned	all	NGOs	the	opprobrium	of	the	state,	
and	as	Moi	ramped	up	his	attempts	to	control	civil	society	May	and	Ian	Leggett	reported	
to	 Oxford	 on	 the	 ‘renewed	 scrutiny	 by	 the	 Kenyan	 Government	 of	 the	 activities	 of	
NGOs’. 122 	Indeed,	 there	 were	 indications	 that	 NGO	 funds	 would	 now	 have	 to	 be	
channelled	 through	District	 Councils,	 and	 that	NGOs	would	 have	 to	 declare	 in	 advance	
how	much	they	were	spending	and	where.	Understandably,	May	and	Leggett	feared	that	
the	‘freedom	of	action	of	NGOs	will	[soon]	be	heavily	curtailed’,	and	they	were	especially	
concerned	that	the	deterioration	in	NGO-state	relations	‘could	have	serious	repercussions	
on	 the	 type	 of	 partners	 Oxfam	 can	 work	 with’,	 particularly	 as	 threats	 against	 NGOs	
considered	‘subversive’	became	more	frequent	and	the	government	successfully	co-opted	
others.123	Anxiety	would	only	 increase	as	Ministers	 lined	up	to	criticise	NGOs	and	called	
for	‘coordination’,	and	Moi	himself	suggested	that	the	government	would	like	to	exercise	
control	over	the	allocation	of	NGO	funds.124 
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 Nor	were	these	fears	unfounded:	behind	the	scenes	the	Cabinet	met	in	late	1986	
to	discuss	‘the	recent	and	present	upsurge	in	the	numbers	of	NGOs	and	their	activities’.	
The	 ‘upsurge’	 was	 considered	 a	 ‘matter	 of	 concern	 politically	 and	 in	 terms	 of	 the	
country’s	 security’.	 Particularly	 troubling	 was	 the	 ‘unmonitored	 manner	 in	 which	 the	
NGOs	 are	 setting	 themselves	 up…	 without	 the	 approval	 or	 involvement	 of	 the	
Government’.	 As	 well	 as	 operating	 outside	 government	 development	 plans,	 Ministers	
condemned	NGOs	for	taking	all	the	credit	for	their	work	–	‘as	opposed	to	associating	the	
Government	to	it’	–	thereby	threatening	government	legitimacy.	Moreover,	and	without	
any	 sense	 of	 irony,	Ministers	 noted	 the	 fact	 that	NGOs	 receiving	 large	 sums	 of	money	
from	 overseas	 posed	 a	 security	 risk	 to	 the	 country	 ‘as	 the	 funds	 could	 easily	 be	
misappropriated	 and	misapplied’.	 ‘It	 is	 quite	 possible’,	 the	memorandum	 argued,	 ‘that	
they	 [NGOs]	 may	 be	 agents	 of	 international	 espionage	 networks’.	 Accordingly,	 the	
Cabinet	was	asked	to	give	its	approval	to	legislation	that	would	allow	for	the	supervision	
and	 regulation	 of	 NGO	 activities	 in	 order	 to	 ensure	 that	 NGOs	 operated	 only	 in	 an	
apolitical	 ‘gap-filling’	 manner	 and	 only	 in	 close	 cooperation	 with	 the	 state	 on	 social	
problems	(such	as	juvenile	delinquency,	alcoholism	and	drug	addiction)	rather	than	their	
political	 causes.125	It	 would	 be	 another	 four	 years	 before	 this	 legislation	 was	 finally	
brought	 forward	 at	 the	 peak	 of	 civil	 society	 clamour	 for	 multipartyism,	 but	 in	 the	
meantime	a	commission	involving	the	Ministry	of	Foreign	Affairs	and	the	Treasury	set	out	
to	 investigate	 the	 role,	 activities	and	privileges	of	NGOs.126	In	 fact,	 the	Foreign	Ministry	
requested	 all	 government	 departments	 to	 provide	 information	 on	 NGOs,	 including	 the	
location	of	their	headquarters,	the	size	of	their	staff,	the	programmes	they	were	involved	
in	and	copies	of	 their	annual	reports.	This	was	to	enable	the	Ministry	to	 ‘monitor’	NGO	
activities	in	the	country.127 
For	 Oxfam,	 the	 increasing	 ‘tension	 in	 relations	 between	 the	 Government	 and	
international	 agencies’	 and	 lingering	 mistrust	 over	 Wajir	 meant	 that	 its	 operational	
agreement	 with	 the	 government	 would	 not	 be	 renewed	 in	 1986	 despite	 negotiations	
starting	 well	 in	 advance	 of	 the	 deadline.	 Ostensibly	 the	 result	 of	 the	 government	
examining	the	terms	on	which	NGOs	operated,	 in	reality	the	delay	was	due	to	‘the	GOK	
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[government	of	Kenya]	seeking	to	assert	[its]	control’.	Luckily,	a	covering	letter	from	the	
Treasury	 allowed	 Oxfam	 to	 continue	 to	 operate	 legally	 for	 the	 time	 being.128	Other	
organisations	were	 less	 fortunate:	 Catholic	 church	 development	 programmes	 based	 on	
the	 Freirian	 psycho-social	 method	 in	 the	 four	 most	 radical	 dioceses	 (Meru,	 Lodwar,	
Marsabit	 and	 Mombasa)	 were	 dismantled	 in	 a	 similar	 fashion	 to	 the	 CDES	 in	 the	
aftermath	of	 the	coup	attempt	 in	1982.	Government	officials	also	encouraged	paranoia	
about	 NGO	 activities	 to	 spread	 across	 the	 country:	 in	 Kajiado	 the	 District	 Social	
Development	Officer	wrote	to	his	colleagues	warning	that	NGOs	were	‘making	[a]	move	in	
the	district	with	the	intention	of	recruiting	women[’s]	groups’.	Since	only	the	government	
could	‘advise	our	women[’s]	groups	on	where	to	invest	their	money’,	meetings	between	
the	latter	and	NGOs	were	denied	unless	permission	was	received	from	the	Commissioner	
for	Social	Services.129	
In	the	prevailing	climate	May	conceded	that	it	was	‘difficult	for	NGOs	to	speak	up	
on	national	 issues’.	Expatriate	agencies	 like	Oxfam	faced	particular	criticism,	she	wrote,	
‘in	 an	 attempt	 to	 divert	 attention	 from	 internal	 issues’	 such	 as	 the	 emergence	 of	
Mwakenya,	difficulties	between	Moi	and	the	Kikuyu	elite	over	a	resurgence	of	interest	in	
Mau	 Mau	 and	 high	 levels	 of	 inflation	 and	 unemployment.130	At	 the	 same	 time,	 the	
government	 continued	 to	 arrest	 political	 opponents,	 while	 the	 President	 held	 rallies	
across	 the	 country	 to	 register	 (through	 intimidation)	 new	members	of	 KANU,	 and	used	
threats	of	exclusion	from	the	party	to	tame	dissent	(since	employment	and	government	
beneficence	often	relied	on	party	membership).	State	repression	on	this	scale	created	a	
level	 of	 anxiousness	 among	 NGO	 staff	 that	 was	 unprecedented	 for	 Kenya.	 As	 one	
interviewee	recalled,	Oxfam	staff	–	in	common	with	much	of	the	Kenyan	public	–	began	
to	 ‘look	 over	 their	 shoulders’	 to	 see	 who	 was	 listening	 before	 being	 critical	 of	 the	
government;	 fortunately,	 a	 particular	 giveaway	 for	 special	 branch	 agents	 was	 their	
predilection	 for	 long-wheelbase	 Peugeots.131	In	 the	 hope	 of	 facilitating	 better	 relations	
with	 the	 government,	Oxfam	 submitted	 to	 political	 pressure	 and	became	a	member	of	
the	Kenya	National	Council	of	Social	Services	in	1987.	This	was	to	no	avail,	however,	for	
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once	NGOs	such	as	Amnesty	International	spoke	out	on	government	human	rights	abuses	
–	 taking	 advantage	 of	 the	 opportunity	 provided	 by	 Moi’s	 need	 to	 negotiate	 large	 aid	
packages	 with	 the	 West	 –	 the	 government	 became	 even	 more	 suspicious	 of	 NGO	
activities	 and	 developed	 an	 acute	 sensitivity	 to	 any	 kind	 of	 criticism.	 Indeed,	 as	
punishment	for	NGO	outspokenness	over	human	rights	violations,	the	state	forced	NGOs	
to	 re-register,	 closed	 private	 airstrips	 and	withheld	 radio	 licences	 in	 order	 to	 interfere	
with	relief	and	development	work.132	
During	Nicky	May’s	 first	 few	years	 in	Kenya	the	context	 in	which	she	operated	–	
both	as	regards	the	Kenya	government’s	suspicion	towards	the	organisation	after	Wagalla	
(and	 towards	 NGOs	 generally),	 and	 with	 regard	 to	 the	 debate	 in	 Oxford	 about	 Oxfam	
activities	in	Africa	–	not	only	defined	the	major	strategic	issues	that	she	and	Oxfam	sought	
to	address	but	also	 indicated	the	 tactical	 limitations	on	 their	ability	 to	do	so.	Thus	May	
concluded	that	while	it	was	politically	difficult	to	address	‘the	root	causes	of	poverty	and	
exploitation’	 in	Kenya,	 it	was	particularly	problematic	 to	do	 so	 through	 the	operational	
style	 that	 she	 had	 inherited	 from	 David	 Campbell.	 May	 understood	 that	 high-profile	
‘operationality’	 would	 expose	 Oxfam	 to	 increased	 government	 surveillance	 and	 would	
attract	state	pressure	to	direct	resources	in	a	manner	that	suited	government	objectives,	
since	the	added	strain	placed	on	government	finances	by	IMF	conditions	in	the	mid-1980s	
meant	operational	NGOs	faced	growing	demands	to	provide	services	and	infrastructure	in	
collaboration	 with	 the	 state,	 and	 to	 channel	 their	 money	 through	 the	 treasury. 133	
Furthermore,	 large-scale	 development	 projects	 were	 increasingly	 falling	 prey	 to	
corruption	around	this	time.	The	Turkwell	dam	project	(discussed	in	chapter	one)	was	the	
most	 obvious	 example:	 dangerous	 for	 thousands	 of	 pastoralists,	 it	 was,	 nonetheless,	
financially	rewarding	for	Moi	and	his	allies	and	so	proceeded	without	regard	to	those	who	
populated	the	area.134	
Moreover,	 after	 digesting	 the	 implications	 of	 the	 debate	 in	 Oxford,	 even	 those	
who	had	advocated	Oxfam	operational	work	acknowledged	by	this	stage	that	operating	
alone	 in	 pastoral	 areas	 prevented	 the	 organisation	 from	 rooting	 the	 project	within	 the	
community:	 on	 a	 large	 scale,	 ‘activities	 like	 re-stocking…	 remain	 something	 done	 to	
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pastoralists…	with	little	direct	involvement	by	them,	and	no	improvement	in	their	ability	
to	 organise	 themselves	 for	 development’.135	They	 also	 allowed	 the	 state	 to	 avoid	 its	
responsibilities.	May	 agreed	with	 such	 an	 analysis,	 and	 –	 along	with	 Leggett	 and	 Peter	
Wiles	–	was	one	of	a	cohort	of	Oxfam	staff	committed	to	the	ideals	of	empowerment	and	
solidarity	rather	than	charity.136	She	thus	argued	that	Oxfam	should	‘be	working	with	and	
for	the	poorest’	to	‘encourage	processes	of	change	which	enable	them	to	take	control	of	
the	improvement	of	their	quality	of	life’.	Assessing	the	context	in	Kenya,	she	concluded	in	
the	 same	 language	as	Gormley	 that	Oxfam	would	not	 ‘make	much	 impact	on	 the	huge	
issues	of	population,	land	and	unemployment’.	Rather:	
	
Our	 limited	 resources	 should	 be	 used	 in	 ways	 that	 assist	 communities	 to	 develop	
their	 own	 responses	 to	 these	 problems,	 whether	 in	 small	 scale	 community	 based	
initiatives,	advocacy,	strengthening	social	organisation	etc.	
	
‘The	theme	underlying	our	work’,	she	continued,	‘should	be	the	process	of	development’;	
this	necessitated	‘a	shift	from	largely	technical	solutions	to	supporting	and	strengthening	
local	social	organisations,	more	input	into	human	development	and	creating	awareness’.	
In	turn,	this	required	 ‘a	shift	away	from	Oxfam	operational	projects	to	closer	work	with	
local	partners…	[and]	pressure	groups…’	who	worked	on	issues	of	policy	and	legal	rights.	
As	 regards	 pastoralism,	May	 considered	 it	 vital	 to	 continue	 working	 in	 the	 sector,	 but	
hoped	to	 tie	 together	 (for	 the	 first	 time)	Oxfam’s	efforts	 in	 the	sector	with	 the	 issue	of	
rights	denied	 to	other	marginalised	Kenyans	 (such	as	women,	 small-holders	 in	Western	
Kenya,	landless	people	and	the	urban	poor),	moving	from		
	
the	 technical,	 operational	 approach	 to	more	 concentration	 on	 strengthening	 social	
organisation,	 to	 enable	 pastoral	 people	 to	 adjust	 to	 the	modern	 economy	on	 their	
own	 terms,	 and	 make	 their	 own	 demands	 on	 GOK	 and	 agency	 development	
services.137	
	
Though	she	was	broadening	the	scope	of	Oxfam’s	work,	May	was,	therefore,	returning	to	
the	pre-drought	tactical	model	for	Oxfam	work	in	Kenya,	focused	as	it	was	on	the	effort	to	
challenge	 the	 state	 to	 fulfil	 its	 developmental	 mandate	 through	 ‘the	 process	 of	
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empowerment’.138	In	such	a	way,	the	Kenya	programme	would	be	consistent	with	Oxfam	
principles	and	values	as	articulated	by	Leggett	and	Gormley	et	al	in	the	Africa	Committee	
debates.139	
Nonetheless,	the	radical	rhetoric	coming	out	from	Nairobi	was	actually	considered	
somewhat	 naïve	 by	many	 in	 Oxford.	 After	 reading	May’s	 recommendations,	 the	 Africa	
South	 Sub-Committee	 noted	 that	while	 operational	work	was	 risky	 in	 the	 context	 of	 a	
breakdown	 in	 relations	 between	 the	 government	 and	 NGOs	 and	 the	 ‘emergence	 of	 a	
party	and	President	asserting	their	supremacy	more	firmly’,	too	strong	‘a	move	within	the	
programme	 to	 concentrate	 on	 animation	 work’	 was	 equally	 dangerous.	 Although	
members	 accepted	 that	 it	 was	 necessary	 on	 occasion	 to	 take	 risks	 and	 did	 not	 reject	
animation	or	empowerment	work	outright,	 they	were	anxious	 that	an	 ‘almost	exclusive	
focus	 on	 such	 work	 could	 leave	 Oxfam	 in	 a	 difficult	 position,	 particularly	 in	 view	 of	
Government-NGO	 relations’	 and	 Oxfam’s	 position	 in	 the	 aftermath	 of	 Wagalla.140	In	
response,	 Ian	 Leggett	 admitted	 to	 the	 Committee	 that	 ‘the	 present	 demand	 for	
unquestioning	 loyalty	 to	 the	 Kenyan	 leadership	 had	 affected	 the	 atmosphere	 in	 which	
Oxfam	 works’	 and	 that	 numerous	 partners	 were	 anxious	 about	 working	 towards	
empowerment,	but	he	attempted	to	calm	their	nerves	by	assuring	them	that	the	Kenya	
programme’s	 support	 for	 animation	work	was	 not	 exclusive	 and	 that	 ‘the	Nairobi	 staff	
[are]	proceeding	very	cautiously’.141	In	fact,	May	was	forced	to	pull	the	Kenya	programme	
back	 from	 a	 more	 radical	 tactical	 shift	 towards	 empowerment	 work	 in	 1987.	 As	 she	
admitted	in	her	annual	report:	
	
With	the	general	paranoia	on	the	part	of	the	GOK	about	the	development	activities	
of	 NGOs	 in	 the	 rural	 areas	 it	 has	 been	 difficult	 at	 times	 to	 pursue	 a	 strategy	 of	
dialogue	and	empowerment	of	local	communities	–	for	example	a	workshop	run	by	a	
project	partner	on	community	development	methodologies	was	disrupted	by	Special	
Branch…142	
	
It	was,	 therefore,	 simply	 too	great	 a	 risk	 to	pursue	 conscientisation	and	empowerment	
openly	in	Kenya	at	this	time.	By	adopting	wholesale	a	radical	empowerment	programme	
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in	Kenya,	Oxfam	would	not	only	be	endangering	lives	but	also	its	entire	operation	in	the	
country,	 on	 which	 hinged	 the	 longer-term	 strategy	 of	 cajoling	 the	 state	 to	 take	
responsibility	for	its	citizens.	
	 Consequently,	 while	May	 reaffirmed	 her	 support	 for	 the	 ‘process	 of	 animation’	
among	groups	that	had	been	 ‘marginalised	 into	poverty’,	and	still	 sought	to	wind	down	
the	operational	side	of	Oxfam’s	work	as	much	as	possible	–	to	more	easily	resist	pressure	
to	 ‘allow	 our	 scarce	 resources	 to	 be	 spent	 on	 providing	 services	 which	 should	 be	 the	
government’s	 responsibility’	 –	 she	 came	 to	 realise	 that	 ‘animation	work	may	better	 be	
supported	through	the	medium	of	a	more	technical	looking	project’,	which	would	provide	
an	‘umbrella	for	wider	community	development	activities’	by	maintaining	the	superficial	
‘complementarity	 of	 NGO	 and	 GOK	 efforts	 for	 development’.143	Other	 staff	 also	 noted	
that	 it	was	 ‘easier	to	cloak	what	[Oxfam	was]	doing	 in	a…	humanitarian	agenda’	or	as	a	
relief	 intervention,	 because	 this	 fooled	 the	 ‘many	 vested	 interests	 in	 the	 people	
remaining	passive	and	not	questioning	their	own	development’.144	Without	articulating	it	
in	 such	a	way,	Oxfam	would	 thus	adopt	 the	 ‘onion	skin’	approach	documented	by	Alan	
Fowler	in	his	work	on	the	Undugu	organisation	in	Kenya.	Fowler	describes	the	approach	
as	 the	 use	 of	 an	 ‘outer	 layer	 of	 welfare-oriented	 activity	 to	 [protect]	 inner	 layers	 of	
material	 service	 delivery	 that	 act	 as	 nuclei	 for	 a	 core	 strategy	 dedicated	 to	
transformation’.145	Similarly	 to	 Undugu,	 Oxfam	 would	 attempt	 to	 disguise	 (or	 at	 least	
make	easier	 to	 swallow)	 the	more	controversial	elements	of	 its	programme	by	 layering	
relatively	small-scale	and	unthreatening	technical	measures	and	observable	inputs	on	top	
of	 empowerment	 work;	 this	 served	 to	 distract	 (or	 attract)	 local	 officials	 –	 taking	
advantage	of	their	technical	training	and	the	temptations	of	patronage	politics	–	thereby	
maintaining	political	space	and	enabling	the	NGO	to	work	closely	with	the	community	on	
animation	and	empowerment.146	Indeed,	by	layering	development	activity	in	such	a	way,	
local	officials	or	politicians	were	less	likely	to	perceive	Oxfam	actions	as	contrary	to	their	
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interests	 and	had	more	 to	 lose	 than	 ‘unwelcome’	 empowerment	 if	 the	NGO	withdrew,	
since	service	delivery	promised	to	placate	groups	that	otherwise	might	have	sought	other	
patrons.147	
	 Hence,	Oxfam	 in	 Kenya	 remained	 tactically	 pragmatic	 as	well	 as	 value-driven	 in	
terms	of	strategy.	While	the	organisation	as	a	whole	sought	to	move	away	from	disputed	
‘neo-colonial’	 operational	 work,	 those	 on	 the	 ground	 accepted	 that	 its	 ideologically-
driven	 empowerment	 agenda	 stood	 no	 chance	 of	 success	 under	 a	 government	
determined	to	stamp	out	dissent.	To	enable	at	 least	some	empowerment	work	 to	 filter	
out	from	the	Kenya	programme,	it	was	vital	that	Oxfam	work	with	the	prevailing	system	
in	Kenya.	Staff	were	keenly	aware	that	peripheral	benefits	for	elites	were	often	necessary	
to	gain	access	 to	communities	and	 to	maintain	 the	 thrust	of	empowerment	work.	They	
understood	 that	 district	 officials	 were	 often	 ‘less	 interested	 in	 an	 overall…	 theory	 of	
development…’	 than	 they	 were	 ‘persuaded,	 in	 the	 context	 of	 limited	 government	
resources,	[that]	if	they	could	get	an	NGO	to	begin	to	do	something,	and	for	them	to	be	
associated	with	that…’	they	could	not	only	‘keep	tabs’	on	what	Oxfam	was	doing	but	also	
‘claim	 the	 credit’	 for	 the	 initiative.	 As	 one	 interviewee	 emphasised,	 Oxfam	 was	 stoic	
about	 the	 way	 such	 things	 worked:	 ‘everybody	 knew	 what	 had	 happened	 in	 [each]	
project;	the	fact	that	a	politician	turns	up	and	claims	glory…	is	irrelevant’.	The	important	
questions	for	Oxfam	were	‘to	what	extent	is	government	wanting	to	[become	involved]…	
for	 its	 own	 political	 purposes	 and	 to	 what	 extent	 will	 it	 actually	 advance	 Oxfam’s	
concerns…	Sometimes,	one	action	will	do	both…	Provided	I	am	satisfied	that	[the	activity]	
advances	 Oxfam’s	 concerns,	 I	 am	 not	 [necessarily]	 bothered	 that	 it	 also	 advances	 a	
particular	politician	or	government’s	concerns’.	It	was	a	balancing	act:	‘essentially	it’s	the	
eighty-twenty	rule.	If	I	can	get	eighty	per	cent	of	what	I’m	looking	for,	and	I	have	to	give	
twenty	per	 cent	of	 the	 credit	 or	 profile	 or	 recognition	 [to	 the	 government]	 then	 I’ll	 do	
it’.148	
	 Oxfam’s	earlier	water	harvesting	and	restocking	projects	were,	therefore,	given	a	
stay	 of	 execution,	 but	 May	 shifted	 their	 focus	 from	 ‘elite,	 top-down	 expatriate	 work’	
towards	‘empowering	pastoral	people	and	their	organisations	to	take	control	of	their	own	
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development’.149	Adrian	 Cullis	 was	 retained	 to	 manage	 this	 transition	 as	 regards	 the	
Turkana	Water	Harvesting	project.	As	a	review	of	the	project	notes,	he	had	always	been	
concerned	 at	 the	 ‘lack	 of	 participation	 in	 the	 decision-making	 processes	 on	 the	 part	 of	
[project]	members’	and	had	previously	attempted	to	work	towards	the	formation	of	new	
pastoral	institutions.150	Cullis	had,	moreover,	‘resisted	the	attempt	to	impose	a	“technical	
fix”	on	the	situation’;	yet		
	
despite	 the	 efforts	 of	 the	 project	 manager…	 based	 on	 his	 own	 conviction	 that	 a	
slower	more	participative	approach	was	vital,	he	was	required	by	the	previous	Oxfam	
Field	Director	 [Campbell]	 to	proceed	directly	 to	 the	demonstration	of	 the	 technical	
objectives…	 The	 consequence	 was	 that…	 institutional	 aspects	 were	 never	
systematically	investigated	or	documented	–	an	important	handicap	at	the	outset	of	
the	project…151	
	
From	 late	 1985,	 however,	 there	was	 a	 concerted	move	within	 the	 project	 to	 take	 into	
account	 indigenous	 organisation	 and	 to	 strengthen	 local	 groups	 to	 manage	 their	 own	
resources	 and	 make	 claims	 on	 government	 structures.	 The	 ‘demonstration	 approach’,	
which	focused	on	foreign	technologies	mainly	imported	from	Yemen,	gradually	gave	way	
to	a	more	participatory	approach	as	Cullis	worked	with	 local	Turkana	to	strengthen	and	
improve	 existing	 gardening	 skills	 and	 institutional	 arrangements.	 A	 member	 of	 staff	
involved	 in	 the	project	 recalled	 that	 new	 staff	were	driven	by	 a	belief	 that	 pastoralism	
was	 the	 most	 appropriate	 system	 of	 production	 for	 arid	 environments	 and	 that	
pastoralists	 should	 be	 central	 to	 the	 development	 process;	 they	 were,	 accordingly,	
‘committed	to	pastoral	empowerment	[and]	used	Freirian	approaches’.	Dialogue	with	the	
community	was	particularly	important	to	ensure	‘accountability	of	both	the	project	staff	
and	 the	project	 to	 the	community’,	while	 the	project	encouraged	 ‘staff	and	community	
leaders	to	participate	in…	psycho-social	training	organised	by	the	Lodwar	diocese’.152	For	
the	time	being,	of	course,	it	remained	important	to	emphasise	the	technical	inputs	of	the	
intervention	 ahead	 of	 this	 empowerment	 work:	 one	 staff	 member	 involved	 with	 the	
project	noted	that	‘the	strategy	I	usually	used	[was	to]	go	for	the	low-hanging	fruit,	build	
relationships	 and	 trust,	 then	 nudge	 upwards’.153	Fortunately,	 emphasising	 the	 technical	
input	was	 fairly	 straightforward:	 over	 4,500	 people	were	 directly	 involved	 in	 rainwater	
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harvesting,	and	the	improved	gardens	that	resulted	were	reported	to	have	‘increased	the	
reliability	 and	 productivity	 of	 cropping,	 particularly	 in	 years	 of	 medium	 and	 poor	
rainfall’. 154 	Nonetheless,	 the	 ‘sensitivity	 of	 the	 project	 manager	 in	 considering	
[participation]	with	local	groups…	[also	ensured	that]	their	self-directing	capabilities	were	
built	 and	 strengthened’. 155 	Oxfam	 would,	 in	 fact,	 soon	 hand	 responsibility	 for	 self-
management	 of	 the	 project	 to	 a	 local	 co-ordinating	 body,	 which	 had	 been	 trained	 in	
community	development.156	The	organisation	continued	to	finance	community	animation	
workshops	 for	 the	 management	 board	 and	 local	 community	 until	 1997	 (at	 a	 cost	 of	
£143,000)	in	order	to	encourage	them	to	take	on	broader	development	initiatives.157	The	
management	board	took	up	the	challenge:	the	project	changed	its	name	to	the	Lokitaung	
Pastoral	 Development	 Project	 in	 January	 1989,	 reflecting	 a	 wider	 remit	 that	 included	
marketing,	credit	and	animal	health.	
	 Meanwhile,	 the	 delay	 in	 the	 implementation	 of	 the	 Samburu	 restocking	 effort	
until	 1986	 meant	 that	 May	 had	 an	 opportunity	 to	 remodel	 the	 project	 to	 reflect	 her	
emphasis	 on	 ‘low-level	 institution	 building	 using	 re-stocking	 as	 a	 vehicle’.	 In	 fact,	 she	
hoped	 that	 Oxfam	 could	 work	 directly	 with	 small	 groups	 and	 develop	 a	 committee	 of	
representatives	 to	manage	 the	work	on	 a	 larger	 scale.158	Thus	 the	programme	 initiated	
‘community	 conscientisation	 activities’	 to	 try	 to	 ‘make	 people	 aware	 of	 why	 they	 are	
doing	what	they	are	doing’,	and	Oxfam	held	discussions	with	women	on	the	issue	of	milk	
prices,	which	resulted	 in	a	proposal	 for	regulation;	women	in	the	programme	were	also	
encouraged	 to	 form	 a	 committee	 to	 co-ordinate	 activities	 around	 the	 programme	area	
and	to	reach	out	to	the	wider	community.159	Post-drought	rehabilitation	workshops	later	
revealed	that	land	issues	and	economic	opportunity	were	the	most	pressing	local	issues.	
As	 a	 result	 of	 these	 discussions,	 Oxfam	 helped	 to	 create	 hides	 and	 skins	 outlets	 for	
women	 and	 many	 communities	 hired	 lawyers	 to	 advocate	 for	 pastoral	 land	 rights	 in	
Nairobi.	Similarly	to	the	water	harvesting	scheme,	in	1987	Oxfam	handed	control	to	local	
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committees	 and	 women’s	 groups	 who	 would	 monitor	 families	 restocked	 under	 the	
programme	 and	 identify	 priorities	 for	 their	 own	 development. 160 	Accordingly,	 the	
Samburu	 approach	 fitted	 more	 closely	 to	 May’s	 assessment	 of	 the	 need	 for	
empowerment	 among	 pastoralists	 than	 the	 technical	 approach	 to	 restocking	 seen	 in	
Turkana.161		
Nevertheless,	 because	 of	 Oxfam’s	 history	 in	 the	 region,	 it	 proved	 ‘difficult	 for	
Oxfam	to	change	the	perception	of	itself	from	an	agency	which	gives	things	to	an	agency	
which	helps	people	to	analyse	their	situation’.162	In	both	Turkana	and	Samburu,	it	quickly	
became	 clear	 that	 moving	 beyond	 well-meaning	 rhetoric	 about	 community-driven	
development	was,	 as	 a	 result	 of	 this	 perception,	 immensely	 difficult.	 As	 Peter	 Kisopia,	
Oxfam’s	Pastoral	Programme	Officer	at	the	time,	admitted,	the	dynamic	between	Oxfam	
and	the	community	was	always	unbalanced,	even	in	empowerment	work:	
	
Yes,	people	learned	new	skills	in	rainwater	harvesting,	but	to	what	extent	were	those	
activities	productive	or	sustainable	by	themselves?	If	the	jembes	[hoes]	broke,	Oxfam	
either	 repaired	 or	 replaced	 them.	No	one	was	 looking	 at	 the	 subsidies	 that	Oxfam	
was	putting	in,	or	asking	what	would	happen	if	Oxfam	withdrew.163	
	
Moreover,	rhetoric	on	 institution	building	and	working	with	 ‘traditional’	groups	was	not	
matched	by	an	appropriate	level	of	understanding	of	the	history	or	present	condition	of	
those	groups:	 restocking	committees	were,	 for	 instance,	dominated	by	 individuals	 from	
around	fixed	trade	centres,	thus	hardly	representing	traditional	institutions.	Furthermore,	
in	a	concession	to	the	Kenyan	‘system’,	the	local	chief	often	had	an	input	in	the	selection	
of	these	groups.164	
	 Later	reviews	would	also	criticise	the	Samburu	restocking	effort	and	the	Turkana	
Water	 Harvesting	 projects	 for	 shifting	 too	 far	 towards	 institution	 building,	 thereby	
restricting	their	physical	achievements.	This	was	seen	to	be	problematic	since	in	order	for	
pastoral	institutions	to	prove	sustainable,	they	had	‘to	serve	some	more	tangible	purpose	
than	 merely	 to	 exist…’.165	These	 projects	 faced	 additional	 criticism	 for	 their	 refusal	 to	
engage	more	directly	with	the	Kenya	government;	but	May	defended	Oxfam’s	approach	
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at	the	time	by	arguing	that	government	‘policy	towards	the	arid	pastoral	areas	appears	to	
be	 based	 on	 an	 agriculture-centred	 view	 of	 development	 and	 suspicion	 of	 the	 more	
mobile	 “primitive”	 [mode]	 of	 living	 of	 the	 pastoralists’.	 ‘Under	 the	 Group	 Ranch	
Representatives	Act’,	she	wrote,	
	
land	registration…	rapidly	gives	way	to	demarcation	of	individual	farms	for	the	richest	
and	 most	 powerful,	 thus	 cutting	 off	 the	 poorer	 community’s	 access	 to	 the	 best	
grazing	 land…	 The	 land,	 where	 good,	 is	 often	 farmed	 by	 down-country	
agriculturalists,	where	unsuitable	for	this	it	may	be	used	as	collateral	for	credit	or	for	
speculative	 purposes.	 The	 pastoral	 way	 of	 life	 is	 further	 squeezed	 by	 settlement	
schemes	 (GOK’s	 attempt	 to	 find	 land	 for	 its	 growing	 and	 dispossessed	 agricultural	
population);	and	by	irrigation	projects.	
	
May	continued:	‘We	feel	there	is	a	need	to	put	forward	positive	images	of	pastoralism	as	
the	only	rational	use	of	 the	arid	areas…	to	correct	an	 imbalance	 in	 the	perceptions…	of	
GOK	officials’,	but	this	did	not	mean	working	directly	together	with	a	government	hostile	
to	 NGOs	 and	 convinced	 that	 pastoralists	 were	 ‘primitive’. 166 	As	 one	 interviewee	
remarked,	 ‘[Nicky]	occupied	 the	position	 that	NGOs	were	good	at	pioneering	 [projects]	
and	 government	 should	 be	 rolling	 [programmes]	 out	 for	 the	 mass	 population’.	 ‘There	
was’,	 they	 continued,	 no	 ‘refusal	 to	 co-operate	 with	 government…	 but	 relations	 were	
fairly	distant’.167	
	 Indeed,	 at	 the	 national	 level,	 ‘the	 position	 of	 Oxfam	 in	 Kenya	 [remained]	
tenuous’.168	Oxfam	operated	throughout	the	final	years	of	the	1980s	in	a	de	facto	fashion	
under	 the	same	privileges	as	granted	previously,	but	 the	 ‘continued	suspicion	of	NGOs,	
and	generalised	tension…	on	the	part	of	both	the	administration	and	the	party,	mean	that	
we	must	 continue	 to	 observe	 protocol…	 scrupulously’.	 In	 a	 confidential	 note	 to	Oxford	
(no	copies	of	which	were	to	remain	in	Kenya	in	any	form)	May	further	elaborated	on	the	
context:	 ‘increased	repression	of	criticism…	censorship	and	self-censorship	of	 the	press;	
rapid	 constitutional	 changes	 to	 suit	 executive	 policy	 [and]	 increased	 centralisation	 of	
power	in	the	hands	of	the	President’	made	it	‘harder	to	analyse	the	general	situation	and	
challenge	 injustice…	 without	 seeming	 to	 threaten	 security	 or	 be	 unpatriotic’.	 She	
recorded	 that	 ‘people	 in	 the	 rural	 areas	 have	 been	 warned	 to	 beware	 of	 suspicious	
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foreigners’,	 and	 permits	 were	 now	 required	 for	 any	meeting	 with	 local	 groups.169	May	
also	 reported	 on	 widespread	 government-led	 human	 rights	 abuses,	 the	 rigging	 of	
elections	 in	1988	–	 to	 remove	 the	 ‘“old	guard”	of	politicians	 from	Kenyatta’s	 time’	and	
produce	a	 ‘docile	Parliament’	befitting	Moi’s	 attempt	 to	make	KANU	supreme	over	 the	
legislature	 –	 and	 the	way	 in	 which	 Kenya	was	 increasingly	 ruled	 by	 directive	 from	 the	
President	 through	 KANU,	 District	 Commissioners	 (who	 ‘controlled	 everything	 from	
development	to	defence’),	the	police	and	‘youthwingers’.170	In	Oxford,	May’s	report	was	
read	 with	 trepidation:	 Kenya	 was,	 discussants	 agreed,	 a	 classic	 example	 of	 ‘autocratic	
decline’,	 whereby	 autocracy	 undermined	 popular	 participation	 in	 decision-making	 and	
‘the	elite	gear	 things	 into	 the	meeting	of	 their	 interests	at	 the	expense	of	 those	of	 the	
majority…	all	in	the	name	of	development’.171	‘Any	wrong	step,	however	slight’,	the	Africa	
Committee	noted,	‘may	mean	expulsion’.172	Thus	May	was	advised	to	do	her	best	to	keep	
Oxfam’s	work	low	profile.	
	 For	 the	most	 part	 the	 Field	Director	was	 successful	 in	 this	 regard;	 in	 fact,	 there	
was	only	one	direct	threat	to	Oxfam’s	position	in	this	period,	and	it	occurred	a	year	earlier	
when	May	conducted	a	survey	 in	anticipation	of	an	Oxfam	programme	for	participatory	
development	in	Wajir.	At	the	time,	the	DC	(recalling	Oxfam’s	earlier	efforts	in	the	district)	
was	 less	 than	 pleased	 with	 the	 questions	 she	 asked	 about	 animal	 deaths	 and	
malnutrition,	 but	 he	 allowed	May	 to	 submit	 a	 ‘sanitised’	 version	 of	 her	 findings	 to	 the	
Provincial	 Commissioner,	 justifying	 an	 Oxfam	 programme	 in	 concert	 with	 AMREF	 and	
others.173	A	more	 critical	 report	 regarding	 the	 lack	 of	 investment	 by	 public	 and	 private	
bodies	 in	 the	 region	was	 sent	 to	Oxford.	 Soon	after,	Oxfam’s	 Field	Officer	 visited	Wajir	
and,	in	the	usual	fashion,	paid	a	courtesy	call	on	the	DC	while	he	waited	for	May	to	drive	
up	from	Nairobi.	Immediately	he	noticed	that	the	usual	cordial,	if	formal,	atmosphere	was	
missing.	Instead,	he	sensed	hostility	and	irritation	on	the	part	of	government	officials	he	
encountered.	When	he	finally	met	with	the	DC,	the	Field	Officer	was	told	in	no	uncertain	
terms	 that	 he	was	 not	 to	 leave	Wajir	 or	 to	 continue	with	 his	work.	Moreover,	 the	 DC	
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ordered	the	Field	Officer	to	call	May	and	tell	her	not	to	travel	to	Wajir	without	the	explicit	
permission	of	the	Office	of	the	President.	The	Field	Officer,	fearing	arrest,	did	as	he	was	
told,	 but	 May	 was	 already	 en	 route	 and	 was,	 in	 any	 case,	 nonplussed	 as	 to	 why	 the	
government	would	not	wish	her	 to	visit	Wajir.	She	hoped	that,	whatever	 the	 issue,	 she	
could	argue	her	case	in	person	with	the	DC.		
	 When	May	arrived	in	Wajir,	she	and	the	Field	Officer	were	escorted	to	meet	the	
DC,	who	had	assembled	his	security	committee	of	departmental	heads,	police	officers	and	
members	of	 the	 intelligence	services.	 In	 front	of	 this	 threatening	cabal,	 the	DC	accused	
May	of	writing	damaging	untruths	about	the	state	of	Wajir	and	blaming	the	government	
for	the	people’s	suffering	when	the	true	cause	was	drought.	Without	waiting	to	hear	what	
the	Oxfam	staff	had	 to	 say	 for	 themselves,	he	ordered	 them	out	of	 the	office	and	 told	
them	 to	 stay	 in	Wajir	 overnight.	 Unsurprisingly,	May	 and	 her	 Field	Officer	 both	 feared	
what	would	happen	if	they	stayed	overnight	in	Wajir,	and	their	suspicions	were	confirmed	
by	a	contact	 in	 the	government	who	suggested	they	needed	to	 leave	quickly.	Together,	
they	 fled	Wajir	 and	 returned	 to	Nairobi.	 Their	 contact	 in	 the	 government	would	 reveal	
later	that	the	reports	on	the	situation	in	Wajir	had	been	placed	in	the	wrong	envelopes:	
the	critical	version	had	thus	been	dispatched	to	 the	Provincial	Commissioner	 (while	 the	
sanitised	version	ended	up	at	Oxfam	Head	Office).	In	retaliation,	the	DC	had	arranged	to	
throw	Oxfam	 out	 of	Wajir	 in	 full	 view	 of	 the	 assembled	 press,	 a	 potential	 propaganda	
coup	for	a	government	looking	to	blame	external	forces	for	unrest	in	the	country.174	
	 The	test	of	how	far	Oxfam’s	relationship	with	the	state	had	been	damaged	by	the	
episode	 arrived	 soon	 after.	 In	 late	 1987	 the	 short	 rains	 failed	 totally	 in	 North	 Eastern	
Province,	 creating	 a	 ‘potentially	 serious	 situation	 in	 and	 around	 Wajir’.	 Oxfam	
acknowledged	 that	 ‘due	 to	 historical	 factors’	 and	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 situation	 coincided	
with	the	first	stage	of	national	elections,	its	response	had	to	be	prepared	‘with	the	utmost	
sensitivity’.	Regardless	of	Oxfam’s	efforts,	the	Office	of	the	President	refused	to	allow	the	
organisation	into	Wajir.175	As	a	confidential	report	on	the	political	and	economic	context	
in	Kenya	commented,	
	
state	repression	of	pastoralists	continues…	in	North	Eastern	Province	drought	led	to	
many	 livestock	deaths	and	a	growing	number	of	destitute	people	 in	distress...	 [but]	
the	government	seemed	more	concerned	about	security	and	its	international	image	
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than	 it	 did	 about	 the	plight	of	 the	people	 concerned,	 and	 refused	 to	 allow	outside	
assistance	into	the	area.176	
	
Fortunately,	 the	 rains	 came	 not	 long	 after,	 resolving	 this	 potentially	 serious	
disagreement;	 but	Oxfam	would	 not	 be	 allowed	 to	 return	 to	 the	 district	 officially	 until	
1992.	
	 Predictably,	 therefore,	 the	prevailing	attitude	at	 the	 time	–	particularly	amongst	
Oxfam’s	 national	 staff	 –	 was	 one	 of	 cynicism	 towards	 the	 occupants	 of	 the	 state	
apparatus,	who	were	too	busy	supporting	the	‘culture	of	“big	men	eating”’	and	repressing	
widespread	 popular	 disaffection	 to	 have	 any	 commitment	 to	 poverty	 alleviation.177	Yet	
there	were	signs	of	a	softening	of	attitudes	among	staff:	as	one	Oxfam	employee	noted,	
NGOs	‘can	call	[the	government]	illegitimate	or	undemocratic	but…	they	are	there…	[and]	
the	potential	for	 increasing	Oxfam’s	impact	is	greater	if	[the	organisation]	can	create	an	
effective	working	relationship	with	the	government’.	Indeed,	if	–	as	May	acknowledged	–	
development	 in	 pastoral	 regions	 (as	 elsewhere)	 was	 ‘as	 much	 a	 matter	 of	 educating	
government	officials	as	local	[people]’,	many	felt	the	organisation	needed	to	improve	its	
work	as	an	interlocutor	between	the	state	and	society.178	As	Jimmy	Betts	had	stressed	20	
years	 previously,	 this	 could	 only	 realistically	 happen	 if	 institutionalised	 channels	 of	
communication	were	opened	up	with	government:	otherwise,	however	loud	at	the	village	
level,	the	voice	of	the	marginalised	was	not	going	to	be	heard	in	Nairobi.179		
	 Thus	when	the	restocking	and	water	harvesting	projects	ended	in	1987/88	Oxfam	
found	itself	‘at	a	watershed	in	planning	our	involvement	in	[the	pastoral]	sector	over	the	
next	 few	 years’.180	The	 1989-1993	 strategic	 plan	 for	 Kenya	 noted	 this	 opportunity	 and	
reflected	on	the	fact	that	the	roots	of	poverty	in	pastoral	areas	were	located	‘up-country’	
–	 whether	 in	 policies	 that	 encourage	 settlement,	 negative	 attitudes	 on	 the	 part	 of	
planners,	or	the	exploitation	of	pastoral	resources	for	tourism	or	the	benefit	of	the	elite	–	
but	 that	 ‘growing	 awareness	 of	 the	 need	 to	 address	 important	 policy	 issues	 had	 no	
outlet’.	Consequently,	May’s	successor,	Karen	Twining,	began	to	invest	in	Oxfam’s	public	
communications	 capacity	 and	 worked	 to	 create	 a	 national	 pastoral	 organisation	 –	 The	
Pastoral	Steering	Committee	(PSC)	–	that	could	enter	dialogue	with	receptive	government	
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officers	on	the	development	challenges	in	pastoral	areas.181	The	PSC,	which	started	out	as	
a	‘loose	network	of	Oxfam	staff	and	partners’,	soon	expanded	to	include	members	from	
pastoral	districts	right	across	the	country,	and	sought	to	provide	a	forum	at	national	level	
in	which	 issues	of	concern	to	pastoralists	could	be	raised	and	debated.	Meanwhile,	The	
Pastoralist	–	a	newsletter	formed	by	the	PSC	–	discussed	past	and	present	development	
interventions,	 advocated	 community	 development	 techniques	 and	 lambasted	 absentee	
MPs	 who	 voted	 against	 their	 constituents’	 interests. 182 	In	 light	 of	 government	
‘sensitivities’,	 concerns	 were	 raised	 in	 Oxford	 that	 the	 PSC	 was	 ‘a	 bit	 of	 an	 ambitious	
initiative	at	this	stage’,	and	that	it	could	draw	‘undesirable	attention	to	the	whole	sphere	
of	 pastoral	 work’.	 But	 Leggett	 asserted	 that	 its	 members	 ‘were	 fully	 aware	 of	 the	
disadvantages	of	drawing	undue	attention	to	 itself’.	Moreover,	he	averred,	 the	pastoral	
programme	was	 ‘learning	 from	 previous	 experience	 not	 to	 work	 in	 a	 vacuum	 but	 to…	
obtain	district	officials’	support’.	Furthermore,	the	PSC	–	funded	by	Oxfam	but	not	run	by	
the	organisation	–	could	engage	in	‘dialogue	with	government	that	will	not	compromise	
Oxfam	or	the	PSC	members’	individually.183	
The	 balancing	 act	 of	 engaging	 government	 while	 ‘keeping	 [it]	 at	 arms’	 length’	
remained	 at	 the	 forefront	 of	 Oxfam	 staff	 concerns	 in	 the	 last	 years	 prior	 to	 the	
reestablishment	of	multipartyism	in	Kenya.	Oxfam’s	‘representative	function’	–	lobbying,	
networking	 and	 coordination	 –	was	 considered	 ‘increasingly	 important	 to	 influence	 the	
context	in	which	our	programmes	operate’.184	Consequently,	when	staff	realised	that	an	
isolated	pressure	 group	 such	 as	 the	PSC	was	having	 limited	 impact	 in	Nairobi,	 they	 set	
about	bringing	pastoralists,	development	practitioners	together	with	government	officials	
at	 the	 ‘grassroots’. 185 	For	 example,	 in	 1989	 the	 organisation	 involved	 the	 District	
Agricultural	 Officer	 in	 the	 extension	 of	 the	 community-based	 approach	 to	 water	
harvesting	 demonstrated	 at	 Lokitaung	 to	 Kakuma.	 The	 Kakuma	 Pastoral	 Development	
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Project	 aimed	 to	 improve	 traditional	 sorghum	 gardens	 and	 build	 on	 existing	 pastoral	
institutions,	and	would	receive	over	£125,000	between	1989	and	1997.186	Meanwhile,	in	
Samburu,	Oxfam	staff	were	careful	‘to	involve	or	inform	the	district	administration	of	all	
we	do’,	particularly	as	regards	the	fight	against	the	exploitation	of	pastoral	communities	
by	traders.	As	a	result	of	this	 increased	dialogue	Oxfam	faced	‘no	major	difficulties	with	
the	animation	approach’,	which	successfully	raised	hides	and	skins	prices	from	three	to	42	
shillings. 187 	Oxfam	 also	 cautiously	 stepped	 up	 its	 ‘development	 education’	 training	
(DELTA),	 used	 to	 ‘challenge	 accepted	 values	 of	 development	 and	 help	 communities	 to	
decolonise	ideas	that	development	comes	from	outside,	consists	of	handouts	[sic],	and	is	
dependent	on	institutions	rather	than	people’.188	From	1989	to	1991,	over	15	per	cent	of	
staff	 time	 was	 devoted	 to	 such	 training.	 This	 coincided	 with	 the	 employment	 of	 two	
pioneers	 of	 the	 development	 education	movement	 in	 Kenya:	 Adelina	Mwau	 and	 Peter	
Kisopia	had	worked	under	the	umbrella	of	the	Catholic	Church	until	the	latter	was	forced	
to	disown	 the	process	of	 education	as	 too	politically	 radical.189	A	Programme	Officer	 at	
the	time	noted	the	overall	transition	in	Oxfam’s	methodology:	
	
In	the	beginning	Oxfam	did	not	believe	in	working	with	the	government…	they	were	
seen	 as	 oppressors…	 and	 it	 [the	 state]	 looked	 at	 NGOs	 as	 a	 threat	 to	 the	 regime	
[because	they	were]	creating	awareness	and	rocking	the	boat…	There	was	[also]	a…	
divide	between	 the	 local	 community	and	 the	government…	 the	government	offices	
[were]	no	go	zones	[for]	local	people,	so	even	if	they	had	problems	they	feared	going	
to	these	offices,	they	were	so	bureaucratic,	executive…	We	tried	to	break	that	fear	to	
bring	closer	the	communities	and	the	government…	At	first	government	[asked]	what	
is	 Oxfam	 doing	 here?	 You	 give	 us	 the	 food,	 we	 distribute	 it…	 [However],	 slowly,	
through	 these	 programmes,	 Oxfam	 designed	 a	methodology	 not	 starting	 from	 the	
top,	but	starting	from	the	grass	roots	government	officials,	bringing	them	in	through	
the	 [programmes]…	 Soon	 [we]	 got	 the	 support	 of	 government	 officials	 at	 the	
grassroots…190	
	
	 The	approach	appeared	to	have	paid	off	when,	 in	1990,	 the	government	singled	
out	Oxfam	for	its	expertise	on	ASAL	areas	and	invited	the	organisation	to	sit	on	its	newly	
created	 ASAL	 taskforce.	 It	 was	 possible,	 of	 course,	 that	 the	 invitation	 was	 a	 cynical	
																																																						
186	‘Kenya	Annual	Update:	November	1988	–	October	1989’,	11-12	January,	1990,	OxA,	MS.	Oxfam	
PRG/1/3/20	Folder	1:	January	1990;	‘Kenya	Biannual	Report’,	10-11	January,	1991,	OxA,	MS.	Oxfam	
PRG/3/4/12	Folder	6:	Kenya	Biannual	Report,	November	1989	–	October	1990.	
187	‘Annual	Report	for	Kenya,	December	1987	to	October	1988’,	27	January,	1989,	OxA,	MS.	Oxfam	
PRG/1/3/18:	January	1989.	
188	The	DELTA	method	came	to	Kenya	in	the	mid-1980s,	introduced	mainly	by	the	Catholic	Church	in	
reaction	to	the	repressive	political	climate.	
189	‘Kenya	Biannual	Report’,	10-11	January,	1991,	OxA,	MS.	Oxfam	PRG/3/4/12	Folder	6:	Kenya	Biannual	
Report,	November	1989	–	October	1990.	
190	Interview	with	author	no.	IX,	16	October,	2014.	
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manoeuvre	 to	 co-opt	one	of	 the	 foremost	organisations	working	on	pastoral	areas	 into	
the	 government	 apparatus.	 Regardless,	 Oxfam’s	 increasing	 commitment	 to	 pushing	 for	
policy	change	ensured	that	the	organisation	would	not	refuse	a	seat	at	the	top	table.	The	
new	Country	Representative	wrote	 that	 the	 ‘unique	opportunity	 to	 inform	government	
policy	with	the	mandate	of	our	pastoral	partners’	was	too	good	to	pass	up.191	
		
 
‘DANCING WITH THE STATE’ 
 
Oxfam	had,	 therefore,	 begun	 to	 re-engage	 tentatively	with	 the	Moi	 state	by	1990.	 The	
contrast	with	the	late	1970s	and	early	1980s	is	marked;	yet	the	shift	in	approach	is	not	as	
surprising	 as	 it	 might	 seem	 at	 first	 glance,	 however,	 because	 the	 variety	 of	 different	
tactical	 approaches	Oxfam	 took	 in	Kenya	masked	overall	 strategic	 continuity.	At	 a	 time	
when	many	NGOs	saw	their	existence	as	a	direct	and	overdue	challenge	to	an	out-dated	
institution,	Oxfam	believed	in	building	the	responsiveness	of	the	state	(or	at	 least	doing	
nothing	to	damage	the	ability	of	the	state	to	respond)	as	a	long-term	strategic	objective.	
Under	Moi,	the	Kenyan	state	was	predatory,	corrupt	and	often	violent	towards	its	citizens	
–	 all	 of	 the	 things	 that	 made	 donors	 wince	 from	 offering	 bilateral	 assistance.	 For	 this	
reason	Oxfam	would	 look	for	alternatives	to	working	directly	with	the	government	as	 it	
had	 done	 for	 the	 majority	 of	 the	 Kenyatta	 era.	 To	 use	 Christy	 Lorgen’s	 metaphor	 of	
‘dancing	with	the	state’,	during	the	Kenyatta	period	Oxfam	had	attempted	to	 ‘lead’	 the	
dance	with	the	state;	during	the	early	Moi	era,	the	state	was	attempting	to	choreograph	
the	 movements	 of	 civil	 society,	 and	 sought	 to	 push	 virtuosos	 off	 the	 dance	 floor	
permanently.	In	such	a	scenario,	Oxfam	made	the	tactical	judgement	to	absent	itself	from	
the	 ‘dance’.	 Where	 previously	 the	 organisation	 had	 worked	 alongside	 the	 Kenyatta	
regime	 in	a	 ‘supply-side’	 reform	effort	–	cajoling	 the	government	 to	 take	accountability	
and	 responsibility	 to	 its	 citizens	 seriously	 –	 in	 the	 Moi	 era,	 government	 suspicion	 of	
anything	 remotely	 challenging	 to	 the	 authority	 of	 the	 state	 rendered	 this	 approach	
unsuitable.	
In	 this	 context,	Oxfam	hoped	 to	build	 the	capacity	of	Kenyan	citizens	 to	 take	 its	
place	in	the	dance	with	the	state.	In	alighting	on	such	an	approach,	the	organisation	was	
																																																						
191	‘Kenya	Biannual	Report’,	10-11	January,	1991,	OxA,	MS.	Oxfam	PRG/3/4/12	Folder	6:	Kenya	Biannual	
Report,	November	1989	–	October	1990;	‘Minutes	of	the	Africa	South	Sub-Committee’,	2-3	July,	1990,	OxA,	
MS.	Oxfam	PRG/1/3/21:	July	1990.	
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responding	not	only	to	the	local	environment,	but	also	to	a	fundamental	shift	in	its	values	
away	 from	 technical	 and	 modernisation	 work	 and	 towards	 empowerment	 and	
conscientisation.	 Thus	 while	 the	 desperate	 crises	 that	 affected	 Turkana,	 Samburu	 and	
Wajir	 in	 the	 early	 1980s	 emboldened	 the	 Field	 Director	 to	 bring	 a	 more	 operational	
Oxfam	into	existence,	once	the	crises	had	passed	Oxford	and	Nairobi	(under	a	new	Field	
Director)	agreed	that	Oxfam	should	focus	on	the	‘demand-side’	of	development	in	Kenya.	
Influenced	by	the	conscientisation	movement,	Oxfam	rejected	the	temptation	to	scale	up	
and	attempt	to	solve	problems	unilaterally	with	the	patronage	of	large	IFIs,	as	this	would	
come	at	the	cost	of	imposing	technical	and	‘quick	fix’	solutions	on	the	unwilling	‘objects’	
of	development.	Crucially,	however,	both	sides	of	the	operational	versus	empowerment	
debate	came	from	the	left-liberal	tradition	that	prescribed	remedial	action	by	the	state,	
and	so	were	 in	agreement	 that	Oxfam	had	to	 influence	the	state	 in	a	more	responsible	
direction,	whether	through	 independent	operational	work	or	by	conscientising	those	on	
the	 ground.	 The	 debate	 concerned	 tactics,	 not	 strategy;	 in	 short,	 it	 asked	 how	 Oxfam	
could	best	achieve	its	strategic	goals:	from	the	top-down	or	the	bottom-up?	
Notwithstanding	 the	different	approaches	 taken	 to	development	work	 in	Kenya,	
therefore,	 –	 whether	 working	 to	 empower	 local	 communities,	 to	 distribute	 relief	 and	
encourage	rehabilitation	during	emergency	situations	or	acting	to	bring	local	government	
officers	and	citizens	together	 in	different	 forums	–	Oxfam	continued	to	believe	that	the	
state	 had	 the	 ultimate	 duty	 and	 responsibility	 for	 those	 it	 represented.	 Exhibiting	 the	
pragmatism	that	so	often	enabled	Oxfam	to	continue	to	push	its	values,	the	organisation	
for	 a	 time	 combined	 the	 operational	 and	 empowerment	 approaches	 in	 order	 to	 best	
match	circumstances	on	the	ground	in	Kenya.	Using	technical	projects	as	a	cloak,	Oxfam	
sought	to	encourage	 local	communities	to	challenge	unresponsive	state	 institutions	and	
demand	better	 representation.	 Latterly,	Oxfam	sought	 to	 take	advantage	of	 committed	
government	 staff	 to	 influence	 policy	 away	 from	 elite	 interests	 and	 towards	 those	 of	
Kenya’s	marginalised	citizens.	Though	the	risks	of	such	an	approach	were	widely	known	
and	 understood,	 by	 the	 late	 1980s	 it	 was	 clear	 that	 policy	 change	was	 a	 fundamental	
requirement	 in	 pastoral	 areas,	 and,	 having	 exhausted	 the	 alternatives,	working	 around	
the	state	was	no	longer	an	option.	Thus	while	many	NGOs	and	IFIs	continued	to	threaten	
the	Kenyan	state,	in	a	manner	which	would	have	pleased	Jimmy	Betts	Oxfam	set	out	once	
more	to	directly	engage	the	state	to	increase	its	accountability	to	marginalised	Kenyans.	
In	 doing	 so,	 the	 organisation	 pre-empted	 the	 development	 community’s	 embrace	 of	
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‘good	governance’	 after	1989	and	 the	World	Bank’s	own	volte-face	 on	 the	need	 for	 an	
effective	 state	 in	 its	 1997	 report,	 The	 State	 in	 a	 Changing	World.192	Unfortunately,	 as	
Kenya	lurched	between	natural	disaster,	economic	turmoil	and	political	crisis	in	the	early	
1990s	the	opportunity	for	influence	over	policy	grew	only	as	quickly	as	the	risks	involved,	
for	Moi	 resorted	 to	 increasingly	desperate	 times	with	 increasingly	desperate	measures.	
How	Oxfam	navigated	this	risk-reward	dilemma	is	the	subject	of	the	following	chapter.	
																																																						
192	World	Bank	Group,	World	Development	Report	1997:	The	State	in	a	Changing	World	(New	York,	Oxford	
University	Press,	1997).	
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Chapter Four 
	
‘OF	COURSE	IT’S	CORRUPT…	BUT	[IT’S]	ABOUT	WORKING	WITH	THE	GRAIN’	–	
OXFAM	IN	KENYA,	1991-2002	
	
	
	
	
	
	
Beneficiaries	here	 I	 come	/	Donor	with	a	 tidy	sum;	/	Help	me	be	a	good	provider	/	
Open	up	your	mouths	much	wider;	/	All	will	gain,	that	is	the	notion	/	You	get	cash,	I	
get	 promotion;	 /	 Shun	 the	 mean	 facilitator	 /	 What	 he	 brings	 is	 less	 and	 later;	 /	
Participation	too’s	a	mess	/	You	do	more	and	they	do	 less;	/	What	good	calling	you	
clients	and	actors?	/	Better	cash	from	benefactors…	
Extracts	from	‘A	Bureaucrat’s	Plea	to	the	Poor’,	by	Robert	Chambers,	Institute	of	Development	Studies,	
1996.	
	
	
The	 following	 chapter	 describes	 how	 Oxfam	 responded	 to	 the	 complexity	 of	 the	 crisis	
enveloping	Kenya	in	the	1990s.	Moi’s	attempt	to	informalise	the	state	and	instrumentalise	
disorder	 after	 he	 was	 forced	 to	 succumb	 to	 demands	 for	 multipartyism	 by	 external	
creditors	presented	an	early	difficulty	for	the	organisation.	Indeed,	state-inspired	violence	
and	corruption	challenged	Oxfam	hopes	that	the	Moi	state	could	be	made	responsible	for	
its	 citizens.	Moreover,	 violent	 ethnic	 conflict	 combined	with	 drought	 and	 flood	 to	 send	
Kenya	into	complex	emergency	situations	on	three	occasions	between	1990	and	2002.	On	
these	 occasions	Oxfam	had	 to	 respond	 on	 an	 unprecedented	 scale,	 raising	 fears	 that	 it	
was	 once	more	 replacing	 the	 state	whose	 capacity	 and	 responsibility	 it	 hoped	 to	 build.	
Importantly,	 however,	 the	 chapter	 describes	 how	 the	 relief	 operations	 provided	 Oxfam	
with	 the	 standing	 and	 leverage	 to	 lobby	 the	 state,	 particularly	 on	 pastoral	 issues.	 Two	
projects	that	were	considered	promising	in	this	regard	–	the	Wajir	Pastoral	Development	
Programme	and	the	Arid	Lands	Resource	Management	Project	–	are	described	in	detail	to	
show	how	Oxfam	endeavoured	to	make	the	most	of	its	newfound	standing	in	Kenya.	The	
penultimate	 section	 of	 the	 chapter	 concentrates	 on	 the	 pernicious	 implications	 of	
becoming	 more	 closely	 involved	 with	 the	 development-politics	 nexus	 at	 the	 apex	 of	
government,	while	the	final	section	comments	on	the	‘circularity’	of	development	failures	
in	 Kenya	 as	 well	 as	 of	 Oxfam	 responses	 to	 the	 failure	 of	 development	 in	 Kenya,	
emphasising	the	importance	of	historical	inquiries	into	development	and	its	actors.	
	
As	 the	 Berlin	 Wall	 tumbled	 in	 late	 1989,	 signifying	 the	 end	 of	 the	 Cold	 War	 and	 the	
‘triumph’	of	Western	 liberal	democracy,	 fractures	were	also	 forming	 in	 the	ediface	Moi	
had	constructed	in	support	of	his	authoritarian	regime	in	Kenya.	Having	eroded	the	elite	
intra-ethnic	consensus	that	had	underpinned	Kenyatta’s	presidency,	the	President	faced	
pressure	 from	 leading	 figures	 in	 politics	 and	 civil	 society	 for	 the	 reform	 of	 Kenya’s	
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constitution	and	the	repeal	of	the	provision	for	single-party	rule	(clause	2A).1	The	anger	at	
government	abuses	was,	however,	spread	widely	throughout	Kenyan	society:	thus	when	
high-profile	 figures	 organised	 a	 rally	 demanding	 the	 return	 of	 multipartyism,	 Kenyans	
attended	in	their	thousands.2	Despite	the	upsurge	in	popular	anger	with	the	regime,	Moi	
was	 able	 to	 suppress	 demands	 for	 multipartyism	 until	 December	 1991,	 when	 –	 under	
pressure	from	a	coalition	of	foreign	donors	who	threatened	that	Kenya’s	aid	tap	would	be	
turned	off	if	the	country	did	not	make	a	quick	transition	to	liberal	democracy	–	he	finally	
repealed	constitutional	clause	(2A).	The	President	had,	in	fact,	calculated	that	it	would	be	
easier	to	manipulate	and	control	a	weak	democracy	than	to	run	a	patronage	system	with	
no	money.3	He	 also	 understood	 that	multiparty	 democracy	 provided	 an	 opportunity	 as	
well	 as	 a	 threat:	 since	 votes	were	 liable	 to	 flow	down	ethnic	 lines,	 the	President	 could	
whip	up	ethnic	hostility	to	divide	and	rule	his	country.4	Gone,	therefore,	was	Kenyatta’s	
‘ideology	of	order’;	 in	 its	place	Kenyans	experienced	the	 instrumentalisation	of	disorder	
and	the	informalisation	of	the	state	along	the	lines	postulated	by	Patrick	Chabal	and	Jean-
Pascal	Daloz.5	
	 Unsurprisingly,	much	 of	 the	 tentative	 enthusiasm	Oxfam	 had	 for	 engaging	with	
the	state	following	the	apparent	‘opening’	of	Kenyan	politics	was	dimmed	in	a	clash	with	
the	 stark	 reality	of	Kenya’s	descent	 from	a	prebendal	 to	a	predatory	 state.	 Indeed,	 the	
organisation	feared	that	the	use	of	ethnicity	for	‘disruption	and	exploitation’	by	ruthless	
politicians	had	exposed	the	‘fragile	nature	of	nationhood	in	Kenya’.6	Meanwhile,	the	NGO	
Coordination	 Act	 (finally	 passed	 in	 mid-1992)	 was	 seen	 as	 a	 clear	 signal	 of	 the	 Moi	
regime’s	continued	disdain	for	civil	society,	and	Oxfam	was	concerned	that	it	would	‘act	
as	a	controlling	rather	than	a	facilitating	tool’	at	a	time	when	‘tolerance	of	questioning,	let	
																																																						
1	Particularly	noticeable	in	these	campaigns	were	members	of	the	Kikuyu	elite	hitherto	marooned	outside	
Moi’s	patronage	networks.	They	were	supported	by	civil	society	actors,	in	particular	lawyers	and	
churchmen,	angered	at	the	human	rights	abuses	of	Moi’s	government	and	its	clumsy	attempts	to	rig	the	
1988	election	results.	
2	The	protest	took	place	on	7	July,	or	saba	saba	in	Swahili	(7/7).	
3	New	aid	deals	worth	$350	million	had	been	suspended	for	six	months.	Moreover,	he	recognised	quickly	
that	donors	were	far	more	interested	in	democracy	as	an	institution	than	as	a	process.	Brown	‘From	
Demiurge	to	Midwife’.	
4	Kalenjin	allies	would	act	as	Moi’s	proxies,	reviving	calls	for	majimboism	and	inciting	ordinary	Kenyans	to	
force	potential	opponents	and	‘foreigners’	–	defined	by	their	ethnicity	–	to	return	to	their	ethno-regional	
‘homeland’.	Branch,	Kenya:	From	Hope	to	Despair,	pp.	199-202.	See	also	Widner,	The	Rise	of	a	Party-State	
in	Kenya,	pp.	156-157;	S.	Mueller,	‘Dying	to	Win:	Elections,	Political	Violence,	and	Institutional	Decay	in	
Kenya’,	Journal	of	Contemporary	African	Studies,	Vol.	29,	No.	1	(2011),	pp.	102-103.	
5	Branch	and	Cheeseman,	‘Democratisation,	Sequencing	and	State	Failure’,	p.	4;	P.	Chabal	and	J.	P.	Daloz,	
Africa	Works:	Disorder	as	Political	Instrument	(Oxford,	James	Currey,	1999).	Cohen,	‘Foreign	Aid	and	Ethnic	
Interests	in	Kenya’,	in	Esman	and	Herring	(eds.),	Carrot,	Sticks,	and	Ethnic	Conflict,	pp.	99-101.	
6	‘Oxfam	Kenya:	Strategic	Plan,	August	1992	to	July	1995’,	July,	1992,	Personal	Archive	of	Karen	Twining;	
Branch,	Kenya:	Between	Hope	and	Despair,	p.	243.	
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alone	dissent,	 [was]	diminishing’.7	As	 the	Oxfam	strategic	plan	 for	1992-1995	remarked,	
‘the	present	political	atmosphere	 is	unlikely	 to	be	more	conducive	 for	 the	alleviation	of	
poverty	 or	 [to]	 open	 up	 room	 for	 common	 people	 to	 voice	 their	 grievances’;	 ‘the	
potential	 for	 fruitful	 collaboration	 remains	 limited’.	 Moreover,	 the	 ‘lack	 of	
accountability…	pervasive	corruption,	the	absence	of	commitment	to	poverty	alleviation’	
and	the	incitement	of	violence	meant	that	some	staff	were	‘reluctant	to	work	too	closely	
with	 government	 structures’.8 	On	 the	 other	 hand,	 there	 were	 still	 many	 within	 the	
organisation	who	hoped	that	some	level	of	engagement	with	the	state	was	possible.	The	
strategic	 plan	 reflected	 this	 concern,	 conceding	 that	 ‘for	 development	 initiatives	 to	 be	
sustainable	 the	 people	 themselves	and	 their	 government	must	 be	 responsible’.	 Putting	
the	 excesses	 of	Moi	 and	 his	 cabal	 aside,	 it	 continued,	 ‘the	Government	 does	 have	 the	
advantage	 of	 a	 nationwide	 presence,	 and	 within	 its	 ranks	 there	 are	 many	 excellent	
individuals,	frustrated	by	lack	of	resources	to	do	any	work’.	Importantly,	this	was	both	a	
pragmatic	 acknowledgement	 that	 without	 a	 responsible	 state	 apparatus	 development	
was	 likely	 to	 stall	and	 a	 reflection	 of	 Oxfam	 ideas	 about	 the	 ‘responsible’	 state,	which	
dated	 back	 to	 the	 early	 1960s	 in	 Kenya	 and	 had	 their	 longer-term	 origins	 in	 the	
organisation’s	left-liberal	consciousness.	
	 In	the	early	1990s,	the	contradiction	that	was	the	‘opening’	of	Kenyan	politics	thus	
brought	 Oxfam	 anxieties	 around	 engagement	 with	 the	 Kenyan	 state	 to	 the	 fore.	 The	
organisation	 continued	 to	 have	 faith	 in	 the	 potential	 of	 the	 state	 as	 a	 central	
development	actor,	but	was	uncertain	as	to	whether	the	‘opening’	of	Kenyan	politics	was	
an	 opportunity	 to	 engage	 a	more	 ‘responsible’	 state	 or,	 as	 the	 actions	 of	Moi	 and	 his	
cronies	suggested,	a	mirage	much	like	the	early	years	of	the	Kenyatta	and	Moi	regimes.	
Whereas	 other	 governments,	 such	 as	 Nyerere’s	 in	 Tanzania,	 had	 seemingly	 adopted	
Oxfam	values	and	so	made	the	decision	to	support	the	state	apparatus	a	straightforward	
one,	 in	 Kenya,	 the	 resilience	 of	 the	 predatory	 state	 placed	 the	 Oxfam	 ideal	 of	 a	
responsible	state	at	odds	with	its	aims	to	empower	people	to	have	control	over	their	own	
development.	For,	if	Oxfam	worked	with	the	state,	it	could	not	be	certain	that	the	state	
would	 take	 responsibility	 for	 its	 citizenry;	nor	could	 it	be	certain	 that	 its	 support	would	
not	 inadvertently	 legitimise	 government	 interventions	 that	 were,	 in	 fact,	 anti-
																																																						
7	‘Confidential	Briefing:	Political,	Social	and	Economic	Round-up’,	10-11	January,	1991,	Personal	Archive	of	
Karen	Twining;	‘East	Africa	Desk	Report’,	January,	1991,	OxA,	MS.	Oxfam	PRG/1/3/22:	January	1991	–	
March	1991.	
8	‘Oxfam	Kenya:	Strategic	Plan,	August	1992	to	July	1995’,	July,	1992,	Personal	Archive	of	Karen	Twining.	
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developmental	 (such	 as	 the	 settlement	 of	 pastoralists	 in	 the	 1960s	 and	 1970s).	
Alternatively,	if	Oxfam	worked	only	with	local	groups,	it	would	undoubtedly	be	sacrificing	
the	 opportunity	 (dangled	 tantalisingly	 in	 front	 of	 the	 organisation	 by	 promises	 of	
improved	 governance)	 to	 have	 a	 significant	 impact	 on	 Kenyan	 development	 through	
encouraging	 the	 state	 to	 be	 responsible	 for	 its	 citizens;	 furthermore,	 it	 would	 almost	
certainly	 be	 entrenching	 the	 divide	 between	 the	 Kenyan	 state	 and	 civil	 society	 that	 it	
sought	 to	 combat.	 Predictably,	 perhaps,	 the	 response	 of	 the	 strategic	 plan	 to	 this	
ideological	 and	 practical	 conundrum	 was	 a	 pragmatic	 judgement	 that	 ‘Oxfam	 cannot	
afford	to	ignore	the	government,	[and]	may	be	most	effective	where	there	is	a	possibility	
of	 influencing	 policy’	 but	 that	 it	 should	 endeavour	 to	 ‘create	 pressure	 from	 the	 grass	
roots	as	well	as	from	the	top’.9	
	 Nonetheless,	as	so	often	the	case	in	Kenya,	events	would	soon	overwhelm	Oxfam	
plans	and	debates.	Within	a	month	of	 the	 final	draft	of	 the	strategic	plan	being	written	
the	Africa	 Committee	 heard	 that	 the	 humanitarian	 situation	 in	 Kenya	 had	 deteriorated	
substantially.	The	reasons	for	the	deterioration	were	threefold:	drought	in	the	north,	an	
influx	 of	 refugees,	 and	 internal	 violence	 as	 national	 elections	 drew	 near. 10 	Indeed,	
because	 elections	 were	 looming,	 the	 government	 was	 reluctant	 to	 admit	 to	 these	
problems	 ‘for	 fear	 that	 it	 would	 reflect	 badly	 on	 the	 performance	 of	 the	 ruling	 KANU	
party’.11 	As	 a	 result,	 the	 President	 would	 delay	 his	 appeal	 for	 aid	 until	 June	 1992,	
hindering	 the	 response	 of	 international	 organisations	 such	 as	 WFP	 –	 which	 needed	
government	permission	to	act	–	and	the	response	of	NGOs	that	sought	to	transport	and	
distribute	 food	donated	by	WFP	 and	others.	 Crucially,	Oxfam’s	 own	 response	was	 held	
back	by	the	fact	that	staff	were	reluctant	to	consider	substantial	operational	emergency	
work	–	caricatured	as	heavy-handed,	expatriate	and	anti-developmental	–	for	fear	that	it	
would	 hamper	 the	 organisation’s	 development	 programme.	 Significantly,	 institutional	
memory	of	the	last	major	emergency	efforts	in	Kenya	in	1984	had	all	but	disappeared	by	
the	early	1990s.12	What	little	knowledge	of	the	1984	efforts	remained	mostly	concerned	
																																																						
9	‘Oxfam	Kenya:	Strategic	Plan,	August	1992	to	July	1995’,	July,	1992,	Personal	Archive	of	Karen	Twining.	My	
emphasis.	
10	‘Minutes	of	the	Africa	Committee’,	2	July,	1992,	OxA,	MS.	Oxfam	PRG/1/3/23	Folders	1,	2	&	3:	July	1991	–	
July	1992.	
11	P.	Wiles,	M.	Buchanan-Smith,	J.	Umbima,	‘Oxfam’s	Emergency	Programmes	in	Kenya,	1992-1993’,	
October,	1993,	Personal	Archive	of	Karen	Twining.	
12	There	had	been	two	Country	Representatives	and	Deputy	Country	Representatives	in	the	interim	period	
and	the	major	Kenya	programme	plans	since	1987	omitted	any	reference	to	the	possibility	of	emergency	
work.	The	relationship	between	Oxfam’s	ideology	and	its	institutional	memory	would	benefit	from	further	
study.	Unfortunately,	there	is	not	the	space	here	for	such	a	digression.	
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operational	 difficulties	 and	 the	 pervasiveness	 of	 government	 corruption.	 At	 the	 same	
time	Oxfam	had	 also	been	warned	by	 its	 one	 remaining	 staff	member	 in	Wajir	 to	 hold	
back	from	working	there	due	to	the	political	sensitivities	in	the	region	following	Oxfam’s	
involvement	in	the	aftermath	of	Wagalla.13	For	a	time,	therefore,	the	Kenya	programme	
reflected	only	a	‘partial	interpretation	of	Oxfam’s	mandate,	with	a	bias	against	emergency	
work’.14	
	
	
Map	3:	Oxfam	projects	1991-2002.	1	=	Relief	intervention,	Wajir	(1992);	2	=	Relief	intervention,	Turkana	
(1992);	3	=	Relief	intervention,	Samburu	(1992);	4	=	Relief,	intervention,	conflict	(1994);	5	=	Wajir	pastoral	
development	project	(1994);	6	=	Drought	mitigation	project	(1999).	
	
																																																						
13	A	Somali	monitor	of	the	30	restocked	families	from	1984.	
14	P.	Wiles,	M.	Buchanan-Smith,	J.	Umbima,	‘Oxfam’s	Emergency	Programmes	in	Kenya,	1992-1993’,	
October,	1993,	Personal	Archive	of	Karen	Twining;	Interview	with	author	no.	XXI,	28	April,	2015.	
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	 Regardless	 of	 the	 delay,	 Oxfam	was	 still	 one	 of	 the	 first	 NGOs	 to	 respond	 in	 a	
significant	 fashion	 to	 the	 unfolding	 emergency	 situation,	 particularly	 in	 the	 north	 (see	
Map	3).	In	fact,	the	overwhelming	scale	of	the	emergency	scenario	in	Kenya	soon	ensured	
that	the	ideological	sticking	points	and	debates	over	its	remit	from	the	1970s	and	1980s	
were	set	aside,	and	Oxfam	returned,	for	a	time,	to	its	original	rationale	–	to	avert	famine.	
From	Wajir,	the	restocking	monitor	reported	that	the	failure	of	the	long	and	short	rains	in	
1991	and	the	machinations	of	politicians	forcing	‘foreign’	pastoralists	out	of	Garissa	and	
into	Wajir	had	increased	the	pressure	on	pasture	and	water	supplies.	Around	43	per	cent	
of	children	were	malnourished,	while	80	per	cent	of	small	stock,	70	per	cent	of	cattle	and	
30	per	cent	of	camels	had	died.	Oxfam	provided	its	first	grant	in	March	1992	to	support	
food	 distribution	 to	 750	 families	 through	 the	Wajir	 Volunteer	 Group	 (WVG).	 This	 was	
followed	 by	 a	 supplementary	 feeding	 programme	 and	 nutritional	 surveillance	 work.	
Overall,	 Oxfam’s	 food	 distribution	 through	 WVG	 reached	 around	 1,260	 families	 each	
week	from	April	to	July.15	In	addition	to	feeding,	Oxfam	worked	on	improving	local	water	
supplies	by	de-silting	pans	and	improving	shallow	wells.	Meanwhile,	the	organisation	also	
funded	an	income	generation	and	relief	project	–	based	on	the	creation	and	distribution	
of	homemade	dufful	mats	–	for	displaced	women	around	Wajir	town.	The	project	assisted	
over	 2,000	 families	 in	 Wajir	 alone,	 and	 nearly	 500	 more	 were	 reached	 in	 three	
settlements	nearby.	The	cost	of	these	combined	efforts	was	around	£200,000.	Of	course,	
in	 the	 context	 of	 the	 crisis	 in	 the	 district	 the	 direct	 impact	 of	 Oxfam’s	 operational	
interventions	was	limited;	yet	its	lobbying	work	in	Nairobi	helped	to	bring	the	drought	to	
the	 attention	 of	 the	 Kenyan	media	 and	 put	 pressure	 on	 the	 government	 to	 intervene,	
which	it	did	soon	after.16	
	 As	Oxfam	scaled	down	its	operation	in	Wajir	the	drought	crisis	spread	to	Samburu	
and	Turkana.	In	both	regions	the	drought	was	more	prolonged	and	intense	than	the	one	
experienced	 in	 1984,	 with	 some	 areas	 suffering	 over	 80	 per	 cent	 livestock	 losses.17	As	
regards	Samburu,	Oxfam	was	aware	that	the	area	had	lacked	good	rains	since	1989	and	
had	 granted	 around	 £15,000	 to	 local	 Catholic	 missions	 to	 distribute	 rations	 to	 1,800	
families.	An	in-depth	assessment	of	the	situation	in	June	1992	convinced	staff	of	the	need	
																																																						
15	After	Oxfam	lobbied	for	assistance	from	other	NGOs,	GTZ	(the	Gesellschaft	für	Technische	
Zusammenarbeit	or	German	Agency	for	Technical	Cooperation)	took	over	responsibility	for	the	region	in	
mid-1992	and	Oxfam’s	involvement	was	reduced.	
16	P.	Wiles,	M.	Buchanan-Smith,	J.	Umbima,	‘Oxfam’s	Emergency	Programmes	in	Kenya,	1992-1993’,	
October,	1993,	Personal	Archive	of	Karen	Twining.	
17	Livestock	disease	–	particularly	East	Coast	Fever	–	was	hugely	problematic	as	herders	migrated	over	
longer	distances	in	search	of	better	pasture.	
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to	take	on	an	emergency	operation,	and	the	organisation	made	an	initial	grant	of	£58,700	
for	 a	 general	 food	 distribution	 scheme	 in	 Baragoi.	 The	 grant	 (of	 which	 £40,000	 was	
reimbursed	by	the	Overseas	Development	Administration)	allowed	for	the	purchase	of	oil	
to	 supplement	 grain	 donated	 by	WFP.	 Further	 grants	 totalling	 £123,844	 (with	 £51,500	
from	the	ODA)	extended	the	programme	over	the	coming	months,	and	between	50,000	
and	60,000	pastoralists	 received	over	3,000	 tonnes	of	 relief	 food	and	141	 tonnes	of	oil	
across	28	distribution	centres	from	July	1992	to	 late	1993.	Later	reviews	noted	that	the	
operation	had	started	just	in	time	to	head	off	a	serious	famine	situation	as	June	and	July	
saw	 the	 beginnings	 of	 severe	 malnutrition.	 Unfortunately,	 the	 efforts	 in	 Samburu	 did	
slightly	 delay	 intervention	 in	 Turkana,	 where	 locals	 had	 taken	 to	 calling	 the	 drought	
‘Nakwaakoyo’,	 meaning	 ‘white	 bones	 noticed	 everywhere’.	 There,	 Oxfam	 would	
distribute	 over	 13,000	 tonnes	 of	 relief	 food	 to	 around	 370,000	 pastoralists	 across	 111	
distribution	centres	from	October	1992	to	June	1993.18	
	 Crucially,	the	relief	interventions	in	Samburu	and	Turkana	were	influenced	by	the	
neighbouring	 Uganda	 programme	 and	 so	 the	 approach	 taken	 to	 distribution	 in	 both	
locations	 was	 based	 on	 the	 idea	 of	 saving	 livelihoods	 as	 well	 as	 lives.19	Rather	 than	
working	solely	with	the	most	destitute	and	acting	as	a	palliative,	Oxfam	aimed	to	provide	
relief	 to	 all	 pastoralists	 (except	 for	 those	 with	 salaries)	 in	 order	 to	 stop	 them	 from	
slaughtering	their	animals	and	thereby	permanently	blocking	their	return	to	pastoralism.	
The	 method	 of	 distribution	 Oxfam	 used	 in	 both	 regions	 was	 based	 on	 the	 idea	 of	
pastoralists’	 ‘entitlement’	to	food	security,	an	entitlement	they	lost	when	their	 livestock	
died	 and	 they	 had	 nothing	 to	 exchange	 for	 food.	 It	 was	 not	 enough,	 according	 to	 this	
interpretation,	 to	 feed	 people	 in	 the	 short-term	when	 they	 had	 already	 lost	 their	 food	
security;	 rather,	 feeding	 needed	 to	 protect	 pastoralists’	 entitlement	 to	 food	 over	 the	
longer-term.	 Distributed	 food	 was,	 therefore,	 understood	 as	 an	 asset	 that	 could	 be	
exchanged	 for	 livestock	 or	 to	 meet	 social	 obligations:	 it	 had	 value	 beyond	 that	 of	
individual	 consumption.20	In	 addition,	 in	 order	 to	 meet	 its	 developmental	 mandate	 to	
																																																						
18	‘Economic	Impact	Assessment	of	Oxfam’s	Relief	Operation	in	North	Turkana,	Kenya,	1992/4’,	1	October,	
1994,	Personal	Archive	of	Karen	Twining;	P.	Wiles,	M.	Buchanan-Smith,	J.	Umbima,	‘Oxfam’s	Emergency	
Programmes	in	Kenya,	1992-1993’,	October,	1993,	Personal	Archive	of	Karen	Twining.	
19	In	contrast	to	the	approach	taken	in	Kenya,	around	this	time	the	Uganda	programme	was	focused	on	the	
cancellation	of	Uganda’s	external	debts.	Interview	with	author	no.	XI,	4	December,	2014.	See	also	
Anderson,	‘Oxfam,	The	World	Bank	and	Heavily	Indebted	Poor	Countries’,	in	Rugendyke	(ed.),	NGOs	as	
Advocates	for	Development,	pp.	96-125;	T.	Callaghy,	‘Networks	and	Governance	in	Africa:	Innovation	in	the	
Debt	Regime’,	in	T.	Callaghy,	R.	Kassimir	and	R.	Latham	(eds.),	Intervention	and	Transnationalism	in	Africa:	
Global-Local	Networks	of	Power	(Cambridge,	Cambridge	University	Press,	2001),	pp.	115-148.	
20	‘Food	Distribution	in	Turkana:	Oxfam	Report’,	January,	1995,	Personal	Archive	of	Karen	Twining.	
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empower	 local	 communities,	 Oxfam	 argued	 that	 working	 in	 ways	 that	 recognised	 and	
reinforced	 community	 structures	 was	 vital.	 Its	 approach	 thus	 focused	 on	 transparency	
with	beneficiaries	over	ration	rates	and	in	the	distribution	itself,	using	uniform	scoops	and	
registering	all	members	of	a	household	so	that	larger	families	did	not	suffer.	Women	were	
also	 chosen	 as	 recipients	 of	 relief	 to	 support	 their	 traditional	 role	 within	 the	 family.	
Finally,	Oxfam	operated	using	a	large	network	of	widely	dispersed	distribution	centres	to	
suit	the	scattered	pattern	of	the	pastoralist	population	and	to	reduce	the	distances	that	
recipients	 had	 to	 travel.	 This	 prevented	 the	 build	 up	 of	 large	 concentrations	 of	
pastoralists,	which	often	led	to	settlement	and	the	spread	of	disease.	
	 Oxfam’s	 novel	 approach	 to	 distribution	was,	 however,	 extremely	 expensive	 and	
jarred	 on	 an	 ideological	 level	 with	 the	WFP,	which	 took	 a	much	 narrower	 view	 of	 the	
purpose	 of	 relief	 interventions.	 WFP	 considered	 that	 blanket	 distributions	 encouraged	
dependency,	despite	the	fact	that	distributing	food	before	a	pastoralist	became	destitute	
meant	that	they	retained	the	ability	to	return	to	the	pastoral	sector,	ultimately	regaining	
their	 independence.	Since	the	WFP	was	the	main	food	donor,	Oxfam	faced	a	significant	
shortfall	 in	 relief	 allocations.	 Furthermore,	 for	 reasons	 beyond	 Oxfam’s	 control	 (most	
importantly	WFP	 and	 CARE’s	 inability	 to	 deliver	 even	 the	 agreed	 levels	 of	 food)	 it	was	
never	possible	to	meet	the	target	for	distribution:	12	kilograms	of	cereals,	1.8	kilograms	
of	beans	and	0.6	kilograms	of	oil	per	person,	per	month.	 Instead,	 the	amount	of	maize	
distributed	in	Samburu	fluctuated	between	1.5	and	8.5	kilograms	per	person,	per	month.	
In	February	and	March	1993,	 for	 instance,	only	20	and	15	per	cent	 (respectively)	of	 the	
full	allocation	was	delivered	by	WFP	and	CARE	 (which	organised	primary	 transportation	
within	 Kenya).	 Oxfam	 thus	 had	 to	 supplement	 the	 rations	 in	 Samburu	 from	 its	 own	
budget	 and	ODA	grants.	 In	 Turkana	 the	gap	between	 the	Oxfam	and	WFP	assessments	
was	 even	 starker:	 WFP	 provided	 food	 for	 230,000	 people	 but	 Oxfam	 wanted	 to	 feed	
374,000,	and	in	any	case	only	34	per	cent	and	28	per	cent	of	the	agreed	allocation	arrived	
from	WFP	in	February	and	March	1993.	Fortunately,	Oxfam	was	able	to	make	up	most	of	
the	shortfall	by	purchasing	nearly	4,000	tonnes	of	maize	using	an	£800,000	grant	from	the	
ODA.21	Though	perhaps	not	as	effective	in	protecting	livelihoods	as	saving	lives	due	to	the	
delayed	response	and	 limited	distribution,	Oxfam’s	 interventions	did	reduce	the	market	
																																																						
21	‘Turkana	Programme	Report’,	May,	1993,	quoted	in	‘Food	Distribution	in	Turkana:	Oxfam	Report’,	
January,	1995,	Personal	Archive	of	Karen	Twining.	
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price	of	maize	and	slowed	the	slaughter	of	productive	animals	as	well	as	 improving	the	
health	status	of	the	populations.22	
	 Meanwhile,	 Oxfam	 also	 responded	 to	 ‘eruptions	 of	 violence	which	 [had]	 all	 the	
hallmarks	of	ethnic	 cleansing’	 in	Western	Kenya.	The	organisation	had	 received	 reliable	
reports	 that	 hundreds	 of	 people	 had	 been	 killed	 in	 politically	motivated	 ethnic	 clashes	
from	 October	 1991,	 with	 more	 than	 100,000	 people	 displaced	 by	 marauding	 ethnic	
militias.	From	March	1992	to	January	1993,	therefore,	Oxfam	made	seven	grants	totalling	
£60,041	for	relief	and	rehabilitation	work.	The	funds	provided	for	food,	utensils,	blankets	
and	transport	costs	for	the	thousands	in	temporary	camps	on	the	border	of	Nyanza	and	
Rift	 Valley.	 Oxfam	 could	 not	 work	 operationally,	 however,	 due	 to	 the	 ‘political	
sensitivities’	 involved,	 instead	 supporting	 church-based	 relief	 work.	 Even	 this	 was	
controversial,	 and	 the	 government’s	 obstruction	 of	 relief	 workers’	 access	 to	 displaced	
people	hampered	most	humanitarian	efforts.	Lobbying	and	communications	work	on	the	
clashes	was	also	restricted	because	the	root	cause	of	 the	problem	–	 ‘the	GOK’s	policies	
and	actions’	–	meant	that	any	misstep	could	lead	to	expulsion.23	
	 Predictably,	these	relief	efforts	caused	a	rapid	expansion	in	the	expenditure	of	the	
Kenya	programme,	from	£438,000	in	1991-92	to	£1.7	million	in	1992-93.24	(See	Figures	9	
and	10.)	By	this	time	there	were	more	than	100	staff	employed	by	Oxfam	in	Kenya,	93	of	
whom	 were	 employed	 in	 the	 field	 in	 Turkana	 (66),	 Samburu	 (20)	 and	 Wajir	 (7).	 This	
represented	a	four-fold	increase	from	the	immediate	pre-emergency	period	and	a	three-
fold	 increase	 within	 a	 year.25	There	 was,	 moreover,	 little	 chance	 of	 the	 emergency	
situation	abating	quickly,	as	Moi’s	re-election	in	December	1992	meant	that	the	political	
and	 economic	 situation	 in	 Kenya	 continued	 to	 deteriorate:	 ‘dirty	 tricks,	 insecurity	 and	
increasing	ethnic	polarisation	have	characterised	Kenyan	politics	over	 the	past	eighteen	
months’,	noted	the	Oxfam	1993	annual	report.	With	the	‘government	free	to	pursue	 its	
course	 unchallenged…	 [and]	 politicians	 who	 indulge	 in	 inflammatory	 statements…	
politically-inspired	tribal	clashes	have	[only]	increased	in	scope	and	severity	leaving	death,	
																																																						
22	P.	Wiles,	M.	Buchanan-Smith,	J.	Umbima,	‘Oxfam’s	Emergency	Programmes	in	Kenya,	1992-1993’,	
October,	1993,	Personal	Archive	of	Karen	Twining;	‘Economic	Impact	Assessment	of	Oxfam’s	Relief	
Operation	in	North	Turkana,	Kenya,	1992/4’,	1	October,	1994,	Personal	Archive	of	Karen	Twining;	P.	Wiles,	
M.	Buchanan-Smith,	J.	Umbima,	‘Oxfam’s	Emergency	Programmes	in	Kenya,	1992-1993’,	October,	1993,	
Personal	Archive	of	Karen	Twining;	‘Food	Distribution	in	Turkana:	Oxfam	Report’,	January,	1995,	Personal	
Archive	of	Karen	Twining.	
23	‘Oxfam	Kenya	Programme:	Annual	Report,	1993’,	May,	1994,	OxA,	MS.	Oxfam	PRG/3/4/12/7:	Oxfam	
Kenya	Programme	Annual	Report,	1993.	
24	‘Oxfam	Kenya	Programme:	Annual	Report,	1993’,	May,	1994,	OxA,	MS.	Oxfam	PRG/3/4/12/7:	Oxfam	
Kenya	Programme	Annual	Report,	1993.	
25	‘Oxfam	Kenya	Country	Office	Staff	List’,	October,	1993,	Personal	Archive	of	Karen	Twining.	
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suffering	and	fear	in	their	wake’.	Meanwhile,	corruption	and	economic	decline	(inflation	
was	 running	at	47	per	 cent)	meant	 that	 social	 services	were	 collapsing.	Combined	with	
poor	 rains	 and	 ethnic	 violence,	 the	 inadequate	 provision	 of	 faulty	 seed,	 for	 instance,	
meant	 that	 the	 crop	 deficit	 for	 the	 country	was	 between	 four	 and	 five	million	 bags	 of	
grain.	 Accordingly,	 1993-94	 was	 also	 dominated	 by	 emergency	 work:	 the	 organisation	
distributed	£5.5	million	in	food	aid	to	Samburu	and	Turkana	alone.	It	also	worked	to	aid	
those	 displaced	 by	 ethnic	 clashes,	 establishing	 the	 NGO	 Council	 Ethnic	 Clashes	
Coordination	 Network,	 which	 brought	 together	 churches,	 NGOs,	 the	 UNDP	 and	 other	
relevant	 bodies	 to	 coordinate	 responses	 in	 the	 regions	 most	 badly	 affected.	 Oxfam’s	
overall	expenditure	in	Kenya	reached	£8	million,	representing	ten	per	cent	of	the	overall	
global	income	of	the	organisation	that	year.26		
	 Facing	fiscal	ruin	and	the	loss	of	patronage	resources	under	pressure	from	donors	
and	IMF	conditionalities,	Moi	would	attempt	to	appropriate	a	portion	of	the	vast	swathes	
of	humanitarian	aid	entering	 the	country.	Having	 first	met	with	a	 representative	of	 the	
FAO	in	1991	to	discuss	the	looming	humanitarian	crisis	 in	three	of	Kenya’s	districts,	Moi	
would	soon	inflate	the	number	of	districts	in	need	to	17.	Middleton	and	O’Keefe	note	that	
as	a	result	of	Moi’s	pleas	over	$121	million	worth	of	cereals,	oil	and	pulses	was	brought	
into	Kenya	between	1992	and	1994	by	the	WFP	alone,	and	they	allege	that	a	proportion	
was	likely	distributed	to	constituencies	less	out	of	humanitarian	need	than	as	a	bribe	to	
allied	 politicians	 and	 blocs	 of	 voters.27	Interestingly,	 the	 £800,000	 grant	 to	Oxfam	 from	
ODA	was	forthcoming	after	the	visit	of	Lady	Chalker,	Minister	of	State	in	the	Foreign	and	
Commonwealth	Office,	to	Kenya	in	February	1993.	Twining	suspected	that	the	ODA	only	
stepped	in	to	supplement	the	WFP	allocation	‘as	part	of	a	positive	political	 line	towards	
Kenya’	on	behalf	of	the	British	government,	but	in	the	midst	of	the	crisis,	and	convinced	
of	the	importance	of	its	blanket	approach,	the	Country	Representative	could	not	afford	to	
be	 picky.28 	Nevertheless,	 Middleton	 and	 O’Keefe	 overstate	 their	 argument	 that	 the	
drought	crisis	was	not	out	of	the	ordinary	and	that	‘a	chronic	emergency	of	insecurity	and	
ethnic	 violence	 was	 treated	 as	 if	 it	 was	 a	 sudden	 and	 acute	 emergency’	 in	 order	 to	
covertly	 assist	 the	 Kenya	 government.	 Firstly,	 Oxfam	 had	 their	 own	 monitors	 on	 the	
ground	to	assess	the	levels	of	need	and	each	told	a	consistent	story	of	desperation	and		
																																																						
26	‘Oxfam	Kenya	Programme:	Annual	Report,	1993’,	May,	1994,	OxA,	MS.	Oxfam	PRG/3/4/12/7:	Oxfam	
Kenya	Programme	Annual	Report,	1993.	
27	Middleton	and	O’Keefe,	Disaster	and	Development,	pp.	54-68.	
28	‘Turkana	Programme	Report’,	May,	1993,	quoted	in	‘Food	Distribution	in	Turkana:	Oxfam	Report’,	
January,	1995,	Personal	Archive	of	Karen	Twining.	
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suffering.	Thus	even	if	the	grant	from	ODA	was	a	political	gesture,	Oxfam	distributed	the	
funds	 in	 areas	 in	 need	 as	 defined	 by	 its	 own	 monitors	 rather	 than	 Moi’s	 political	
calculations.29	(The	question	of	whether	such	aid	allowed	the	Moi	state	to	direct	its	own	
relief	 in	a	political	 fashion	 is	one	 that	 in	 the	midst	of	 crisis,	Oxfam	staff	had	 to	 ignore.)	
Secondly,	 while	 the	 crisis	 did	 have	 long-term	 causes	 such	 as	 insecurity	 and	 ethnic	
violence,	 the	 drought	 situation	 was	 itself	 severe.	 Though	 the	 drought	 had	 been	
developing	 for	more	 than	 two	 years	 by	 1991	 –	 and	 Oxfam	 admits	 that	 it	 should	 have	
acted	sooner	–	the	difficulty	is	judging	the	appropriate	time	to	intervene	since	the	onset	
of	crises	 in	pastoral	regions	 in	particular	 is	rapid.	The	final	slide	 into	famine	occurs	very	
suddenly	 since	 nutritional	 status	 is	 protected	 for	 a	 time	 because	 of	 the	 availability	 of	
meat	 from	 dead	 and	 dying	 animals.	 As	 herds	 deplete,	 famine	 conditions	 develop	
quickly.30	In	such	a	way	a	crisis	can	be	chronic	but	have	a	sudden	onset	period.	
	 Moreover,	 although	 Moi	 and	 his	 administration	 grasped	 at	 humanitarian	
assistance	as	a	‘decent	alternative	to	development	aid’	over	these	years,	authors	should	
take	care	not	to	tar	all	humanitarian	aid	with	the	same	brush.	Oxfam	understood	that	‘the	
advent	 of	multi-party	 politics…	meant	 the	 politicisation	 of	 relief	 aid	 at	 local	 levels’	 and	
sought	to	avoid	its	distribution	programmes	‘wearing	political	labels’.	It	was	fortunate	in	
one	 sense	 in	 that	 Turkana	 and	 Samburu	were	 solid	 KANU	areas;	 hence	 there	was	 ‘less	
likelihood	 of	 the	 emergency	 programmes	 becoming	 political	 footballs’.	 But	 the	
organisation	also	took	important	steps	to	avoid	its	aid	being	used	as	patronage.	Indeed,	
noting	 the	 politicisation	 of	 relief	 by	 the	 government,	 the	 organisation	 endeavoured	 to	
direct	 its	relief	work	from	the	ground	up	rather	than	the	top	down.	Thus	Oxfam’s	relief	
interventions	set	out	to	prove	that	‘community	mobilisation’	was	possible	even	within	an	
emergency	 programme,	 something	 the	 organisation	 felt	 was	 ‘misunderstood	 or	
overlooked	by	those	who	see	relief	work	as	responding	only	to	the	physical	needs	of	an	
individual	and	not	to	the	overall	growth	of	a	community’.31	
	 Oxfam	 encouraged	 community	 mobilisation	 during	 the	 relief	 work	 by	 electing	
relief	 committees	 at	 open	 village	meetings	 to	 liaise	with	 the	 organisation	 on	 screening	
																																																						
29	Questions	would,	however,	be	asked	much	later	about	the	appropriateness	of	some	of	Oxfam’s	early	
intervention	work	and	its	links	with	the	political	ambitions	of	certain	Oxfam	staff	(as	opposed	to	the	
government).	This	issue	is	dealt	with	in	more	detail	below.	
30	Middleton	and	O’Keefe,	Disaster	and	Development,	pp.	54-68;	M.	Buchanan-Smith,	‘A	Review	of	Oxfam’s	
Approach	to	Relief	Food	Distribution	in	Samburu	and	Turkana	Districts	of	Kenya,	1992/93’,	October,	1993,	
OxA,	MS.	Oxfam	PRG/5/5/8	Folder	2:	Kenya,	1992-1993.	
31	P.	Wiles,	M.	Buchanan-Smith,	J.	Umbima,	‘Oxfam’s	Emergency	Programmes	in	Kenya,	1992-1993’,	
October,	1993,	Personal	Archive	of	Karen	Twining;	‘Turkana	Programme	Report’,	May,	1993,	quoted	in	
‘Food	Distribution	in	Turkana:	Oxfam	Report’,	January,	1995,	Personal	Archive	of	Karen	Twining.	
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and	 registration,	 to	 ensure	 the	 security	 of	 food	 and	 to	 organise	 its	 distribution.	 Staff	
hoped	 that	 such	 work	 would	 build	 the	 capacity	 of	 local	 groups	 while	 also	 ‘[guarding]	
against	the	relief	effort	being	captured	by	powerful	interests	within	the	community’	such	
as	 chiefs	 or	 elders. 32 	Predictably,	 the	 approach	 caused	 some	 difficulties	 with	 local	
government	 officers,	 who	 ‘resented	 their	 control	 over	 relief	 being	 usurped’.	 This	 was	
most	 apparent	 in	 Turkana,	 where	 there	 were	 ‘a	 few	 incidents	 of	 chiefs	 disrupting	 the	
relief	 operation,	 for	 example	 by	 misappropriating	 sacks	 of	 food’.33	Others	 sought	 to	
dominate	 the	 committee	 and	 behaved	 in	 a	 ‘dictatorial’	 fashion:	 in	 one	 location	 an	
assistant	 chief	 nominated	 18	 people	 for	 the	 committee	 including	 himself	 and	 allied	
members	 of	 the	 administration.	When	Oxfam	 insisted	 that	 the	 decisions	 be	 taken	 at	 a	
baraza,	the	people	themselves	rejected	most	of	the	assistant	chief’s	suggestions.34	As	one	
monitor	recorded:	
	
The	 system	protected	 individuals	against	 the	power	of	 the	 chief.	 It	was	 the	 system	
which	was	challenging	 the	status	quo	and	standing	up	 for	 [people’s]	 rights,	not	 the	
individuals.35	
	
While	 far	 from	 perfect	 (some	 resisted	 women	 members	 vehemently,	 while	 many	
members	 volunteered	 because	 they	 wanted	 to	 get	 extra	 allocations	 or	 continued	 to	
provide	food	to	the	chief	and	his	 family	before	anyone	else)	the	relief	committees	gave	
communities	 a	 level	 of	 independence	 that	 they	 had	 never	 had	 before	 and	 helped	 to	
challenge	the	enormous	political	power	wielded	by	government	officials	who	used	their	
control	 over	 relief	 resources	 to	 buy	 loyalty	 and	 electoral	 support.36	As	 a	 review	 of	 the	
interventions	 recorded,	 ‘the	 district	 authorities…	 played	 a	 very	 small	 role	 in	 this	 relief	
operation…	At	 community	 level	 the	 relief	operation	has	 tended	 to	by-pass	 government	
officers	[and]	the	chiefs	who	normally	play	a	key	role	in	relief	distributions…	in	favour	of	
relief	committees	of	which	they	are	not	a	member’.37	
	 Despite	the	undoubted	success	of	the	programme	both	practically	and	in	terms	of	
mobilising	communities	 to	 take	control	of	 their	 survival,	Oxfam	wrestled	uncomfortably	
																																																						
32	M.	Buchanan-Smith,	‘Oxfam’s	Relief	Operation	in	Baragoi,	Report	to	ODA’,	July	1993,	OxA,	MS.	Oxfam	
PRG/5/5/8	Folder	2:	Kenya,	1992-1993.	
33	P.	Wiles,	M.	Buchanan-Smith,	J.	Umbima,	‘Oxfam’s	Emergency	Programmes	in	Kenya,	1992-1993’,	
October,	1993,	Personal	Archive	of	Karen	Twining.	
34	The	community	accepted	only	three	of	the	assistant	chief’s	recommendations.	‘Food	Distribution	in	
Turkana:	Oxfam	Report’,	January,	1995,	Personal	Archive	of	Karen	Twining.	
35	‘Food	Distribution	in	Turkana:	Oxfam	Report’,	January,	1995,	Personal	Archive	of	Karen	Twining.	
36	‘Food	Distribution	in	Turkana:	Oxfam	Report’,	January,	1995,	Personal	Archive	of	Karen	Twining.	
37	P.	Wiles,	M.	Buchanan-Smith,	J.	Umbima,	‘Oxfam’s	Emergency	Programmes	in	Kenya,	1992-1993’,	
October,	1993,	Personal	Archive	of	Karen	Twining.	
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with	the	consequences	of	such	‘bypassing’	for	the	state	in	Kenya.	If,	as	the	strategic	plan	
pointed	 out,	 development	 in	 Kenya	 required	 that	 ‘the	 people	 themselves	 and	 their	
government	must	be	responsible’,	then	the	‘increasing	international	reliance	on	NGOs	to	
perform	major	 relief	 and	welfare	 functions’	was	 concerning.	 Although	 the	 organisation	
acknowledged	that	the	‘increased	bypassing	of	national	and	local	government	structures	
may	 be	 justified	 in	 the	 short-term	 when…	 agencies	 are	 faced	 with	 weak	 and	 corrupt	
structures’,	it	feared	that	‘the	continued	exclusion	of	government…	when	the	government	
is	 already	 weakened	 by	 the	 impact	 of	 the	 structural	 adjustment	 programmes…	 must	
create	 a	 vicious	 circle	 with	 [the]	 further	 atrophying	 of	 government	 structures’.	
Accordingly,	Twining	wrote	in	mid-1994	that	‘over	the	next	year	we	need	to	address	the	
question	 of	 operationality,	 and	 ask	 hard	 questions	 about	 our	 past	 and	 future	 pastoral	
development	 work’. 38 	There	 was,	 as	 one	 report	 into	 the	 emergency	 interventions	
concluded,	‘a	long	term	strategic	issue	here	for	Oxfam’.	
	
Will	 Oxfam	 (along	 with	 other	 NGOs)	 be	 the	 major	 providers	 of	 emergency	 relief	
assistance	in	Kenya	for	the	foreseeable	future?	This	appears	to	be	a	role	which	CARE	
has	 been	 happy	 to	 adopt.	 Should	Oxfam	 follow	 this	 route	 or	 decide	 to	 investigate	
strategies	 which,	 in	 the	 long-term,	 could	 strengthen	 the	 capacity	 of	 government	
structures…?	This	latter	approach	would	have	to	be	planned	carefully	at	central	and	
local	level,	involving	government	officials…	[and]	would	need	to	be	underpinned	with	
support	 to	 Kenyan	 NGOs	 and	 popular	 structures…	 which	 can	 monitor	 the	
performance	 of	 the	 government	 officials	 and	 have	 the	 strength	 and	 confidence	 to	
complain	 and	 lobby	 if	 things	 go	 wrong.	 This	 latter	 route	 could	 be	 seen	 as	 a	
contribution	to	strengthening	civil	society	and	accountability	within	Kenya.39	
	
	 Fortunately,	if	emergency	work	posed	a	dilemma	for	Oxfam	in	the	early	1990s,	it	
also	 provided	 an	opportunity,	 for,	 as	 Twining	 noted,	 ‘Oxfam’s	 profile	 is	much	higher	 in	
Kenya	than	two	years	ago,	due	mainly	to	our	emergency	work’.	As	Swift	had	predicted	ten	
years	 previously,	 large-scale	 operational	 work	 would	 open	 doors	 for	 the	 organisation:	
contemporary	 reports	 noted	 that	 the	 organisation’s	 response	 in	 emergencies	 was	
important	 ‘in	earning	 credibility,	which	 then	gets	 [us]	 time	 for	advocacy’.	 To	an	extent,	
therefore,	while	MPs	and	chiefs	bought	votes,	 ‘Oxfam	Kenya	buys	 its	way	 into	decision-
making…’.40	Indeed,	 the	 prominence	 of	 Oxfam’s	 programmes	 in	 the	 arid	 lands	 meant	
Oxfam	was	‘increasingly	viewed	as	a	leading	NGO	in	this	area’	and	earned	Oxfam	the	ear	
																																																						
38	‘Oxfam	Kenya	Programme:	Annual	Report,	1993’,	May,	1994,	OxA,	MS.	Oxfam	PRG/3/4/12/7:	Oxfam	
Kenya	Programme	Annual	Report,	1993.	
39	P.	Wiles,	M.	Buchanan-Smith,	J.	Umbima,	‘Oxfam’s	Emergency	Programmes	in	Kenya,	1992-1993’,	
October,	1993,	Personal	Archive	of	Karen	Twining.	
40	‘Kenya:	Food	Aid	and	Livelihoods	Programming’,	8	August,	2002,	Oxfam	‘O’	Drive	File,	Oxfam	Office,	
Nairobi.	
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of	 influential	officials	 in	 the	Office	of	 the	President.41	Oxfam	was,	 in	 fact,	 the	only	NGO	
invited	to	Parliament	to	witness	the	debate	on	a	motion	in	favour	of	the	abolition	of	sub-
division	of	 group	 ranches	 in	 1993.	 Somewhat	 unsurprisingly,	 the	motion	 failed	 to	 pass:	
Twining	wrote	that	the	government	still	saw	pastoralism	as	‘incompatible	with	the	goals	
of	 the	 modern	 nation-state’,	 and	 preferred	 farms,	 which	 could	 serve	 as	 ‘collateral	 for	
speculation	on	mirror-fronted	sky-scrapers	 in	Nairobi’.42	But	the	Country	Representative	
was	not	unhopeful	of	a	change	of	attitude,	and	organised	meetings	with	the	World	Bank	
and	other	donors	on	land	tenure	in	ASAL	areas	while	continuing	to	try	to	cement	‘closer	
relations’	with	the	Office	of	the	President.	At	the	same	time,	the	organisation	also	helped	
to	set	up	new	pastoral	organisations	in	the	mould	of	the	PSC	to	generate	momentum	for	
change	 from	 the	 ground	 up.	 Thus	 the	 Arid	 Lands	 Information	 Network	 (ALIN)	 and	 the	
Kenya	Pastoralist	Forum	(KPF)	would	receive	Oxfam	support	in	the	early	1990s.43	
	 Meanwhile,	 after	 the	 passage	 of	 the	 NGO	 Act,	 Oxfam	 took	 something	 of	 a	
leadership	role	in	the	lobbying	effort	to	amend	the	legislation	and	to	remove	some	of	its	
more	 controlling	 elements,	 either	 lobbying	 itself	 or	 funding	 others	 –	 such	 as	 the	 NGO	
Network	–	 to	challenge	 the	 legislation.44	The	 lobbying	effort	was	effective:	many	of	 the	
most	 odious	 conditions	 of	 the	 act,	 such	 as	 the	 absolute	 executive	 and	 judicial	 powers	
bestowed	 on	 the	 responsible	 Minister,	 the	 lack	 of	 recourse	 to	 the	 court	 system	 for	
disputes	and	the	short	re-registration	period,	were	watered	down	subsequently.	After	its	
registration	 under	 the	 act	 in	 March	 1993,	 Oxfam	 was	 also	 represented	 on	 several	
committees	of	the	NGO	Council	(a	body	established	under	the	act	comprising	all	NGOs	in	
Kenya),	 opening	 a	 new	 channel	 for	 raising,	 debating	 and	 addressing	 NGO	 concerns	 in	
Kenya,	and	Oxfam’s	Country	Representative	was	elected	by	fellow	members	of	the	NGO	
Council	 to	 take	 one	 of	 the	 two	 international	 NGO	 positions	 on	 the	 Government	 NGO	
Board	–	 the	body	 involved	 in	 the	 registration	of	NGOs	under	 the	new	 legislation.45	The	
																																																						
41	Between	January	1994	and	June	1995	the	numbers	receiving	relief	food	dropped	from	230,000	to	
197,000	in	Turkana	and	60,000	to	38,000	in	Samburu.	The	food	aid	required	–	around	20,000	tonnes	and	
worth	just	over	£3.2	million	–	was	sourced	mainly	from	WFP,	but	one	quarter	came	from	the	ODA.	Non-
food	allocations	totalled	a	further	£1.4	million.	See	‘Oxfam	Kenya	Annual	Report,	1994-1995’,	July,	1995,	
OxA,	MS.	Oxfam	PRG/3/4/12/8:	Oxfam	Kenya	Programme	Annual	Report	1994-1995.	
42	‘Oxfam	Kenya:	Strategic	Plan,	August	1992	to	July	1995’,	July,	1992,	Personal	Archive	of	Karen	Twining.	
43	‘Oxfam	Kenya	Programme:	Annual	Report,	1993’,	May,	1994,	OxA,	MS.	Oxfam	PRG/3/4/12/7:	Oxfam	
Kenya	Programme	Annual	Report,	1993.	
44	The	NGO	Network	was	a	collection	of	local	and	international	NGOs	brought	together	by	shared	hostility	
towards	the	NGO	Act.	Oxfam	supported	the	grouping	financially	from	1991.	
45	‘Oxfam	Kenya	Programme:	Annual	Report,	1993’,	May,	1994,	OxA,	MS.	Oxfam	PRG/3/4/12/7:	Oxfam	
Kenya	Programme	Annual	Report,	1993;	Interview	with	author	no.	VIII,	6	November,	2014;	Interview	with	
author	no.	XI,	4	December,	2014;	Interview	with	author	no.	XXI,	28	April,	2015.	See	Ndegwa,	The	Two	Faces	
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tactical	 shift	 from	 ‘reaching	 the	 poorest’	 under	 May	 to	 a	 more	 broadly	 ‘rights	 based’	
programme	 under	 Twining	 was	 underway,	 made	 possible	 by	 the	 emergency	 situation,	
which	had	strengthened	Oxfam’s	hand	in	negotiations	with	the	state.46	
	 Of	course,	not	all	members	of	 the	Kenya	staff	were	convinced	by	the	move	to	a	
‘software’	 approach	 made	 possible	 by	 Oxfam’s	 higher	 profile.	 A	 regional	 meeting	 of	
Oxfam	 staff	 in	November	 1993	 asked	whether,	 given	 the	 actions	 of	 the	 government	 in	
supporting	 –	 if	 not	 initiating	 –	 ethnic	 cleansing,	 Oxfam	 could	 ever	 in	 good	 conscience	
work	with	the	government	to	‘mop-up	government	created	conflict’.47	The	new	Country	
Representative	 (from	 late	1994),	Adam	Leach,	was,	however,	convinced	that	 the	course	
set	by	Twining	was	 the	right	one.	He	believed	that	 ‘change	depends	on	 the	quality	and	
extent	of	our	exposure	and	information	and	our	ability	to	influence	policy	development’	
at	the	heart	of	government,	not	 ‘low	level	efforts	on	basic	needs’,	and	he	mourned	the	
‘insufficient	 efforts	 to	 understand	 and	 identify	 scope	 for	 establishing	 effective	
collaboration	at	different	 levels	of	government’	caused	‘by	differing	attitudes	within	the	
team	 to	 working	 with	 Government	 (some	 being	 opposed	 and	 others	 being	 willing	 at	
certain	 levels,	 and	 other	 [sic]	 keen	 to	 explore	 relations)’. 48 	To	 ‘address	 structural	
problems	 in	 [a]	Kenyan	 society…	crumbling	 from	within’,	he	argued,	 required	Oxfam	 to	
move	 further	 beyond	 institutional	 support	 to	 other	 NGOs	 and	 towards	 involvement	 in	
policy	debate	and	‘increasing	dialogue	with	government’.	‘Action	on	policy	issues’	and	the	
integration	 of	 project	 work	 with	 efforts	 to	 promote	 institutional	 development	 were	
considered	‘a	crucial	step	forwards	for	Oxfam	in	Kenya’.49	
	 At	the	same	time,	the	new	Country	Representative	–	who	had	grown	up	in	Kenya	–	
made	no	secret	of	his	own	distaste	for	the	Moi	regime.	In	his	first	annual	report	he	was	
scathing	about	 the	 ‘misuse	of	 state	power…	 the	use	of	 force	and	 [the]	manipulation	of	
ethnic	 tensions	 in	key	areas	 throughout	 the	Rift	Valley’	as	well	as	 the	 ‘abuse	of	human	
rights’	 by	 the	 regime,	 including	 police	 torture,	 the	 abuse	 of	 the	 legal	 process	 and	 the	
‘repression	 of	 all	 forms	 of	 potential	 opposition	 to	 the	Government	with	 harassment	 of	
																																																																																																																																																																			
of	Civil	Society	and	Kanyinga,	‘The	Politics	of	Development	Space	in	Kenya’,	in	Semboja	and	Therkildsen	
(eds.),	Service	Provision	under	Stress,	for	more	information	on	the	NGO	Act.	
46	‘Developing	New	Directions	for	Oxfam	in	Kenya:	Annual	Report,	May	1995	–	April	1996’,	January,	1996,	
OxA,	MS.	Oxfam	PRG/3/4/12/9:	Developing	New	Directions	for	Oxfam	in	Kenya,	Annual	Report	1995-1996.	
47	‘East	and	Central	Africa	Regional	Meeting’,	8-12	November,	1993,	Personal	Archive	of	Karen	Twining.	
48	‘Annual	Report,	1997-1998:	Action	to	Achieve	Impact	on	Poverty	in	Kenya’,	June,	1998,	OxA,	MS.	Oxfam	
PRG/3/4/12/12:	Annual	Report	1997-1998,	‘Action	to	Achieve	Impact	on	Poverty	in	Kenya’.	
49	‘Oxfam	Kenya	Annual	Report,	1994-1995’,	July,	1995,	OxA,	MS.	Oxfam	PRG/3/4/12/8:	Oxfam	Kenya	
Programme	Annual	Report	1994-1995;	‘Oxfam	Kenya	Five	Year	Strategic	Plan,	May	1996	–	April	2001’,	
November,	1995,	OxA,	MS.	Oxfam	PRG/3/8/8	Folder	2:	Kenya;	‘Oxfam	Kenya	Five	Year	Strategic	Plan	Annual	
Revision,	May	1997	–	April	2002’,	November,	1996,	OxA,	MS.	Oxfam	PRG/3/8/8	Folder	2:	Kenya.	
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individuals…	 churches	 and	 NGOs’.50	Leach	 also	 authored	 two	 confidential	 reports	 to	
Oxford	 on	 ‘state	 sponsored,	 politically	motivated	 social	 violence	 in	 Kenya’,	which	went	
further	in	their	criticism	of	the	regime,	linking	the	maltreatment	of	ordinary	citizens	with	
the	political	interests	of	the	elite	and	denying	government	rhetoric	on	the	ethnic	hostility	
behind	 the	 clashes.	 He	 alleged	 that	 Kenyans	were	 ‘under	 threat	 from	 a	 powerful	 elite	
intent	on	retaining	power	and	capable	of	devastating	impacts	on	the	economic	and	social	
welfare	of	Kenyan	society’.	Thousands	of	people	faced,	he	wrote,	being	‘forcibly	removed	
to	 other	 places	 in	 Kenya	 as	 part	 of	 concerted	Government	 action	 to	 disperse	 people…	
through	 the	 so-called	 “ethnic	 clashes”’.51	The	 interests	 of	 ‘the	 wealthiest	 and	 most	
powerful	 members	 of	 the	 ruling	 elite’,	 he	 argued,	 were	 ‘well	 served	 by	 [such]	 social	
conflict	and…	this	has	been	sanctioned,	at	times	even	perpetrated,	by	the	state’.	Thus	the	
Country	Representative	considered	‘widely	documented	statements	about	the	inevitable	
fragmentation	along	ethnic	lines	by	President	Moi’	as	‘evidence	for	deliberate	attempts	to	
destabilise	 society	 in	 Kenya’.	 Moreover,	 he	 suspected	 that	 displacement	 and	
destabilisation	was	‘part	of	a	strategy	for	[the]	progressive	clearance	of	ethnic	groupings	
(chiefly	Kikuyu)	whom	the	Moi	Government	either	mistrusts	politically	or	simply	wishes	to	
expel	 from	areas	traditionally	regarded	as	pastoralist	–	or	both’.	Considering	the	efforts	
by	Moi	 to	 ‘ensure	 the	 economic	 ruination	 of	 specific	 areas…	 known	or	 feared	 to	 be	 in	
opposition	to	the	ruling	elite’,	Leach	felt	it	was	mistaken	to	accept	‘simplistic	explanations	
about	ethnic	divisions	in	Kenya’.	Indeed,	he	believed	that	the	description	of	social	conflict	
as	 ‘ethnic	 clashes’	 was	 ‘misleading	 and	 dangerous’	 since	 the	 term	 ‘simply	 deflects	
attention	from	the	real	nature	of	political	abuse’.52		
	 Yet	 while	 Leach	 was	 unswerving	 in	 his	 condemnation	 of	 Moi	 and	 his	 state	
apparatus,	 it	 was	 precisely	 because	 of	 the	 ‘degeneration	 of	 governance’	 in	 Kenya	 that	
policy	 work	 and	 support	 for	 Kenyan	 institutions	 was	 so	 vital.	 Grave	 damage	 had	 been	
done		
	
to	 the	 nature	 of	 governance	 in	 Kenya…	 [and	 to]	 the	 nature	 of	 leadership,	 the	
objective	 interests	 of	 citizens,	 and	 observance	 of	 universal	 values…	 Contemporary	
political	 behaviour	 has	 raised	 profound	 concern	 about	 the	 appropriateness	 and	
relevance	 of	 outmoded	 political	 models	 (which	 derive	 mainly	 from	 claims	 about	
																																																						
50	‘Oxfam	Kenya	Annual	Report,	1994-1995’,	July,	1995,	OxA,	MS.	Oxfam	PRG/3/4/12/8:	Oxfam	Kenya	
Programme	Annual	Report	1994-1995.	
51	A.	Leach,	‘State	Sponsored,	Politically	Motivated	Social	Violence	in	Kenya’,	17	February,	1995,	OxA,	MS.	
Oxfam	PRG/3/7/17/9:	PAC	Preparation.	
52	A.	Leach,	‘State	Sponsored,	Politically	Motivated	Social	Violence	in	Kenya’,	17	February,	1995,	OxA,	MS.	
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nationhood)	and	the	breakdown	of	a	centralised	bureaucratic	system	of	government	
in	favour	of	political	‘clientelism’	and	preference	for	patronage	and	prejudice.	
	
‘Growing	social	conflict,	economic	decline,	and	political	abuse	has’,	he	wrote,	‘frustrated	
significant	 impact	 by	 conventional	 development	 approaches,	 including	 small-scale	
development	 project	 activities’.	 This	 posed	 ‘major	 challenges	 to	 an	 operating	 style	
characterised	 as	 principally	 “developmental”’.53	As	 Kenya	 became	 ‘more	 vulnerable	 to	
ineffective	 governance’	 in	 the	 1990s,	 Leach	 considered	 that	 ‘the	 seeds	 of	 stability,	
prosperity	and	egalitarian	 (participatory)	 social	order	must	come	from	civil	 society’.	But	
civil	society	was	not	a	‘panacea	for	the	evils	of	the	state’	nor	a	replacement	for	it,	since	
many	NGOs	were	dominated	by	 the	urban	middle	class	and	were	not	 representative	of	
the	 most	 marginalised	 of	 Kenya’s	 citizens.	 Rather,	 Leach	 believed	 that	 NGOs	 such	 as	
Oxfam	–	 given	 an	 ‘institutional	mandate’	 by	 civil	 society	 and	 deriving	 as	 they	 did	 from	
notions	of	the	‘intrinsic	rights	of	citizenship	to	engage	in	collective	action	to	ensure	that	
the	 state	 exercises	 its	 proper	 functions’	 –	 were	 vital	 for	 creating	 ‘common	 ground	
between	the	state	and	its	citizens’.	In	such	a	way,	Oxfam	could	‘play	a	very	valuable	role	
in	bringing	together	civil	society	organisations,	government	and	others	to	bring	about	real	
changes	in	policy	and	practice’	on	development,	disaster	management,	land	reform,	food	
security	 and	 conflict.	 If	 Oxfam	 could	 influence	 and	 collaborate	 with	 government	
departments,	 it	 would,	 he	 thought,	 not	 only	 ‘enhance	 effective	 and	 cost	 effective	
implementation	of	our	activities’,	but	also,	ensure	‘the	productivity	of	the	GoK	staff	who	
otherwise	would	remain	 inactive’.54	The	 informalisation	of	 the	Kenyan	government	 thus	
demanded	 ‘not	 only	 a	 humanitarian	 response	 but	 also	 a	 greater	 political	 awareness	
among	NGOs’.55	Oxfam	would	not,	he	concluded,	‘become	the	provider	of	a	single	form	of	
assistance	 (funds,	 operational	work,	 non-funding	 support)’,	 but	would	work	 towards	 ‘a	
more	holistic	analysis	of	the	nature	of	vulnerability’.	56	
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	 Accordingly,	 Oxfam	 would	 no	 longer	 work	 on	 either	 the	 ‘supply’	 side	 or	 the	
‘demand’	side	of	the	development	equation	in	Kenya;	 instead,	 it	would	work	both	sides	
simultaneously.	By	taking	advantage	of	new	opportunities	to	engage	with	the	state	and	
work	 on	 the	 ‘supply’	 side	 of	 the	 development	 equation	 the	 organisation	 hoped	 to	
maximise	 its	 potential	 developmental	 impact;	 by	 working	 on	 the	 ‘demand’	 side	 of	 the	
equation	with	 local	 groups	and	civil	 society,	Oxfam	sought	 to	minimise	 the	 risk	of	anti-
developmental	 unintended	 consequences	 resulting	 from	 engagement	 with	 the	 state	
alone.	 Under	 Leach,	 the	 Kenya	 programme	 would,	 therefore,	 strengthen	 its	 focus	 on	
developing	the	capabilities	of	communities,	local	organisations	and	government	agencies,	
while	 endeavouring	 to	 influence	 policy	 formulation	 with	 Oxfam	 experience	 and	 by	
‘enabling	impoverished	and	marginalised	people	to	speak	for	themselves’.57	Leach	was,	in	
fact,	 combining	 the	 tactical	 approaches	 Oxfam	 had	 used	 throughout	 its	 time	 in	 Kenya	
with	the	same	overarching	strategic	goal	–	to	bring	about	policy	change	and	a	state	more	
responsive	to	its	most	marginalised	citizens.	
	 Nonetheless,	 for	 all	 the	 hopeful	 discussion	 of	 Oxfam’s	 potential	 impact,	 the	
organisation	still	had	to	be	‘careful	about	official…	perceptions	of	[its]	work’.	While	past	
‘misunderstanding’	between	Oxfam	and	the	government	had,	the	Country	Representative	
argued,	been	partly	‘a	result	of	lack	of	dialogue	and	openness’,	‘demand’	side	work	could	
easily	 be	 construed	 as	 political	 activism.58	Oxfam	 could	 not	 challenge	 the	 Moi	 regime	
publicly	on	the	continued	instance	of	politically	motivated	ethnic	clashes,	corruption	and	
land	rights,	for	instance,	without	risking	the	lives	and	livelihoods	of	its	local	staff,	many	of	
whom	were	 followed	 quite	 brazenly	 by	 the	 security	 forces	 in	 the	mid-1990s.59	For	 the	
time	being,	Oxfam	 continued	 to	 provide	 humanitarian	 assistance	 to	 those	 displaced	by	
violence:	 at	 Enoosupukia,	 Thessalia,	 Longonot,	 Embakasi	 and	Bungoma,	Oxfam	assisted	
thousands	 of	 families	 by	 providing	 food,	 construction	 materials,	 blankets	 and	 tools,	
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59	One	local	staff	member	was	warned	by	her	civil	servant	husband	to	leave	Oxfam	if	it	took	any	stand	that	
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1995	–	April	1996’,	January,	1996,	OxA,	MS.	Oxfam	PRG/3/4/12/9:	Developing	New	Directions	for	Oxfam	in	
Kenya,	Annual	Report	1995-1996.	
		 231	
though	 government	 officials	 often	 refused	 to	 allow	 the	 organisation	 access	 to	 the	
temporary	camps.	It	also	worked	with	the	ethnic	clashes	network	of	the	NGO	Council	to	
coordinate	 responses	 to	 conflict	 across	 the	 voluntary	 sector.	 But	 Leach	 rejected	 donor	
expectations	 that	 NGOs	 should	 continue	 to	 provide	 humanitarian	 assistance	 ‘in	 the	
absence	 of	 any	 action	 to	 alter	 the	 political	 context	 in	 which	 Government	 operates’	 as	
‘tantamount	to	hypocracy	[sic]	or	calculated	disregard	for	the	interests	of	ordinary	people	
in	 Kenya’.	 He	was	 critical	 of	 the	 international	 community	 for	 the	 ‘total	 absence	 of	 any	
adequate	official	or	other	public	statement	both	about	the	reasons	for	the	displacement	
of	people	and	their	subsequent	dispersals	and	[for	the	lack	of]	effective	condemnation	of	
the	Kenyan	government	despite	the	granting	of	substantial	official	assistance	[around	$83	
million]	 two	 weeks	 before	 the	 1994	 dispersals	 took	 place’.	 The	 ‘absence	 of	 official	
condemnation’,	he	argued,	‘must	therefore	be	seen	as	an	acquiescence	to	the	behaviour	
of	 the	 Government	 of	 Kenya…	 bent	 on	 manipulating	 social	 order	 for…	 political	 ends’.	
Donors	were	also	criticised	for	 the	enforced	 implementation	of	macroeconomic	policies	
that	had	encouraged	 the	 ‘retreat	of	 the	 state	 in	 key	 social	 services	with	 [an]	attendant	
decline	 in	 [the]	 notion	 of	 [the]	 state	 as	 [the]	 servant	 of	 local	 people’,	 and	 for	 their	
lacklustre	 commitment	 to	 ‘good	 governance’,	 which	 left	 ‘powerful	 individuals	 free	 to	
manipulate	government	apparatus	for	their	own	interests’.60	
	 Although	 Oxfam	 could	 not	 agitate	 loudly	 for	 policy	 change,	 it	 did	 increase	 its	
support	 to	 local	 institutions	 that	 expressed	 the	 demands	 of	 ordinary	 people	 against	
‘terminal	spoils	politics’	and	the	‘overbearing	power’	of	the	state.	During	Leach’s	tenure	
over	£100,000	per	year	was	spent	on	enabling	local	NGOs	to	challenge	the	state	on	rights	
issues.	A	Programme	Officer	noted	in	1996	that	‘as	is	the	case	everywhere	in	Kenya,	most	
of	the	problems…	[are]	a	result	of	human	rights	abuse…	We	realise	the	need	to	help	these	
communities	understand	their	rights	and	organise	them	to	take	active	part	in	advocating	
for	 change’.	 Supported	 organisations	 included	 the	 Kenya	 Land	Alliance	 (KLA)	 and	 Kituo	
che	Sheria.61	Working	through	partners	such	as	these	and	focusing	on	socio-economic	as	
opposed	to	political	rights	did	not	insulate	Oxfam	completely	from	government	interest,	
of	 course:	 many	 of	 the	 organisations	 Oxfam	 supported	 were	 associated	 with	 the	
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opposition	movement	in	Kenya,	as	were	individuals	with	whom	Oxfam	had	contact,	such	
as	Willy	Mutunga	(then	chairman	of	the	Kenya	Human	Rights	Commission	and	today	chief	
justice	of	 Kenya)	 and	Peter	Anyang’	Nyong’o	 (a	 prominent	opposition	MP).	Hence,	 one	
senior	official	in	the	Office	of	the	President	warned	a	member	of	the	Oxfam	staff	that	he	
needed	to	‘get	his	mzungu	[Leach]	under	control’,	while	a	junior	Minister	let	slip	(perhaps	
deliberately)	that	Leach	was	often	followed	to	see	who	Oxfam	was	supporting.62	
	 Despite	 these	warnings,	 Leach	 pushed	 his	 team	 to	 try	 to	 find	 ‘common	 ground	
between	 the	 state	 and	 its	 citizens’,	 emphasising	 that	 some	 level	 of	 ‘direct	 engagement	
with	the	government’	was	possible,	in	particular	because	‘there	is	a	lot	of	good	will	within	
government	 (especially	at	departmental	 level)	 for	 the	work	of	Oxfam	and	our	potential	
for	 impact	 on	 poverty’.63	Significantly,	 both	 Twining	 and	 Leach	 encouraged	 pragmatism	
and	realism	as	regards	working	with	the	state	apparatus	and	encouraged	staff	not	to	view	
the	government	as	a	monolith	or	 to	 ‘talk	 about	government	as	a	homogenous	mass’.64	
The	 local	 Health	 Office	 in	Wajir	 was,	 as	 one	 interviewee	 noted,	 a	 long	 way	 from	 land	
evictions	 in	 the	 Rift	 Valley.65	Oxfam	 staff	 were	 advised	 to	 sound	 out	 ‘key	 agents	 of	
change’	within	 the	 state	 apparatus,	 and	 to	 search	 for	 individuals	 that	 the	 organisation	
could	 ‘catalyse’	 into	 action	 through	 its	 advocacy:	 ‘co-operation	with	 these	 officials	 and	
linking	them	with	the	communities’	was	a	strategic	goal	‘both	to	tap	the	existing	expertise	
in	 government	 and	 also	 [to]	 open	 up	 lobbying	 channels’.66	Often,	 another	 interviewee	
recalled,	local	officials	were	‘desperate	to	do	something.	They’re	sitting	around	in	under-
resourced	districts	where	they	have	no	fuel	for	a	vehicle,	no	spare	parts…	[but]	with	a	bit	
of	material	support,	[they	are]	up	and	running’.	For	this	staff	member,	engagement	with	
the	 local	 administration	 ‘debunked	 a	 lot	 of	 myths…	 that	 government	 was	 essentially	
hostile	to	the	population…	The	assumption	that	they	are	not	interested	in	working	for	the	
people…	was	wrong’.	 Instead,	 the	question	was	 to	whom	did	 they	 feel	accountable.	By	
encouraging	 ‘relationships	 of	 accountability	 between	 people	 and	 government…	 in	 the	
delivery	of	services	that	people	require’,	Oxfam	hoped	to	develop	on	both	sides	‘the	idea	
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that	 they	 [the	 government]	 should	 be	 able	 to	 provide	 these	 services’.67	There	 was	 a	
feeling	that	Oxfam	should	‘help	the	government	be	seen	to	deliver	in	areas	where	it	has	
not	 [previously]	 and	 to	 restore	 some	 level	 of	 public	 trust…	 in	 government’.	 There	was,	
too,	an	acknowledgement	that	the	task	was	sometimes	a	‘muddy’	one:	
	
Of	 course	 it’s	 corrupt…	and	we	know	 that	most	MPs	will	 give	 contracts	 to	 cousins,	
but	school	classrooms	still	get	built…	I’m	not	saying	that’s	right,	but	for	the	first	time	
people	are	seeing	something	which	they	never	saw	before…	[it’s]	about	working	with	
the	grain’.68	
	
	 To	 borrow	 from	 a	 recent	 book	 on	 the	 failings	 of	 ‘good	 governance’	 attitudes	
towards	development,	Oxfam	was	seeking	out	‘islands	of	effectiveness’	within	the	Kenya	
government,	and	such	an	approach	has	always	 required	a	hefty	dose	of	 realism.69	As	 in	
the	1960s,	Oxfam	was	 less	 concerned	with	 the	precise	 characteristics	of	 the	 state	 than	
with	the	state	as	an	integral	development	institution.	Thus	staff	had	nothing	good	to	say	
of	the	Moi	regime,	but	felt	that	if	different	parts	of	the	state	apparatus,	with	a	mixture	of	
support	and	cajoling,	would	engage	with	Kenyan	citizens,	the	latter’s	concerns	could	filter	
into	 policy-making.	 Indeed,	 Oxfam	 had	 long	 understood	 that	 beneath	 the	 grandiose	
façade,	the	Kenyan	state	was	highly	personalised	–	dominated	as	it	was	by	a	small	coterie	
of	elites	who	took	a	keen	interest	in	development	initiatives	–	and	could	be	influenced	by	
those	who	 appreciated	 the	 intricacies	 of	 its	 internal	 hierarchies.	Oxfam’s	 efforts	 in	 this	
direction	 were	 helped	 by	 the	 employment	 of	 two	 former	 government	 officers	 –	
Mohammed	Elmi	and	Mohammed	Mursal	–	who	had	worked	for	 the	Ministry	of	Health	
and	the	Ministry	of	Livestock	Development	in	Wajir.	Both	knew	of	the	darker	side	of	the	
Moi	 state:	 Elmi,	 for	 instance,	 had	 lost	 his	 brother	 in	 the	Wagalla	massacre.70	But	 both	
were	 also	 committed	 to	 building	 a	 relationship	 between	 the	 state	 and	 its	 citizens	 and	
pushing	 the	 former	 to	 the	 centre	 of	 development	 interventions	 in	marginal	 areas;	 and	
according	to	contemporaries	their	experience	 inside	government	meant	they	knew	how	
to	navigate	its	personalised	apparatus	efficiently	and	without	compromising	Oxfam.71	
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‘YOU CAN’T TALK ABOUT DEVELOPMENT IF YOU DON’T INVOLVE THE 
GOVERNMENT’: THE WAJIR PASTORAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT 
 
The	 first	 programme	 that	 took	 the	 interlinked	 issues	 of	 community	 empowerment	 and	
government	accountability	to	scale	started	on	the	back	of	Oxfam’s	drought	intervention	
in	 Wajir.	 As	 discussed	 previously,	 Wajir	 was	 a	 tense	 and	 marginalised	 part	 of	 Kenya	
following	the	Shifta	conflict	and	the	Wagalla	massacre.	Indeed,	after	Wagalla	even	those	
services	 formerly	 provided	 through	enforced	 settlement	began	 to	be	withdrawn	as	 the	
state	 imposed	 cost-sharing	 for	 health	 and	 education,	 and	 handed	 boreholes	 over	 to	
communities	 to	manage	 –	 an	 impossible	 task	 for	 people	 lacking	 the	 skills	 and	 training	
necessary	 to	 do	 so.72	By	 the	 early	 1990s,	 in	 the	 grip	 of	 a	 devastating	 drought	 and	
heightened	insecurity	–	as	a	result	of	the	collapse	of	neighbouring	Somalia	and	increased	
ethnic	 tension	 in	 the	early	 stages	of	multipartyism	–	Wajir	was	not	only	worse	off	 than	
Kenya’s	agricultural	heartlands,	but	also	most	other	ASAL	regions.	Its	local	infrastructure	
was	sorely	deficient	–	Wajir	had	only	one	fifth	of	the	average	 length	of	roads	per	1,000	
square	kilometres	for	the	nation	(40	km	per	1,000	sq	km);	 its	 literacy	rate	was	12.5	per	
cent,	compared	with	the	national	average	of	69	per	cent;	while	under	five	mortality	stood	
at	339	per	1,000	–	seven	times	the	national	average.73	
	 Witnessing	 the	devastation	 in	 the	district,	 in	 1992	Karen	Twining	 identified	Elmi	
and	 two	other	 local	development	workers	who	were	 involved	with	 the	Wajir	Volunteer	
Group	and	the	Nomadic	Primary	Health	Care	Programme	(funded	by	UNICEF)	and	offered	
funds	for	them	to	undertake	a	year	of	participatory	training	and	research	in	order	to	help	
Oxfam	 develop	 its	 long-term	 strategic	 plan	 for	 work	 in	 the	 district	 in	 anticipation	 of	 a	
project	 in	 the	 region	 from	April	 1993.	 (With	 their	 contacts	 in	government,	Elmi	and	his	
colleagues	were	also	able	to	smooth	the	path	for	Oxfam	to	return	to	the	district	after	a	
five-year	absence.	The	timing	was	apposite:	after	inter-clan	violence	threatened	to	spiral	
out	 of	 control	 in	 1993	 and	 a	 UNICEF	 pilot	 was	 killed,	 Oxfam	 would	 be	 the	 only	
international	NGO	to	maintain	its	presence	in	the	district.)	The	plans	drawn	up	by	those	
involved	 in	 the	 participatory	 process	 reflected	Oxfam’s	 commitment	 to	 ‘supporting	 the	
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pastoral	 sector	 rather	 than	 modernising	 it’	 and	 criticised	 earlier	 efforts	 at	
commercialisation	and	settlement.74	Nonetheless,	 they	were	unlike	anything	Oxfam	had	
attempted	before.	The	Wajir	Pastoral	Development	Project	(WPDP)	was	designed	in	three	
phases	to	cover	a	nine-year	period	from	July	1994.	The	first	phase	sought	to	‘bring	about	
change	 within	 Wajir	 through	 involving	 all	 stakeholders	 in	 the	 development	 process’,	
including	government	and	voluntary	actors.	The	project	planned	to	work	in	the	areas	of	
animal	 and	 human	 health,	 water	 development,	 restocking	 and	 income	 generation;	 but	
capacity	building	was	at	the	heart	of	all	these	technical	interventions,	as	Oxfam	sought	to	
reinforce	 local	 institutional	 capacity	 –	 both	 governmental	 and	 in	 the	 form	 of	 pastoral	
associations	and	 local	NGOs	–	 in	order	 that	pastoralists	could	 ‘manage	development	on	
their	own	terms,	and	exercise	claims	on	the	state	with	respect	to	the	full	range	of	their	
rights’.75	
	 By	1995,	 the	 targets	 set	by	Oxfam	 for	 the	 first	phase	were	well	on	 their	way	 to	
being	 met:	 to	 overcome	 the	 lack	 of	 essential	 drugs	 needed	 to	 treat	 common	 animal	
diseases,	Oxfam	 funded	 the	 erection	 of	 five	 drug	 stores	 in	Wajir	 Bor,	which	would	 sell	
drugs	 at	 a	 reasonable	 price	 and	 use	 the	 profits	 to	 create	 a	 revolving	 fund	 to	 purchase	
drugs	 and	 stock	 the	 store.	 Meanwhile,	 to	 combat	 the	 paucity	 of	 knowledge	 on	 both	
human	 and	 animal	 health,	Oxfam	 –	 in	 collaboration	with	willing	 government	 officers	 –	
aimed	 to	 train	 80	 daryelles	 (Somali	 for	 ‘caretakers’)	 in	 the	 first	 phase.	 These	 daryelles	
would	then	travel	with	each	group	of	pastoralists	providing	advice	and	treatment	while	
the	group	was	far	away	from	medical	centres	in	towns.	35	daryelles	were	trained	within	
the	first	year.	As	regards	water	development,	Oxfam	provided	the	cement	and	whitewash	
necessary	 to	cap	300	wells	 (reducing	 the	need	 to	de-silt	 them),	while	 the	owner	of	 the	
well	 provided	 the	 labour	 and	 other	 materials	 for	 the	 construction.	 Altogether,	 Oxfam	
supported	the	capping	of	162	wells	in	the	first	year,	and	maintained	36	communal	water	
pans.	 (The	 target	 for	 the	 first	 three-year	 phase	 was	 200	 wells	 and	 50	 water	 pans.)	 In	
terms	of	 restocking,	during	 the	 first	 year	42	 families	were	 restocked	with	30	goats	and	
burden	 animals	 (out	 of	 an	 overall	 target	 for	 the	 first	 phase	 of	 300),	 while	 92	 (of	 200)	
families	were	given	burden	animals	to	enable	them	to	return	to	pastoral	life.	With	regard	
to	 income	 generation,	 the	 planned	 credit	 scheme	 for	 local	 women	 had	 not	 started	 by	
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1995,	 but	 discussions	 with	 local	 groups	 had	 led	 to	 the	 formation	 of	 the	 requisite	
structures	 through	 which	 the	 credit	 scheme	 would	 be	 implemented,	 and	 training	 had	
been	provided	to	several	women’s	groups.76	
	 Alongside	 these	 technical	 interventions,	Oxfam	had	 also	 helped	 communities	 to	
form	 five	 pastoral	 associations	 (PAs)	 by	 1995.	 To	 do	 so,	 the	 organisation	 brought	
communities	 together	 in	 meetings	 to	 discuss	 their	 development	 needs	 (sometimes	
literally	by	providing	 transport	 to	pastoralists	who	would	not	otherwise	have	made	 the	
meetings).	These	meetings,	at	which	women	and	nomadic	pastoralists	were	encouraged	
to	speak	up,	helped	to	define	the	outputs	for	the	overall	project	and	allowed	the	pastoral	
associations	 to	 take	 the	 initiative	 in	 achieving	 these	 goals.	 Each	 association	 was	 thus	
involved	 in	all	aspects	of	 the	ensuing	project,	managing	essential	 services	and	engaging	
with	 other	 stakeholders:	 they	 identified	 and	 supervised	 the	 daryelles;	 built	 and	
maintained	the	drug	stores	(including	setting	the	pricing	for	essential	drugs	and	operating	
the	bank	account	of	the	revolving	fund);	supervised	the	water	inputs;	and	purchased	and	
distributed	 the	animals	 to	 families	 they	selected	 (with	Oxfam	checks	 to	stop	any	ethnic	
favouritism	or	nepotism).	Importantly,	Oxfam	urged	the	associations	to	form	across	clan	
lines	 in	 an	 effort	 to	 bridge	 the	 ethnic	 polarisation	 of	 the	 region,	 which	 was	 being	
manipulated	 by	 self-interested	 politicians	 and	 was	 causing	 inter-ethnic	 violence	 to	
escalate.	Moreover,	the	organisation	encouraged	(albeit	slowly)	the	equal	representation	
of	women	 in	 these	associations	and	guarded	against	 their	domination	by	 local	elites	by	
helping	members	to	draft	constitutions	that	emphasised	accountability.	Four	larger	local	
organisations	 were	 also	 supported	 by	 the	 project:	 the	 WVG,	 the	 NPHC,	 the	 Wajir	
Association	 for	 the	 Disabled	 (WAD)	 and	 the	Wajir	 Peace	 and	 Development	 Committee	
(WPDC).	 Each	 organisation	 ran	 its	 own	 activities,	 such	 as	 the	 provision	 of	 shelter	 and	
income	generation	for	women	by	making	traditional	Somali	dufful	mats,	the	maintenance	
of	 wells	 and	 the	 improvement	 of	 local	 sanitation,	 education	 on	 disability	 and	 the	
rehabilitation	 of	 disabled	 people	 in	 the	 region,	 and	 the	 creation	 of	 reconciliation	
workshops	and	seminars	on	peace	education.		
	 To	 take	 the	WPDC	 as	 an	 example,	 Oxfam’s	 initial	 approach	was	 to	 support	 the	
work	of	 local	 groups	and	 traditional	 institutions	 in	Wajir	by	arranging	meetings	 such	as	
Women	 for	 Peace,	 Youth	 for	 Peace	 and	 the	 Council	 of	 Elders	 for	 Peace.	 These	 were	
designed	 as	 opportunities	 to	 discuss	 problems	 of	 conflict	 as	 individuals	 or	members	 of	
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groups	that	were	not	clan	based.	The	meetings	were	formalised	in	1995	in	the	WPDC,	a	
sub-committee	 of	 the	 powerful	 District	 Development	 Committee	 (DDC).	 The	 WPDC	
brought	 together	women,	elders,	businessmen	and	young	people	 from	the	district	with	
the	 local	 authorities	 and	 security	 forces	 and	 served	 as	 an	 umbrella	 forum	 for	 the	 co-
ordination	 of	 peace	 work.	 It	 undertook	 research	 on	 historical	 problems,	 linked	 groups	
with	 educational	 institutions	 and	 employment	 opportunities	 and	 encouraged	
communities	 to	 mobilise	 for	 peace.77	Under	 the	 leadership	 of	 the	 DC,	 the	 committee	
combined	traditional	approaches	to	conflict	resolution	with	the	juridical	authority	of	the	
state	 in	order	 to	bring	 together	different	perspectives	on	governance	and	 justice	 into	a	
form	that	would	be	respected	by	a	 large	cross-section	of	society.	As	Birch	notes,	 in	one	
instance	the	government	accepted	the	continuation	of	traditional	symbolic	payments	for	
wrongdoing	 as	 long	 as	 elders	made	 efforts	 to	 locate	 those	 culpable	 and	 take	 them	 to	
court.	 In	 turn,	 the	 elders	 accepted	 their	 responsibility	 for	 as	 long	 as	 the	 police	 did	 not	
enter	 into	communities	 in	an	arbitrary	 fashion	to	 try	 to	 find	 the	culprits.	On	a	separate	
occasion,	 elders	were	 even	 able	 to	 resolve	 a	 dispute	 dating	 back	 to	 the	Shifta	 conflict.	
Oxfam	would	 fund	 the	WPDC	and	meetings	 between	 relevant	 stakeholders	 throughout	
the	duration	of	the	WPDP.78	
	 Meanwhile,	 the	 employment	 of	 former	 government	 staff	 and	 the	 inclusion	 of	
government	officials	in	all	important	discussions	sent	a	signal	to	the	state	that	Oxfam	was	
willing	to	pursue	a	constructive	relationship	at	a	time	when	many	NGOs	were	hostile	to	
the	Moi	regime.	Consequently,	 ‘a	supportive	relationship	was	established	with	the	 local	
administration	 and	 the	 relevant	 GOK	ministries’	 in	Wajir.79	As	 Elmi	 noted	 in	 1995,	 the	
‘deliberate	cultivation	of	 [this]	 relationship…	 is	 [not]	only	 for	coordinator	and	resources	
sharing	 [sic]	 but	 is	 based	 on	 the	 realization	 that	 Oxfam	 or	 any	 single	
organization/programme	for	that	matter	will	never	be	able	to	meet	needs	in	the	district	
and	 therefore	 the	need	 to	 share	 and	 communicate	our	 experiences	 and	 approaches’.80	
Indeed,	 as	 part	 of	 its	 commitment	 to	 influence	 the	 policy	 environment	within	which	 it	
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operated,	in	May	1995	Oxfam	helped	to	create	a	new	coordination	forum	for	the	district	
to	 help	 the	 people	 gain	 access	 to	 government	 representatives.	 The	 District	 Pastoral	
Steering	 Committee	 (DPSC)	 was,	 like	 the	 WPDC,	 a	 sub-committee	 of	 the	 DDC	 and	
received	 representation	 from	 the	 veterinary,	 livestock,	 health,	 agriculture,	 water	 and	
social	development	departments,	along	with	co-ordinators	from	Oxfam	and	other	NGOs	
such	 as	NPHC.	Oxfam	hoped	 that	 the	DPSC	would	help	 to	 influence	 government	policy	
towards	 pastoralists	 by	 providing	 perspectives	 from	 that	 sector,	while	 also	maintaining	
forward	 momentum	 when	 the	 inevitable	 and	 frequent	 changes	 in	 government	 staff	
threatened	to	derail	progress.	The	DPSC	would,	moreover,	provide	pastoral	associations	
with	 support	 and	 training,	 giving	 the	 latter	 an	 opportunity	 to	 voice	 their	 concerns	 to	
government	staff,	who	would	hopefully	transfer	the	message	up	the	chain	to	the	DDC.81	
Furthermore,	Oxfam	encouraged	the	pastoral	associations	to	combine	to	form	a	District	
Pastoral	 Association	 (DPA),	 which	 would	 increase	 the	 volume	 of	 their	 demands	 and	
recommendations.	
	 In	 keeping	 with	 Leach’s	 advocacy	 of	 a	 ‘more	 holistic	 analysis	 of	 the	 nature	 of	
vulnerability’	 in	 Kenya,	 the	 WPDP	 thus	 recognised	 that	 building	 people’s	 material	
resources	 would	 only	 prove	 useful	 if	 their	 capacity	 to	 sustain	 those	 resources	 was	
strengthened;	 that	 in	 places	 of	 acute	poverty	 focused	 interventions	may	 satisfy	 donors	
but	 do	 little	 to	 alleviate	 suffering	 since	 they	 are	 often	 undermined	 by	 failure	 in	 other	
sectors;	and	that	 linking	 interventions	 together	means	 they	can	begin	 to	subsidise	each	
other	over	time.	Together	with	 its	 ‘transformative’	approach	–	the	‘intention	to	address	
policy	 and	 institutional	 change	 as	 well	 as	 service	 delivery’	 –	 these	 factors	 were	 an	
important	part	of	the	reason	why	DfID	(then	ODA)	offered	to	provide	75	per	cent	of	the	
funding	 for	 the	 first	phase	and	90	per	cent	 thereafter.82	‘The	key	 thing	which	 the	Wajir	
project	offered’,	noted	one	DfID	official,	 ‘was	 [the	opportunity]	 to	get	 a	better	balance	
between	delivering	 tangible	benefits	 to	poor	people	 and	achieving	wider-level	 change’.	
Significantly,	this	was	the	first	time	that	Oxfam	had	received	donor	support	for	 its	 long-
term	 work	 as	 opposed	 to	 emergency	 interventions.	 Also	 unique	 was	 the	 scale	 of	 the	
funding:	the	budget	for	the	first	phase	was	£1,136,384;	for	the	second	phase	the	budget	
was	£1,113,832;	and	for	the	final	phase	it	was	£911,024.83	
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	 At	the	close	of	the	first	phase	of	the	project	in	1997,	reviews	undertaken	by	Oxfam	
and	external	consultants	were	largely	positive.	One	noted	that	the	project		
	
improved	 the	 supply	 of	 human	 and	 animal	 health	 care	 services	 to	 nomadic	
pastoralists;	provided	credit	facilities	and	livestock	to	women’s	groups	and	destitute	
pastoral	 families;	 improved	 the	 quality	 and	 availability	 of	 education	 services	 to	
pastoral	families;	enabled	private	and	communal	water	supplies	to	be	developed	and	
maintained;	contributed	to	greater	security,	law	and	order	in	the	area;	and	sought	to	
influence	 the	 wider	 national	 policy	 and	 legislative	 framework	 in	 order	 to	 create	 a	
more	enabling	environment	for	a	thriving	and	resilient	pastoral	economy.84		
	
Indeed,	in	partnership	with	government	medical	workers,	the	full	cohort	of	daryelles	–	80	
in	total	–	had	been	trained	by	1997,	along	with	60	traditional	birth	attendants.	Not	only	
did	 this	 mean	 that	 medical	 assistance	 was	 at	 most	 half	 a	 day’s	 walk	 away,	 it	 also	
encouraged	government	staff	to	recognise	that	training	and	related	tasks	formed	part	of	
their	 responsibilities	 rather	 than	 an	 invitation	 to	 charge	 ‘rents’.	 Consequently,	 direct	
channels	of	communication	were	established	between	pastoralists	and	representatives	of	
the	 state.	Access	 to	water	 had	 also	been	 improved	by	 the	 completion	of	 200	wells,	 50	
shallow	pans	and	three	new	boreholes,	allowing	pastoralists	to	remain	in	the	wet	grazing	
area	(as	opposed	to	permanent	water	points	which	were	liable	to	degrade)	for	two	extra	
months.	 In	 terms	 of	 income	 generation,	women’s	 groups	were	 receiving	 repayment	 of	
around	 102	 per	 cent	 of	 the	 loans	 distributed,	 generating	more	 than	 3,000	 shillings	 per	
woman,	per	year.	Meanwhile,	restocking	reached	close	to	700	households	–	93	per	cent	
of	whom	were	re-instated	 into	pastoral	society	–	and	of	 the	500	destitute	 families	who	
would	not	have	been	restocked	through	traditional	means,	only	24	per	cent	continued	to	
receive	 food	aid,	compared	to	63	per	cent	outside	project	 sites.85	Those	 in	project	 sites	
also	 lost	 fewer	 stock	 (around	 18	 per	 cent	 of	 their	 holdings	 –	 worth	 Ksh.	 37,233)	 than	
those	 outside	 (around	 29	 per	 cent	 –	 Ksh.	 58,951),	 and	 22,000	 fewer	 animals	 died	
compared	 with	 non-project	 sites	 due	 to	 the	 correct	 use	 of	 quality	 drugs.	 In	 addition,	
project	 beneficiaries	 consumed	 65	 per	 cent	more	milk	 than	 those	 outside	 the	 project,	
with	86	per	cent	reporting	that	they	were	better	off	in	terms	of	food	consumption	thanks	
to	 the	 input	 of	 credit.	 Unsurprisingly,	 households	 in	 project	 sites	 reported	 that	 their	
quality	 of	 life	 and	 ability	 to	 withstand	 drought	 had	 improved,	 contrasting	 with	 non-
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beneficiaries,	 who	 thought	 the	 opposite.86	Crucially,	 all	 of	 this	 was	 achieved	 with	 only	
very	minimal	contact	with	 the	communities	since	 the	pastoral	associations	were	mostly	
very	effective:	as	Leach	recalled,	‘the	whole	project	was	about	galvanising	local	action	and	
providing	the	opportunities	for	people	to	take	that	action	on	their	own	or	in	conjunction	
with	formal	institutions’.87	
	 Somewhat	 inevitably,	 however,	 the	 creation	 of	 pastoral	 associations	 threatened	
to	 generate	 tension	 with	 local	 chiefs,	 who	 saw	 their	 control	 over	 external	 resources	
reduced	 and	 felt	 that	 the	balance	of	 power	was	 being	 tilted	 towards	 local	 people.	 The	
Kutulo	PA,	for	example,	faced	difficulties	when	the	local	chief	set	the	membership	fee	at	
Ksh.	1,000	in	order	to	discourage	anyone	other	than	himself	and	local	shop	owners	from	
joining.	 His	 was	 a	 deliberate	 attempt	 to	 subvert	 the	 purpose	 of	 the	 PA	 into	 a	 profit-
making	 venture	 by	 limiting	 participation	 to	 those	who	 supported	his	 aim	of	 controlling	
the	 drugs	 coming	 from	 Oxfam	 (which	 would	 have	 been	 sold	 by	 members	 of	 the	
association	at	a	profit	to	poor	pastoralists).	When	Oxfam	called	a	meeting	to	discuss	the	
issue,	it	was	revealed	that	the	PA	had	only	12	members;	rangeland	pastoralists	also	made	
it	clear	that	they	had	not	been	receiving	the	designated	share	of	government	maize	and	
other	 food	 relief	because	of	 the	chief’s	manipulations.	As	a	 result,	 fresh	elections	were	
held	 to	 determine	 the	 proper	 membership	 of	 the	 PA;	 but	 thereafter	 the	 chief	 did	
everything	in	his	power	to	stop	the	association	from	functioning.	First,	he	demanded	that	
the	drug	store	be	built	next	to	his	office	(in	order	to	both	gain	access	to	the	drugs	and	so	
that	he	could	use	the	new	building	as	an	upgrade	on	his	office);	when	the	newly	elected	
PA	 refused	 and	 suggested	 a	 new	 plot,	 he	 rejected	 the	 idea.	 Only	 when	 the	 chief	 was	
arrested	and	imprisoned	for	a	variety	of	misdemeanours	could	the	association	build	the	
drug	store	in	their	preferred	location.	Upon	his	release,	the	chief	would	continue	to	forbid	
the	PA	to	meet	 in	his	absence,	and	he	manipulated	elections	(often	holding	them	more	
than	once)	to	place	his	favoured	candidates	as	chairmen	of	the	association.	Predictably,	
Kutulo	was	the	poorest	performing	of	the	five	associations	established	in	the	first	phase	
of	the	project.	The	other	PAs	–	Khorof	Harar,	Riba,	Wajir	Bor	and	Wargadud	–	performed	
better,	 in	 part	 because	while	 there	were	 sometimes	 tensions	with	 chiefs	 over	 finances	
and	elections,	the	latter	were	either	much	less	involved	in	the	day	to	day	running	of	the	
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associations	or	were	newly	appointed	and	 thus	 less	 threatened	 than	 the	 chief	 involved	
with	 Kutulo.	 Furthermore,	 the	 power	 of	 chiefs	 declined	 following	 the	 advent	 of	
multipartyism	as	clan	leaders	promised	to	bring	far	more	voters	to	the	polling	booths;	this	
had	the	effect	of	boosting	the	confidence	of	PAs	vis	à	vis	the	chiefs.88	
	 Yet	at	the	same	time	as	multipartyism	reduced	the	power	of	chiefs,	it	also	had	the	
unwelcome	 effect	 of	 encouraging	 MPs	 to	 pressure	 the	 provincial	 administration	 into	
creating	new	 locations	or	 sub-locations,	 thereby	placing	 increased	strain	on	 the	already	
fragile	environment.	The	rationale	behind	the	creation	of	new	locations	was	political,	for	
each	new	administrative	unit	came	with	a	plethora	of	official	positions	–	chief,	assistant	
chief	and	administrative	police	 for	example	–	 that	could	be	distributed	as	patronage	 to	
newly	 powerful	 clan	 leaders	 in	 return	 for	 votes.	 Hence,	 between	 1992	 and	 1996	 the	
number	of	 locations	and	sub-locations	 increased	 from	62	 to	170.	But	whereas	previous	
settlements	had	often	followed	the	discovery	or	establishment	of	new	water	points,	new	
locations	 were	 in	 unsuitable	 regions,	 and	 so	 required	 external	 intervention	 to	 drill	
boreholes;	 these	 boreholes	 then	 reduced	 the	 availability	 of	 pasture	 for	 nomadic	
pastoralists.89	When	Oxfam	encouraged	PAs	 to	 challenge	 these	new	 locations,	MPs	and	
chiefs	complained	to	the	Provincial	Commissioner	that	the	organisation	was	setting	up	an	
alternative	government	in	Wajir,	forcing	Oxfam	to	step	back.90	Unfortunately,	therefore,	
self-interest	 combined	 with	 the	 patronage	 system	 and	 the	 pressure	 to	 deliver	
Parliamentary	 seats	 for	 KANU	 (and	 Presidential	 votes	 for	 Moi)	 to	 ensure	 that	 upward	
accountability	 was	 more	 important	 for	 local	 chiefs	 and	 MPs	 than	 was	 downward	
accountability	to	their	constituents.	Accordingly,	the	second	phase	of	the	project	not	only	
sought	to	achieve	much	the	same	outputs	as	the	first	phase,	but	over	a	much	larger	area	
–	Wajir	district	 (100,000	beneficiaries)	as	opposed	to	Wajir	Bor	and	Wajir	Town	(40,000	
beneficiaries)	 –	 but	 also	 sharpened	 its	 focus	 on	 increasing	 the	 participation	 of	
communities	 in	 ‘the	 institutions	which	 influence	 their	 lives’.	As	 the	project	manager	 for	
this	 phase	 noted,	 ‘Oxfam	 is	 only	 temporary	 here	 –	 it	 is	 the	 government	 that	will	 last…	
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between	1996	and	2002	the	number	increased	from	45	to	71.	New	boreholes	were	often	drilled	using	
‘emergency’	funds	from	UNICEF,	World	Vision	and	the	World	Bank.	R.	Walker	and	H.	Omar,	‘Pastoralists	
Under	Pressure:	The	Politics	of	Sedentarisation	and	Marginalisation	in	Northeast	Kenya’,	held	at	Oxfam	
Office,	Nairobi	(2002).	
90	It	was	difficult	for	pastoralists	themselves	to	successfully	oppose	the	new	water	points	because	
opposition	could	be	painted	as	hostility	to	the	incumbent	MP	or	the	particular	clan	or	sub-clan	that	stood	to	
benefit	from	the	new	location.	Interview	with	author	no.	VIII,	6	November,	2014.	
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[but]	we	want	 the	government	 to	be	as	 responsive	as	possible,	 to	ensure	 that	all	 these	
things	which	communities	have	started	are	supported’.91	
	 Thus	Oxfam	 continued	 to	 promote	 the	 DPA	 and	 the	 PSC,	 funding	 a	 visit	 by	 the	
former	to	Nairobi	to	discuss	their	work	with	senior	staff	in	central	government.	The	latter,	
meanwhile,	 is	 generally	 regarded	 to	 have	 had	 an	 effect	 on	 the	 DDC	 and	 its	 District	
Development	 Plans:	 as	 Birch	 notes,	 while	 the	 plan	 for	 development	 in	Wajir	 between	
1994	and	1996	repeated	the	traditional	caricatures	of	pastoralists	–	that	they	are	unable	
to	manage	stock	levels	or	the	environment	–	and	concluded	that	their	‘migratory	nature’	
is	a	major	 ‘constraining	 factor	 to	development	 in	 the	district’,	 the	plan	 that	 followed	 in	
1997	 showed	 a	 different	 attitude.	 It	 highlighted	 instead	 the	 need	 to	manage	 recurrent	
drought	situations,	insecurity	and	the	provision	of	credit,	and	referred	to	the	importance	
of	 measuring	 the	 ecological	 sustainability	 of	 schemes	 to	 promote	 irrigation,	 water	
development	and	settlement.92	Meanwhile,	 the	WPDC	was	soon	scaled	up	to	become	a	
national	 initiative	 –	 coordinated	 by	 Oxfam	 in	 collaboration	 with	 the	 Office	 of	 the	
President	 and	 other	 agencies	 involved	 in	 peace	 work	 –	 and	 approaches	 developed	 in	
Wajir	were	used	 to	 great	 effect	 to	 influence	national	 policy	 on	 conflict.93	Together,	 the	
WPDC,	 DPA	 and	 PSC	 helped	 to	 ‘institutionalise’	 Oxfam’s	 approach	 to	 pastoral	
development	in	Wajir	and	guarded	against	individual	biases	and	the	frequent	turnover	of	
government	staff.	
	 Regrettably,	 the	 second	 phase	 of	 the	 WPDP	 was	 undermined	 by	 the	 onset	 of	
critical	 emergencies,	 including	 drought	 in	 1996-97,	 flooding	 in	 1998,	 and	 drought	 and	
conflict	 in	 2000.	 Following	 the	 first	 two	of	 these	 emergencies,	 a	 population	of	 close	 to	
200,000	people	required	rations	and	medical	assistance	to	combat	a	severe	outbreak	of	
malaria	and	malnutrition.	At	the	same	time,	between	60	and	80	per	cent	of	shoats,	30	to	
50	per	cent	of	camels	and	ten	to	15	per	cent	of	cattle	had	died.	Much	of	the	remaining	
agricultural	 land	 and	 crops	 had	 also	 been	 ruined	 by	 the	 floods,	 as	 had	water	 supplies,	
which	 were	 contaminated	 by	 floodwater	 and	 sewerage.94	Oxfam	 first	 responded	 with	
food	 relief	 for	 around	 30,000	 people	 from	 September	 to	 December	 1996,	 purchasing	
1,200	 tonnes	of	maize,	240	 tonnes	of	beans	and	60	 tonnes	of	vegetable	oil	 locally	with	
funding	from	the	ODA.	When	the	short	rains	failed	in	1997,	the	project	was	expanded	to	
																																																						
91	Quoted	in	Birch	and	Shuria,	Perspectives	on	Pastoral	Development,	p.	84.	
92	Birch	and	Shuria,	Perspectives	on	Pastoral	Development,	p.	78.	
93	The	following	section	describes	this	in	greater	detail.	
94	‘Tour	Report’,	OxA,	MS.	Oxfam	PRG/5/5/8	Folder	3:	Kenya,	1993-1998.	
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reach	 105,000	 people	 (4,200	 tonnes	 of	maize,	 640	 tonnes	 of	 beans,	 210	 tonnes	 of	 oil)	
with	support	 from	WFP.	Overall	expenditure	 in	1996-97	was	over	£4.6	million.	 In	1998,	
Oxfam	 expanded	 its	 operation	 further	 to	 deal	 with	 flooding,	 reaching	 over	 220,000	
people	 in	Wajir	 and	 neighbouring	Mandera.95	The	 scale	 of	 the	 relief	 effort	 raised	 fears	
among	 staff	 concerning	 the	 ‘potential	 for	 official	 interference	 with	 Oxfam	 work’;	 but	
there	 were	 no	 recorded	 instances	 of	 government	 meddling. 96 	Instead,	 the	 local	
administration	was	mostly	 concerned	with	 keeping	 control	of	 the	 ‘corrupted’,	 and	 thus	
‘insufficient’,	distribution	effort	in	Wajir	town.97	By	contrast,	reviews	of	the	Oxfam	effort	
would	 note	 that	 the	 relief	 food	 became	 a	 critical	 component	 of	 the	 local	 diet	 and	
contributed	 to	 a	 fall	 in	 malnutrition	 rates	 during	 1997.	 The	 food	 distribution	 also	
stabilised	food	prices,	ensuring	that	fewer	livestock	were	killed	or	sold.98	
	 Inevitably,	however,	these	responses	stretched	the	Oxfam	team	–	already	working	
on	 a	 similar	 scale	 relief	 project	 in	 Turkana	 –	 and	 ‘significantly	 slowed	 the	 pace	 of	 the	
development	 programme’	 in	 Wajir	 because	 certain	 activities	 such	 as	 restocking,	 PA	
meetings	 and	 training	 were	 not	 possible.99	Nonetheless,	 the	 WPDP	 retained	 forward	
momentum:	Oxfam’s	1998	annual	report	notes	that	122	daryelles	and	87	TBAs	had	been	
trained	in	the	nine	locations	in	which	the	organisation	was	now	operating,	while	65	new	
wells	and	five	new	drug	stores	were	constructed	under	the	watch	of	four	new	PAs.	The	
credit	scheme,	meanwhile,	had	increased	its	reach	to	180	women’s	groups.100	Moreover,	
Oxfam	 staff	 made	 efforts	 to	 integrate	 the	 emergency	 response	 with	 the	 WPDP:	 PAs	
helped	 to	 design	 the	 food	 distribution	method	 (minimal	 targeting	was	 used,	 similar	 to	
previous	Oxfam	interventions	in	Turkana	and	Samburu,	in	order	to	support	livelihoods	as	
well	as	save	 lives),	 register	beneficiaries	and	monitor	the	distribution.	This	ensured	that	
communities	were	 active	 participants	 in	 the	 emergency	 response	 rather	 than	 passively	
																																																						
95	‘Annual	Report,	1998-1999:	Orienting	Programme	Action	towards	Policy	Work	for	Greater	Impact’,	April,	
1999,	OxA,	MS.	Oxfam	PRG/3/4/12/13:	Annual	Report	1998-1999,	‘Orientating	Programme	Action	Towards	
Policy	Work	for	Greater	Impact’.	
96	‘Annual	Report,	1996-1997:	Consolidating	Oxfam	Strategic	Directions	in	Kenya’,	June,	1997,	OxA,	MS.	
Oxfam	PRG/3/4/12/10:	Annual	Report	1996-1997,	‘Consolidating	Oxfam	Strategic	Directions	in	Kenya’.	
97	In	Wajir	town	the	administration’s	distribution	effort	was	‘sporadic,	insufficient	[and]	corrupted	by	the	
fact	that	council	officers	and	chiefs	may	be	assumed	to	be	a)	using	it	for	political	ends	and	b)	skimming	in	
the	process’.	‘Tour	Report’,	OxA,	MS.	Oxfam	PRG/5/5/8	Folder	3:	Kenya,	1993-1998;	Interview	with	author	
no.	X,	3	January,	2015.	
98	M.	Buchanan-Smith	and	D.	Barton,	‘Evaluation	of	the	Wajir	Relief	Programme,	1996-98	(1999),	Oxfam	
Archive,	Lavington,	Nairobi.	
99	‘Annual	Report,	1996-1997:	Consolidating	Oxfam	Strategic	Directions	in	Kenya’,	June,	1997,	OxA,	MS.	
Oxfam	PRG/3/4/12/10:	Annual	Report	1996-1997,	‘Consolidating	Oxfam	Strategic	Directions	in	Kenya’.	
100	‘Annual	Report,	1998-1999:	Orienting	Programme	Action	towards	Policy	Work	for	Greater	Impact’,	April,	
1999,	OxA,	MS.	Oxfam	PRG/3/4/12/13:	Annual	Report	1998-1999,	‘Orientating	Programme	Action	Towards	
Policy	Work	for	Greater	Impact’.	
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receiving	 aid.101 	Indeed,	 as	 a	 result	 of	 their	 recommendations,	 emergency	 livestock	
purchases	and	re-distribution,	food-for-work	and	cash-for-work	projects	accompanied	the	
food	distribution	efforts.102	
	 The	second	and	third	phases	of	the	WPDP	thus	tried	to	retain	consistency	with	the	
underlying	aims	of	the	project	and	the	Kenya	programme	as	a	whole.	During	each	phase	
Oxfam	 sought	 to	 advocate	 for	 the	 community	 management	 of	 resources,	 sensitive	
conflict	management	and	the	pastoral	associations	themselves,	while	also	pushing	for	a	
national	 pastoral	 development	 policy	 that	 would	 enable	 the	 local	 structures	 it	 had	
created	in	Wajir	to	flourish,	thereby	empowering	pastoralists	to	take	control	of	their	own	
development.	The	WPDP	would	expand	horizontally	 in	the	 later	years	of	the	1990s	as	 it	
was	 integrated	 within	 Oxfam’s	 broader	 national	 pastoral	 development	 programme	 in	
Kenya.	 The	 knowledge	 and	 understanding	 gained	 over	 the	 first	 two	 phases	 was,	
therefore,	 transferred	 to	 Turkana	 and	 Samburu:	 experience	 with	 conflict	 in	Wajir	 was	
used	in	both	locations	in	1998,	for	instance,	while	in	Turkana	Oxfam	focused	on	building	
community	 organisations	 similar	 to	 the	 PAs	 in	 order	 that	 the	 communities	 could	 take	
responsibility	 for	 their	 own	 development	 needs.103	The	 WPDP	 also	 helped	 to	 shape	
Oxfam’s	East	African	Regional	Pastoral	Programme	(EARPP).	The	EARPP	followed	closely	
the	 model	 of	 the	 WPDP,	 seeking	 to	 build	 the	 capacity	 of	 pastoral	 populations	 in	
Ngorongoro,	Karamoja,	Wajir	and	Turkana	using	PAs	to	improve	animal	health	and	water	
supplies,	 to	 facilitate	 the	 improvement	 of	 pastoral	 livelihoods	 via	 restocking	 and	 credit	
inputs,	 and	 to	 increase	 pastoralists’	 access	 to	 basic	 services.	 Channelling	 these	 efforts	
vertically,	 Oxfam	 lobbied	 East	 African	 governments	 on	 issues	 of	 representation,	 land	
rights,	peace	and	security,	and	support	to	pastoral	livelihoods	and	hoped	to	encourage	a	
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favourable	policy	context	across	East	Africa.104	Hence,	while	the	‘tactical’	objective	of	the	
Wajir	 project	 –	 building	 representative	 community	 organisations	 –	 remained	 constant,	
the	 ‘strategic’	 objective	 –	 for	 these	 organisations	 to	 become	 institutionalised	 and	 to	
define	and	drive	the	future	of	pastoralism	–	was	expanded	in	scope.	The	success	of	this	
endeavour	 in	 Kenya	 would,	 to	 a	 certain	 extent,	 rely	 on	 Oxfam’s	 success	 in	 a	 related	
enterprise:	the	Arid	Lands	Resource	Management	Project.	
	
	
	
‘A GOLDEN WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY’:  THE ARID LANDS RESOURCE 
MANAGEMENT PROJECT (ALRMP) 
 
Oxfam	 had	 an	 opportunity	 to	 engage	 the	 Kenya	 government	 directly	 as	 regards	
pastoralism	 through	 the	 Arid	 Lands	 Resource	 Management	 Project	 (ALRMP),	 a	 World	
Bank	 initiative	 located	 at	 the	 heart	 of	 government,	 in	 the	Office	 of	 the	 President.	 The	
ALRMP	 had	 three	 components:	 drought	 management,	 livestock	 marketing	 and	
infrastructure,	and	community	development.	Oxfam	first	worked	with	the	project	in	1993,	
when	 it	 was	 known	 as	 the	 Emergency	 Drought	 Recovery	 Programme	 (EDRP).	 Running	
from	 1993	 to	 1996,	 the	 EDRP	 sought	 to	 stimulate	 recovery	 from	 the	 1992	 drought	 by	
funding	the	provision	of	livestock	drugs,	spare	parts	for	boreholes,	road	building	and	the	
rehabilitation	of	health	facilities.105	At	first,	the	relationship	between	Oxfam	and	the	EDRP	
was	ad	hoc,	as	was	the	small	amount	of	funding	Oxfam	provided	to	the	scheme,	but	three	
things	soon	pulled	Oxfam	closer	to	the	programme.	First,	 the	overlap	between	much	of	
what	 the	 EDRP	 sought	 to	do	 across	 the	 arid	 lands	 in	 Kenya	 and	Oxfam’s	work	 in	Wajir	
(including	 conflict	 management,	 improving	 access	 to	 basic	 services,	 and	 building	 the	
capacity	 of	 government	 institutions	 and	 pastoral	 associations)	 convinced	 Oxfam	 the	
project	was	worthwhile.	Second,	the	close	personal	relationship	between	Mohamed	Elmi	
and	Mahboub	Maalim	–	the	coordinator	of	the	EDRP	and	later	the	ALRMP	–	opened	doors	
for	 the	organisation.	Maalim	had	worked	as	 the	District	Drought	Co-ordinator	 for	Wajir	
when	Oxfam’s	WPDP	was	first	established,	and	Elmi’s	positive	moves	towards	the	district	
authorities	meant	that	the	two	formed	a	level	of	trust	not	often	found	between	NGO	and	
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government	 staff.	 When	 Maalim	 was	 promoted	 to	 the	 Office	 of	 the	 President,	 he	
established	 the	 ALRMP	 and	 looked	 to	 Elmi	 to	 support	 the	 initiative	 from	 the	 non-
government	sector.	Third,	and	most	importantly,	the	location	of	the	EDRP	and	ALRMP	in	
the	Office	of	the	President	meant	the	programme	was	important	strategically	for	Oxfam’s	
lobbying	 and	 advocacy	 efforts.	 The	 ALRMP	 thus	 offered	 an	 exceptional	 and	 unusual	
opportunity	for	partnership	with	the	state	–	which	Oxfam	considered	to	be	the	‘key	and	
meaningful	 agent	 for	 real	 change’	 in	 Kenya	 –	 at	 a	 time	 when	 most	 NGOs	 were	 in	
confrontation	with	 it.	 The	 project	 provided	 an	 entry	 point	 for	 Oxfam	 into	 government	
structures	and	‘an	avenue	to	champion	its	cause,	mission	and	values’;	it	was,	according	to	
an	Oxfam	case	study	of	the	initiative,	a	‘golden	window	of	opportunity	to	create	a	cultural	
connection	 into	government…	[to]	pilot	a	new	model	of	government	operation	and	[to]	
influence	the	progress	of	development	in	the	region	on	the	largest	scale’.106	Through	the	
ALRMP,	Oxfam	set	out	to	achieve	two	goals:	firstly,	it	wanted	to	make	empowerment	of	
communities	 (though	 without	 using	 the	 term)	 ‘politically	 palatable	 in	 turbulent	 local	
politics’;	 secondly,	 it	 sought	 to	 place	 government	 at	 the	 centre	 of	 development	
interventions	as	the	 ‘primary	duty	bearer’	 for	 its	citizens.107	Both	objectives	to	a	certain	
extent	required	‘an	ever-closer	working	relationship	with	the	GoK’.108		
	 Oxfam	funding	to	the	project	was	limited,	however,	at	around	£300,000	per	year.	
While	not	trivial,	the	sum	pales	 into	near	 insignificance	when	compared	with	the	World	
Bank	 contribution	 to	 the	 project	 (around	 $12	 million	 per	 year).	 Yet	 the	 World	 Bank	
contribution	 was	 mainly	 financial	 and	 linked	 with	 broader	 budget	 support	 initiatives;	
Oxfam’s	focus,	on	the	other	hand,	was	on	the	practicalities	of	 institution	building	 in	the	
arid	lands,	as	Elmi	and	Maalim	sought	to	make	use	of	the	lessons	learned	during	the	early	
stages	of	the	WPDP.109	The	organisation	also	sought	to	engage	 local	stakeholders	 in	the	
development	 process	 and	 worked	 closely	 with	 some	 of	 the	 best	 civil	 servants	 in	 the	
country	 (hand-picked	 from	 other	 departments)	 to	 formulate	 policy	 and	 create	
committees	 and	 forums	 to	 institutionalise	 local	 community	 involvement	 in	 the	
development	process.	 Indeed,	with	the	blessing	of	 the	ALRMP,	Oxfam	helped	to	 form	a	
number	 of	 pastoralist	 institutions	 that	 would	 influence	 the	 trajectory	 of	 pastoral	
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development	 in	 Kenya	 over	 the	 next	 decade.	 Most	 notable	 are	 the	 Kenya	 Livestock	
Marketing	Council,	the	Pastoralists’	Thematic	Group	and	the	Kenya	Food	Security	Steering	
Group.	To	deal	with	each	in	turn:	the	Kenya	Livestock	Marketing	Council	was	an	umbrella	
body	for	livestock	marketing	associations	created	in	ten	arid	districts	as	a	result	of	a	series	
of	 consultative	 regional	workshops	 to	 review	 the	 livestock	 sector	 initiated	by	ALRMP	 in	
1998.	 It	 provided	 a	 structure	 through	 which	 pastoralists	 could	 not	 only	 access	 the	
national	market	 in	 livestock	–	enabling	 them	to	sell	 stock	more	easily	 in	 times	of	 stress	
(and	without	the	manipulations	of	local	traders)	–	but	also	influence	livestock	marketing	
policy.110	The	government	was	persuaded	to	create	these	livestock	marketing	associations	
by	the	Pastoralists’	Thematic	Group,	an	Oxfam	initiative	that	empowered	pastoralists	to	
contribute	 to	 the	 Poverty	 Reduction	 Strategy	 Paper,	 a	 15-year	 blueprint	 for	 national	
development.111	As	a	review	of	the	Regional	Pastoral	Programme	noted,	‘engagement	in	
the	PRSP	has	been	an	important	policy	success	for	Oxfam.	The	interim	version	of	the	PRSP	
made	only	passing	references	to	pastoralist	concerns…	[but	after	work	by	Oxfam	and	the	
PTG]	for	the	first	time	a	national	plan	has	included	pastoral	issues	from	the	perspectives	
of	the	pastoralists	themselves’	and	‘issues	highlighted	by	the	group	have	been	reflected	in	
the	PRSP	document’.112	Meanwhile,	 the	Kenya	Food	Security	Steering	group	would	help	
to	 institutionalise	 drought	 management	 practices	 as	 opposed	 to	 ‘eleventh	 hour’	
emergency	 relief,	which	 came	 too	 late	 in	 the	drought	 cycle	 –	 after	 the	 socio-economic	
system	of	the	area	had	already	collapsed	–	meaning	all	that	was	left	to	do	was	hand	out	
food.113	Once	 Oxfam’s	 lobbying	 on	 this	 issue	 caught	 the	 ‘favourable	 attention	 of	 the	
President’,	drought	 contingency	 funds	were	 set	up	 in	 threatened	districts	and	a	district	
level	early	warning	and	rapid	response	system	was	established.114	Moreover,	when	relief	
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efforts	were	unavoidable,	the	organisation	convinced	the	government	and	WFP	to	adopt	
the	 community	 based	 food	 aid	 targeting	 method	 pioneered	 by	 Oxfam	 in	 Turkana,	
Samburu	 and	Wajir	 in	 the	 early	 1990s.	 In	 fact,	 the	 KFFSG	would	 replace	 the	WFP	 food	
balance	sheet	–	which	originally	worked	only	with	the	UN	and	NGOs	–	with	a	system	that	
placed	 the	 government	 at	 the	 centre	 of	 relief	 operations	while	 utilising	 the	 local	 level	
expertise	 of	 NGOs	 to	 help	 with	 targeting.115	It	 was	 widely	 acknowledged	 that	 ‘these	
outcomes	would	not	have	occurred	without	Oxfam	advocacy	and	lobbying’	and	the	‘close	
collaboration	between	Oxfam	and	especially	the	ALRMP	in	the	Office	of	the	President’.116		
	 Oxfam	reported	proudly	that	 it	had	built	up	a	 level	of	 ‘credibility	and	trust’	with	
the	 government	 as	 regards	 pastoralism	 by	 working	 with	 the	 ALRMP,	 and	 it	 was	
recognised	by	the	Office	of	the	President	as	the	‘leading	non-governmental	organisation	
in	 drought	management’.	 This	 ensured	 that	 its	 views	 on	 a	 range	 of	 issues	 were	 taken	
seriously	 and	 that	 its	 staff	 had	 ‘access	 to	 high-level	 decision	 makers’,	 who	 were	
‘demonstrating	 a	 greater…	 commitment	 to,	 and	 understanding	 of,	 issues	 of	 pastoral	
development’.117	The	test	of	Oxfam’s	 influence	came	in	1999,	when	drought	hit	the	arid	
lands.	For	 its	part,	 the	organisation	 implemented	a	Drought	Mitigation	Programme	at	a	
cost	 of	 around	 £1	 million,	 ensuring	 the	 availability	 of	 water	 for	 620,000	 people	 in	
Turkana,	Moyale,	 Isiolo	and	Wajir	by	improving	borehole	infrastructure	and	other	water	
facilities,	 creating	 contingency	 boreholes	 and	 tankering	water	 to	 areas	 in	 need.	 Oxfam	
also	ran	an	emergency	livestock	purchase	scheme,	buying	weak	animals	with	little	market	
value	and	distributing	the	meat	back	to	the	poorest	pastoralists.	As	a	result	of	the	project,	
livestock	 losses	were	 less	than	ten	per	cent	 in	most	areas	–	as	opposed	to	60	or	70	per	
cent	in	1996/97.	Notably,	however,	reviews	of	the	programme	reported	that	the	general	
situation	had	benefited	substantially	 from	the	ALRMP’s	 lobbying	efforts	around	drought	
management,	relief	targeting	and	early	warning	systems.	For	the	first	time	the	‘mistrust	
between	 the	 government	 on	 the	 one	 side	 and	 other	 stakeholders…	 on	 the	 other,	with	
regard	 to	 the	 approach	 to	 food	 insecurity…	 has	 been	 waning	 as	 dialogue	 through	
different	 forums	 such	 as	 the	 Kenya	 Food	 Security	 Steering	 Group	 has	 been	 rising’.	
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Crucially,	 while	 previous	 drought	 interventions	 saw	 donors	 and	NGOs	 adopt	 ‘a	 parallel	
relief	 delivery	 system	 to	 that	 of	 the	 government’	 because	 they	 did	 not	 trust	 the	
government	 to	 implement	an	objective	 relief	 intervention,	 the	work	of	Oxfam	and	DfID	
alongside	 the	 government,	 ‘to	 influence	 its	 decisions	 and	 policies	 from	within’,	 meant	
that	the	government	and	donors	eventually	agreed	to	combine	their	relief	contributions	
(mainly	maize	and	beans)	and	distribute	relief	through	a	single	pipeline.	This	was	a	major	
departure	 from	 the	 system	used	 in	1996/97,	when	 the	government	used	 the	provincial	
administration	 to	 distribute	 food	 relief	 based	 on	 considerations	 other	 than	 technical	
information	 available	 from	 the	 various	 early	 warning	 systems.118	A	 former	 Oxfam	 staff	
member	who	was	present	 for	both	emergencies	 recalled	 that	previously	around	half	of	
their	 time	 was	 spent	 trying	 to	 get	 the	 government	 to	 accept	 the	 need	 to	 distribute	
according	to	objective	need	rather	than	politics:		
	
[The	 government’s]	 primary	 impulse	 is	 political…	 [their]	 understanding	 of	 the	
purpose	of	politics	 is…	 to	negotiate	a	 share	of	 the	 spoils…	The	pressure	 to	allocate	
relief	to	places	that	didn’t	really	need	it	was	[acute]…	The	government	official	is	not	
going	 to	 agree	 that	 some	 districts	 will	 have	 no	 relief…	 that’s	 not	 politically	
sustainable…	All	constituencies	must	get	an	equal	amount	of	support	because	it	is	a	
public	 good…	 even	 if	 it’s	 100	 bags	 of	 beans	 given	 into	 the	 care	 of	 an	 MP	 to	 be	
distributed	–	obviously	completely	clientelist	stuff	–	they	just	need	to	do	something,	
otherwise	they	can’t	do	anything…119	
	
The	shift	towards	a	combined	pipeline	for	relief	delivery	was	thus	a	significant	departure	
on	behalf	of	the	government	and	donor	organisations,	and	was	based	to	a	large	extent	on	
Oxfam	 and	 DfID’s	 argument	 that	 ‘in	 the	 long	 term,	 the	 government	 of	 the	 day	 in	 any	
country	 must	 be	 responsible…	 feed	 its	 people	 and…	 ensure	 that	 none	 of	 its	 citizens	
succumbs	 to	 the	 debilitating	 impacts	 of	 famine	 and	 destitution’.120	To	 be	 clear,	 the	
government	was	somewhat	forced	to	the	table	by	its	perilous	economic	situation,	which	
rendered	impossible	any	single-handed	response	to	the	drought	crisis.	The	state	needed	
the	support	of	other	stakeholders	and	was	pressed	by	Oxfam	and	the	ALRMP	(along	with	
reformers	 in	 the	 civil	 service	 such	 as	 Dr.	 Richard	 Leakey)	 to	 accept	 a	 multi-agency	
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approach	 to	 the	 drought.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 the	 partnership	 between	 Oxfam	 and	
government	officials	and	agencies	–	 for	 instance	 the	District	Water	Offices	 in	Wajir	and	
Turkana	–	 set	 a	positive	precedent	 for	 a	multi-agency	 response	and	was	 considered	an	
exceptional	 example	 of	 a	 government-NGO	 relationship.121	Internationally,	 Oxfam	 was	
also	making	an	impact	on	donor	attitudes	through	the	ALRMP:	WFP	would	soon	adopt	the	
community	based	food	targeting	and	distribution	system	across	the	region,	while	USAID	
began	to	redefine	its	drought	management	policy	to	stress	improving	livelihoods	as	well	
as	saving	lives.122	
	 Furthermore,	as	a	result	of	the	credibility	that	Oxfam	earned	in	its	peace	building	
work	 in	Wajir	and	 its	 lobbying	efforts	 through	the	ALRMP,	 the	organisation	was	able	 to	
secure	 the	 necessary	 institutional	 commitment	 from	 government	 officials	 to	 start	 a	
conflict	reduction	project	 in	July	2000.	Indeed,	 it	was	considered	‘very	doubtful	that	the	
government	would	have	allowed…	such	a	programme	without	the	credibility	derived	from	
such	grassroots	experience’.	Funded	by	DfID	at	a	cost	of	£660,000	over	three	years,	the	
project	 sought	 to	 promote	 peace	 building	 processes	 that	 involved	 and	 empowered	
communities	 in	 ten	 arid	 districts.	 The	 underlying	 strategy	 was	 to	 build	 on	 customary	
institutions	 for	 negotiating	 peace	 by	 supporting	 district	 level	 rapid	 response	 initiatives,	
dialogue	meetings,	 peace	 seminars	 and	 education,	 and	 by	 establishing	 frameworks	 for	
collaboration	 between	 government	 and	 communities	 in	 times	 of	 conflict.	 At	 the	 same	
time,	the	project	hoped	to	push	the	government	to	create	a	national	level	framework	for	
peace	 and	 security	 work	 co-ordinated	 by	 the	 Office	 of	 the	 President,	 to	 influence	
government	 to	 address	 the	 underlying	 causes	 of	 conflict	 (including	 land	 tenure	 and	
natural	 resources	 management)	 and	 to	 encourage	 the	 government	 to	 recognise	
customary	 institutions	 of	 conflict	management.	 It	 also	 sought	 to	 train	 official	 and	 non-
government	 actors	 in	 mediation	 and	 negotiation	 techniques	 and	 community	 policing,	
while	 conducting	 research	 and	 media	 work	 on	 the	 causes	 of	 and	 consequences	 of	
pastoral	 conflict.123	By	 2002,	 significant	 progress	 was	 noted	 at	 the	 district	 level,	 with	
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District	 Committees	 working	 on	 conflict	 prevention	 and	 providing	 early	 warning	 of	
escalating	 tensions.	 They	 also	 worked	 to	 establish	 rapid	 response	 strategies	 and	 used	
traditional	 methods	 of	 dispute	 resolution	 and	 conflict	 management	 (including	
compensation,	 restitution	 and	 punishment)	 as	 well	 as	 arms	 surrender,	 community	
policing	 and	 the	 recovery	 and	 return	 of	 stolen	 stock.	 The	 conflict	 programme	 was	
reported	to	have	‘increased	the	community’s	confidence	in	the	government’.124	
	 At	the	national	 level,	Oxfam	helped	to	form	the	National	Steering	Committee	on	
Peacebuilding	and	Conflict	Management.	The	Committee	 included	 representatives	 from	
government	 (the	 Office	 of	 the	 President,	 ALRMP,	 Ministry	 of	 Foreign	 Affairs	 and	 the	
police);	non-government	organisations	 (Oxfam,	Caritas	Spain,	World	Vision	–	Kenya	and	
PeaceNet);	UN	agencies	(UN	Office	for	Co-ordination	of	Humanitarian	Affairs	and	the	UN	
Development	 Programme);	 donors	 (DfID,	 USAID,	 GTZ);	 religious	 institutions	 (National	
Council	 of	 Churches	 of	 Kenya,	 Kenya	 Catholic	 Secretariat,	 Supreme	 Council	 of	 Kenya	
Muslims);	and	regional	organisations	(Inter-Governmental	Authority	on	Development	and	
the	Organisation	of	African	Unity	 (OAU)	 Inter-Africa	Bureau	 for	Animal	Resources).	 The	
Committee	successfully	mapped	peace-building	activities	across	the	country	and	secured	
funding	 from	 DfID	 for	 a	 national	 institution	 for	 peace	 work. 125 	The	 government’s	
‘paradigm	shift	 in	policy	and	practice’	 regarding	pastoral	conflict	–	 from	tight	control	of	
every	 aspect	 of	 security	 and	 ‘characterised	 by	 an	 indiscriminate	 use	 of	 force’	 to	 the	
recognition	of	traditional	institutions	and	customary	mechanisms	of	conflict	management	
–	 was	 at	 least	 partly	 due	 to	 Oxfam’s	 efforts	 to	 bring	 local	 groups	 and	 government	
together,	boosting	their	confidence	in	formal	and	traditional	institutions,	respectively.126	
External	reviewers	concluded	that,	‘to	the	extent	that	there	is	currently	a	pastoral	conflict	
management	 policy	 in	 Kenya,	 it	 is	 derived	 from	 the	Wajir	 experience,	 to	which	Oxfam	
made	a	major	contribution’	and	was	also	the	result	of	Oxfam’s	willingness	to	engage	(and	
compromise)	with	 the	state	 in	a	pragmatic	 fashion,	not	 least	 through	the	ALRMP.	Most	
importantly,	however,	this	work	was	having	an	impact	on	the	ground:	assessments	of	the	
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levels	of	insecurity	in	the	arid	and	semi-arid	lands	spoke	of	‘a	significant	reduction	in	the	
incidence	of	conflict	and	 insecurity	 in	the	arid	districts…	attributable,	at	 least	 in	part,	 to	
the	collaborative	efforts	of	government	and	the	community	peace	committees’,	as	well	as	
to	improving	regional	security	and	good	levels	of	rainfall.127	
	 The	 evidence	 above	 shows	 how	 Oxfam	 was	 able	 to	 fulfil,	 even	 if	 in	 a	 limited	
fashion,	both	of	its	objectives	for	the	ALRMP,	which,	along	with	the	WPDP,	illustrated	the	
possibilities	 of	 its	 tactical	 and	 strategic	 approach	 to	 development	 in	 Kenya.	 The	
organisation	helped	to	give	communities	a	say	in	conflict	situations	and	convinced	many	
ALRMP	 staff	 to	 ‘quietly	 support	 empowerment	 as	 a	 driver	 for	 change’,	 while	 also	
encouraging	 the	 government	 to	 adopt	 national	 drought	 and	 conflict	 management	
strategies	and	a	more	open	resource	distribution	mechanism.128	Moreover,	Oxfam	noted,	
‘policy	makers	 themselves	will	 attribute	 the	 changes	 relating	 to	work	 in	 pastoralism	 to	
Oxfam’.	The	government’s	‘enthusiasm	for	collaboration	with	Oxfam’	was	reflected	in	the	
appointment	 of	 the	 organisation	 (through	Mohamed	 Elmi)	 to	 the	National	 Commission	
for	Poverty	Eradication	in	1999.129	Speaking	of	drought	management,	but	applicable	more	
broadly,	a	senior	official	in	the	Office	of	the	President	remarked	that	‘Oxfam	has	opened	
up	 perspectives	 and	 perceptions…	 that	 are	 new	 and	 valuable	 to	 the	 government.	 It	
doesn’t	get	these	from	other	non-governmental	organisations’.130		
	 Yet	it	would	strain	credulity	to	think	that	the	Moi	government	–	particularly	in	the	
run	up	to	the	elections	in	1997	and	2002	–	was	interested	only	in	ideas,	and	Oxfam	was	
certainly	not	naïve	about	the	government’s	motive	in	partnering	with	the	organisation	in	
the	 ALRMP.	 As	 a	 confidential	 Oxfam	 report	 noted,	 partnership	 was	 key	 for	 the	
government	 because	 the	 organisation	 was	 already	 located	 in	 the	 arid	 and	 semi-arid	
districts	and	its	track	record	of	grassroots	work	meant	it	had	the	ability	to	engage	pastoral	
communities	 and	 win	 their	 trust.	 This	 ability	 was	 not	 matched	 in	 many	 other	
organisations,	and	certainly	not	in	government;	in	fact,	‘the	government	needed	a	way	in,	
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and	 a	way	 to	 gain	 credibility	 and	 trust’	with	 pastoralists.131	Clearly,	 not	 all	 government	
staff	were	‘as	sympathetic	to	Oxfam’s	values’	as	some	in	the	ALRMP.	Thus	Oxfam	noted	
that	 ‘as	 a	 seasonned	 [sic]	 international	 diplomat’	 the	 Permanent	 Secretary	 for	
Development	 in	 the	Office	 of	 the	 President	 –	with	whom	Oxfam	wanted	 to	 engage	 on	
pastoral	 issues	–	‘talks	a	good	game’.	‘Nonetheless,	she	has	not	reached	such	a	position	
without	 the	 correct	 KANU	 credentials	 and	 allies’.132	Other	 government	 officials	 were	
known	to	have	‘unseen	relations	with	political	groups’	and	Oxfam	staff	were	warned	‘not	
to	 use	 resources	 and	 relationships	 to	 create	 allegiances	with	 local	 elites’.133	Moreover,	
they	were	reminded	that	since	independence	‘efforts	to	speak	up	[as	regards	pastoralism]	
have	 been	 systematically	 crushed	 and	 silenced	 [and]	 this	 approach	 has	 become	
institutionalised’.	Therefore,	while	for	Oxfam	‘partnership	might	assume	a	shared	notion	
of	public	good	with	the	government…	the	government	might	have	a	different	sense	of	the	
partnership’	at	a	time	when	Moi	‘holds	doggedly	to	power’.	For	the	state,		
	
[partnership]	 might	 serve	 as	 an	 effective	 delivery	 strategy	 for	 pushing	 its	 own	
acceptance	 among	 communities…	 [and]	 may	 serve	 to	 enhance	 its	 influence	 and	
strengthen	its	legitimacy	within	communities.134		
	
Nevertheless,	 the	 fact	 that	 the	ALRMP	was	 simultaneously	 at	 the	 heart	 of	 government	
and	 slightly	 outside	 traditional	 government	 structures	 –	 and	 was	 itself	 possessed	 of	 a	
progressive	 mandate	 (and	 staff)	 –	 made	 it	 easier	 for	 Oxfam	 to	 laud	 its	 potential	 for	
influencing	while	at	the	same	time	denying	any	cost	to	the	organisation’s	credibility	as	a	
result	 of	 its	 ‘complicity	 with	 government’.135	How	 far	 the	 ALRMP	 and	 other	 related	
initiatives	 were	 able	 to	 avoid	 falling	 prey	 to	 the	 whims	 of	 powerful	 individuals	 and	 a	
political	 system	 driven	 by	 patronage	 is	 the	 subject	 of	 the	 penultimate	 section	 of	 the	
chapter.	
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‘BE CAREFUL WHAT YOU WISH FOR’:  OXFAM AND THE DEVELOPMENT-
POLITICS NEXUS 
 
Oxfam	was	moving	ever	closer	to	the	centre	of	the	development-politics	nexus	in	Kenya,	
a	‘gate’	guarded	ruthlessly	by	the	political	and	economic	elite.	The	risks	were	obvious	and	
not	 limited	to	 issues	of	organisational	credibility:	 in	his	 report	on	capacity	building	with	
pastoralist	communities	in	1998,	Peter	Kisopia	wrote	that	‘tackling	development	issues	in	
a	system	which	shuns	any	attempt	to	address	them	because	they	affect	the	ruling	clique	
is	worrying’,	particularly	since	the	organisation	was	‘attempting	to	address	very	sensitive	
issues	 which	 would	 otherwise	 be	 left	 untouched	 because	 of	 fear’.136	The	 government	
remained	 especially	 sensitive	 about	 NGOs	 ‘mentioning	 the	 government	 negatively’	 or	
suggesting	 that	 political	 change	 was	 necessary.	 Oxfam	 thus	 had	 to	 be	 very	 careful	 to	
distinguish	between	politics	and	policy:	the	organisation	could	discuss	policy	on	pastoral	
areas,	 but	 had	 to	 be	 cautious	 not	 to	 stray	 into	 criticism	 that	 could	 be	 construed	 as	
political.137 	Somewhat	 inevitably,	 though,	 Oxfam’s	 higher	 profile	 advocacy	 work	 and	
capacity	building	with	powerless	communities,	combined	with	 its	 large	scale	emergency	
funding,	 encouraged	 ‘gatekeepers’	 (and	 particularly	 MPs)	 to	 take	 a	 ‘mixed’	 view	 of	
Oxfam.	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 ‘gatekeepers’	 wanted	 Oxfam	 to	 bring	 resources	 to	 their	
constituency.	For,	 just	as	Oxfam	would	 laud	its	achievements	 in	 influencing	government	
policy,	 the	 government	 and	 elected	 representatives	 would	 laud	 their	 achievement	 in	
bringing	 Oxfam	 to	 a	 particular	 community.	 ‘Ultimately’,	 as	 one	 interviewee	 noted,	 ‘it’s	
about	power	and	resources’	and	subverting	‘what	would	be	appropriate	from	a	need	and	
technical	solutions	perspective	and	trying	to	divert	that	from	a	political	perspective’:	
	
If	you’re	an	MP,	you	want	to	be	seen	to	bring	those	resources	to	your	community…	
You	want	to	be	seen	to	be	the	MP	to	bring	the	borehole	to	your	community,	to	bring	
the	 water,	 to	 bring	 the	 school,	 to	 bring	 whatever	 the	 service	 may	 be…	 An	MP	 in	
Garissa	wanted	a	borehole	 in	 that	area	 [for	example].	 It	was	completely	unsuitable	
from	 an	 environmental	 [perspective]…	 what	 it	 meant	 to	 pastoral	 trekking	 routes,	
what	it	was	going	to	mean	in	terms	of	degradation	of	the	land…	[but	the	MP]	wanted	
to	be	seen	to	bring	a	borehole	to	the	people.	
	
Pressure	 was	 more	 acute	 when	 there	 were	 bigger	 sums	 of	 money	 ‘at	 stake’.	 During	
humanitarian	 interventions,	 for	 instance,	 ‘the	 corruption	 around	 food	 aid	 was	 huge…	
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whether	 it’s	paying	 transporters	 [since]	most	of	 the	 transport	companies	are	owned	by	
MPs	[or]	siphoning	off	food	for	a	local	chief	or	an	MP	somewhere…’.	Pressure	would	be	
applied	 in	 conversations	 and	 letters,	 by	 influencing	 communities	 to	 ask	 Oxfam	 for	
interventions	or	to	challenge	Oxfam’s	decisions,	and	through	the	medium	of	licensing	and	
contract	disputes.138	
	 On	the	other	hand,	Oxfam	was	able	to	make	use	of	a	set	of	simple	tactics	to	resist	
pressure	 and	 co-optation	 by	 MPs	 and	 the	 state,	 frustrating	 those	 who	 wished	 to	
manipulate	incoming	resources.	Firstly,	the	organisation	followed	strict	technical	data	on	
the	need	for	distribution	efforts	and	used	this	data	when	government	Ministers	and	MPs	
asked	 the	organisation	why	 it	was	not	working	 in	Nyeri	 or	Machakos	 for	 instance	 (two	
common	examples).	Secondly,	Oxfam	often	played	down	the	size	of	 its	 interventions	to	
make	them	less	attractive	to	the	questioner.	Thirdly,	staff	avoided	travelling	with	MPs	or	
going	 to	 villages	with	 a	 government	 introduction	 and	 resisted	 the	 temptation	 to	 bring	
news	crews	to	the	 launch	of	projects.	Oxfam	was,	of	course,	happy	to	give	some	of	the	
credit	to	the	government	and	its	representatives	(if	and	when	they	deserved	it)	in	order	
to	 build	 communities’	 confidence	 in	 state	 structures	 and	 bolster	 government	
commitment	 to	policy	 change.139	Yet	 the	potential	 for	glory	and	 resource	appropriation	
was	 balanced	 by	 the	 possibility	 that	Oxfam	might	 also	 challenge	 accepted	 routines	 for	
resource	distribution	or	ask	difficult	questions	about	development	in	the	region.	As	such,	
the	 organisation	 inspired	 conflicted	 attitudes	 from	MPs,	 who	 veered	 quickly	 ‘between	
hostility	[and]	positive	engagement’.140	
	 Another	 important	driver	of	this	conflicted	attitude	was	the	fact	that	Oxfam	had	
begun	employing	more	staff	from	local	areas	to	run	its	projects,	and	these	staff	members	
were	 becoming	 popular	 with	 local	 communities	 as	 a	 result	 of	 their	 involvement	 in	
emergency	 and	development	 programmes.	 Consequently,	 a	 number	 of	 incumbent	MPs	
feared	that	Oxfam	staff	might	undermine	their	hold	over	the	local	electorate,	which	was	
based	 on	 the	 ability	 to	 bring	 resources	 and	 development	 initiatives	 from	 the	 central	
government.	The	fear	was	far	from	unfounded:	two	Oxfam	staff	members	–	Ekwee	Ethuro	
																																																						
138	Indeed,	in	December	2000,	Oxfam	reported	problems	with	the	Turkana	Tender	and	Transporters	
Association	(TUTTA),	which	had	encouraged	a	strike.	‘A	clique	within	TUTTA’,	noted	the	report,	‘has	political	
links’.	‘Turkana	Updates’,	December,	2000,	Oxfam	Archive,	Lavington,	Nairobi:	Kenya	Programme,	
Humanitarian	Programme,	Box	No.	10,	File:	Correspondence,	Project	Turkana;	Interview	with	author	no.	III,	
4	December,	2014;	Interview	with	author	no.	IV,	6	January,	2015.	
139	Interview	with	author	no.	IX,	16	October,	2014;	interview	with	author	no.	XX,	24	September,	2014.	
140	‘Annual	Report,	1997-1998:	Action	to	Achieve	Impact	on	Poverty	in	Kenya’,	June,	1998,	OxA,	MS.	Oxfam	
PRG/3/4/12/12:	Annual	Report	1997-1998,	‘Action	to	Achieve	Impact	on	Poverty	in	Kenya’.	
		 256	
(then	 Deputy	 Country	 Representative)	 and	 John	 Munyes	 (then	 Turkana	 programme	
manager)	–	 resigned	 in	1997	 to	stand	 for	election	 in	Turkana,	a	district	where	 resource	
distribution	was	highly	politicised:	
	
In	Turkana	 it	was	all	about	 the	division	of	 resources…	you	couldn’t	hire	a	 truck	 if	 it	
wasn’t	on	the	list	that	the	MPs	gave	you…	[and]	you	couldn’t	employ	someone	if	[the	
MP]	hadn’t	approved	 it…	The	 senior	elite	 in	Kenya	 [is]	 very	good	at	manipulation…	
you	would	have	a	huge	transport	and	loaders	strike	in	Turkana…	no	one	would	take	a	
single	 bag	 of	maize	 on	 a	 truck…	 The	MP	would	 never	 appear	 at	 the	 front	 of	 that	
group,	but	you	would	know	there	was	a	lot	of	manipulation	behind	the	scenes…	[the	
loaders]	 would	 have	 been	 incited	 or	 even	 paid…	 it	 was	 all	 about	 control	 of	
resources…	it	was	a	feeding	frenzy.141	
	
Ethuro	 was	 successful	 in	 his	 election	 attempt	 for	 KANU	 in	 Turkana	 North,	 and	 was	
appointed	as	the	Assistant	Minister	for	Labour	and	Human	Resource	Development	by	Moi	
in	 1998.	He	 left	 KANU	 to	 join	NARC	 in	 2002	 and	was	 successfully	 re-elected	 as	 an	MP,	
before	joining	the	Party	of	National	Unity	in	2007	and	holding	his	seat	once	more.	In	2013	
he	was	elected	as	the	speaker	of	the	Kenyan	senate.	Munyes	was	defeated	in	1998,	but	
had	 been	 associated	 with	 FORD-Kenya	 (despite	 vying	 for	 the	 KANU	 ticket)	 in	 a	 solidly	
KANU	region	and	faced	a	hugely	powerful	opponent	in	Japheth	Ekidor.	Ekidor	had	built	a	
powerbase	in	Turkana	North	since	his	election	in	1979,	and,	according	to	the	Daily	Nation,	
had	 been	 returned	 to	 Parliament	 at	 every	 election	 thereafter	 ‘not	 so	much	 due	 to	 his	
popularity	but	his	ability	to	intimidate	potential	rivals	and	voters’.142	(In	1995,	Ekidor	had	
even	bitten	off	the	ear	of	a	Turkana	County	Council	Chairman	when	the	latter	challenged	
one	of	 the	MP’s	decisions.)	Munyes	was	certainly	 intimidated	during	 the	campaign:	 the	
Daily	Nation	reported	that	he	was	unable	to	go	to	some	areas	of	the	constituency	due	to	
harassment	and	threats	from	chiefs,	while	a	number	of	interviewees	recalled	that	he	was	
ambushed	 at	 least	 twice	 during	 the	 campaign	with	 the	 intention	 of	 scaring	 him	 off.143	
Munyes	was,	however,	successful	in	2002,	standing	for	FORD-Kenya.	He	was	re-elected	in	
2007	 and	 was	 appointed	 Minister	 for	 Water	 and	 Irrigation	 in	 the	 coalition	 Cabinet	 of	
2008.	 In	2013,	Munyes	was	elected	as	 the	senator	 for	Turkana.	Other	Oxfam	staff	soon	
followed	the	example	of	Ethuro	and	Munyes:	in	2002	Adelina	Mwau	(Programme	Officer)	
was	nominated	as	an	MP	and	today	serves	as	the	Deputy	County	Governor	in	Makueni.	In	
2007	Mohamed	Elmi	was	elected	for	the	Orange	Democratic	Movement	in	Wajir	East.	He	
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was	then	appointed	to	the	Cabinet	as	Minister	of	Development	for	Northern	Kenya	and	
other	Arid	Lands	in	2008.	Abdirahman	Ali	Hassan	was	also	elected	to	Parliament	for	ODM	
in	2007	in	Wajir	South	constituency.	In	Turkana	South,	Josephat	Nanok	was	elected	on	an	
ODM	 ticket	 in	 2007	 and	 became	 governor	 of	 Turkana	 in	 2013.	 Other	 high-profile	 ‘ex-
fammers’	include	Halakhe	Waqo,	appointed	as	the	first	Secretary	of	the	Ethics	and	Anti-
Corruption	Commission	(EACC)	in	2013.	
	 Association	with	Oxfam	was	clearly	no	hindrance	to	political	ambitions,	therefore.	
One	former	Oxfam	staff	member,	now	an	MP,	discussed	the	 issue	openly	and	admitted	
that	‘once	they	[Oxfam	staff]	went	for	politics…	they	had	a	big	edge	over	anybody	[else].	I	
worked	for	ten	years	in	[my	district]…	so	when	the	time	came	and	I	was	standing…	I	was	a	
household	name’.144	Numerous	other	interviewees,	meanwhile,	spoke	of	the	way	that	in	
certain	 districts	 –	 particularly	 Turkana	 and	Wajir	 –	 ‘you	 couldn’t	 not	 know	 them’	 as	 a	
voter.145	Others	cautioned	that	work	done	for	Oxfam	did	not	cause	electoral	success,	but	
was	itself	a	consequence	of	employees’	educational	attainment,	their	motivation	to	help	
communities	and	their	desire	to	challenge	unhelpful	government	policies	–	characteristics	
that	made	these	individuals	highly	likely	to	be	competitive	in	elections	regardless	of	their	
work	for	Oxfam.	(In	fact,	Oxfam	deliberately	chose	to	employ	individuals	who	could	take	
on	a	leadership	role	with	local	communities,	in	order	to	encourage	the	latter	to	challenge	
the	 status	quo.)	 Furthermore,	when	elections	 came	around,	 communities	often	did	not	
have	many	 candidates	 to	 choose	 from	 –	 Turkana	 in	 particular	was	 a	 classic	 ‘one-horse	
town’	–	and	Oxfam	employees	were	precisely	the	type	of	people	who	could	be	tempted	
to	 enter	 politics,	 motivated	 by	 the	 desire	 to	 serve	 their	 community.	 According	 to	 this	
interpretation,	it	was	almost	inevitable	that	a	number	of	Oxfam	employees	would	end	up	
as	MPs.146	
	 Nonetheless,	 it	was	 clear	 to	many	 contemporaries	 that	 ‘individuals	who	worked	
[for	Oxfam]	gained	personal	credit	and	reputation	because	of	the	work,	and	were	trading	
on	 that’.147	The	 question	 of	 how	 far	 Oxfam	 staff	 took	 advantage	 of	 their	 work	 for	 the	
organisation	 takes	 on	 a	 different	 complexion	 in	Wajir	 and	 Turkana,	 however.	 In	Wajir,	
there	 is	 a	 much	 greater	 sense	 of	 ‘greatness’	 being	 thrust	 upon	 Oxfam	 staff,	 and	
particularly	Mohamed	Elmi.	Having	spoken	 to	Elmi	and	 to	 those	with	whom	he	worked	
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closely	 at	Oxfam	and	 in	Parliament,	 it	 is	 noticeable	 that	he	had	no	 real	desire	 to	enter	
Parliament,	 but	 was	 pressured	 to	 do	 so	 by	 the	 community	 in	 Wajir.	 Indeed,	 Elmi’s	
standing	in	the	community	was	so	high	as	a	result	of	his	work	for	Oxfam	and	his	previous	
work	 as	 a	 medical	 practitioner	 for	 the	 government	 that	 elders	 cajoled	 him	 to	 seek	
election,	 saying	 ‘you’re	our	 son,	 you’re	 going	 to	 go	 there	 and	do	 this	 for	 us’.148	On	 the	
other	hand,	in	Turkana	there	was	a	different	dimension	at	work.	One	Kenyan	employee,	
who	 worked	 for	 Oxfam	 in	 the	 pastoral	 regions	 for	 nearly	 20	 years,	 recalled	 that	 the	
recurrent	 relief	 efforts	 in	 the	 region	 since	 independence	 ensured	 that	 ‘if	 you	 give	 a	
Turkana	food,	you	are	the	best	of	friends	regardless	of	whether	you	have	good	leadership	
qualities	or	not’.	As	Oxfam	coordinators,	Ethuro	and	Munyes	received	requests	for	food	
aid	and	conveyed	news	of	 their	 acceptance;	 consequently,	 the	Turkana	attributed	both	
‘the	acceptance	of	that	request	and	the	action	that	comes	out	of	it’	to	these	individuals	
(and	to	Nanok	in	the	early	2000s).	Thus	‘because	of	Oxfam’s	relief	intervention…	[Ethuro	
and	 Munyes]	 were	 seen	 as	 our	 sons	 who	 have	 brought	 us	 food	 in	 tonnes’.149	The	
coordinators	were	even	nicknamed	Apa	a	Ngibaren	or	‘fathers	and	providers	of	stock’,	as	
they	 were	 considered	 to	 have	 turned	 on	 the	 resource	 tap.	 All	 interviewees	 with	
experience	in	the	district	concurred	with	this	assessment:	
	
He	who	is	seen	to	bring	the	resources	is	automatically	in	a	position	of	power…	which	
is	 exactly	why	 it	 is	 no	 coincidence	 that	 pretty	much	 all	 the	 senior	 office	 holders	 in	
Turkana	worked	for	Oxfam…	Oxfam	for	a	long	period	of	time…	was	pretty	much	the	
only	 serious	 supplier…	 the	 only	 long-term	 presence	 in	 that	 district…	 Someone	 like	
John	Munyes…	was	driving	out	on	trucks	to	distribute	food	relief…	and	of	course	[at]	
the	next	election	he	is	elected.150	
	
Importantly,	former	staff	spoke	of	the	difficulty	people	had	in	differentiating	between	the	
individual	and	the	organisation:	‘the	people	there…	cannot	differentiate	that	you	are	the	
programme	coordinator	and	Oxfam	[as	an	organisation]	is	bringing	[the	relief]…	they	see	
you	as	our	saviour,	our	son’.151	Another	staff	member	who	worked	for	a	number	of	years	
in	Turkana	recounted	that:	
	
The	link	in	Turkana	between	the	resources,	the	power,	Oxfam	and	politics	was	really	
close	 because	 it	 is	 such	 a	 resource	 poor	 environment…	 and	 there	 were	 so	 few	
international	and	civil	society	organisations	[there]…	It	was	very	difficult	for	people…	
to	 disaggregate	 John	Munyes	 as	 the	 Project	 Officer	 who	 works	 for	 Oxfam…	 [from	
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someone]	who	 is	bringing	hundreds	of	tonnes	of	 food	relief.	What	people	wouldn’t	
necessarily	know	is	how	those	resources	are	allocated…	It	would	be	wrong	for	them	
to	think	that	Munyes	had	personally	brought	 it	to	them…	but	 it	would	be	very	easy	
for	them	[the	Oxfam	staff	member]	to	represent	it	in	that	way,	and	it	would	be	very	
easy	for	the	community	to	believe	that	even	if	they	[Oxfam	staff]	didn’t	represent	it	
in	 that	 way.	 And	 given	 that	 politics	 is	 all	 about	 the	 delivery	 of	 benefit	 (that’s	 the	
purpose	of	politics	 in	Kenya…	you	get	 there	 in	order	 to	be	able	 to	eat	 something…	
ideally	your	community	will	eat	something	as	well)	you	wouldn’t	have	any	other	way	
of	 understanding	 what	 leadership	 was,	 other	 than	 that	 this	 particular	 concrete	
benefit…	came	to	me	[as	a	result	of	this	man].	
	
	 In	contrast	 to	Elmi	 in	Wajir,	 there	 is	a	 fair	degree	of	concurrence	among	 former	
Oxfam	staff	that	Ethuro	and	Munyes	‘always	intended	to	be	where	they	are	now’.152	One	
alleged	that	while	‘Oxfam	were	very	visible	in	Turkana	–	we	had	cars	with	Oxfam	logos	on	
them,	we	had	two	projects	and	then	a	relief	operation	–	Ekwee	and	Munyes…	capitalised	
on	that’.153	Another	spoke	of	those	in	Turkana	‘using	food	to	be	popular	so	that	they	will	
find	 it	 easier	 to	 go	 to	 Parliament’.154	The	 drought	 crises	 in	 the	 1990s	were	 particularly	
useful	for	those	envisaging	a	campaign.	It	was	‘on	the	back	of	that	for	the	most	part	that	
the	likes	of	Ekwee	and	Munyes…	established	their	platform’.	Indeed,	it	was	claimed	that	
‘Ethuro…	 exploited	 [the	 situation]	 massively…	 [he]	 exploited	 resources,	 and	 there	 was	
evidence	 that	 he	 had	 used	 vehicles	 [to	 campaign],	 for	 example’.155	According	 to	 one	
interviewee,	 Ethuro	 ‘was	 clearly…	 doing	 consultancies	 for	 other	 organisations	when	 he	
was	being	paid	by	Oxfam…	and	there	was	no	doubt	that	he	was	electioneering…’.156	Given	
these	factors,	it	is	unsurprising	that	voters	would	choose	to	elect	their	Oxfam	‘sons’	into	
government.	
	 More	concerning	for	Head	Office	 in	Nairobi	was	the	question	of	 from	where	the	
money	 for	 the	 campaigns	 was	 coming.	 Election	 campaigns	 in	 Kenya	 are	 prohibitively	
expensive,	helping	to	entrench	the	position	of	incumbents	who	are	able	to	mobilise	state	
resources	for	their	re-election	drive.	One	Oxfam	staff	member	who	visited	Turkana	in	the	
mid-1990s	 alleged	 that:	 ‘these	 people	 [in	 Turkana]	 were	 doing	 their	 accounts	 on	 a	
coconut	tree;	nothing	from	these	accounts	I	am	getting	from	Turkana	are	real…	nothing	
was	happening	with	the	programme…	[but]	because	of	the	drought	they	got	money	year	
in,	year	out’.	According	to	this	interviewee,	the	Turkana	programme	‘was	a	cash	machine	
for	 the	managers,	 for	 the	politicians…	and	 the	books	did	not	add	up…’.	When	 the	 staff	
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member	 attempted	 to	 visit	 the	 programme,	 permission	was	 delayed	 for	 over	 a	 year	 –	
partly,	they	argued,	because	of	the	relatively	high	position	of	authority	that	Ethuro	held	
at	 Oxfam	 at	 the	 time.	 When	 a	 visit	 finally	 took	 place,	 an	 arduous	 journey	 ended	 in	
disappointment:	 ‘they	 had	 burned	 all	 the	 finance	 records’.	 Nevertheless,	 for	 this	
interviewee,	it	was	still	fairly	clear	that	‘[Ethuro]	campaigned	with	Oxfam	money’	and	had	
been	 running	 an	 election	 campaign	 rather	 than	 the	 development	 and	 relief	 work.	
Moreover,	the	visit	and	discussions	with	local	beneficiaries	had	confirmed	the	suspicions	
of	many	staff	that	‘relief	itself	was	used	as	a	campaign	tool	[in	the	manner	of]	“I	am	the	
one	bringing	the	food,	and	you	can	vote	for	me”…’.157	
	 Placing	aside	the	issue	of	the	misuse	of	Oxfam	relief	–	something	that	cannot	be	
proven	and	was,	as	has	been	mentioned,	not	even	necessary	for	staff	to	be	seen	as	the	
‘saviour’	 of	 their	 region	 –	Oxfam	 staff	were	unanimous	 that	 getting	 individuals	 such	 as	
Ethuro	and	Munyes	into	Parliament	could	actually	be	interpreted	as	a	sign	of	success	for	
the	organisation.	For	this	was	an	NGO	seeking	 ‘islands	of	effectiveness’	within	the	state	
and	looking	for	individuals	with	whom	Oxfam	staff	could	engage.	What	better,	then,	than	
Parliamentarians,	Ministers	and	Cabinet	members	schooled	in	Oxfam	ideas?	Thus	it	was	
considered	‘not	a	bad	thing	if	some	MPs	have	a	real	understanding	of	profound	poverty,	
of	inequality…	that	they	will	have	received	being	a	member	of	staff	at	Oxfam’.158	In	fact,	
‘Oxfam	saw	it	as	quite	a	good	thing	at	the	time…	we	thought	they	had	been	sufficiently	
indoctrinated	with	our	ways	of	thinking...	we	thought	they	would	be	on	the	right	side’.159	
Unfortunately,	whether	the	MPs	continued	to	work	towards	Oxfam	values	once	elected	
was	 a	 different	 question	 entirely.	 One	 interviewee	 asserted	 despondently	 that	 ‘when	
somebody	becomes	a	politician	in	Kenya…	all	those	good	values	evaporate	slowly’.160	‘It’s	
something	 about	 Kenya’s	 political	 system’,	 noted	 another,	 ‘the	 pressures	 on	 you	 to	
behave	in	a	certain	kind	of	way	[to	participate	in	patronage	politics]	are	extraordinary’.161	
A	third	cautioned	that	
		
You	have	to	be	careful	what	you	wish	for…	One	of	our	objectives	was	to	promote	the	
representation	 of	 people	 from	 marginalised	 communities	 in	 decision-making	
positions…	From	that	point	of	view	[Oxfam	was]	remarkably	successful…	The	problem	
is	you	can’t	necessarily	control	what	they	do	when	they	get	there…162	
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Notably,	 it	 is	alleged	that	when	Ethuro	and	Munyes	got	 to	Parliament,	 they	 ‘fought	 the	
government	to	give	them	relief’	rather	than	the	early	warning,	drought	management	and	
community	 based	 development	 that	 they	 had	 once	 advocated	with	Oxfam.	 Food	 relief	
was,	of	course,	an	easier	sell	to	communities	and	guaranteed	more	votes.163	Moreover,	in	
2012,	Ethuro	and	Nanok	were	arrested	and	charged	with	incitement	to	violence	after	the	
murder	of	41	police	officers	 in	Baragoi.164	They	were	alleged	to	have	implied	that	 it	was	
desirable	to	‘bring	death	or	physical	injuries’	to	police	officers	in	Turkana	County,	and	had	
defended	 the	actions	of	 the	Turkana	as	a	 response	 to	a	 ‘state	 sponsored	attack’;	 gone,	
therefore,	were	efforts	to	build	bridges	between	the	state	and	pastoralists.	Yet	because	
they	were	within	 the	precinct	 of	 Parliament	when	 they	 spoke,	 Ethuro	 and	Nanok	were	
able	to	escape	prosecution.165	Meanwhile,	Nanok	was	one	of	12	governors	asked	to	step	
aside	by	President	Kenyatta	 in	2015,	with	allegations	of	graft	by	the	EACC	 including	the	
payment	 of	 Ksh.	 14	 million	 to	 a	 contractor	 to	 build	 a	 bridge	 that	 does	 not	 exist.166	
Furthermore,	 regardless	 of	motive,	 each	member	 of	 Oxfam	 staff	who	 has	 crossed	 into	
Parliament	has	 faced	problems	of	 inertia	amongst	government	 staff,	 a	 civil	 service	 that	
barely	functions	and	the	daunting	task	of	persuading	half	of	Kenya’s	MPs	that	they	do	not	
actually	need	food	relief.167	
	 Predictably,	 the	 entrance	of	Oxfam	 staff	 into	politics	 caused	 ‘significant	 political	
turbulence	 and	 uncertainty	 for	 Oxfam’	 and	 ‘put	 Oxfam	 at	 some	 risk’.	 The	 organisation	
certainly	experienced	government	hostility	over	Munyes’	resignation	to	challenge	Ekidor,	
which	 came	directly	after	 relief	work	was	wound	down	 in	Turkana	and	at	a	 time	when	
‘the	 political	 environment	was	 very	 sensitive	 and	Oxfam	was	 being	 accused	of	 political	
activities’.168	These	accusations	were,	unsurprisingly,	 related	 to	 the	activities	of	Munyes	
and	Ethuro,	who	had	organised	a	cross-border	meeting	in	Lodwar	with	Ugandan	officials	
																																																						
163	interview	with	author	no.	XX,	24	September,	2014.	
164	John	Munyes	–	who	was	also	present	at	the	time	–	was	not	arrested,	but	was	summoned	to	CID	
headquarters.	
165	‘MPs	Refuse	to	Take	Plea	in	Cases’,	Daily	Nation,	20	November,	2012,	available	at:	
http://www.nation.co.ke/News/politics/MPs-refuse-to-take-plea-in-cases/-/1064/1624598/-/u56yoq/-
/index.html	[accessed	18	December,	2014];	‘Court	Throws	Out	MPs’	Incitement	Case’,	Daily	Nation,	21	
November,	2012,	available	at:	
http://www.nation.co.ke/News/Court-throws-out-MPs-incitement-case-/-/1056/1625732/-/s2337mz/-
/index.html.	[accessed	18	December,	2014]	
166	‘Sh.	14m	Graft	Probe	Against	Turkana	Governor	Still	Under	Way:	EACC’,	The	Standard,	28	May,	2015,	
available	at:	http://www.standardmedia.co.ke/thecounties/article/2000163477/sh14m-graft-probe-
against-turkana-governor-still-under-way-eacc?pageNo=1.	[accessed	18	December,	2014]	
167	Interview	with	author	no.	XVII,	23	October,	2014.	
168	‘Annual	Report,	1997-1998:	Action	to	Achieve	Impact	on	Poverty	in	Kenya’,	June,	1998,	OxA,	MS.	Oxfam	
PRG/3/4/12/12:	Annual	Report	1997-1998,	‘Action	to	Achieve	Impact	on	Poverty	in	Kenya’.	
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without	the	knowledge	of	Leach	or	other	members	of	the	organisation.	(It	was	alleged	in	
the	 aftermath	 that	 Ethuro	 in	 particular	 ‘was	 electioneering…	 He	 organised	 [the]	 cross-
border	 meeting…	 without	 telling	 anyone…	 He	 clearly	 was	 doing	 this	 for	 his	 own	
advancement’.169)	 Threatened	 by	 Ethuro’s	 increasing	 popularity,	 the	 incumbent	 MP	 in	
Turkana	North	–	Emmanuel	Imara	–	sensed	an	opportunity	to	block	the	candidacy	of	his	
potential	rival,	and	so	reported	the	cross-border	meeting	to	the	President.	In	and	of	itself,	
organising	meetings	with	foreign	officials	and	inviting	them	onto	Kenyan	soil	without	the	
government’s	permission	was	a	 serious	 faux	pas;	but	 the	 situation	was	made	worse	by	
the	deliberate	actions	of	 Imara	to	heighten	the	tension.	Thus	whereas	the	meeting	was	
organised	by	the	Kenya	Pastoralist	Forum	–	the	replacement	for	the	PSC	in	Kenya	–	Imara	
reported	 that	 the	meeting	was	 a	 front	 for	 the	 activities	 of	 the	 Kenya	 Patriotic	 Front,	 a	
guerrilla	 terrorist	 group	 created	 by	 Koigi	 wa	 Wamwere	 and	 based	 (unfortunately	 for	
Oxfam)	in	Uganda.	Although	both	had	the	acronym	KPF,	 it	would	have	been	difficult	for	
Imara	 to	 mistake	 a	 pastoralist	 discussion	 group	 for	 a	 guerrilla	 terrorist	 group;	 by	 all	
accounts	his	report	to	the	President	was	a	desperate	attempt	to	have	Oxfam,	and	more	
importantly	Ethuro,	thrown	out	of	the	region.170	
	 As	the	elections	drew	near	there	was	more	than	enough	paranoia	at	the	heart	of	
government	 around	 guerrilla	 campaigns	 and	 opposition	 movements	 to	 trigger	 a	 stern	
response.	 The	 mention	 of	 the	 KPF	 and	 the	 discussions	 with	 Ugandan	 officials	 was	 of	
sufficient	concern	for	Moi	to	personally	telephone	Oxfam’s	Country	Representative.	In	a	
tense	 telephone	 call	 –	 during	 which	 Moi	 did	 most	 of	 the	 talking	 –	 the	 President	
questioned	why	Oxfam	was	supporting	opponents	to	his	government	and	ordered	Leach	
to	stop	any	meetings	within	two	hours.	Leach	thought	it	best	not	to	argue	the	point	and	
complied	 with	 the	 President’s	 demand;	 he	 also	 closed	 the	 entire	 Turkana	 programme	
soon	 after:	 ‘given	 political	 sensitivities’,	 he	 wrote,	 the	 organisation	 needed	 ‘time	 to	
rethink	strategy	in	the	region’.171	In	the	event,	Oxfam	was	fortunate	that	its	international	
profile	 was	 high	 and	 a	 portion	 of	 its	 recent	 work	 was	 in	 collaboration	 with	 DfID;	 this	
meant	that	Moi	was	reluctant	to	throw	the	NGO	out	of	the	country.	(A	local	organisation	
would,	 in	 all	 likelihood,	 have	 been	 disbanded	 immediately.)	 Another	 factor	 in	 Oxfam’s	
																																																						
169	Interview	with	author	no.	X,	3	January,	2015.	
170	Interview	with	author	no.	VIII,	6	November,	2014;	Interview	with	author	no.	XIV,	21	September,	2014;	
Interview	with	author	no.	XVII,	23	October,	2014;	Interview	with	author	no.	X,	3	January,	2015;	Interview	
with	author	no.	XV,	23	October,	2014;	Interview	with	author	no.	XX,	24	September,	2014.	
171	‘Annual	Report,	1997-1998:	Action	to	Achieve	Impact	on	Poverty	in	Kenya’,	June,	1998,	OxA,	MS.	Oxfam	
PRG/3/4/12/12:	Annual	Report	1997-1998,	‘Action	to	Achieve	Impact	on	Poverty	in	Kenya’.	
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favour	 was	 that	 it	 was	 a	 major	 provider	 of	 resources	 to	 areas	 such	 as	 Turkana.172	
Accordingly,	while	 the	MPs	might	 feel	 threatened	 and	 government	 ‘would	 shake	 you	 a	
little	bit	to	shut	you	up…	they	want	to	work	with	you	because	you	are	still	an	important	
development	actor	“out	 there”	 [in	marginalised	areas]’.173	In	addition,	Oxfam’s	contacts	
within	 the	Office	 of	 the	 President	 through	 the	 ALRMP	 helped	 to	 calm	 the	 situation	 by	
making	 clear	 to	 anyone	who	would	 listen	 that	 the	organisation	did	not	 involve	 itself	 in	
politics.174	Thus	 after	 extensive	 dialogue	 with	 the	 government	 about	 Oxfam	 plans	 and	
activities,	and	after	providing	assurances	that	‘all	activities	in	our	project	areas	[would	be]	
carried	out	in	collaboration	with	the	relevant	government	departments’,	the	organisation	
was	allowed	to	re-open	its	Turkana	programme	in	1998.175	
	 Sadly,	although	having	allies	in	the	Office	of	the	President	helped	to	smooth	over	
the	difficulties	in	Turkana,	the	ALRMP	itself	was	not	as	insulated	from	the	development-
politics	nexus	as	Oxfam	had	hoped.	When	it	was	first	established,	the	ALRMP	worked	in	
truly	marginalised	 areas	 of	 Baringo,	 Garissa,	 Isiolo,	Mandera,	Marsabit,	 Samburu,	 Tana	
River,	 Turkana	and	Wajir,	 and	Oxfam	anticipated	 that	 the	project	would	 take	 clientelist	
conversations	 out	 of	 development	 in	 the	 arid	 lands.176	However,	 interested	 Ministers	
soon	 expanded	 the	 programme	 to	 reach	 semi-arid	 areas,	 allegedly	 in	 order	 to	 benefit	
politically	(from	the	opportunity	to	provide	patronage)	and	financially.177	Thus,	when	the	
Vice	Presidency	for	Integrity	(INT)	–	which	investigates	allegations	of	fraud	and	corruption	
in	World	Bank-financed	projects	–	undertook	a	forensic	audit	of	ALRMP	activities	in	seven	
Kenyan	 districts	 in	 2009,	 it	 found	 that	 62	 per	 cent	 of	 expenditures	 between	 2006	 and	
2008	 were	 suspected	 fraudulent	 or	 questionable,	 equating	 to	 Ksh.	 511	 million.	
																																																						
172	This	was	especially	important	after	NORAD	left	the	region	when	Norway	broke	ties	with	the	Moi	
government	in	the	early	1990s.	
173	Interview	with	author	no.	VIII,	6	November,	2014;	Interview	with	author	no.	XIV,	21	September,	2014;	
Interview	with	author	no.	XVII,	23	October,	2014;	Interview	with	author	no.	X,	3	January,	2015;	Interview	
with	author	no.	XV,	23	October,	2014;	Interview	with	author	no.	XX,	24	September,	2014.	
174	Those	who	wished	to	campaign	for	election	to	parliament	had	to	resign	their	position,	a	factor	that	
helped	Oxfam’s	cause.	
175	‘Annual	Report,	May	1998	–	April	1999:	Orienting	Programme	Action	towards	Policy	Work	for	Greater	
Impact’,	April,	1999,	OxA,	MS.	Oxfam	PRG/3/4/12/13:	Annual	Report	1998-1999,	‘Orientating	Programme	
Action	Towards	Policy	Work	for	Greater	Impact’.	
176	Oxfam	continued	to	work	together	with	the	ALRMP	as	a	‘crucial	partner’	until	2010.	‘Oxfam	GB,	Kenya	
ASAL	Programme	Strategy’,	c.	2007,	Oxfam	Archive,	Lavington,	Nairobi:	Kenya	Programme	Peace	Building,	
Box	No.	1,	File:	Partners’	Narratives	and	Financial	Reports,	2005-2007.	
177	In	phase	two	of	the	project	in	2003,	11	districts	were	added:	Kajiado,	Kitui,	Laikipia,	Makueni,	Mbeere,	
Mwingi,	Narok,	Nyeri,	West	Pokot,	Tharaka	and	Trans	Mara.	Six	more	semi-arid	districts	would	be	added	in	
2006:	Kilifi,	Kwale,	Lamu,	Malindi,	Meru	North	and	Taita	Taveta.	Interview	with	author	no.	IX,	16	October,	
2014.	
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(Unsurprisingly,	the	project	was	suspended	and	closed	in	2010.)178	A	joint	INT	and	Kenyan	
Internal	Audit	Department	(IAD)	review	later	reduced	the	amount	to	Ksh.	340	million,	or	
approximately	 45	 per	 cent	 of	 audited	 funds.	 Nonetheless,	 if	 even	 the	 reduced	 level	 of	
misappropriation	had	been	experienced	across	all	the	districts	involved	in	the	project,	for	
those	two	years	alone	the	amount	defrauded	from	the	scheme	would	have	reached	Ksh.	
1	 billion.	 The	 INT	 report	 did,	 indeed,	 conclude	 that	 fraud	 was	 ‘systemic’	 and	 involved	
possible	 collusion	 with	 accountants	 in	 district	 treasuries	 (who	 signed	 cheques	 for	
individual	 projects),	 staff	 in	 Kenyan	 commercial	 banks	 (who	 retrospectively	 altered	
cheques	 and	 bank	 statements	 to	 suit	 those	 defrauding	 the	 scheme)	 and	 even	 Kenya	
Revenue	Authority	officials.	Given	that	many	of	the	staff	of	the	ALRMP	had	been	with	the	
project	 since	 its	 inception,	 the	evaluation	 team	also	 considered	 it	entirely	possible	 that	
the	financial	mismanagement	of	the	project	–	including	the	misuse	of	funds	from	Oxfam	
and	other	donors	–	was	prevalent	across	the	whole	timespan	of	the	project.179	
	 Somewhat	ironically,	the	project	had	been	moved	in	2008	from	the	Office	of	the	
President	 to	 the	 newly	 created	 Ministry	 for	 the	 Development	 of	 Northern	 Kenya	 and	
other	 Arid	 Lands,	 headed	 by	 Mohamed	 Elmi.	 It	 fell	 to	 Elmi,	 therefore,	 to	 defend	 the	
project	 in	 Parliament	 in	 2012.	 This	 he	 did	 by	 denying	 any	 personal	 knowledge	 of	
misappropriation	 and	 by	 asserting	 that	 the	 funds	 suspected	 of	 misuse	 amounted	 to	 a	
mere	four	per	cent	of	the	project	outlay.	(The	figure	has	since	been	dismissed	as	‘a	gross	
distortion	 by	 any	 reasonable	 calculation’.)180	Elmi	 was,	 of	 course,	 expected	 to	 toe	 the	
government	line	as	a	Cabinet	Minister.	Moreover,	his	own	time	at	the	head	of	the	project	
did	not	overlap	for	more	than	a	month	or	so	with	the	audited	period	of	 the	project,	so	
																																																						
178	World	Bank	Group	Integrity	Vice	Presidency	(INT),	‘Forensic	Audit	Report:	Arid	Lands	Resource	
Management	Project	–	Phase	II’,	July,	2011,	available	via	Google	cache	of	
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTDOII/Resources/Kenya_Arid_Lands_Report.pdf	[accessed	12	
December,	2014].	See	also	AfriCOG’s	publication	on	the	issue:	‘Kenya’s	Drought	Cash	Cow:	Lessons	from	the	
Forensic	Audit	of	the	World	Bank	Arid	Lands	Resource	Management	Project’,	December,	2012,	available	at	
http://www.africog.org/sites/default/files/ALRMP_Report_final.pdf	[accessed	12	December,	2014].	See	
also	INT	and	IAD,	‘Redacted	Joint	Review	to	Quantify	Ineligible	Expenditures	for	the	Seven	Districts	and	
Headquarters	of	the	Arid	Lands	Resource	Management	Program	Phase	II	(ALRMP	II)	for	FY07	&	FY08’,	18	
November,	2011,	available	at	
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTDOII/Resources/GOK_WB_Redacted_Joint_Report.pdf	[accessed	12	
December,	2014].	
179	The	fraud	itself	took	numerous	forms,	including	kickbacks	to	managers	in	return	for	granting	
development	funds	to	particular	districts.	In	such	cases	cash	was	often	given	to	managers	immediately	
when	the	cheque	that	they	had	written	for	a	project	had	cleared.	Suspected	fraud	also	included	the	use	of	
invoices	instead	of	receipts	for	claiming	reimbursement,	bid	rigging	in	favour	of	well-connected	suppliers,	
payment	ahead	of	the	receipt	of	goods	and	‘double	dipping’.	‘Double	dipping’	meant	that	finance	from	
donors	such	as	the	UNDP,	the	European	Union	and	Oxfam	was	claimed	despite	the	World	Bank	already	
covering	the	expenditure.	INT,	‘Forensic	Audit	Report’,	p.	16;	AfriCOG,	‘Kenya’s	Drought	Cash	Cow’,	pp.	11-
16.	
180	AfriCOG,	‘Kenya’s	Drought	Cash	Cow’,	p.	25;	INT,	‘Forensic	Audit	Report’,	p.	6.	
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there	 is	no	 suggestion	 that	he	knew	of	or	 condoned	 the	 fraudulent	misuse	of	 funds.	 In	
such	circumstances,	and	with	his	personal	investment	in	the	project	and	his	knowledge	of	
how	important	the	ALRMP	was	to	those	on	the	ground	in	the	arid	districts,	it	is	perhaps	
no	surprise	that	Elmi	chose	to	defend	the	project.	At	the	same	time,	others	more	closely	
involved	with	the	day-to-day	workings	of	the	ALRMP	found	it	untenable	to	continue	their	
work:	 ‘once	you’re	really	aware	of	the	corruption…	within	government,	the	diversion	of	
resources,	[and]	the	bribes…’	and	have	witnessed	the	‘very	ugly	incidents	around	where	
resources	were	going	and…	who	was	diverting	resources	where’,	 ‘it	becomes	impossible	
to	work	[there]’.	Tellingly,	this	interviewee	left	the	project	in	the	early	2000s.181	
	 Nor	was	the	ALRMP	the	only	high-level	initiative	supported	by	Oxfam	to	go	awry	in	
this	 manner:	 the	 organisation	 had	 also	 been	 involved	 with	 the	 launch	 of	 the	 National	
Poverty	 Eradication	 Plan	 (NPEP)	 in	 1998.	 The	 NPEP	 was	 a	 15-year	 plan	 for	 poverty	
reduction,	 improved	 service	 coverage	 and	 broad-based	 economic	 growth.	 Oxfam	
participated	 in	 the	 first	 national	 stakeholder	 workshop	 and	 hoped	 to	 influence	 the	
government’s	 attitude	 to	 poverty	 eradication	 by	 encouraging	 ‘people-oriented	 policy	
changes’.182	However,	 later	 evaluations	 argued	 that	 the	 programme	 ‘fuelled	 the	 [Moi]	
regime’s	political	patronage	system,	both	at	the	national	and	district	levels…	[serving]	to	
strengthen	existing	power	relations’.	According	to	evidence	obtained	from	more	than	50	
interviews,	 beneficiaries	 of	 the	 Ksh.	 126.5	 million	 spent	 under	 the	 scheme	 by	 2003	
‘tended	to	be	KANU	associates	who	were	linked	to	the	programme	by	their	patrons…	In	
most	 districts,	 government	 officials	 and	 local	 politicians	 used	 the	 programme	 to	
strengthen	 their	 own	 power	 hold	 and	 to	 reward	 political	 clients’.183	Oxfam’s	 conflict	
initiative	would	also	find	itself	temporarily	bogged	down	by	the	political	machinations	of	
the	 late	Moi	regime:	 in	 late	2001	 it	was	reported	that	there	was	 ‘some	unhappiness’	 in	
the	Office	of	the	President	about	aspects	of	the	conflict	work.	In	October,	Moi	unilaterally	
cancelled	a	meeting	of	the	National	Steering	Committee,	an	act	that	threatened	to	derail	
																																																						
181	In	particular	the	interviewee	remembered	there	being	‘a	lot	of	question	marks’	about	the	World	Bank	
team	leader,	Dr.	Christine	Cornelius,	whose	role	had	been	to	ensure	that	the	project	abided	by	the	
conditions	of	the	agreements	between	the	Kenya	government	and	World	Bank.	The	interviewee	recalled	‘a	
lot	of	talk	about	resources	being	diverted	and	whether	[Cornelius]	should	have	been	allowed	to	manage	
that	project…	not	least	because	she	was	married	to	a	Kenyan-Somali’.	Interview	with	author	no.	IV,	6	
January,	2015.	
182	‘Annual	Report,	1997-1998:	Action	to	Achieve	Impact	on	Poverty	in	Kenya’,	June,	1998,	OxA,	MS.	Oxfam	
PRG/3/4/12/12:	Annual	Report	1997-1998,	‘Action	to	Achieve	Impact	on	Poverty	in	Kenya’.	
183	D.	Patrick,	H.	Els	and	F.	Wanyama,	‘The	Emergence	of	Multilevel	Governance	in	Kenya’,	Working	Paper	
No.	7,	Interdisciplinary	Research	Group	on	International	Agreements	and	Development,	2005,	pp.	7-10;	see	
also	J.	Campbell,	‘International	Development	and	Bilateral	Aid	to	Kenya	in	the	1990s’,	Journal	of	
Anthropological	Research,	Vol.	64,	No.	2	(2008),	pp.	262-263.	
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its	 vital	 peacebuilding	 work.184	Later,	 it	 emerged	 that	 the	 President	 was	 particularly	
unhappy	 about	 the	 high-profile	 role	 the	 NCCK	 was	 taking	 in	 the	 Committee	 and	 in	
proposals	 for	 new	 conflict	 management	 projects,	 and	 wished	 to	 see	 the	 group	
excluded.185	
	 Thus,	 for	 all	 the	 success	 that	 Oxfam	 had	 in	 nudging	 the	 government	 to	 make	
changes	 in	 its	approach	to	pastoral	development,	emergencies	and	conflict,	and	despite	
its	indirect	victory	in	having	its	staff	elected	to	Parliament,	when	Adam	Leach	left	Kenya	in	
1999	he	wrote	sombrely	that	‘the	state	of	governance	in	Kenya	is	as	bad	as	it	was	in	1994	
with	 little	 real	 prospect	 of	 changing’.	 At	 the	 root	 of	 Kenya’s	 ills	 remained	 a	 ‘plunder	
regime’,	which	rendered	institutions	‘barely	able	if	genuinely	concerned	[to	deal]	with	the	
needs	 of	 citizens’.	 The	 NGO	 sector	 in	 Kenya	 had	 also,	 he	 wrote,	 been	 undermined	 by	
corruption	and	mismanagement,	making	it	‘vulnerable	to	the	very	excesses	of	which	the	
government	is	accused’.186	One	step	forward	–	whether	in	the	encouragement	of	pastoral	
associations,	 as	 regards	 livestock	 marketing	 or	 in	 terms	 of	 peace	 and	 conflict	
management	and	humanitarian	responses	–	had,	therefore,	been	followed	for	the	most	
part	 by	 two	 steps	 back	 as	 the	 tentacles	 of	 patronage	 and	 corruption	 leached	 the	
resources	and,	more	importantly,	the	credibility	from	many	of	the	best	initiatives	such	as	
the	 ALRMP,	 and	 compromised	 many	 of	 those	 MPs	 and	 officials	 in	 whom	 Oxfam	 had	
invested	time,	training	and	faith.	Yet	if	Oxfam’s	impact	on	Kenyan	development	was	less	
than	it	had	hoped	for,	it	should	be	noted	that	the	impact	of	the	Kenya	programme	on	the	
organisation	 had	 been	 profound.	 In	 particular,	 Oxfam’s	 work	 with	 pastoralists	 –	 both	
emergency	and	developmental	–	helped	to	shape	the	approach	the	organisation	took	to	
conflict	work	and	methods	of	drought	 response	across	 the	 region.187	Moreover,	 though	
the	impact	on	the	Moi	government	was	minimal,	Oxfam’s	work	during	the	1990s	laid	the	
foundations	 for	work	with	 a	new	government	under	President	Kibaki	 on	 issues	 such	as	
livestock	 management,	 pastoral	 livelihoods,	 peace	 and	 conflict	 management,	 drought	
management	and	humanitarian	interventions.	
	
	
																																																						
184	‘Kenya	National	Pastoral	Policy	Programme	Evaluation’,	March,	2002,	OxA,	MS.	Oxfam	PRG/3/6/10/2:	
Kenya	National	Pastoral	Policy	Programme	Evaluation,	March	2002.	
185	The	NCCK,	of	course,	was	one	of	the	foremost	opponents	to	the	Moi	regime	in	the	early	1990s	and	
continued	to	act	as	a	gadfly	to	the	state.	Interview	with	author	no.	VIII,	6	November,	2014.	
186	‘CR	Final	Report,	September	1994	–	April	1999:	Managing	Change	at	a	Programme	Level’,	April,	1999,	
OxA,	MS.	Oxfam	PRG/3/7/17/8:	Managing	Change	at	Programme	Level,	1994-1999	CR	Final	Report,	April	
1999;	Interview	with	author	no.	XI,	4	December,	2014	
187	Interview	with	author	no.	III,	4	December,	2014.	
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EPILOGUE – ‘CIRCULARITY’ 
 
When	Moi	 left	 office	 there	 was	 a	 great	 deal	 of	 hope	 within	 Oxfam	 that	 things	 would	
finally	 change.	 Staff	 noticed	 almost	 immediately	 that	 the	 government	was	much	more	
responsive	 to	NGO	 requests	 for	meetings	 and	 information,	 and	 policy	 formation	 under	
Kibaki	appeared	much	more	open	to	influence	by	the	NGO	sector.	Where	Moi	had	sought	
to	 reinforce	 the	 bureaucratic-executive	 state	 and	 a	 steep	 pyramid	 of	 power	 with	 the	
President	 at	 the	 apex,	 Kibaki	 articulated	 a	 desire	 to	 restrain	 the	 executive	 presidency;	
where	Moi	had	 seen	NGOs	as	 a	 threat	 to	 the	 security	of	 the	 state,	 Kibaki	 brought	 civil	
society	 actors	 into	 government	 decision-making	 via	 district	 development	 planning:	 the	
NGO-state	divide	had	become	increasingly	blurred.188	(Indeed,	Oxfam’s	influence	can	still	
be	 traced	 in	 the	Kibaki	 regime’s	 legislation	on	ASAL	development,	 emergency	 response	
and	conflict	management.)	Regrettably,	however,	the	promise	of	wielding	real	 influence	
(if	 they	 stepped	 inside	 the	 ‘tent’)	 served	 to	 neuter	 or	 co-opt	 many	 of	 the	 previous	
regime’s	 most	 vociferous	 opponents.	 Consequently,	 the	 blurring	 of	 the	 NGO-state	
boundary	allowed	 the	President	 to	concentrate	his	efforts	on	developing	high-potential	
areas	of	agricultural	land	while	entrenching	the	Mount	Kenya	Mafia	at	the	pinnacle	of	the	
patronage	networks	vacated	by	Moi.189	
	 Hence,	for	Oxfam,	the	‘marked	change	in	the	political	 landscape’	had	made	little	
tangible	 difference	 on	 the	 ground	 by	 the	 mid-2000s:	 ‘on	 the	 whole,	 institutions	 of	
government	 are	 still	 not	 responsive	 to	 poor	 people’s	 concerns,	 and	 ethnic-based	 and	
patronage	politics	persist…	[pervading]	all	aspects	of	political,	social	and	economic	life’.190	
Meanwhile,	as	the	political	elite	‘continue	to	capture	public	institutions	and	resources	to	
serve	 their	 own	 interests’,	 drought	 in	 the	 ASAL	 areas	 in	 2005	 and	 2006	 exposed	 the	
alarming	‘absence	of	the	apparatus	of	the	state’.	This	continued	absence,	Oxfam	warned,	
left	‘historical	grievances	open	to	political	manipulation…	without	restraint	or	redress’	(a	
chilling	 note	 considering	 the	 post-election	 violence	 that	 would	 take	 place	 in	 2007	 and	
																																																						
188	J.	Brass,	‘Blurring	Boundaries:	The	Integration	of	NGOs	into	Governance	in	Kenya’,	Governance,	Vol.	25,	
No.	2	(2012),	pp.	209-235.	
189	Branch,	Kenya:	Between	Hope	and	Despair,	pp.	252-262.	
190	‘Oxfam	GB,	Kenya	ASAL	Programme	Strategy’,	c.	2007,	Oxfam	Archive,	Lavington,	Nairobi:	Kenya	
Programme	Peace	Building,	Box	No.	1,	File:	Partners’	Narratives	and	Financial	Reports,	2005-2007;	‘Oxfam	
GB	in	Kenya,	National	Change	Strategy	Document,	2008	–	2011’,	April	2008,	Oxfam	Archive,	Lavington,	
Nairobi,	Kenya	Programme	Peace	Building,	Box	No.	1,	File:	Partners’	Narratives	and	Financial	Reports,	2005-
2007.	
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2008).191	Nonetheless,	 ‘prior	to	the	2007	general	election,	Oxfam’s	assumption	was	that	
change	 in	 Kenya	was	 broadly	 linear…’.192	‘One	 thing	we	 really	 underestimated’	 recalled	
one	member	of	staff,	was	‘how	government	works,	or	doesn’t	[work]…	It	felt	like	politics	
was	everything,	because	of	Moi…	[and]	the	enemy	is	clear	and	you	can	all	unite	around	
that.	But	actually	you	haven’t	really	been	able	to	build	in	your	mind	a	proposition	of	how	
it	would	work	afterwards…’.193	The	events	of	early	2008	 led	 the	organisation	 to	 rethink	
any	 notion	 of	 linear	 improvement	 under	 Moi’s	 successor.194	In	 fact,	 as	 ethnic	 conflict	
spiralled	out	of	control,	Oxfam	wrote	of	the	‘circularity’	of	the	Kenyan	situation,	whereby	
insecurity,	 the	 lack	 of	 basic	 rights,	 and	 systems	of	 patronage	 and	 ethnic	 segregation	 in	
business,	 politics	 and	 education	 served	 to	 consolidate	 the	 self-serving	 actions	 of	 those	
with	 access	 to	 power	 and	 resources,	 and	 to	 benefit	 those	 capable	 of	 maintaining	 the	
status	quo	based	on	exclusivity.195	
	 Yet	if	there	was	a	certain	circularity	to	the	failure	of	development	in	Kenya,	there	
was	 circularity	 also	 in	 Oxfam’s	 response.	 Without	 framing	 it	 in	 such	 a	 way,	 Oxfam’s	
approach	 in	 the	1990s	had	been	a	 combination	of	each	of	 the	different	methodologies	
the	organisation	had	used	in	Kenya	over	the	previous	30	years.	The	cajoling	of	the	state	to	
be	 ‘responsible’	was	 thus	 reminiscent	 of	 the	 early	 Kenyatta	 years;	while	 the	 efforts	 to	
encourage	 grass	 roots	 demands	 and	 empowerment,	 the	 emergency	 operationality	 and	
the	 questions	 raised	 by	 such	 intervention	were	 redolent	 of	 the	 programme	 in	 the	 late	
1970s	and	1980s.	Moreover,	similarly	to	the	way	that	concerns	about	engagement	with	
the	 Kenyatta	 state	 had	 been	 dampened	 by	 the	 optimism	 of	 the	 1960s,	 Oxfam’s	
hopefulness	 in	 the	 multiparty	 era	 of	 the	 1990s	 encouraged	 the	 organisation	 to	 work	
alongside	the	state	more	closely	than	at	any	point	since	the	Kenyatta	era.	Thereafter,	just	
as	Oxfam’s	disillusionment	with	the	Kenyatta	government	had	come	to	the	surface	as	the	
latter	 revealed	 its	 true	 nature	 in	 the	 later	 years	 of	 the	 1960s,	 the	 organisation’s	
disillusionment	in	the	late	1990s	came	after	its	high-level	engagements	succumbed	to	the	
intense	 politicisation	 of	 development	 in	 Moi’s	 Kenya.	 Continuing	 with	 the	 theme	 of	
																																																						
191	‘Oxfam	GB,	Kenya	ASAL	Programme	Strategy’,	c.	2007,	Oxfam	Archive,	Lavington,	Nairobi:	Kenya	
Programme	Peace	Building,	Box	No.	1,	File:	Partners’	Narratives	and	Financial	Reports,	2005-2007.	
192	‘Oxfam	GB	in	Kenya,	National	Change	Strategy	Document,	2008	–	2011’,	April	2008,	Oxfam	Archive,	
Lavington,	Nairobi,	Kenya	Programme	Peace	Building,	Box	No.	1,	File:	Partners’	Narratives	and	Financial	
Reports,	2005-2007.	
193	Interview	with	author	no.	XVII,	23	October,	2014.	
194	‘Oxfam	GB	in	Kenya,	National	Change	Strategy	Document,	2008	–	2011’,	April	2008,	Oxfam	Archive,	
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Programme	Peace	Building,	Box	No.	1,	File:	Partners’	Narratives	and	Financial	Reports,	2005-2007.	
		 269	
circularity,	much	as	Moi’s	ruthless	governance	 in	the	1980s	suppressed	the	appetite	 for	
direct	 engagement	 with	 the	 Kenyan	 state	 among	 Oxfam	 staff,	 in	 the	 late	 2000s	 the	
unabashed	 criminality	 of	 elements	 of	 the	 government	 also	 discouraged	 Oxfam	 from	
working	 too	 closely	with	 the	Kibaki	 administration.	 Furthermore,	on	both	occasions,	 an	
organisation	founded	on	faith	in	the	state	as	the	key	developmental	actor	lost	its	sense	of	
direction	 and	 faced	 serious	 questions	 over	 its	 orientation:	 thus	 while	 Oxfam	 became	
operational	 during	 the	 1980s,	 in	 the	 2000s	 the	 organisation	 adopted	 an	 equally	
technocratic	 approach,	 concentrating	 on	 finding	 technical	 ‘solutions’	 to	 Kenya’s	
development	 problems.	 In	 each	 period,	 the	 focus	 on	 implementing	 physically	 and	
environmentally	 appropriate	 interventions	 –	 as	 opposed	 to	 challenging	 the	 political	
structures	that	condemned	many	Kenyans	to	poverty	–	disappointed	many	staff	versed	in	
Oxfam	 values	 that	 conceptualised	 development	 as	 about	 more	 than	 drilling	 boreholes	
and	 distributing	 equipment. 196 	To	 complete	 the	 circle,	 in	 2012-2014	 the	 Kenya	
programme	 was	 undergoing	 a	 shift	 back	 towards	 a	 focus	 on	 influencing	 government,	
although	this	time	utilising	the	devolved	powers	at	county	and	constituency	 level	under	
the	 new	 constitution.	 The	 complex	 interaction	 between	 ‘values’,	 ‘pragmatism’	 and	 the	
political,	 economic,	 social	 and	 historical	 context	 in	 which	 the	 organisation	 works	
continues	 to	 define	 Oxfam’s	 role,	 therefore,	 and	 although	 a	 rough	 circular	 pattern	 is	
discernible	 when	 taking	 a	 long-view	 of	 its	 interventions,	 the	 forces	 that	 forged	 this	
pattern	and	all	of	its	intricacies	are	specific	to	Oxfam	in	Kenya.	Thus	it	would	be	unwise	to	
generalise	outwards	 from	this	 specific	example;	as	argued	above,	broad	generalisations	
and	ahistorical	assertions	about	NGOs	are	unable	to	fully	capture	the	complexity	of	NGOs	
and	their	diverse	roles	in	development	across	the	globe.	
																																																						
196	Interview	with	author	no.	XVII,	23	October,	2014;	Interview	with	author	no.	VIII,	6	November,	2014;	
Interview	with	author	no.	II,	7	October,	2014.	
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Conclusion 
	
‘THE	ORCHESTRA	ON	THE	TITANIC?’	–	OXFAM	IN	KENYA,	1963-2002	
	
	
	
	
	
	
‘What	 is	 meant	 by	 success?	 Reaching	 project	 milestones?	 Having	 an	 impact	 at	
community	 level?	Raising	awareness	of	a	 theme?	All	 [of	 these]?	Success	 is	a	 rather	
grand	word	 in	my	view…	[My]	project	probably	 [had]	 little	 lasting	 impact	 [whereas]	
the	impact	on	individuals’	lives	was,	I	think	considerable.	Isn’t	that	what	projects	are	
really	about?’	
Extract	from	interview	with	author	no.	VI,	1	September,	2014.	
	
‘The	failure	of	development	overall	[was	disappointing]…	We	weren’t	tackling	the	
most	intransigent	problems…	[and]	we	talked	a	lot	about	reaching	the	poorest,	but	
we	probably	didn’t.’	
Extract	from	interview	with	author	no.	XXI,	28	April,	2014.	
	
	
The	question	of	whether	Oxfam	was	akin	to	the	‘Orchestra	on	the	Titanic’	as	regards	its	
work	 in	Kenya	elicited	a	variety	of	responses	from	former	Oxfam	staff;	but	most	settled	
into	one	of	 two	camps,	as	 illustrated	by	 the	quotes	above.	 Indeed,	 three	decades	after	
the	Africa	 Committee	 divided	over	what	Oxfam	had	 achieved	 in	Africa,	 the	major	 fault	
line	of	that	period	–	between	those	who	celebrate	the	organisation’s	minor	triumphs	and	
those	who	 lament	 the	 fact	 that	Oxfam	 has	 been	 unable	 to	 contribute	 to	 development	
more	broadly	–	 is	still	evident.	This	speaks,	of	course,	to	the	unavoidable	subjectivity	of	
judgements	as	regards	the	 ‘success’	or	 ‘failure’	of	NGO	development	 initiatives.	For	this	
reason,	 the	 foregoing	 has	 focused	 instead	 on	 the	 role	an	NGO	 like	Oxfam	 fulfils	 in	 the	
grand	 scheme	 of	 Kenyan	 development,	 and	 has	 sought	 to	 analyse	 the	 mechanisms,	
dynamics,	structures	and	discourses	of	Oxfam	approaches	and	operations	in	a	particular	
context.	 In	 doing	 so,	 it	 has	 shown	 that	Oxfam	did	 not	 adopt	 an	 inappropriate,	 ‘off	 the	
shelf’	solution	for	Kenya,	but	instead	weighed	up	the	shifting	development	context	in	the	
country	and	defined	its	role	accordingly.	
	 Moreover,	 at	 no	 time	 did	Oxfam	 exclude	 politics	 from	 its	 analysis	 of	 poverty	 in	
Kenya.	 Given	 Oxfam’s	 very	 political	 history,	 the	 fact	 that	 it	 undertook	 to	 examine	 and	
remedy	 the	 political	 causes	 of	 poverty	 in	 Kenya	 should	 not,	 perhaps,	 be	 particularly	
shocking.	 Yet	 to	 date,	 where	 researchers	 have	 managed	 to	 pull	 away	 from	 studying	
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statistics	 regarding	 the	number	and	cost	 ratios	of	NGO	projects,	 they	have	 fallen	 into	a	
different	 type	 of	 generalisation,	 a	 generalisation	 that	 suggests	 that	 NGOs	 serve	 to	
depoliticise	causes	of	poverty	located	in	the	decisions	taken	by	national	governments	and	
Western	 donors.	 Thus	 authors	 such	 as	 James	 Ferguson	 and	 Arturo	 Escobar	 have	 been	
fixated	 on	 ‘development	 paradigms’	 and	 ‘power-knowledge	 dyads’.	 Through	 discourse-
analysis	 they	 have	 identified	 NGOs	 as	 a	 constituent	 part	 of	 a	 Western-dominated	
development	‘machine’,	whereby	the	discourse	and	instrumental	effects	of	development	
interventions	(both	promoted	by	NGOs)	serve	to	legitimise	Western	capitalist	hegemony	
while	 simultaneously	 buttressing	 submissive	 ‘southern’	 governments	 and	 their	
‘comprador’	 elites.	 Such	 studies	do,	of	 course,	have	utility:	 they	have	asked	 timely	 and	
pertinent	questions	about	the	unseen	role	that	international	organisations	can	play	in	the	
politics	of	 the	global	south.	Nonetheless,	as	 is	 the	nature	of	paradigms	and	overarching	
theories,	 they	are	 somewhat	 static	and	 lack	 the	historicism	necessary	 to	 fully	articulate	
the	variegated	role	that	NGOs	actually	play	in	the	development	of	the	global	south.	The	
role	of	NGOs	in	national	development	and	the	areas	of	congruence	and	conflict	between	
NGOs	 and	 state	 apparatuses	 have	 been	 theorised	 to	 breaking	 point	 either	 by	
extrapolating	from	a	small	sample	across	a	short	period	of	time	(as	Ferguson	did	for	CIDA	
in	Lesotho)	or	by	making	predictions	about	the	expected	behaviour	and	impact	of	these	
organisations	 from	 (among	 others)	 Hegelian,	 Weberian	 or	 Gramscian	 social	 theories	
about	state-civil	society	interactions.	
	 Generalising	 in	 such	 a	 fashion	 only	 takes	 the	 field	 so	 far,	 however,	 for	 just	 as	
neighbouring	 states	 may	 have	 vastly	 divergent	 ideological	 foundations	 and	 attitudes	
towards	 development	 and	 civil	 society,	 so	 do	 outwardly	 similar	 NGOs	 –	 or	 even	 the	
different	 country	 offices	 of	 larger	NGOs	 such	 as	Oxfam	–	 have	 different	 approaches	 to	
development	 and	 diverging	 perceptions	 of	 the	 appropriate	 role	 of	 the	 state.	 State	 and	
civil	 society	 then	 impact	 on	 each	 other	 in	 a	 reflexive	 fashion:	 for,	 as	 development	
interventions	make	 some	 form	 of	 impact	 on	 the	 host	 nation,	 so	 does	 the	 host	 nation	
impact	 upon	 the	 NGO	 and	 the	 role	 it	 adopts	 in	 development.	 As	 regards	 Oxfam	 in	
particular,	this	thesis	has	argued	that	the	Field	Director	and	the	periphery	could	help	to	
shape	 policy,	 both	 on	 the	 ground	 and	 in	 Oxford.	 As	 a	 result	 of	 its	 responsiveness	 and	
flexibility,	the	NGO	could	be	described	as	‘plumbers	without	borders’	in	one	nation	at	the	
same	time	as	it	appeared	to	be	a	radical	and	subversive	political	agency	in	a	neighbouring	
country.	To	avoid	the	potential	paralysis	of	continual	contextualisation,	though,	the	thesis	
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adopted	a	dynamic	perspective,	acknowledging	 that	 the	 role	NGOs	occupy	depends	 for	
the	 most	 part	 on	 three	 factors:	 firstly,	 the	 values	 the	 NGO	 upholds	 (their	 mandate,	
understanding	of	development	needs	and	perceptions	of	the	role	of	the	state);	secondly,	
the	necessary	pragmatism	of	development	organisations	(their	need	to	operate,	financial	
circumstances,	and	relations	with	the	host	government);	and	thirdly,	the	combination	of	
said	values	and	pragmatism	with	the	political,	economic,	social	and	historical	context	 in	
which	 the	NGO	 is	active.	Together,	 these	 factors	define	 the	role	 that	an	NGO	adopts	 in	
each	country.	 Importantly,	this	dynamic	perspective	does	not	postulate	conclusions,	but	
instead	 requires	 historical	 and	 empirical	 investigation;	 rather	 than	 ‘magic	 bullets’,	
‘COMPRANGOs’	or	any	other	catchy	designation,	NGOs	are	best	understood	as	an	arena	
within	 which	 the	 ideological	 and	 practical	 tensions	 regarding	 development	 are	
internalised,	debated	and	resolved.	Our	knowledge	of	this	process,	even	for	one	NGO,	is	
extremely	 limited;	 the	 thesis	 contributes,	 therefore,	 to	 a	 wider	 endeavour	 to	 test	 the	
predominant	theories	of	social	science	empirically	and,	above	all,	historically.	
	
	
	
OXFAM AND THE DEVELOPMENTAL STATE IN KENYA 
 
Despite	 its	 capitalist	 orientation,	 the	 state	 loomed	 large	 in	 Kenyan	 development	 right	
across	 the	 period	 under	 examination.	 The	 challenge	 and	 purpose	 of	 independent	
nationhood	was	 felt	 to	be	synonymous	with	the	 idea	of	national	development,	and	this	
justified	 the	 concretisation	 of	 the	 colonial	 ‘developmental	 state’	 apparatus	 alongside	
many	other	(less	savoury)	elements	of	the	colonial	state,	including	the	powerful	provincial	
administration	and	the	ruthless	suppression	of	dissident	voices.	But	the	appropriate	role	
for	the	state	in	development	was	(and	remains)	an	ideological	and	political	battleground,	
and	 Oxfam	 believed	 it	 could	 have	 some	 influence	 on	 the	 outcome.	 For	 President	
Kenyatta,	 the	 issue	 of	 development	 was	 characterised	 as	 a	 question	 of	 morality;	 he	
preached	 that	 hard	 work	 and	 self-interest	 were	 the	 true	 drivers	 of	 development,	
economic	 growth	 and	 the	 trickle-down	 of	 the	 fruits	 of	 independence.1	He	 rejected	 any	
notion	of	redistribution	and	dismissed	arguments	in	favour	of	intervening	to	resolve	the	
disparities	of	wealth	and	opportunity	evident	between	Kenya’s	ethnic	groups	and	social	
classes.	Oginga	Odinga,	on	the	other	hand,	felt	that	there	was	little	morality	to	be	found	
																																																						
1	Branch,	Kenya:	Between	Hope	and	Despair,	p.	63.	
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in	watching	 the	 poor	 struggle	 to	 pull	 themselves	 up	 by	 the	 bootstraps	 of	 non-existent	
boots.	 Yet	 for	 both	 Kenyatta	 and	 Odinga,	 the	 morality	 of	 development	 was	 closely	
intertwined	with	 issues	of	ethnicity	and	politics:	the	need	to	serve	ethnic	support	bases	
rhetorically	 and	 practically	 in	 order	 to	 retain	 their	 political	 support	 influenced	 these	
national	and	ethnic	leaders	to	come	to	very	different	conclusions	about	the	appropriate	
role	 for	 the	 state	 in	 Kenyan	 development.	 Accordingly,	 Kenyatta’s	 promotion	 of	
individualism	 matched	 well	 with	 Kikuyu	 culture,	 while	 Odinga’s	 ‘communocratic’	
prescriptions	dovetailed	with	Luo	philosophy.	More	importantly,	to	Kenyatta	it	was	clear	
that	the	Kikuyu	would	best	entrench	the	economic	and	political	advantage	that	they	had	
acquired	 during	 the	 later	 years	 of	 the	 colonial	 period	 if	 ‘welfarism’	 and	 redistribution	
could	be	avoided	after	decolonisation,	and	if	development	was	instead	oriented	towards	
economic	 growth	 above	 all	 else.	 In	 contrast,	 by	 the	 mid-1960s	 Odinga’s	 support-base	
comprised	outsiders,	both	politically	and	economically,	and	those	who	needed	a	‘leg-up’	
to	benefit	 from	 independence.	These	diverging	 interpretations	of	national	development	
and	the	role	of	the	state	helped	to	shatter	the	fragile	elite	and	ethnic	consensus	on	which	
KANU	was	based,	and	which	had	been	thought	so	vital	to	the	independence	cause.	
	 Subsequently,	 service	 provision	 became	 increasingly	 politicised	 and	 directed	 by	
ethnic	concerns.	Of	course,	the	provision	of	services	had	always	been	a	political	issue:	the	
conflict	 between	 Kenyatta	 and	 Odinga	 revealed	 that	 it	 was	 far	 more	 than	 a	 ‘neutral’	
obligation	 on	 behalf	 of	 the	 state	 towards	 its	 citizens.	 But	 after	 the	 split	 at	 the	 top	 of	
Kenya’s	 elite,	 the	 provision	 of	 services	 would	 perform	 a	 marked	 political	 function:	 in	
deciding	where	to	locate	development	projects,	boreholes,	schools,	medical	facilities	and	
other	services,	Kenyatta’s	government	could	reward	allies	and	punish	enemies;	the	state	
could	 create	 jobs,	 improve	 the	 quality	 of	 life	 and	 facilitate	 access	 to	 agriculture	 for	 its	
favourites	 and	 supporters,	while	 at	 the	 same	 time	 casting	 a	watchful	 eye	 over	 suspect	
populations	 or	 denying	 opponents	 any	 place	 in	 Kenyan	 development.	 The	 doctrine	 of	
‘African	Socialism’	was	intended	to	conceal	Kenyatta’s	capitalist	leanings	and	the	fact	that	
his	 growth-centric	 development	 model	 more-than-conveniently	 served	 his	 political	
interests;	 but	 it	 was	 also	 an	 attempt	 to	 obscure	 the	 political	 action	 performed	 by	 the	
government	through	development	interventions	and	to	silence	alternatives	to	Kenyatta’s	
development	 apparatus	 as	 advocated	 by	 Odinga	 and	 others.	 To	 do	 so,	 it	 combined	
modernising	rhetoric	with	a	smattering	of	African	‘tradition’.	Yet	more	than	that,	‘African	
Socialism’	was	designed	as	an	 ‘anti-politics	machine’	doctrine:	by	 reducing	poverty	 to	a	
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technical	 issue,	 prescribing	 ‘neutral’	 and	 ‘scientific’	 solutions	 to	 that	 poverty,	 and	
condemning	 and	 silencing	 opponents	 to	 such	 interventions	 by	 labelling	 them	 as	
‘backward’,	it	was	an	attempt	to	shore	up	the	bureaucratic-executive	Kenyatta	state.	
	 Ferguson	has	postulated	that	development	agencies	fail	to	incorporate	a	political	
dimension	 into	 their	 understanding	 of	 development	 and	 thus	 inevitably	 support	 and	
facilitate	 this	 entrenchment	 and	 expansion	 of	 state	 power.	 By	 prescribing	 and	 funding	
‘neutral’	and	technical	solutions	to	poverty,	Ferguson	alleges,	development	agencies	not	
only	remove	politics	from	the	causes	of	poverty,	but	also	provide	cover	and	legitimation	
for	 the	 spread	 of	 the	 bureaucratic	 developmental	 state	 machine	 as	 a	 response	 to	
underdevelopment.	 In	 Lesotho,	 the	 development	 apparatus	 supported	 by	 external	
agencies	 was	 revealed	 to	 be	 ‘a	machine	 for	 reinforcing	 and	 expanding	 the	 exercise	 of	
bureaucratic	 state	 power	 which	 incidentally	 takes	 “poverty”	 as	 its	 point	 of	 entry’.	 The	
developmental	 interventions	 themselves	 were	 found	 to	 have	 had	 minimal	 impact	 on	
poverty:	 production	 targets	 were	 missed,	 living	 standards	 stagnated	 and	 popular	
participation	 was	 limited;	 however,	 this	 failure	 itself	 only	 justified	 increased	 state	
intervention,	surveillance	and	control	over	areas	in	which	the	state	formerly	had	a	limited	
presence.	 In	 such	 a	 way,	 the	 instrumental	 effect	 of	 development	 interventions	 –	 the	
expansion	 of	 governance	 into	 areas	 formerly	 weakly	 governed	 –	 drove	 its	 constant	
renewal	ahead	of	any	limited	evidence	of	development.	
	 In	an	ostensibly	similar	manner,	the	state	in	Kenya	defined	a	development	vision	–	
African	Socialism	–	and	used	 this	 to	 justify	policies	 favourable	 to	 its	political	and	ethnic	
heavyweights,	to	expand	its	control	over	recalcitrant	populations	and	to	expand	its	reach	
into	 formerly	 weakly	 governed	 areas	 (particularly	 in	 the	 north	 and	 east).	 As	 Ferguson	
might	 have	 predicted,	 Oxfam	 supported	 the	 expansion	 of	 the	 bureaucratic	 state	
apparatus	into	‘backward’	areas	of	Kenya	throughout	the	1960s.	Indeed,	Jimmy	Betts	and	
his	 colleagues	 encouraged	 the	 Kenyan	 state	 to	 be	 active	 in	 ‘modernising’	 Turkana	 and	
other	arid	regions	at	a	time	when	the	state	was	content	to	do	the	minimum	required	to	
maintain	 control	 and	 order.	 Ferguson	 would	 also	 have	 predicted	 that	 the	 reason	 for	
Oxfam	support	had	nothing	to	do	with	any	coercion	on	the	part	of	 the	state;	Betts	and	
Oxfam	 initiated	contact	with	 the	state	and	pestered	 the	government	 to	work	alongside	
the	 NGO	 on	 modernising	 development	 projects.	 The	 Kenyatta	 state	 itself	 had	 little	
interest	 in	coercing	NGOs	–	they	fitted	well	 into	the	President’s	harambee	development	
philosophy	and	were	mostly	left	alone	before	the	1980s.	Yet	contrary	to	Ferguson’s	‘anti-
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politics	 machine’	 idea,	 Oxfam’s	 support	 and	 encouragement	 for	 the	 Kenyan	 state	 in	
development	was	not	a	result	of	the	organisation	depoliticising	poverty	or	reducing	it	to	a	
technical	issue.	Rather,	the	organisation	acted	as	a	partner	to	the	Kenyan	state	because	it	
identified	with	a	political	agenda	strongly	in	favour	of	the	central	developmental	role	of	
the	state,	but	–	with	 its	knowledge	of	the	 local	political	and	developmental	context	–	 it	
did	not	trust	the	Kenyan	regime	to	live	up	to	expectations.	Consequently,	Oxfam	intended	
to	induce	a	responsible	state	apparatus,	and	incorporated	this	very	political	purpose	into	
its	projects.	
	
	
	
‘DEVELOPMENT? IT’S HISTORY’ 
 
Why	Oxfam	chose	to	work	alongside	the	state	in	Kenya	during	the	1960s	has	much	more	
to	 do	 with	 its	 origins	 and	 history	 than	 with	 any	 overriding	 ‘anti-politics	 machine’	
discourse.	Oxfam	was	 formed	 at	 a	 time	when	NGOs	were	 just	 beginning	 to	 stress	 that	
politics	and	government	action	(or	inaction)	was	the	root	cause	of	suffering,	both	at	home	
and	 abroad.	 But	 equally,	 this	 was	 a	 period	 when	 state	 planning	 for	 welfare	 and	
development	 was	 widely	 accepted	 as	 a	 necessity	 in	 order	 for	 change	 to	 occur	 on	 a	
meaningful	 level.	 In	 an	 era	 defined	 by	 grandiose	 reconstruction	 and	 development	
programmes	(most	notably	the	Marshall	Plan)	and	state	planning	(exemplified	during	the	
Second	World	War	and	by	the	formation	of	the	British	welfare	state	in	its	aftermath)	the	
assumption	was	that	the	state	should	have	control	over	development	policy	and	provide	
social	 services.	 At	 home,	 the	 promise	 of	 the	 NHS	 and	 the	 extended	 network	 of	 state	
support	was	that,	influenced	by	science	and	technology,	the	state	could	solve	problems	of	
poverty	 and	 distress	 for	 British	 citizens.	 Abroad,	 the	 ‘second	 colonial	 occupation’	
promised	 colonial	 citizens	 not	 only	 economic	 development	 but	 also	 welfare	 and	 an	
improved	 quality	 of	 life	 in	 an	 attempt	 to	 bind	 them	 to	 the	 nation-state	 (and	 to	 the	
imperial	centre);	development	was	about	making	citizenship	worthwhile.	Hence,	those	on	
the	liberal-left,	which	included	Oxfam	and	many	contemporary	NGOs,	adopted	an	agenda	
that	 upbraided	 governments	 for	 poverty	 and	 suffering	 whilst	 accepting	 that	 remedial	
action,	 as	 opposed	 to	 temporary	 palliatives,	 could	 only	 come	 from	 an	 interventionist	
state.	Given	this	background,	it	is	unsurprising	that	Oxfam	had	an	ideological	bias	towards	
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the	state	when	it	entered	developing	nations	such	as	Kenya	–	for	what	was	the	purpose	
of	the	decolonised	state	if	it	was	not	to	be	the	arbiter	of	national	development?	
	 Accordingly,	Oxfam	hoped	to	facilitate	the	expansion	of	the	developmental	state	
in	Kenya.	But	its	Kenya	programme	was	more	than	a	politically	naïve	attempt	to	support	
the	state	in	its	fundamental	task	of	alleviating	poverty.	In	fact,	it	aimed	to	encourage	the	
Kenyan	state	to	behave	in	a	way	that	would	reduce	exploitation	and	promote	equality;	it	
aimed	 to	make	citizenship	work	 for	 the	whole	of	 the	Kenyan	population	as	opposed	 to	
merely	those	fortunate	enough	to	be	Kikuyu	or	to	live	in	Central	Province.	Oxfam	was	not,	
therefore,	 blind	 to	 the	political	 implications	 in	 supporting	 the	 expansion	of	 the	Kenyan	
state	as	Ferguson	suggests	for	Lesotho.	In	the	latter	case,	CIDA	facilitated	the	expansion	
of	 state	 power	 unintentionally,	 but	 inevitably,	 once	 it	 characterised	 development	 as	 a	
technical	and	apolitical	issue.	Nor	was	Oxfam	blinded	by	any	ideological	harmony	with	the	
Kenyan	state	as	Jennings	discovered	in	Tanzania.	There,	Oxfam	became	convinced	that	it	
was	 helping	 to	 facilitate	 a	 community-led	 style	 of	 development	 when	 it	 was,	 in	 fact,	
supporting	the	expansion	of	an	authoritarian	state.	 In	Kenya,	on	the	other	hand,	Oxfam	
worked	alongside	 the	Kenyan	state	not	because	of	 ideological	harmony	with	Kenyatta’s	
development	project	itself	but	because	it	felt	that	the	poverty	it	witnessed	was	the	result	
of	the	narrow	concentration	of	state-led	development	efforts	on	economically	productive	
and	politically	important	areas.	Betts	and	his	colleagues	were	critical	of	development	run	
along	such	exclusivist	lines	and	wished	to	act	as	a	gadfly	to	the	state	to	encourage	socio-
political	change	 in	 the	 form	of	a	more	responsible	state	apparatus.	Project	case	studies	
show	that	Betts	and	others	considered	the	facilitation	of	a	particular	form	of	etatization	
as	 one	 of	 their	 primary	 purposes.	 Above	 all,	 they	 wished	 to	 expand	 the	 geographical	
horizons	of	the	Kenyan	state	in	the	hope	that	it	would	be	compelled	to	adopt	a	national	
structure	for	its	development	interventions.	
	 Oxfam	projects	with	government	participation	did,	of	course,	serve	to	expand	the	
state’s	 reach	 into	 weakly	 governed	 areas	 as	 Ferguson	 predicted.	 However,	 although	
Oxfam	de-politicised	 state	 expansion,	 it	was	 confident	 that	 expanding	 the	 reach	of	 the	
state	 would	 not	 result	 in	 a	 one-way	 power	 relationship	 in	 the	 manner	 implied	 by	
Ferguson.	As	Cooper	has	shown,	history	provides	numerous	examples	wherein	state-led	
development	 (whether	 colonial	 or	 post-colonial)	 encourages	 claims	 to	 be	made	 on	 the	
state	 through	 a	 newly	 powerful	 discourse	 of	 entitlement.	 Citizens	 faced	 with	 a	
developmental	 state	 (whether	 rhetorical	 or	 real),	 according	 to	 Cooper,	 have	 a	 much	
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greater	claim	over	 their	 representatives	and	 institutions	than	those	marginalised	by	the	
total	absence	of	the	state.	The	mobilisation	of	development	by	anti-colonial	nationalists	
during	 the	decade	before	 independence	had	 revealed	 this	 to	be	 the	 case	 in	Kenya	and	
elsewhere.	Oxfam	was	not	extending	state	power	inadvertently	or	because	it	believed	the	
state	was	neutral,	therefore,	but	rather	because	it	hoped	that	the	act	of	expansion	would	
place	 pressure	 on	 the	 state	 to	 become	 a	 more	 neutral	 development	 actor.	 Moreover,	
because	 the	 expansion	 of	 state	 power	 was	 far	 from	 an	 instrumental	 effect	 of	 Oxfam	
projects,	 it	 was	 not	 a	 permanent	 condition	 of	 its	 development	 work	 in	 Kenya;	 on	 the	
contrary,	direct	support	for	the	state	was	a	temporary	intended	effect	encouraged	by	the	
organisation’s	 political	 understanding	 of	 poverty	 and	 the	 role	 of	 the	 state	 in	 its	
eradication.	This	meant	disengagement	was	easier	when	the	success	of	such	an	approach	
was	called	into	question	in	the	late	1960s.	
	 Thus	while	 Jennings	 comes	 to	a	 similar	 conclusion	 to	Ferguson	–	 lamenting	 that	
even	where	development	is	made	political,	as	in	Tanzania,	NGOs	end	up	reinforcing	state	
expansion	and	control	–	this	thesis	shows	that	one	can	no	more	generalise	from	Oxfam’s	
efforts	 in	Tanzania	than	from	Ferguson’s	example	of	development	work	 in	Lesotho.	For,	
by	the	 late	1960s,	 the	 idea	that	Oxfam	could	affect	 the	development	orientation	of	 the	
Kenyan	state	no	longer	held	much	credibility	within	the	organisation.	The	Kenyatta	state	
had	become	 increasingly	 authoritarian,	 elitist	 and	 corrupted,	 and	 it	 showed	no	 signs	of	
listening	to	Oxfam	urgings	around	development	in	marginalised	regions.	Indeed,	outsiders	
were	 no	 longer	 merely	 ‘backward’	 and	 redeemable	 through	 development;	 they	 were	
ethnic	 opponents,	 irredeemable	 as	 a	 result	 of	 their	 tribal	 origins.	 The	 possibility	 of	
encouraging	 a	 more	 responsible	 developmental	 state	 through	 direct	 engagement	 with	
the	 government	 was	 reduced	 accordingly.	 Around	 the	 same	 time,	 the	 influence	 of	
conscientisation	within	 the	 organisation	 raised	 questions	 about	 the	 appropriateness	 of	
top-down	 modernisation.	 Such	 an	 approach	 became	 increasingly	 unpalatable	 for	 the	
organisation	in	an	ideological	sense	just	as	the	practical	success	of	the	method	was	also	
called	 into	 question	 in	 Kenya.	 Whereas	 the	 ideological	 shift	 towards	 conscientisation	
bound	Oxfam	and	 the	Tanzanian	 state	 closer	 together,	 encouraging	Oxfam	 to	 interpret	
Ujamaa	 through	 the	 rhetorical	 prism	 created	 by	 the	 conscientisation	 discourse	 and	
concepts	 such	 as	 ‘empowerment’	 and	 ‘popular	 participation’	 (thereby	 reducing	 the	
technical	failings	in	its	development	interventions	to	a	secondary	place),	conscientisation	
ideology	 challenged	 everything	 Oxfam	 had	 achieved	 to	 date	 in	 Kenya.	 It	 emphasised,	
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rather	than	disguised,	the	failure	of	its	policies	there	and	encouraged	separation	from	the	
Kenyatta	state.	
	 Although	Oxfam’s	ideological	underpinning	served	to	encourage	the	organisation	
to	regard	politics	and	development	from	a	single	–	statist	–	perspective,	therefore,	faith	in	
the	 remedial	 power	 of	 the	 state	 did	 not	 imply	 unquestioning	 support	 for	 the	 Kenya	
government’s	development	efforts,	and	Oxfam	avoided	becoming	dominated	by	the	state	
to	 the	 extent	 that	 Jennings	 found	 for	 Tanzania	 (where	 the	 ideological	 connection	
between	 the	 state	 and	 organisation	 as	 regards	 empowerment	was	 particularly	 strong).	
Instead,	when	direct	support	for	the	state	was	shown	to	have	been	unsuccessful	–	in	the	
sense	 of	 convincing	 the	 state	 to	 take	 on	 responsibilities	 for	 its	 marginalised	 citizens	 –	
Oxfam	would	pull	back	from	its	close	relations	with	the	Kenya	government.	After	Moi	(a	
man	with	 close	ethnic	 ties	 to	 ‘backward’	 pastoralists)	 acceded	 to	 the	presidency,	 there	
was	 some	 hope	within	 the	 organisation	 that	 the	 state	would	 take	 a	more	 responsible,	
‘national’,	stand	on	development.	It	soon	became	clear,	however,	that	the	new	President	
saw	his	primary	task	as	reorienting	state-led	development	towards	the	Kalenjin	areas	of	
the	Rift	Valley.	In	an	era	of	low	growth,	zero	sum	economics	would	mean	that	the	‘losers’	
from	development	were	just	as	numerous	as	under	Kenyatta.	Moi’s	Nyayo	philosophy,	by	
emphasising	 continuity,	 also	 attempted	 to	 silence	 opposition	 to	 his	 politicised	
development	apparatus.	For	both	Presidents,	development	was	as	much	about	ensuring	
political	control	as	it	was	about	improving	Kenyans’	quality	of	life.	
	 Despite	the	Kenyan	state’s	steadfast	refusal	to	adopt	a	more	inclusive	approach	to	
development,	Oxfam	declined	to	help	facilitate	the	collapse	of	the	state	as	an	institution	
by	 acting	 as	 a	 ‘magic	 bullet’.	 Its	 staff	 understood	 that	 by	 accepting	 responsibilities	 for	
service	provision	and	bypassing	the	state	they	would	be,	in	effect,	supporting	the	external	
agenda	 of	 privatisation	 masquerading	 as	 structural	 adjustment.	 Consequently,	 the	
operational	 response	 to	 the	 drought	 crisis	 in	 1984	 was	 praised	 for	 saving	 lives	 but	
criticised	 as	 a	 way	 of	 promoting	 development.	 Indeed,	 informed	 by	 the	 Kenyan	
experience,	Oxfam	refused	to	pick	up	the	costs	of	neo-liberal	 restructuring,	and	 instead	
set	about	encouraging	Kenyan	citizens	to	challenge	the	state	to	do	more	with	its	limited	
resources.	As	it	had	done	in	the	1960s,	Oxfam	would	continue	to	advocate	for	increased	
state	responsibility,	but	 this	 time	from	below.	The	powerful	 rhetoric	of	conscientisation	
only	partially	disguises	strategic	continuity:	Oxfam	persisted	in	its	role	as	a	gadfly	to	the	
Kenyan	 state	 into	 the	 1970s	 and	 1980s,	 though	 it	 acted	 in	 a	more	 indirect	 fashion	 by	
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‘conscientising’	 others	 to	 call	 on	 the	 state	 to	 fulfil	 its	 developmental	 functions.	 Hence,	
while	 the	 strategic	 goal	 remained	 the	 same,	 Oxfam	 shifted	 its	 tactics	 to	 work	 on	 the	
demand	 side	 of	 development.	 Slowly,	 a	 rights-based	 framework	 would	 become	 the	
organising	 motif	 for	 the	 organisation.	 Seeing	 individuals	 as	 ‘rights-bearers’	 and	
governments	as	 ‘rights-protectors’	 tied	poverty,	politics	 and	development	 together	 in	a	
relief-rights-development	continuum,	and	Oxfam	would	attempt	to	give	expression	to	the	
different	groupings	of	civil	society	that	had	been	‘marginalised	into	poverty’.	
	 At	 a	 time	 when	 development	 space	 in	 Kenya	 was	 becoming	 increasingly	
politicised,	 such	 an	 approach	 was	 fraught	 with	 difficulty.	 Oxfam	 was	 seen	 to	 be	
challenging	 the	 state	 on	 a	 number	 of	 political	 and	 economic	 fronts:	 mobilising	
populations	to	counteract	the	control	the	state	had	over	development	threatened	state	
hegemony;	 encouraging	 people	 to	 change	 their	 attitude	 to	 the	 dominant	 political-
economy	in	the	country	challenged	the	security	of	the	state	and	its	elite;	helping	to	form	
local	 organisations	 threatened	 the	 state’s	 ability	 to	 insulate	 itself	 from	 the	 populace;	
while	 its	 very	 presence	 and	 its	 membership	 of	 an	 NGO	 sector	 flush	 with	 donor	 funds	
(while	 the	 state	was	 circumnavigated)	 inevitably	 questioned	 state	 legitimacy.	 For	 these	
reasons,	 during	 the	 1980s	 there	 were	 a	 number	 of	 occasions	 where	 Oxfam	 came	 into	
conflict	with	the	Moi	state.	Its	activities,	particularly	in	Wajir,	saw	the	state	respond	with	
obstruction,	 harassment	 and	 threats,	 though	 its	 attitude	 was	 somewhat	 schizophrenic	
since	 Oxfam	 brought	 resources	 into	 the	 country.	 Highly	 attuned	 to	 the	 politics	 of	
development	in	Kenya,	Oxfam	attempted	to	take	advantage	of	government	confusion	and	
the	 personalised	 nature	 of	 Kenyan	 politics	 by	 camouflaging	 its	 politically	 questionable	
activities	behind	 the	more	 technical	and	 ‘welfarist’	discourse	 first	used	during	 the	1984	
drought	in	order	to	promote	‘transformation	by	stealth’.	
	 Yet,	at	the	same	time,	Oxfam	feared	that	older	political	logics	would	not	disappear	
just	 because	 an	 authoritarian	 regime	 was	 challenged	 from	 below;	 staff	 felt	 that	
momentum	for	change	needed	to	be	maintained	at	the	highest	levels	of	government.	The	
reintroduction	of	multipartyism	in	Kenya	convinced	many	within	the	organisation	that	the	
chance	 of	 creating	more	 enlightened	 state-citizen	 relations	 was	 upon	 them.	 The	Wajir	
Pastoral	Development	Project	was	an	innovative	attempt	to	encourage	the	state	and	its	
citizens	to	solve	problems	collaboratively,	and	was	felt	by	many	within	the	organisation	to	
be	a	method	that	could	be	adapted	for	Oxfam	operations	across	the	globe.	Furthermore,	
while	most	NGOs	avoided	or	attacked	the	Moi	regime,	Oxfam	went	‘back	to	the	future’	in	
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engaging	more	directly	with	those	at	the	apex	of	the	Kenyan	state	to	encourage	reform	
from	 above.	 But	 the	 organisation	 did	 not	 adopt	 the	 missionary	 fervour	 of	 ‘good	
governance’	 converts,	 who	 mistakenly	 presumed	 that	 economic	 and	 political	
liberalisation	would	prove	to	be	mutually	reinforcing	and	placed	impossible	expectations	
on	recalcitrant	regimes.2	Instead,	Oxfam	staff	understood	that	they	needed	to	continue	to	
work	‘with	the	grain’	in	Kenya.	This	did,	of	course,	open	the	organisation	to	the	politics-
development	nexus	at	 the	heart	of	a	government	desperate	 for	patronage	resources	as	
incumbent	elites	feared	for	their	future.	Indeed,	rather	than	serving	to	take	some	of	the	
ethnicised	patrimonialism	out	of	development	interventions,	the	ALRMP	and	a	number	of	
its	higher	profile	local	employees	were	sucked	into	the	political	machinations	of	the	late	
Moi	 regime.	 Nonetheless,	 from	 a	 ‘with	 the	 grain’	 perspective,	 there	 were	 grounds	 for	
optimism	in	both	cases:	the	ALRMP	helped	to	encourage	long-overdue	policy	changes	as	
regards	 pastoralism,	while	 the	 successful	 election	 of	Oxfam	 staff	 to	 Parliament	 offered	
greater	potential	for	Oxfam	ideas	and	ideals	to	influence	government	policy.	
	 In	dealing	with	Oxfam	in	Kenya,	therefore,	it	is	clear	that	the	organisation	behaved	
in	 a	 textbook	 fashion:	 it	 did	 not	 apply	 a	 ‘one-size-fits-all’	 solution	 in	 Kenya,	 but	 acted	
instead	as	an	NGO	should	behave,	adopting	a	programme	to	fit	the	needs	and	context	in	
the	 country	 while	 keeping	 one	 eye	 on	 global	 moments	 of	 transition	 as	 regards	 the	
modalities	 and	 architecture	 of	 development.	 In	 particular,	 rather	 than	 adopting	 a	
technical	 view	 and	 excluding	 politics	 from	 its	 analysis,	 Oxfam	 understood	 the	 political	
causes	of	poverty	and	hoped	to	nudge	the	Kenyan	state	to	become	developmental	in	the	
ideal	sense	of	the	word.	Of	course,	this	meant	the	state	was	supported	and	expanded	its	
reach,	 but	 Oxfam	 hoped	 that	 any	 element	 of	 control	 this	 gave	 the	 state	 would	 be	
balanced	by	its	increased	responsibilities	towards	citizens	included	for	the	first	time	in	the	
national	 project	 and	 empowered	 to	 challenge	 the	 state	 to	 fulfil	 its	 functions.	 In	 fact,	
Oxfam	 constantly	 weighed	 up	 its	 support	 for	 the	 state	 as	 an	 institution	 against	 its	
understanding	of	politics	 in	Kenya.	 It	 remained	pragmatic,	 altering	 its	 approach	 to	best	
suit	 the	 context	 across	 the	 period,	 but	 valorised	 the	 state	 as	 the	 permanent	 fixture	 in	
national	 development	 as	 opposed	 to	 NGOs	 and	 IFIs,	 which	 were	 considered	 at	 best	
merely	 temporary	 influences	 on	 its	 direction.	 The	 overriding	 introversion	 and	
authoritarianism	 of	 the	 Kenyan	 state	 challenged	 Oxfam	 perceptions,	 however,	 and	
																																																						
2	Their	neoclassical	assumption	ran	as	follows:	liberalisation	of	the	economy	creates	growth,	growth	creates	
economic	winners,	and	that	these	winners	join	forces	politically	to	defend	the	liberal	economy	and	
strengthen	democracy.	
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ensured	 that	 long-term	 change	was	 unlikely.	Moreover,	while	Oxfam	may	have	 floated	
like	a	butterfly,	it	stung	like	one	also	–	which	is	to	say	not	at	all.	The	organisation	was	only	
a	minor	 irritant	to	the	Kenyan	state,	for	a	 long	while	buttressed	externally	by	the	West,	
and	its	attempts	to	encourage	reform	in	the	1990s	became	caught	up	in	corruption	and	
electoral	politics.	
	 Nevertheless,	historicised	in	this	way,	development	interventions	take	on	a	much	
messier	appearance	than	theories	of	Western	hegemony	and	the	 ‘anti-politics	machine’	
suppose.	 Indeed,	 the	 conclusions	of	 this	 thesis	 raise	questions	 regarding	 the	 relativized	
nature	of	African	sovereignty.	By	focusing	on	a	specific	set	of	 interventions	made	by	an	
external	 agency	 and	 the	 reactions	 of	 those	 who	 represent	 the	 sovereign	 state,	 the	
foregoing	 has	 helped	 to	 document	 the	 interactions	 between	 the	 domestic	 and	
international	 realms	 that	 form	 the	 dynamic	 sovereign	 ‘frontier	 zone’.3	The	 thesis	 has	
shown	 that	Oxfam	supported	 the	central	 role	of	 the	state	as	 regards	development,	but	
nonetheless	 challenged	 state	 sovereignty	 by	 leveraging	 its	 financial	 support	 on	 the	
reduction	of	ethnic	and	political	 favouritism	as	 regards	 the	distribution	of	development	
resources.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 the	 state	 sought	 to	 selectively	 engage	 with	 Oxfam	 to	
maintain	the	inflow	of	resources	while	defending	its	sovereign	right	to	make	development	
contingent	 on	 ethnicity	 and	 political	 support.	 At	 no	 point	 did	 Oxfam	 cross	 a	 fictitious	
‘sovereign	line’	in	a	truly	neo-colonial	fashion,	however;	rather,	the	thesis	highlights	that	
sovereignty	is	a	transnational	zone	of	(somewhat	asymmetrical)	contestation.	Of	course,	
deconstructionalist	 conclusions	 such	 as	 these	 are	 somewhat	 predictable	 given	 the	
historian’s	 preference	 for	 close,	 textured	 analysis	 of	 sources	 that	 refer	 to	 discrete	
contexts.	 Yet	 this	 thesis	 has	 attempted	 to	 show	 how	 historians	 can	 perform	 a	 useful	
interdisciplinary	function	by	problematising	and	testing	overarching	social	theories	and	by	
moving	 development	 history	 away	 from	 the	 backward	 projection	 of	 contemporary	
theories	 about	 the	 form	 and	 function	 of	 development	 and	 towards	 a	 ‘collaboration	
between	general	models’	and	patterns	of	development	interventions	and	‘the	specific	set	
of	[unique]	phenomena	which	actually	occurred’.4	Finally,	and	more	broadly,	 iconoclasm	
as	 regards	 grand	 theories	 of	 development	 may	 be	 one	 solution	 to	 the	 dwindling	
momentum	of	the	contemporary	development	endeavour.	
	
																																																						
3	G.	Harrison,	‘Debt,	Development	and	Intervention	in	Africa:	The	Contours	of	a	Sovereign	Frontier’,	Journal	
of	Intervention	and	Statebuilding,	Vol.	1,	No.	2	(2007),	pp.	189-209.	
4	Hobsbawm,	‘From	Social	History	to	the	History	of	Society’,	p.	29.	
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WORKING ‘WITH THE GRAIN’ AND THE END OF ‘THE BIG IDEA’ 
 
Today,	 international	 development	 is	 increasingly	 characterised	 as	 wasteful	 and	
inappropriate.	A	number	of	developed	nations	–	 including	Canada	and	Australia	–	have	
subsumed	 their	 international	 development	 departments	 within	 foreign	 and	 trade	
ministries	 and	 are	 beginning	 to	 embrace	 ‘philanthrocapitalism’,	 a	 doctrine	 that	 asserts	
that	donations	should	be	treated	as	investments	rather	than	gifts.	Meanwhile,	the	ability	
of	NGOs	to	engage	with	the	political	causes	of	poverty	at	home	and	abroad	remains	as	
controversial	as	it	was	in	the	1960s.5	Worn	down	by	the	failure	of	grandiose	promises	to	
End	World	 Hunger	 or	 Make	 Poverty	 History,	 however,	 the	 general	 public	 in	 the	West	
offers	 little	 in	the	way	of	resistance	to	the	slow	erosion	of	 international	commitment	to	
the	 development	 effort.	 The	 oft-repeated	 ‘success,	 scale,	 fail’	 cycle	 has	 proved	
particularly	disheartening:	this	is	the	process	by	which	an	exciting	new	development	idea	
–	successful	 in	one	 location	–	receives	massive	publicity	and	an	 influx	of	donor	funding,	
expands	 quickly	 to	 other	 locations,	 and	 ultimately	 fails	 to	 have	 the	 same	 impact.6	The	
urge	to	scale	up	is,	of	course,	an	admirable	one,	but	it	is	based	on	a	somewhat	naïve	hope	
that	an	approach	that	works	in	one	country	can	be	unfurled	across	the	developing	world.	
	 Brian	 Levy	 has	 recently	 criticised	 the	 ‘breath-taking	 combination	 of	 naiveté	 and	
amnesia’	 that	 has	 encouraged	 an	 approach	 to	 development	 based	 predominantly	 on	
reverse	 engineering	 from	 Western	 democracies	 and	 abstracting	 from	 small-scale	
successes.7	Modernisation,	structural	adjustment	and	good	governance	have	all	 failed	in	
the	attempt	to	transfer	‘best	practice’	models	to	low-income	countries	because	they	have	
ignored	 the	 messy	 reality	 and	 political	 nature	 of	 development	 in	 each	 local	 context.	
Instead,	argues	Levy,	positive	changes	are	more	 likely	–	even	 in	hostile	environments	–	
through	minor	 tweaks	 to	 policies	 and	 institutions	 that	 create	 ‘islands	 of	 effectiveness’	
within	 a	 ‘sea	 of	 dysfunction’.	 These	 serve	 as	 platforms	 for	 cumulative	 gains	 in	
																																																						
5	Recently,	Oxfam	was	hauled	over	the	coals	for	its	anti-austerity	message	in	the	UK.	‘Oxfam:	MPs	shocked	
by	“disgraceful”	political	campaigning’,	The	Daily	Telegraph,	10	June,	2014.	Available	at	
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/10888966/Oxfam-MPs-shocked-by-disgraceful-political-
campaigning.html	[accessed	10	June,	2014].	
6	For	instance,	on	the	basis	of	limited	evidence,	Deworm	the	World	received	$600	million	from	
pharmaceutical	companies.	Randomised	control	trials	would	reveal	later	that	the	impact	of	deworming	was	
not	immediately	apparent.	See	http://www.evidenceaction.org	[accessed	January	12,	2015];	D.	C.	Taylor-
Robinson,	N.	Maayan,	K.	Soares-Weiser,	S.	Donegan,	P.	Garner,	‘Deworming	Drugs	for	Soil-Transmitted	
Intestinal	Worms	in	Children:	Effects	on	Nutritional	Indicators,	Haemoglobin	and	School	Performance.	
Cochrane	Database	of	Systematic	Reviews,	No.	11	(2012),	pp.	1-114.	
7	Levy,	Working	with	the	Grain,	p.	7.	
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development	 over	 the	 longer-term. 8 	In	 some	 cases,	 as	 Levy	 acknowledges,	 this	
necessitates	 alignment	 with	 powerful	 elites	 and	 an	 acceptance	 that	 those	 elites	 will	
attempt	 to	 reap	 personal	 benefits	 from	 that	 relationship.	 Though	 such	 an	 approach	
‘comes	perilously	 close	 to	condoning	corruption’,	 Levy	argues	 from	experience	 that	 the	
alternative	 in	 many	 low-income	 countries	 is	 stagnation	 and	 predation	 as	 resources	
dwindle.	 In	 the	 West,	 meanwhile,	 NGOs	 might	 work	 best	 by	 working	 with	 the	 grain	
towards	 closing	 down	 tax	 havens,	 writing	 off	 un-payable	 debts	 and	 making	 global	
institutions	more	representative	of	the	‘global	south’.9	NGOs	are	advised	to	eschew	high-
minded	 and	 unachievable	 promises	 of	 fundamental	 reform	 in	 favour	 of	 agnosticism	 as	
regards	the	process	of	development.10	
	 For	Levy,	taking	a	flexible	approach,	working	with	the	grain	and	integrating	politics	
in	the	heart	of	analyses	of	poverty	offers	the	best	chance	of	successful	interventions,	and	
may	well	sustain	the	momentum	of	the	development	endeavour.	This	 thesis	has	shown	
that	 such	 an	 approach	 is	 not	 novel:	 Oxfam,	 though	 undoubtedly	 influenced	 by	 global	
moments	of	transition	–	whether	the	headiness	of	the	early	independence	era,	the	shift	
towards	empowerment	and	identity	politics	or	moves	towards	human	rights	–	remained	
firmly	tethered	to	the	local	context	in	Kenya.	Although	the	organisation	was	bound	into	a	
single	 strategic	 outlook	 based	 on	 its	 faith	 in	 the	 state,	 it	 worked	 ‘with	 the	 grain’	 and	
adapted	its	tactical	approach	to	local	circumstances,	seeking	schemes	that	were	a	‘good	
fit’	 for	 Kenya	 and	 heightened	 the	 potential	 for	 incremental	 reforms. 11 	A	 broader	
endeavour	to	historicise	development,	to	deconstruct	 its	grand	theories	and	to	 improve	
our	knowledge	of	the	precise	contours	of	past	development	interventions	may	thus	help	
to	challenge	the	notion	that	there	is	one	blanket	‘solution’	to	poverty,	thereby	countering	
the	 understandable	 frustration	 at	 the	 inability	 of	 development	 organisations	 to	 find	 it	
																																																						
8	Levy,	Working	with	the	Grain,	p.	210.	
9	Although	‘developed’	nations	donate	around	£86	billion	per	year	to	developing	nations	today,	debt	
servicing	requires	developing	nations	to	repay	around	£400	billion	to	rich	nations	each	year,	while	tax	
evasion	and	illicit	financial	activity	–	including	trade	misinvoicing	–	meant	the	developing	world	lost	a	record	
£640	billion	in	2012,	and	£4.2	trillion	between	2003	and	2012.	For	sub-Saharan	Africa,	such	illicit	outflows	
averaged	around	5.5	per	cent	of	GDP,	and	this	calculation	of	‘reverse	aid’	discounts	the	hidden	wealth	
transfers	that	occur	when	developing	countries	compete	for	global	investment	by	driving	local	wages	down.	
Petras	and	Veltmeyer,	‘Age	of	Reverse	Aid’,	pp.	281-293;	‘OECD	Aid	Statistics’,	available	at	
http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/	[accessed	8	April,	2015];	‘World	Bank	International	Debt	Statistics’,	
available	at	http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/international-debt-statistics	[accessed	8	April,	2015];	
Global	Financial	Integrity,	‘Illicit	Financial	Flows	From	Developing	Countries:	2003-2012’,	available	at	
http://www.gfintegrity.org/report/2014-global-report-illicit-financial-flows-from-developing-countries-
2003-2012/	[accessed	8	April,	2015].	
10	Levy,	Working	with	the	Grain,	p.	197.	
11	Levy,	Working	with	the	Grain,	pp.	135-203.	
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after	more	than	six	decades	of	trying.	In	such	a	way,	it	is	quite	possible	that	the	future	of	
development	depends	on	an	improved	understanding	of	its	past.	
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